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CHAPTER ONE 
REGIME CHARACTERISTICS, POLICY REFORM AND THE DECOLONISING STATE: 
HEALTH POLICY IN GUYANA, JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: 1945-1970 
1.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this dissertation, I examine and compare the influence of the following regime characteristics - 
strength, stability, ideology, democracy and survival/maintenance - on post-colonial health human 
resources policy processes within one sub-region: the Commonwealth Caribbean; with special reference to 
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (hereinafter called Trinidad) between 1970 to 1990. As I want 
to comparatively assess the role of these characteristics in post-colonial policy processes, I shall in this 
chapter place my study within the context of colonial regime characteristics, society and reform processes, 
assessing its possible influences on post-colonial political developments. This forms the basis of my 
analysis of policy within these three `post-colonial' states during the 1970s and 1980s. Section One 
describes the paradox of health and health human resources status in the Commonwealth Caribbean during 
the 1970s and 1980s. In Section Two, I describe the area under study. In Section Three, I examine 
possible linkages with the nature of power and reform under colonial regimes. In Section Four, I analyse 
the influence of regime characteristics on policy processes by assessing health policy outcomes of post- 
war reform. I begin with an examination of the contradictory status of Commonwealth Caribbean health 
and health human resources development in the 1970s and 1980s. 
1.2 CARIBBEAN HEALTH HUMAN RESOURCES: THE POST-INDEPENDENCE 
PARADOX 
Health human resources policy processes are an integral part of health policy action and processes, and 
therefore cannot be analysed without recognition of wider health developments. In order to explain the 
paradox facing health human resources in the Commonwealth Caribbean post-colonial state in the 1990s 
therefore, I first outline and recognise the achievements, to date, of these governments. 
Caribbean health achievements: outcomes and inputs 
There are good grounds for recognising the generally impressive achievements of Commonwealth 
Caribbean regimes in health development. This is reflected in both activities at the policy level, as well as 
outcomes. In terms of outcomes, the health status of the region ranks among the best in the developing 
world, comparing more than favourably with other frequently-cited examples such as Kerala State (India), 
Costa Rica and Cuba. Demographically, the region's population has increased relatively slowly, with 
fertility rates falling steadily over the last fifty years - the result of successful population programs: the 
estimated figure for 1985 was just over 5.5 million and is projected to reach 6.9 million by the year 2000 
(Alleyne and Sealey, 1992: 4). The percentage of persons under 15 is also expected to fall with a 
concomitant rise in older age groups. Infant mortality has declined steadily in all Commonwealth 
Caribbean countries except Guyana. Life expectancy at birth has increased steadily in all of these 
countries. The average as at 1992 was 72.4 years, which ranks between the Latin American and North 
American average (Alleyne and Sealey, 1992). In terms of physical and technical infrastructure, the 
region has numerous hospitals and other secondary and tertiary health facilities both public and private, 
most of which possess high-technology capacity. By the end of the 1980s then, the outcome of this 
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generally progressive commitment to health was remarkable even by developing country standards with 
action based at both national and regional levels. Communicable diseases such as malaria and yellow 
fever were confined to the hinterlands of Belize and Guyana, both on the mainland. Other tropical 
diseases such as hookworm occurred less frequently, as did childhood infectious diseases such as 
poliomyelitis, diphtheria, and whooping cough. With the exception of Belize, there was no 
Commonwealth Caribbean country in which parasitic diseases were among the three main causes of death 
(Alleyne and Sealey, 1992). 
In the case of health human resources outcomes, equally impressive attempts were also made at the 
regional and national levels to develop and maintain a high quality of health personnel throughout the 
region which also contributed to the relatively good health status. Cooperative efforts in medical training 
have been established since 1948. Nursing examinations were regionalised in the 1980s. Additionally, 
considerable efforts have been made at producing most categories of professional and technical and 
paramedical personnel through national and regional efforts - thus steadily eliminated the (costly) 
necessity to travel abroad. Indeed, the region's medical, nursing and paramedical professions rank quite 
favourably with the rest of the developing world, and is also quite impressive when compared with North 
America and Latin America. For example, in 1984 the Commonwealth Caribbean had fewer doctors, 
nurses, dentists and health auxiliaries that the USA, however it had more nurses, fewer doctors and about 
the same numbers of nurse auxiliaries than Latin America (Alleyne and Sealey, 1992: 22). 
All of these achievements reflect sustained policy activity or inputs in health at both the national and 
regional levels within the Commonwealth Caribbean region. At the national level these inputs included 
active involvement of health ministries, health `academics' and politicians and the significant role of 
health in the developing state political process. Historical factors were also important inputs. The 
persistence of British colonial professional links, whatever the faults and criticisms, enabled the 
development of high training standards in medical, nursing and other professional categories. As we shall 
see later in this chapter and indeed the study itself, the maintenance of essentially colonial public health 
structures, organisations and institutions, whatever the faults, did provide a framework for public health 
development which in most cases persisted well into the 1980s and which was not all entirely bad at least 
in the case of public health itself. 
In terms of regional cooperation, health has been one of the more successful areas of policy endeavour 
through the initiation, in 1986 of the Caribbean Cooperation in Health (CCH) programme, a direct policy 
outcome of activities at the regional health level under the aegis of the Conference of Ministers 
responsible for health, established under the Caribbean Free Trade Association (CARIFTA) in 1969, and 
subsequently brought under the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) under the Treaty of Chaguaramas of 
1973. This policy signalled a turn towards `primary health care' well before it was placed firmly on the 
international agenda in the 1970s. Nevertheless, it has been given greater significance in the post- 1978 
Alma Ata period, when adherence to primary health care was adopted by all of these states. Although 
reliant on various organisations, including the World Health Organisation's sub-regional office in the 
Americas: the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) for technical support, the Caribbean 
`Cooperation in health' Initiative was a manifestation of national commitment by governments to health 
policy development in a number of areas including inter alia, health human resources development (Boyd, 
1977). Other important regional policy actors have been the University of the West Indies medical school 
which has undertaken considerable curricular policy reforms to reflect both a Caribbean reality as well as 
a primary care focus. In the case of the nursing, the reality of `Caribbean' nursing examinations reflected 
an increasingly progressive regional-level cooperation in health not only at the regional governmental 
level, but also at the level of teaching institutions as well as professional associations. 
Comment: In sum then, this generally impressive nature of the region's health development more than 
favourably compares to other developing areas at both ends of the spectrum, from sub-Saharan Africa on 
the one hand, to Latin American and South Asia on the other. It has been due to a combination of factors, 
including rising incomes, a commitment to basic public health measures, literacy, public awareness of 
health matters, and the emergence of national commitment on the part of health professionals. and their 
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demonstration of the feasibility of health development on the basis of modest national resources (Cumper, 
1983: 1983). Most if not all of these factors point to national political/governmental influences. 
However, in addition to the commitment of newly emerging governments, the role of other regional and 
international organisations have been also critical. Many of the above achievements have been realised 
with considerable post-war and post-independence financial support from organisations such as the World 
Bank (through the funding of hospitals and health centres) and the World Health Organization (through 
largely technical support). 
Despite various militating factors then, the political commitment of most Commonwealth governments 
to health as part of the drive for self-determination has been central. Good access to health facilities 
combined with effective and sustained public health programmes were developed in tandem within 
political developments, and regional governments have consistently maintained progressive views on the 
importance of the health sector in national development. However, this generally favourable situation was 
threatened by a variety of factors which threatened to reverse the gains made in the post-war and post- 
independence periods. This will now be examined. 
The paradox of the 1980s and 1990s 
A Shift in health status: Two paradoxical trends occurred during this period with grave implications for 
both health status and health services: a rise in `affluence' related chronic diseases, and the re-emergence 
of `poverty' related infectious diseases. There was a steady rise in the incidence of chronic non- 
communicable diseases in the 1970s and 1980s, which became the leading causes of morbidity and 
mortality. Approximately 40% of the total mortality in the Commonwealth Caribbean was due to cardio- 
vascular diseases and diabetes during this period (Le Franc, 1988: 38-39). In 1989 for instance, Trinidad 
ranked highest in the Americas for heart diseases among women and second, for men ("Chronic diseases 
in Trinidad and Tobago: cause for alarm", Trinidad Express, 28/8/89: 3). Even the downward regional 
trend in infectious diseases, reported in the mid-1970s, was being reversed by the early 1980s, with 
diseases such as dengue, typhoid, tuberculosis, leptospirosis, scabies and gastro-enteritis making ominous 
returns. In addition, increased incidences of malnutrition were registered. Further, even the steadily 
declining infant mortality rates since the 1950s -a good indicator of the effectiveness and accessibility of 
health services as well as nutritional status - actually increased over this period (Alleyne and Sealey, 1992: 
5; Le Franc, 1988: 38-39). Rises were recorded in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad among others. 
Human resources losses: In the case of health personnel, the increased demands on health services as 
noted above added to the pressures on national resources, including health human resources throughout 
the region. While migration has been a persistent feature of the Caribbean experience, in the 1980s many 
Caribbean health professionals - mainly doctors and especially nurses - either left the public health 
services for the private sector, or moved to North America and the Gulf States in search of better 
opportunities. The loss of these professionals - most of whom were trained at considerable government 
expense under progressive and consistently-articulated government health policies after independence - 
was a particularly severe blow. Most governments typically responded to the migration problem by 
training even more personnel, while others suspended training programmes due to scarce resources, where 
it was determined that there were too many numbers of certain professional categories. None of these 
policy responses addressed the problem as migration persisted alongside both economic and political 
contributing factors. We first look at the economic explanation of policy failures. 
Contributing factors 
Economic crisis and structural adjustment: In the case of communicable diseases, the main cause 
was undoubtedly the increased poverty resulting from the economic crises from the mid 1970s, and the 
subsequent implementation of harsh structural adjustment policies by governments which had extremely 
limited room for manoeuvre (Le Franc, 1988: 2). As Le Franc noted of the relationship between 
economic factors and health: 
3 
"... economic difficulties and policy responses of the 1980s, have only served to 
bring these complexities more sharply into focus, and to make even more urgent, an 
understanding of the relationship between illness patterns and socio-economic 
growth and development... an economic recession will in all likelihood lead to a 
deterioration in society's health status... " (1988: 14). 
Studies on economic adjustment in Central America and the wider Caribbean have underscored the 
vulnerability of the region's economies during this period (Thomas, 1988; 1989; Pantin, 1986). Regional 
government responses have ranged from reductions in food subsidies, to mass lay-offs of state employees, 
and to reduced expenditure in the social sector, particularly in the health sector. Economic crisis also 
generated increased social demands on the state, particularly in terms of health services utilisation by both 
the poor, but also by the `new' middle classes (Le Franc, 1988; Musgrove, 1986; Boyd, 1988; Taylor, L, 
1990; Theodore, 1993). In the case of health then, Commonwealth Caribbean government policies, like 
that of many developing areas, were caught between balancing the demands of international financial 
institutions for greater fiscal restraint in these states' social sectors, on the one hand, and fulfilling their 
commitments to providing universal health care, free at the point of delivery at a time of increased 
demand, on the other. The lack of confidence in deteriorating national health services displayed by 
migrating health professionals undoubtedly contributed to the overall health declines, but was also itself 
an outcome of the pervasive economic crisis. Most health personnel expressed frustration at both 
conditions of work and remuneration and inflation. In the case of nurses, career prospects also 
contributed, with their persistent problems of status in relation to their non-classification as health 
professionals. Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad in the 1980 all experienced increased various levels of 
health personnel industrial action and ultimately migration to the private sector, and overseas. The 
outcome of this economic impact for health human resources was thus one of depleted skills combined 
with even less available resources. 
Middle `classization', the media and high-technology demands: Other explanations for the health 
paradox in Commonwealth Caribbean in the 1980s include the steady `middle-classization' of these states, 
the increasing incidence of the new `lifestyle' diseases, and hence the increased demand for the latest 
expensive technologies. In the case of these diseases, the proximity of North America and 
its influences, 
combined with a general increase in the standards of living, means that the outcomes of the middle- 
classization explanation of Commonwealth Caribbean societies also 
has some explanatory power 
Macdonald, 1986; Le Franc, 1988). 1 There are however, in addition to middle classization, other important, 
related social factors. One of the more important has been the role of the media. This new trend 
has 
resulted in demands for new technologies by both medical professionals and the general public, which 
have the ability to absorb a considerable chunks of entire health budgets. The combined effect of both 
middle classization and media influences are reflected in Henry's concerns about: 
'... the current aggressive cultural penetration by the electronic media in our 
countries and the consequent exposure of our citizens to the latest advances at the 
frontiers of medicine which are taking place only hours away from our shores... 
(1988: 21). 
The AIDS and drug addiction crises: Two other important social factors are the rise in incidences of 
AIDS and drug addiction throughout the Commonwealth Caribbean region. The sudden emergence 
in the 
late 1980s of acquired immuno-deficiency syndrome (AIDS) and AIDS-related illnesses throughout the 
region placed an added burden on already over-stretched state health services (Alleyne and 
Sealey, 1992; 
Henry, 1988). Similarly drug addiction - both `hard' and `soft' - in the 1980s escalated 
into full-blown 
crisis in most Commonwealth Caribbean states, some of which, like Trinidad, Guyana and Jamaica, 
found 
themselves on direct narco-trafficking routes to North America and Europe. Increased drug addiction, 
like AIDS thus added to the demands being placed on regional health services already reeling from 
economic crisis. 
Comment: Health human resources policy development in the Commonwealth Caribbean cannot be 
examined without reference to wider health trends within and outside the region. Three sets of 
I `Middle classization' simply means the steady rise in the numbers of the Anglo-Caribbean middle classes. The term 
is 
used by Macdonald (1986) to describe developments in Trinidad and Tobago. However, it is also applicable to varying 
degrees, of course, to the rest of the region during the period under study. 
simultaneously-occurring paradoxes have been observed since the 1970s: 1) increases as well as falls in 
health status indicators; 2) the co-existing rise in the incidence of both diseases of affluence and poverty; 
and 3) increases in both health professional production and migration. While not unique to the 
developing world, these paradoxes point to a number of explanations. The most obvious ones are 
economic, social and environmental factors. Prior to 1980, Caribbean states experienced generally 
favourable health status on most counts: infant mortality, the reduction in communicable diseases and 
longer lifespans. This was generally attributed to considerable resource allocations at both the national 
and international programme levels, as well as the commitment of governments to improving the health of 
their populations, with initiatives co-ordinated at both the national and regional levels. In the case of 
health human resources, this resulted in increases in numbers of trained personnel as well as the quality of 
such training compared with other countries in the Americas. 
After 1980 however, a new trend emerged: one of declines in areas previously recording successes, 
and the advent of new `lifestyle'- as well as the `old' infectious diseases. A number of reasons have been 
advanced for this new, paradoxical development. The most obvious one has been the harsh social impact 
of the economic downturn and subsequent adjustment policies adopted during the 1980s. In the case of 
chronic diseases, this explanation is more attributable to increased affluence and developed country 
`lifestyle' influences in the region, despite the downturn. Economic downturn and structural adjustment 
policies however had severe effects on the ability of health services to cope with the rise in demand for the 
care of both chronic and infectious diseases. The economic factor also explains part of the motivations of 
migrating health human resources in the 1980s and 1990s, i. e. better salaries and career opportunities. 
While supporting the economic and other environmental explanations, my central argument in this 
study is that these influences do not wholly explain a number of other issues relating to the state of the 
Caribbean health sector. Economics, for instance, cannot wholly explain those problems that hint more at 
organisational and political issues as I observed in my study of the three states. My argument in this study 
is that the direct and indirect influence ofpoliticalfactors - including political inaction as reflected in the 
failure to administratively reform - also need to be considered, if only to complement economic and 
social factors in revealing a more accurate picture of the diversity of developing states' policymaking 
responses and experiences. Realistic policy analyses in both developing and developed states, then, 
cannot ignore the political. I now turn to examine the defining features of the Caribbean region. 
1.3 THE COMMONWEALTH CARIBBEAN: BACKGROUND 
Defining the Caribbean 
There are various definitions of `the Caribbean'. Geographically, the 'wider Caribbean' region is 
made up of those territories - continental, archipelagic and island - which rim, or share the common waters 
of the Caribbean Sea. The Caribbean archipelago stretches approximately 2,500 miles from the larger and 
northern-most islands of Cuba, Jamaica, Hispaniola (shared by Haiti and The Dominican Republic) and 
Puerto Rico which all lie relatively close to the North American mainland, to the smaller Eastern 
Caribbean island chain which straddle the Atlantic-Caribbean divide on the eastern side: from Antigua to 
the north, to Trinidad and Tobago, the most southerly of the island chain. Trinidad and Tobago, like 
Aruba and Curacao, are located immediately north of the South American mainland. There are however 
paradoxes, even with geographical descriptions. The Central and South American states which rim the 
Caribbean Sea to the west and south can all be considered `Caribbean' in the broader sense though they 
are usually not defined this way. This area incorporates south-eastern Mexico (the Yucatan Peninsula 
which demarcates the boundaries of the Caribbean Sea and the Gulf of Mexico), Belize, Guatemala, 
Honduras, Nicaragua, Costa Rica and Panama in the Central American isthmus, to Colombia and 
Venezuela on the South American mainland. Interestingly, states such as The Bahamas in the north, 
Guyana on the South American mainland and Barbados in the east are not washed by the Caribbean Sea 
but are typically defined as `Caribbean' countries. 
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Historical and/or cultural descriptions are more relevant to this study in defining the Caribbean 
according to particular colonial influences. In this regard, the `Commonwealth Caribbean' simply 
describes those former British colonial Caribbean territories. These include Jamaica, the smaller eastern 
Caribbean islands of Antigua and Barbuda, Barbados, St Kitts and Nevis, St Lucia, St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Grenada, Trinidad and Tobago, the Bahamas, Belize and Guyana (formerly British Guiana). 
Anguilla, the British Virgin islands, Montserrat and the Turks and Caicos islands are also defined as 
Commonwealth Caribbean islands although they remain British colonies. We now turn to examine the 
three countries under study: Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
Describing Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago 
Geography: Guyana (formerly British Guiana), Jamaica and Trinidad are the largest of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean territories. However there are important geographical differences. Guyana is 
approximately 83,000 square miles in area. It is situated on the north-eastern coast of South America, 
bounded on the north by the Atlantic Ocean, on the east by Suriname, on the south and south west by 
Brazil, and on the north- west by Venezuela. Guyana has a coastline, approximately 210 miles long, and a 
`depth' into the South American mainland of about 450 miles. About 35% of the country lies within the 
Amazon Basin. The name "Guyana" derives from an Amerindian word meaning "land of many waters" 
which aptly describes the country's extensive network of rivers and its large numbers of waterfalls. 
Guyana's population, despite its huge size, has the smallest population of the three countries under study 
with a total of 755,937 persons. About 68% of the population is located in the rural areas and/or 
concentrated mainly along the narrow coastal strip and waterways. Jamaica and Trinidad, by contrast are 
small island states. Jamaica is located at the north-western corner of the Caribbean Sea, about 100 miles 
south of Cuba, and about 900 miles from Guyana. It has a land area of 4,400 square miles which makes it 
about sixteen times smaller than Guyana. Jamaica's population is approximately 2.5 million people, 
roughly 50% urban and 50% rural. The islands of Trinidad and Tobago, with a combined area of 2,318 
square miles (about 1/35th the size of Guyana and about half the size of Jamaica) are located five miles 
off the north-eastern tip of Venezuela, and about 136 miles from Guyana. They are the most southerly of 
the Eastern Caribbean island chain. Trinidad is geologically part of the South American continent, while 
Tobago is markedly similar to the eastern Caribbean islands. Trinidad's population is approximately 1.3 
million, approximately 69% of whom are located in urban and semi-urban areas. 
Historical background: Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad share a common British colonial background 
which is reflected in their political, economic and socio-cultural features. Jamaica, though claimed for the 
Spanish Crown by Columbus on his fourth voyage to the `New World' was captured by the British and 
remained a British territory for over 300 years, from 1655 to 1962. The common British background does 
not fully apply to either Guyana or Trinidad. Guyana is essentially an agglomeration of three former 
British colonial territories on mainland South America: Demerara, Essequibo and Berbice which were 
ceded by the Dutch in 1803 after the Anglo-Dutch War. Both Dutch and English settlers had occupied the 
area as early as 1621. The three territories were united under British rule in 1831, just three years before 
the abolition of slavery in the British Caribbean, to form what would be known until Independence in 
1962 as British Guiana. Trinidad by contrast remained a Spanish colony until 1797 when it was captured 
by the British, and becoming in 1802, the first British crown colony until full Independence in 1962. 
Tobago's history is even more colourful, being a virtual pawn in the various imperial enterprises during 
the 17th and 18th centuries. It was ruled variously by the Dutch, the British and the French, finally 
becoming a British crown colony within the Windward island group in 1814. In 1889, it was 
administratively joined to Trinidad, both later becoming a joint Crown Colony in 1899. The basis of the 
all three territories under colonialism was the plantation, although it must be noted that Trinidad's 
experience of the slave plantation system was relatively short, given its general neglect under Spanish 
colonisation. Jamaica by contrast, remained a British slave colony from the late 1600s to emancipation in 
1834: well over 150 years. 
Economic base: The economies of Guyana, Trinidad and Jamaica, like many other Caribbean 
colonies (including Spanish and French) were based on sugar production. The plantation economy of 
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both the pre-and post-emancipation periods as well as the activities of transnational corporations over the 
last hundred years have both left their legacies on economic activity in these countries. After the initially 
futile `gold rush', the major part of the 17th and 18th centuries was focused on sugar cultivation which 
became the `backbone' of each territory's economy. Gold was eventually found in Guyana, but European 
demand for sugar greatly influenced both society and economy. However, the discovery of oil in Trinidad 
in the 1880s and bauxite in Guyana and Jamaica saw a slow shift away from agriculture in the first half of 
this century. Production of these commodities were in foreign hands until the post-Independence, 1960s 
period, when governments sought state ownership of these concerns. While sugar production still 
constitutes an important social and political part of these territories, each state is dominated by distinct 
economic concerns. Jamaica's economic base is characterised by tourism, along with bauxite and 
manufacturing. Guyana's is focused on extensive forestry exploitation, agriculture, as well as gold 
mining, and Trinidad and Tobago's is dominated by oil exports, alongside manufacturing and tourism. 
Socio-demographic background: The impact of the plantation system on demographic patterns is 
also distinctive to the region and has had important implications for political party formation and national 
political characteristics in the post-colonial era The engine of development was the sugar plantation. The 
exploitation and decimation of the Amerindian populations in early colonial Trinidad and Jamaica 
resulted in the beginning of the British Caribbean slave trade which provided an extremely cheap and 
reliable source of millions of African slaves until emancipation in 1834. The end of slavery was linked to 
economic decline which in turn had profound political consequences for both British colonial rule and the 
future wealth of planters and plantations (Williams, 1969). The acute labour shortage that followed the 
abolition of slavery in 1834 saw planters begin the search for alternative sources of labour from among 
other areas, Madeira, China, eventually, settling upon India, a decision which irrevocably changed the 
socio-political landscape of both Guyana and Trinidad. After slavery, the rural-urban shift of free blacks 
began so that by the late 1800s and early 1900s, each country's urban population underwent rapid growth. 
Jamaica's rural urban shift was arguably the most profound, as many former slaves chose to work on the 
plots given them after emancipation. Many others however remained as paid labour on the sugar estates. 
In Guyana and Trinidad, the experience was somewhat different as acute labour shortages saw planters 
rapidly turn towards Indian indentured labour. 
Between emancipation in 1834 and 1917, more than a half million Indians were brought to the region 
to meet the needs of the labour-deficient plantations. The descendants of these indentured immigrants 
constitute over one million, most of whom live in Guyana and Trinidad, a significant proportion of both 
countries' populations. In Guyana, Indians account for about 49.6% and Africans 30.4% of the 
population (MacDonald, 1986). There are however important minorities: mixed race (14%), and 
Amerindian (5.3%). Trinidad's ethnic composition is 40% Africans, 41% Indian, and the rest made up of 
mixed, Chinese, European and Syrian and Lebanese. Tobago's population of approximately 40,000 is 
more homogenous, with an almost 98% Black population. These ethnic differences in Guyana and 
Jamaica have polarised politics, as we shall see later, along ethnic lines, with potentially serious 
developmental consequences. This movement of East Indian labour to meet the needs of European- 
controlled agriculture mirrors similar experiences in Surinam or Dutch Guiana, Fiji, Mauritius, and 
Malaya, with similar ethno-political cleavages. In Jamaica by contrast, the population is almost 76% 
African, with 16% mixed race, and the remainder made up of Chinese, Indian, European and Lebanese 
peoples. Although predominantly African, the population is nevertheless stratified along colour and class 
lines rather than the strong Indian-African cleavage that define both Guyana and Trinidad. A large 
proportion of Afro-Jamaicans remain at the base of the society with the other groups generally dominating 
business and professional life, though this is slowly changing (Edie, 1989; 1991). The socio-economic, 
socio-cultural situation changed considerably, with most blacks in Trinidad moving into urban areas or the 
oilfields which opened in the early 1900s as Indians replaced them on the sugar estates. Class hierarchies 
are also dominant in Guyana and particularly Trinidad. However racial cleavages are more distinctive, 
and hence significant in these two societies (Hintzen, 1989; MacDonald, 1986; Ryan, 1991). After 
completing their bonded periods, most Indians chose to remain in the Caribbean and have retained their 
links with the sugar industries in both Guyana and Trinidad to the present day. 
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Political systems - race, class, power and `regime' formation: The dominant political parties from as 
far back as the 1940s, to the present have all been based on a mixture of class, race and clientelist support. 
In Guyana and Trinidad, the race factor has been predominant, with the main parties throughout the period 
dominated by the African and Indian segments of the population respectively (Premdas, 1993; 1994; 
Hintzen, 1989; 1994). In Trinidad, Eric Williams and his Peoples National Movement (PNM) party, were 
identified as representatives of the Black segment of the population, while the opposition Democratic 
Labour Party (DLP) were seen to represent the Indians. The nature of the ethnic cleavages were not lost 
on the British authorities who noted the difficulty of forging `healthy political conditions' given the Indian 
presence (Bahadoorsingh, 1971). Nevertheless the first elections under universal adult suffrage in 1956 in 
Trinidad, and 1953 in Guyana, and almost all of the elections since, have been defined by the `race' issue 
(Bahadoorsingh, 1971). 
Political party formation in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad also had its roots in the anti-colonial 
struggle, usually based on middle class interests, but with strong working class support. Most of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean territories, like much of the developing world during the 1950s were 
dominated by independence movements and the coalescing of political parties along class, ideological and 
racial lines. Many of the leaders of these movements, the well-educated middle classes, forged alliances 
with trade unions and other political groupings. In the Caribbean, charismatic leaders such as Eric 
Williams, Alexander Bustamante, Norman Manley, Cheddi Jagan and Forbes Burnham commanded 
overwhelming support among their respective constituencies. While there was a common cause and a 
shared vision of the potential benefits that could accrue to the entire Commonwealth Caribbean through a 
political federation', the attempt, which started in 1958, nevertheless failed within four years and 
Independence was almost immediately gained in its aftermath by the two main contentious parties: 
Jamaica and Trinidad. Williams never forgave the conservative Bustamante-led JLP government in 
Jamaica for undermining the effort. With a Jamaican referendum voting against the idea. Both countries 
gained independence in 1962. 
In the case of Guyana, political troubles saw elections only granted in 1966 under Forbes Burnham. 
While developments followed a similar pattern to Trinidad, there were clear differences, the main one 
being externally-engineered instability. Active as well as covert action by both the British and American 
government saw the Marxist Indian-based Peoples Progressive Party under Cheddi Jagan variously 
outmanoeuvred and deposed from power twice in a decade (in 1953 and again in 1963), given the 
unhappiness of both governments with his Marxist leanings. His chief political rival, Burnham, though 
`socialist' was seen as the lesser of the two evils of socialism, which resulted in active support from both 
powers. In Trinidad, Williams was also able to win colonial support and eventual political power by 
shoring up his anti-Communist, pro-business, pro-American credentials in exchange for British-instigated 
constitutional and electoral boundary changes that effectively guaranteed his party dominance in the 1961 
electoral vote, which was followed by full independence in 1962 (Hintzen, 1994: 64). Compared with the 
Guyanese situation however, Trinidad was much less volatile, and external involvement much less blatant 
though certainly there. Nevertheless, the fact that the two main attempts to destabilise the country were 
based more on working class, urban disaffection than inter-ethnic problems and its general stability 
despite these events reflects a somewhat different reality from the Guyanese situation.. 
In terms of political systems, Jamaica has been closest to a Western style two-party liberal democratic 
system, although retaining the Queen as head of state. Guyana and Trinidad have both had various levels 
of powerful central rule for much of their post independence periods. Trinidad and Tobago became a 
republic in 1976. Guyana became a co-operative socialist republic in 1970, becoming independent only 
four years earlier in 1966. Both Jamaica and Trinidad nominally use a Westminster-style two party, `first 
past the post' system of liberal democracy, although in practice there is much to distinguish each from the 
other as well as from that being practised in Britain. In Jamaica and Trinidad, power is concentrated in 
the hands of an `executive' Prime Minister, although other branches of government such as the judiciary 
are relatively independent. At the administrative level, the institutional legacy of British colonialism is 
still deeply embedded in public sector administration of each country in spite of constitutional differences. 
Despite its republican status, Trinidad's presidential system is however as symbolic as Jamaica's retention 
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of a governor. This presidential power of the first Trinidadian Prime Minister, Eric Williams, and 
electoral violence in Jamaican politics aside, both countries have had a fairly democratic post-colonial 
period in the Westminster `first-past-the-post' of the term. 
The Guyanese system by contrast is framed on a republican representative system, with a strong 
presidency and a limited degree of regional autonomy, born out of Forbes Burnham's authoritarianism in 
the 1970s and 1980s. The president appoints the prime minister and cabinet members, not all of whom 
are members of the National Assembly. The cabinet, which is normally chaired by the president 
formulates policies and plans and is responsible to the National Assembly. The Head of State is the 
president, who is the leader of the party which commands the largest number of seats in the National 
Assembly. The Assembly is unicameral, with 53 of its 65 members elected directly under proportional 
representation and the other 12 from regional assemblies, and sit for five year terms. The Guyanese 
system for much of its post-Independence period has been dominated by the non-democratic rule of the 
African-based Peoples National Congress (PNC) regime under Burnham. 
Comment: There are many differences as well as similarities between and among Guyana, Jamaica 
and Trinidad which we need to recognise as important in a contextual appreciation of post-colonial health 
policy developments. Jamaica and Trinidad share a largely British common colonial background, 
although there are important differences that are significant. Historically, Jamaica remained British for 
well over three hundred years; Trinidad only became British in the late 18th century and British Guiana 
only emerged under British rule in the 1830s. The economies of all three colonies were based on sugar 
production, and though still important by the time of independence, Guyana and Jamaica were also 
producing bauxite, while Trinidad had been producing oil from the early 1900s. Socio-culturally, Guyana 
and Trinidad share a similar African-Indian ethnically plural society, while Jamaica's population is largely 
African. Politically, Guyana and Trinidad are also stratified along ethnic lines. In the case of Jamaica, 
clientelism and class, more than race have played a more important role (Edie, 1989; 1991). The main 
parties in all three states have however had close ties with unions representing their respective clientele, 
and without exception have been largely led by middle class professionals. However, Guyana has a 
proportional representative, and strong presidential system; Jamaica has essentially retained the 
Westminster model; while Trinidad and Tobago' political system is somewhere between the two, 
following the Westminster model, but having republican status, albeit a symbolic one. The authoritarian 
nature of the Guyanese system and the relative democracy and legitimacy of the Jamaican and Trinidadian 
system need to be considered as important defining elements. However, again, the authoritarian rule of 
Trinidad's prime minister Williams especially during the 1970s are a key focus in this study, despite 
Trinidad's relative legitimacy. 
Before we examine the significance of the health policy paradoxes outlined earlier and its possible 
connections to national politics in the 1970s and 1980s, we first need to begin by examining the 
relationship between the colonial state and health policy reform. 
1.4 REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND COLONIAL HEALTH POLICY 
The negative effect of colonialism on health, regardless of coloniser, has been well-documented 
(Doyal, 1979; Navarro, 1982; Fanon, 1965; Turshen, 1977). In her Marxian analysis of this impact on 
British colonial Tanganyika (now Tanzania), Turshen noted that: 
"... the health sector has been subject to the same limitations and distortions under 
colonial rule as other sectors of the political economy. Widespread ill-health and 
essentially chronic malnutrition are not primarily internal problems.. just as 
continuing poverty is not. These are the products of colonial history... and changed 
social relations of production... " (1977: 32-33). 
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Much the same was true for other colonies including those under French rule. Fanon (1965), for 
instance, describes the role of medical care in promoting French military goals in Algeria. Similarly, 
Lasker notes of French colonial health policy in the Ivory Coast: 
"... survival and conquest were the most important goals of colonial rule... the 
military and civilian administrators of the colony developed medical services as one 
of the main means for achieving these goals... " (1977: 281). 
This distortion and limitation is not however confined to the colonial state. Navarro (1976) has 
pointed to the link between health services development and class structure in his study of American 
health policy, suggesting that the capitalist system was organised to serve the dominants interests in 
society: much like health under colonial rule. To assess the politics of health and health reform in with 
specific reference to British Caribbean plantation society, we first turn to an examination of regime 
characteristics within the slave colony and its impact on policy and policy reforms. 
Regime characteristics and Caribbean slave society (the late 1500s to 1834) 
The influence and importance of regime characteristics to the Caribbean plantation economy is critical 
in explaining post-colonial health developments. The raison d'etre of British Caribbean colonialism under 
the `old representative' system of government was the plantation economy and its profitability for both 
planters and the tax-conscious British Colonial Office. Power and strength thus lay in the hands of the 
planters on the one hand, and the governors and their colonial administrators, on the other. The basic aim 
was wealth extraction from sugar production for the benefit of both planter and, ultimately, Crown. The 
main objective therefore was the exercise of power and control in order to maintain a stable system which 
satisfied these aims. Under the Caribbean slave system therefore, a curious blend of autocratic rule 
combined with mercantilism, within a formally `Christian', slave-owning society prevailed. In the case of 
colonial administration, while the governor commanded overall considerable power, `day-to-day' power 
was effectively exercised by bureaucrats. As Jones points out under British colonialism in the Caribbean: 
"... the colonial polity was essentially bureaucratic ... the governmental process was 
dominated by the British Secretariat whose representatives combined administrative 
and political power... bureaucrats defined the rules of the social system, determined 
the exercise of official violence and dictated the pace and direction of political 
change... " (Jones, 1981: 14). 
This system was eventually replaced by the crown colony system in which expansion of local members 
of the council were instituted. However power remained with the planters and the colonial authorities. 
Under both systems, power remained effectively in the hands of planters, propertied classes and the 
governor, with appalling health conditions and little chance of political reform. The result for health care, 
given the aims of the plantation economy was a general legitimisation of the system, while at the same 
time preserving the raison d'etre of the colony. 
The colonial regime, the `legitimising' medical profession and health policy 
One Marxian interpretation of Caribbean health development in the post-emancipation period of the 
late 19th century -a time also of rapid global imperialism - is reflected in Habermas' notion of 
legitimation. Applied to colonial health care, legitimation essentially means the use of medicine and 
social welfare to pacify the oppressed, and hence `legitimise' capitalist penetration of underdeveloped 
societies (Manderson, 1987: 94-95). The ultimate aim was preservation and survival of the status-quo be 
it colonialism, capitalist development or the medical model. Manderson, in her study of British Malaya 
illustrates the role of legitimation through public health `policing' measures and medical services 
provision as mechanisms to establish superiority of colonial knowledge of aetiology and therapy over 
local non-western systems. Legitimation is not confined to colonialism and health. Navarro for instance 
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demonstrates the `legitimising' role of welfare programmes in contemporary America in integrating 
alienated sectors of the population (Navarro, 1976: 135-169; Habermas, 1979; Manderson, 1987: 94-95). 
Nevertheless, under colonialism, the links between the colonial plantation economy, legitimation and 
health care was exemplified by the important role of the British colonial medical profession. Here, 
Turshen's analysis of the dual legitimising roles of colonial medicine in Tanganyika - pacification and 
cure - could well be applied to the British Caribbean: 
"... in the age of imperial expansion, colonial medicine was put at the service of the 
British Empire: British physicians and surgeons, firmly in control of the medical 
professional by the end of the 19th century, inevitably urged and won the adoption 
of the curative approach in the colonies... the rudiments of a system of public health 
and medical services were transferred from Britain... during the period of colonial 
rule. Determined and designed in the metropolis rather than the colony, the colonial 
medical system was responsive to the needs of the rulers than the ruled... " (1977: 8). 
Both the objectives of the colonial system, and medical legitimation were thus important in shaping 
colonial health care under the slave system. Medical practitioners provided care for white planters, other 
expatriates and the local `mixed' or mulatto population. It was, however, in the economic interest of the 
planter to provide some form of rudimentary health care for slaves along with food and other necessities 
to ensure this profitability, although at the height of the slave trade, slaves were cheap enough for planters 
to simply buy more to replace those expiring or ill from over-work. Public health was generally ignored, 
partly due to the mores of the time, but also due to the fact that elites lived in cordon sanitaires, away 
from the masses (Gish, 1979: 205). European ignorance in the 17th century of public health, sanitation 
and disease thus also extended to the colonies, with epidemics of yellow fever, typhoid, typhus, cholera 
and smallpox, as well as dysentery and other diseases killing thousands in both the pre- and post- 
emancipation periods (Parry, Sherlock and Maingot, 1983). 
In terms of health personnel under colonialism, most planters employed largely British-trained private 
medical practitioners for their plantations, who were aided and supplemented by black traditional 
midwives. Despite the fact that the professional qualifications of doctors, privately contracted by 
individual plantations varied, they constituted the focus of colonial health care (Sheridan, 1985). 
However, missionaries, along with the nurses, traditional midwives as well as other categories were also 
important components of the prevailing colonial personnel system, with their specific concern for slave 
welfare. One interpretation is that this `caring' presence offered a legitimising force in plantation society 
regardless of coloniser -a credible interpretation, especially before emancipation (Gouveia, 1971: 21; 
Lasker, 1987). There were also professional differences based on historical factors. 
In sum, then, the role of the colonial regime in British Caribbean colonial society, like that of 
successive British governments in the 16th, 17th and 18th and part of the 19th centuries was ensuring and 
securing the survival of the plantation economy, based an authoritarian slave society. Under this 
prevailing state of affairs then, the balance of power was clearly skewed in favour of the colonising power 
and the planter, with the medical profession playing a legitimising role and reform clearly off the agenda 
as long as the slave system persisted. 
Regime characteristics, the `crown colony'system, and health (1838-1930s) 
Health policy reforms under early colonialism was brought about by a sequence of crisis and reform, 
starting with the abolition of slavery itself. Following abolition 1838, politics, society and health 
provision in the post-emancipation era were conditioned by three main developments: 1) labour attrition 
from plantations; 2) the importation of indentured labour mainly from the Indian sub-continent to replace 
slave labour; and 3) the establishment of a crown colony system of government as a means of the colonial 
authorities assuming more responsibility for social conditions. Labour attrition from the plantations saw 
the planters and the British colonial authorities cooperate in the importation of indentured labourers, 
mainly from India to solve the shortage. Crown colony rule formalised political control under the British 
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Crown on the following grounds: to improve public services and administration; to act as arbiters between 
conflicting classes, and the protection of ex-slaves (Augier, 1971: 72-73). In Jamaica, the direct impact of 
social dissatisfaction resulted in the Morant Bay rebellion which was the primary reason for the transition 
to the crown colony system. Between 1865 and 1930 Jamaica was ruled under the crown colony system. 
Trinidad, being the first crown colony started much earlier in 1802, while Guyana only became a British 
Crown colony in 1928. As Augier notes, the British also saw the crown colony period as a temporary 
transition to full self rule "... as soon as the society had learnt the arts of responsible government... " (1971: 
72-73). 
The implication of these reforms for governance, health and social welfare were mixed. While not 
much had changed, there were now the beginnings of a public health service by the colonial regime 
largely due to planter unwillingness to provide health care for ex-slaves. Given the labour attrition from 
the plantations, planters instead focused their attention and resources towards indentured labour. Planters 
and colonial administrators squabbled over who was to provide health and welfare services for the ex- 
slave. As their fortunes waned, planters, who still controlled the public purse, were more concerned to 
spend their money on immigration and sugar estates rather than welfare and education (Augier, 1971: 72- 
75). This social `gap' thus forced the colonial administrators to accept some level of responsibility, given 
the objectives of the crown colony form of governance. Colonial administrators became very active in 
public health given their new mandate under the crown colony system, for instance, spending public 
resources on the cholera epidemic in Jamaica in 1865. Still as Augier notes, the British Caribbean 
colonial regime barely acknowledged its responsibility for universal health care provision. Consequently, 
the health of freed slaves did not drastically improve during the post-emancipation period, despite these 
stated concerns. Crown colony legislatures were at first praised for their education policies. When this 
system ended in the British Caribbean in the 1930s however, it left education and health effectively in the 
hands of voluntary associations and missionaries, in the absence of any official colonial action (Augier, 
1971: 72-73). 
In addition to the reforms brought on by emancipation and planters' refusal to provide care for ex- 
slaves, two health-related developments influenced the development of an embryonic health sector in the 
British Caribbean crown colonies: 1) the 1848 British public health act and the 1869 Sanitary Commission 
report; and 2) the continued rise of the western medical model of doctor-dominated health care. The 
development towards a form of organised health care in the British Caribbean colonies started with the 
implementation of 1848 Public Health Act in Britain which made public health the concern of the state. 
The Colonial Office was obliged to replicate health developments in Britain within the colonies. 
Similarly, the improvement, through the 1869 Sanitary Commission, of water supplies in order to prevent 
epidemics was translated in various forms to the colonies. Quarantine regulations were established, and 
water works installed and/or improved, which saw a reduction in the incidence of yellow fever and 
typhoid. The foundation of public health services was thus laid during these years (Quamina, 1988). At 
the curative level, hospitals were also built in main towns during the mid 1800s, while medical services 
were established in the late 1800s, with various complements of doctors and nurses. 
The `success' of the Indian indentureship system in rehabilitating the sugar economy in the British 
Caribbean, particularly in Trinidad and Guyana, ensured the persistence of the three-tier health care 
system, but resulted in a new form of slavery. While entitled to health care and housing under the 
indenture system, the poor working and living conditions of indentured labourers, their powerlessness, the 
abuse of power by the estate managers made their situation comparable to slaves (Jayawardena, 1963). In 
Trinidad and Guyana, estate health dispensaries served the Indian indentured labourers both during and 
after their bonded contracts. This three-tier level bears remarkable similarity to other plantation societies 
including former British colonies such as Mauritius (Parahoo, 1986); Ghana (Twumasi, 1981; Akwasi 
Aidoo, 1982); British Malaya (Manderson, 1987); Kenya (Mburu, 1981a; 1981b); and (Tanzania 
(Turshen, 1977) as well as in French colonies such as the Ivory Coast (Lasker, 1977). In Trinidad, 
Guyana and Jamaica district medical services were also established under crown colony rule. In Trinidad 
and Guyana, this was linked to concerns in India about the welfare of Indians on the sugar estates. In 
Trinidad in 1921, the public health ordinance was amended to provide for district medical officers 
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(Gopaul, 1970: 83-86). In 1870 a plan was formulated by the chief medical officer for the medical care 
for the poor as well as the siting of hospitals close to estates (Quamina, 1988; Gopaul, 1970: 83-86). 
In the case of health human resources after full emancipation in 1838, there were a number of 
significant developments including migration of expatriate doctors and consolidation of medical 
professional power which had important effects. First the mass emigration of expatriate doctors after 
emancipation - Jamaica for instance had 217 doctors in 1834; by 1850, this had dropped to 90 - paved the 
way for the emergence of black doctors who learned by doing (Wilkins, 1989: 27-32). By 1846, with 
Trinidad well into British crown colony rule, the relationship between categories such as apothecaries and 
midwives was being managed by the increasingly powerful local medical profession and its parent body 
the Royal College of Physicians (Harnarayan, 1977). The colonial authorities recognised this power and 
tried to bring the medical board under control, which was strongly resisted (Harnarayan, 1977). The 
medical board also controlled midwives, though not nurses. All three territories adhered to the British 
tradition. Trinidad was initially different due to the persistence of Spanish style-administration even after 
British conquest. For instance, as regards doctors, the local `cabildo' or assembly was empowered by 
Spanish colonial laws dating back to the Spanish code of law of the Indies in 1680 administered from 
Caracas, to inspect and approve qualifications of physicians, surgeons, and apothecaries, and organise 
against disease epidemics. The Medical Board in Trinidad was formed relatively early in 1814 to manage 
entry into medical practice in the colony (Harnarayan, 1977). 
Comment: The crown colony experiment was effectively a crisis-driven reform response of the 
colonial formerly slave-owning state. It was partially successful in terms of some health policy reforms in 
the British Caribbean colonies. However, drawbacks included: 1) the continued power wielded by the 
planters; 2) lack of democratisation; and 3) the existence of discriminatory categories of health and 
welfare services for the masses. First, despite the intermediary position of the colonial administration, 
effective power was often wielded by the planters. Secondly, the British adhered to the principle that a 
crown colony could have all the services its revenues could afford, but left it to the discretion of governors 
and the colonial secretariat to allocate available resources which resulted in increased centralisation of 
power. While the increasingly visible public health profile of the British Caribbean colonial authorities 
was also a result of genuine concern to address public health threats, the ideas of crisis-driven reform, 
legitimation and the power of the colonial state does nevertheless have considerable explanatory power 
when applied to this period. Under crown colony rule, the health services of post-emancipation Caribbean 
colonial state continued to be characterised by its authoritarian environment, polarised along ethnic and 
class lines, but now inclusive of indentured labour. The medical profession was part of this system 
legitimation process, controlling both the practice of medicine and the management of early public health 
services that were to eventually constitute health ministries under self-rule, although they were also part of 
the struggle for self-rule and democratisation in the late 19th- and early 20th centuries. 
Placing reform on the colonial agenda: the Moyne report, self government and health reform (1945) 
The main reforms in the Commonwealth Caribbean only began in the immediate post-war period and 
had direct implications for health services organisation and provision. These reforms sprang from 
widespread protest movements and riots in the inter-war period, driven by poor economic and social 
conditions as well as the increasing desire for political self-determination. The demise of sugar, and 
increasing unemployment as a result of the economic crisis saw successive waves of Jamaican and other 
Caribbean workers migrate to build the Panama canal in the early 1900s as well as to Cuba and Central 
American coast of what is now Nicaragua, in addition to the USA. Growing discontent in the 1920s had 
initially resulted in the visit to the West Indian colonies of the British government-appointed Wood 
Commission, which presented its report in 1921. This report regarded the colonies as unprepared for self- 
government because the nature of West Indian society made it too hazardous, with Trinidad and Guyana 
said to pose particular problems because of the ethnic problem (Proctor, 1971). The Wood report instead 
favoured an incremental approach. The general slowness of reforms resulted in further riots between 
1934-1939 throughout the region, often violent, and marked a turning point in the drive towards self- 
government. Another commission led by Lord Moyne was sent to the British Caribbean in response to 
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these riots. Reflecting developments both within the colonies and in Britain, the pattern of health services 
development in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago in the inter-war years had remained largely 
unreformed with the exception of the embryonic colonial central and district health services. 
The appointment of the Royal West India (or Moyne) Commission was the response of the Colonial 
Office to the crisis. The issue of health reform comprised a significant part of the Moyne report. This 
report was unambiguous about widespread poverty being the main `health' problem: poverty of 
individuals, health facilities in rural areas; poverty of medical departments and of the colonial 
governments. As the report noted, the rapid population increases, which began at the turn of the century 
and which had been brought about by a decline in the death rate through marginal improvements in public 
health, placed enormous pressures on public and social services which contributed to the rising 
unemployment and unrest and migration. This report also found that the health of British West Indians, 
while generally better than in some other British colonies, was still unsatisfactory. On the issue of health 
policy however, lack of finances, poor administration, curative bias and bad social conditions were 
identified as the main problems. While focusing on the poverty-related manifestations - high infant 
mortality and general morbidity, deplorable housing, sanitation and poor diets - the report expressed 
concern that the cure of disease received much more attention than had been given to prevention as Table 
1.1 below demonstrates. It noted in this regard that "... little improvement in the health of the people can 
be expected, however extensive the hospital facilities - until these serious defects are remedied... " (Moyne 
Commission Report, 1945). Lack of coordination and effective administration as well as research 
deficiencies were also identified. In the case of health human resources, the report cited the shortage of 
non-medical health categories as a major problem, noting that "... the number of well-trained personnel of 
the subordinate medical staff is everywhere low in proportion to the numbers of fully qualified doctors... " 
(Moyne, 1945). 
The Commission's most important political recommendation recognised the need for transitional self- 
government under a federal system as the main way forward for these states. In terms of administration, 
political reform was vital. The need to speed up process of decentralisation and dissolve the old colonial 
secretariat system, the creation of ministries, were all necessary for decisions to be implemented. The 
implications for political governance were far-reaching as general recommendations included the 
unification of the territories under a federal system. 
TABLE 1.1: Health spending on preventive and curative care in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and 
Tobago in 1945 
% medical 
Country expenditure to total % preventive to total % curative to total 
expenditure health expenditure medical expenditure 
British Guiana (Guyana) 10.2 12 88 
Jamaica 9.8 18 82 
Trinidad and Tobago 
9.2 18 82 
Source: West India Royal Commission Report, 1945, CMND. 6607: 141. 
In the case of health care and health services generally, the Moyne Report's recommendations 
included the unification of the medical services, the decentralisation of medical institutions, the re- 
organisation of services and the development of long-term health policies, including training. In terms of 
medical training, the regional thrust of the report was reflected in its recommendation that consideration 
be given to the eventual establishment of a medical "college" as a faculty of "... a West Indian 
university... " (Moyne Report, 1945). The Jamaica Legislative Council had made such as request two 
years earlier. This request was subsequently supported by the Asquith Commission on medical education 
for the Caribbean colonies, which recommended the establishment of a faculty of medicine under 
University of London supervision. In 1946, the decision was made to establish the medical school in 
Jamaica, with other Caribbean territories pledging financial support. Independence bought the 
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university's full charter, with the University of London granting it full independence of operations in 1962 
alongside Jamaican (and Trinidadian) political independence (Theobalds, 1993: 8-11). This decision had 
a major impact on medical training for the entire region. At the hospital level, attempts were made to 
reform nurse training programs throughout the region, with particular attention paid to local training. The 
nursing profession, like other disciplines up to this time was still dominated by administrators and senior 
nurses trained mainly in the United Kingdom or Canada. 
The key problems in the case of colonial health services were however administration and a curative 
bias (Segovia, 1976). In the case of administration, the three tier-system persisted, with a private (largely 
urban) sector for the ruling elite, the voluntary agencies and the new colonial hospital system for the urban 
poor, and the industrial or estate-based health services for the indentured labourers. The blatant 
discriminatory system which developed, for instance, in Kenya - where Europeans were designated 
`medical officers'; Asians: `Asian medical officers' and Africans: `assistant medical officers' - may not 
have been implemented in the plural societies of Guyana, or Trinidad. However, a two-tier system of 
expatriate, and `colonial' or native doctors, the latter in several cases being discriminated in terms of 
promotions and appointments persisted was similar to that identified by inter alia, Mburu in Kenya 
(Commissiong; 1968; (Mburu, 198 la; 198 lb). In relation to Trinidad and Guyana, the separateness of the 
two major ethnic groups, the Blacks and Indians - spatially and in health care - added to the alienation of 
both groups, with and as Hezekiah has noted in the case of Trinidad, accounted for the absence of Indians 
in nursing and medicine in the late 1800s and early 1900s (1989: 83). 
In terms of curative bias, in the newly emerging public health services, the authorities concentrated 
most of their financial, human and material resources on hospital services located in capital cities and 
centres of production and commerce. Despite the fact that separate arms of public and curative health 
services were developed, health care at the level of the estate, the voluntary sector and the private services 
respectively all focused almost exclusively on curative medical care. In terms of distribution, the missions 
and voluntary agencies focused largely on the remote areas. In the case of funding in the 1920s and 
1930s, financial problems in the British West Indian territories during this inter-war period resulted in cuts 
to public health expenditure. The overall situation was nevertheless marginally better than, for instance, 
the French-ruled Ivory Coast, which never focused on prevention-based health care in the first place 
(Lasker, 1977). The problems however remained the same in the case of health human resources under 
both French and British colonial rule: the dominance and control of all aspects of medical education by 
the profession by virtue of the profession's status and prestige; and the unwillingness -largely due to 
medical professional opposition - to produce auxiliaries and prevention-trained personnel (Twumasi, 
1981; Mburu, 198 la; 198lb). The curative focus in the British Caribbean colonies had another side-effect 
in addition to the neglect of prevention, in the case of health training processes. The status, prestige and 
resources that accrued to the urban-hospital-based system was the main outcome of this skewed system. 
Outcomes: Some of Moyne's were implemented, the main one in the case of health human resources, 
being the establishment of the University of the West Indies. However, little effort or headway was made 
in the case of the curative bias, and the formulation of policies. The primary reason was clearly the fact 
that the period between 1945 and the 1960s was characterised by considerable political manoeuvring as 
parties consolidated themselves in the runup to independence. This process was fraught with problems. 
Of the three territories, Guyana faced the greatest threat to its stability. This fear of instability in the 
newly emerging states thus meant therefore the imposition by the colonial regime of incremental, as 
against radical political, economic and social reforms. In the case of the social services, this meant 
tinkering with the edges of the colonial system. The report itself was arguably an incremental, transitional 
document, which was not concerned about radical change. Even political independence was to follow an 
orderly, incremental process. While fine for political stability, the incremental path would bedevil post- 
colonial health and social policy development, since a comprehensive reform of much of the old colonial 
system, and not a simple tinkering at the edges was urgently needed. 
Beyond awareness of the above health issues then, the main outcome of the incremental Moyne report 
was a heightened awareness of political, economic and social reform. There was increased recognition of 
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the central role of political power transfer and the democratisation of political institutions within colonial 
society to realise these aims. The colonial regime policymakers opted to effect the incremental transfer of 
power without jeopardising either British political, or multi-national and other business interests. In doing 
so the management of the reform process was essentially incremental, and `modemisation-' rather than 
`development-oriented' (Mills, 1973a; 1973b; 1974). During the post war era then, this Report served 
nevertheless as the `blueprint' for the formulation and implementation of general development policy and 
policy reform (Lutchman, 1989: 298). In the case of overall development - political economic and social - 
the Report arguably started the process of political, social and economic decentralisation as the way 
forward for progressive development. As Lutchman notes of the value of this report to the health sector: 
"... it established norms and certain minimum standards... it emphasised an 
integrated approach in attempting to solve social, economic and political problems. 
Thus according to its conceptualisation, health problems were intimately connected 
and related to educational, economic, labour, and even political factors... " (1989: 
298). 
The first decade of independence and health 
Economically, the decade of the 1960s was characterised by the implementation of industrialisation- 
by-invitation policies which while initially successful saw worsened economic and social conditions by 
1970 due to both the failure of this `Operation Bootstrap', US-inspired strategy, as well as a rising 
population. Politically, a Westminster-style ministerial system was already in place in Guyana, Jamaica 
and Trinidad, with permanent secretaries of ministries vested with powers of supervision and 
administration, subject to the control of ministers generally along British lines. In the case of health, the 
old central boards of health under colonial rule formed the core of these new ministries of health. 
Meanwhile, most newly-independent Commonwealth Caribbean governments focused on infectious 
disease eradication and control with Pan American/World Health Organisation (PAHO/WHO) assistance. 
Similarly, national health plans were also formulated with such assistance. However as Quamina (1988: 
36) notes in the case of Trinidad, technical reforms were not followed by administrative reforms, which 
were essential to effect the implementation process. Such plans nevertheless formed the basis of 
considerable physical infrastructural development in the 1970s as sectoral planning gave way to project 
development including, the negotiation of World Bank loans for various levels of health sector support, 
including the building of nurse training schools, health centres, improvements in maternal and child health 
policy and family planning. 
By the end of the 1960s, then, most Commonwealth Caribbean countries had a two-tiered health 
system, covering comprehensive curative and preventive health services. Curative health was delivered 
through community district services as well as various hospitals offering both general and specialist 
services. Preventive services ranged from general environmental concerns to the various levels of 
physical facilities in the community, ranging from health centres to health posts in outlying areas, the latter 
particularly critical for health services provision for example in the vast hinterland of Guyana. 
The evolving structure of health service systems in Guyana, Trinidad and Jamaica was by the end of 
the 1960s then similar to that of many other developing countries, divided into a state-run free public 
health system and a private health care system, with external agencies providing considerable technical 
support in policy formulation and implementation. The Pan American Health Organisation, the sub- 
regional office of the World Health Organization; the Inter-American Development Bank, sub-regional 
office of the World Bank as well as a number of other agencies including the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID). The private medical sector provided services for those who could 
afford it at both the community and secondary levels, while public health care provided the bulk of health 
services at the tertiary/curative level. There were however a series of complex interrelationships between 
these subsectors. In the case of health human resources, many private medical practitioners worked for 
the governments on a contractual basis, due to the perennial shortage of doctors, while many public 
doctors moonlighted in the private sector to supplement their earnings. 
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Comment: The transition period before full Commonwealth Caribbean self-rule was conditioned by 
both international and national political economic and social factors and processes. Internationally, 
Fabian-influenced social welfare thinking in Britain inevitably triggered a similar concern with the plight 
of the poor social, economic and political conditions of the inhabitants of the British colonies. The advent 
of universal adult suffrage and the adoption of declarations on human rights, health, economic and social 
issues at the United Nations meant that interest in the development and modernisation of the newly- 
emerging colonies was on the agenda. At the national level, the decolonisation process within most 
Commonwealth Caribbean states, excluding Guyana, was one of almost peaceful transition, compared 
with the bitter struggles that characterised other states' independence struggles. In terms of politico- 
administrative preparation for self-rule, for most former British colonies the process was therefore 
essentially an evolutionary one with universal suffrage happening alongside the formation of multi-party 
systems, strong trade unions, the creation of ministerial system of government and cabinet systems 
modelled on the British system with colonial power being eventually ceded to representative government 
in the 1960s (Mills, and Jones, 1989). 
At the social policy level, the critical need for reform, in particular administrative and institutional 
reform was highlighted by the findings of the 1945 Moyne Report. Event the incremental Moyne report 
however recognised however that there was need for considerable reform of the old colonial 
administrative structures and institutions if progress was to be achieved. In the case of health, planning 
during the 1960s was heavily promoted and supported by the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) 
in terms of appropriateness of service provision within available resources as well as the elimination of the 
prevention-curative dichotomy by promoting the integration and rationalisation of health services 
especially given the scarce resources of Caribbean states during this period. Changes during this period 
were therefore evolutionary in an effort to preserve stability. In doing so, important frameworks for future 
policy implementation such as bureaucratic reform were neglected, which left serious work to be done in 
the post-independence period in all three states. 
By the end of the 1960s then, all three countries - Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad - experienced 
generally similar problems in the case of health, but understandably chose to tackle the most serious 
physical infrastructural problems first. Thus health policy during the early years essentially comprised 
such basic issues as the building of facilities and the implementation of mass immunisation programmes. 
Of the three, there was little attempt in Trinidad to reform administrative structures at this stage due to the 
emergence of Williams' authoritarian-style of politics. Guyana was also similarly about to pursue an 
authoritarian path in the 1970s under the illegal Burnham regime. Both Guyana and Jamaica, unlike 
Trinidad and Tobago were also about to pursue radical developmental agendas that constituted significant 
shifts from the status quo, and which also had potentially important outcomes for health policy, including 
health human resources development in the post-independence period. 
Caribbean politics and health policy: the neglected dimension 
One of my main concerns in exploring the health policy process in the post-colonial Caribbean 
developing state was partly to address the relevance of political explanations for the paradoxes raised 
earlier, given the groundwork laid by the 1945 Moyne Report. Despite the lack of contemporary studies 
on the politics of health in the Caribbean colonial state, indirect evidence of political impact can be 
gleaned in studies of Caribbean public administration (including health management) ((Mills and Jones (1989); 
Segovia, 1976) and political sociology (Stone, 1986; Hintzen, 1989). The role of national politics is 
extremely relevant as I found in my fieldwork. A cursory review of the numerous consultancy reports as 
well as press reports of health related industrial action throughout the period for instance, points to health 
services neglect and mal-administration by successive governments as one important factors alongside 
economic factors such as resource scarcity in both declining health status and professional dissatisfaction. 
Yet contemporary Caribbean social policy studies have consistently relegated, even ignored the 
importance national politics, focusing almost exclusively on economic factors, thus leaving this most 
important area are of inquiry unexplored. Without such explanations, it is exceedingly difficult to 
question various explanations of policy processes, including economic and political factors. 
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The health paradoxes raised earlier are not unique to Caribbean states. In the Pacific region for 
instance, problems relating to the health transition i. e. the change from infectious to lifestyle diseases as 
the primary cause of illness; political centralisation and its negative effects on health administration, the 
proximity to developed health care societies which not only emphasise medicalised health training, but the 
non-return of trained islanders mirrors the Commonwealth Caribbean post-war and post-independence 
development experience (Taylor, 1990). According to an economics-based interpretation of policy, policy 
processes in developing states are hindered largely by resource scarcity. A `politics-oriented' explanation 
of policy processes in these same states might fmd that while resource scarcity is an important factor, the 
situation is much more complex with explanations heavily conditioned by both political and social context 
and content, in addition to economic factors and processes. The logical extension of this argument is that 
the role of national government and politics in the post-colonial policy process needs to assessed 
alongside other contributing factors such as economic, social and environmental influences. Thus 
Emmanuel's assertion of the importance of the political can be applied to almost any other state, 
developed or developing:: 
"... a proper treatment of issues of governance and democracy in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean must needs be undertaken on the basis of an identification of what 
constitutes the essential properties of the region's political systems, as well as the 
character of relationships between these political systems and their contextual 
social and economic systems... " (1991: 1). 
1.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter I have attempted to set the context for the study by describing the country under study, 
the regional context, an importantly an examination of the politics of policymaking in the colonial policy 
arena, its evolution and its implications for policymaking in the post-colonial period. We began this 
chapter by noting the paradox of Caribbean health improvements and declines in the 1980s. While 
historical and contemporary economic influences must be considered in any explanation of post-colonial 
policy development, I have tried to show the importance and relevance of colonial political patterns of 
development to post-colonial colonial policy reform processes: namely 1) the continuation of a curative 
bias; 2) the retention of authoritarian patterns, with the exception of Jamaica in the post-colonial period 
despite full independence and 3) the crisis-reform pattern of political and policy reform. 
Assessing British colonial health policy in India, Jeffrey has noted that "... it makes little sense to see 
imperial medicine in India solely as either social control or humanitarian concern. The picture is more 
complex. Both aspects are important and were often closely intertwined... " (1986: 79). The same could 
be said for the British Caribbean. The colonial regime was strong and autocratic enough to exert its will, 
bowing to social reforms only under periodic crises, dating back from slave emancipation in 1834 to the 
riots in the 1930s which triggered further, and more far-reaching reforms. After the war, political reforms 
dominated the agenda to the negation of social reforms as political parties jostled for power. On the one 
hand, health reform was incrementally introduced because of humanitarian factors, and mirrored 
developments in Britain at the time. However, like other colonies such reforms were also introduced for 
economic self-interest after crisis periods, giving credence to the idea that incentives for change and 
reform only occurred at such politically-opportune periods. Colonial regime characteristics were thus 
influential in the both the development and underdevelopment of health in the colonial Caribbean as in 
other regions 
This chapter hast attempted to show the historical political (and economic) links between health policy 
and the post-colonial Commonwealth Caribbean state. Given the overwhelming influence of economic-, 
as well as social and environmental factors on national health policies in the post-colonial state, the search 
for alternative explanations such as national-level political influences runs the risk of underestimation of 
these other important factors. Additionally, the question of apportioning both praise and blame in post- 
colonial state policymaking is also problematic. It is, for instance, relatively easy to link positive health 
developments to progressive governance on the part of regimes. It is however both theoretically difficult, 
even unfair, to blame third world regimes for health status declines given the negative impact of 
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externally-imposed structural adjustment programmes. Not surprisingly therefore, much of the literature 
on Caribbean health has focused on the impressive policy gains of regional governments, and the negative 
economic impact of structural adjustment programmes on these gains. Explanations for policy failures 
that are limited to economic arguments do little for our understanding of the both the complexities of the 
developing state policy context, and the abilities of third world policymakers, as pointed out by Grindle 
and Thomas (1991), Walt and Gilson (1994) among others. My aim in this study is to examine and 
question the role of national politics in post-colonial policy processes and its relationships with other 
determining factors such as economic factors. My central contention is that individual meta-level 
explanations that might incorporate a variety of explanations must be striven for, indeed, must be 
addressed as a matter of good objective social science. Such an integrated approach enriches knowledge 
of the developing state policy process by looking beyond economic deterministic answers to more 
complex answers, while simultaneously retaining some level of `generalizeability'. 
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CHAPTER 2 
REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND 'LOW-POLITICS' POLICY REFORM PROCESSES IN 
THE POST-COLONIAL STATE: A `STRUCTURATED' APPROACH 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
Because I want to illustrate the role, influence and relevance of the following characteristics - regime 
strength, stability, ideology, democracy and regime survival - to developing state social policies, I shall in 
this chapter examine evolving theoretical perspectives about the role and importance of the developing 
state and developing state political actors in policymaking specifically. To support this argument, I shall 
draw from, and assess the contributions from the various theoretical debates in the fields of political 
science, development studies, sociology and comparative policy analysis on the role of national regime 
actors in developing state policy processes. In the first section, I shall review the literature on the 
relationship between regime characteristics and developing state policymaking. In the second section, I 
shall briefly examine the lessons from the development theory impasse in the 1980s that can be applied to 
developing country policy on the role and relevance of national actors, particularly the most dominant of 
them all: the regime. In the third section, I shall review and discuss the main themes emerging from both 
the state- and society-based approaches to policymaking in analysing policy actors and their motivations 
as well as their actions, inaction and/or non-decisionmaking as policy. In the fourth section, I analyse of 
the policy literature assessing, among others, the perspectives of Hall, Kingdon and Grindle and Thomas 
on the policy and policy reform process in the developing state. In the final section, I shall state the case 
for the usefulness of regime characteristics as a determinant of social policy processes in the developing 
state. 
2.2 REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND POLICY MAKING IN THE 
DEVELOPING STATE 
Regime characteristics and policy 
Regime types and characteristics have been frequently used to analyse policy processes in developing 
states (Anderson, 1967; Ayers, 1975; Remmer, 1978; Stepan, 1971; Thomas, 1984). One of the more 
important recent discussions of the relevance of regimes types and characteristics to health policy is 
Bossert's cross-comparative case study (1983) of the impact of regime characteristics on primary care 
policy adoption and implementation in Central America. He analysed regime type across four of these 
states and across the following four dimensions: `strength', `stability', `ideology' and `democracy'. He 
covered a range of issues including degrees of centralisation, integration of policy, degree of community 
participation, funding levels and the role of international assistance. He explained his underlying 
hypothetical logic as follows: 
"... Strong regimes will have the capacity to adopt and fund innovative health care 
programs because they will be able to extract sufficient resources and distribute 
those resources to non-dominant sectors of society. Stable regimes will be most able 
to implement these policies because they allow more continuity in the bureaucracy. 
Progressive [or reformist] regimes will pursue more social welfare policies [than 
status-quo conservative regimes]. Democratic regimes will give more voice to lower 
class beneficiaries and therefore be more responsive to their demands... " (Bossert, 
1983: 426). 
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In his testing of these hypotheses, Bossert did not find any simple relationships between regime 
characteristics and policy adoption (1983: 427-424; Reich, 1994: 425-426). Both stable (Costa Rica) and 
unstable (Guatemala and Honduras) regimes adopted the policies, as did reformist (Costa Rica and 
Sandinista Nicaragua) and `status-quo' (Guatemala and Honduras) regimes. Bossert did however identify 
several complex `contingent' relationships among the variables (1983: 426). `Status-quo' regimes that are 
threatened with instability have a greater incentive to adopt reforms as an effort to co-opt support and 
prevent opposition: Without that threat, stable, `status-quo' regimes (like pre-Sandinista Somoza) had 
little incentive to adopt such reforms (1983: 436). The other `status- quo' regime that was unstable - 
Guatemala - was indeed one of the first in the world to adopt primary health care reforms (1983: 436). 
Bossert reached similarly complex conclusions about implementation. Weak and unstable regimes 
(Honduras and Guatemala) showed a lack of centralisation and integration - two important variables for 
successful implementation, in contrast to the strong and stable regime of Costa Rica. He suggested 
however that weak, unstable regimes might not design policies that could be effectively implemented 
because the potential threat that a successful program would pose to political and economic elites. 
Moreover, when weak states did design primary care policies they were more likely to depend on foreign 
funding (Guatemala) in contrast to strong states (Costa Rica) that could allocate available resources to 
rural areas (1983: 436). The lack of clear findings in this study suggests two things: first, the need to 
move beyond hypothesis-testing in policy analysis in order to capture individual complexity, diversity and 
detail, and secondly, the importance and relevance of regime characteristics to the low politics health 
policy process. For a definition of low-politics policy, see page 37; also Walt, 1994: (42-43). 
Other studies focus on one or' more of these regime characteristics. Diamond et al (1989) in their 
study of Latin American regimes, for instance, acknowledge the importance of stability and democracy in 
analysing the developing state context. They define a stable regime as one that is deeply institutionalised 
and consolidated, making it likely to enjoy a high level of popular legitimacy. They identify partially- 
stable regimes as those that are neither fully secure nor in imminent danger of collapse. The institutions 
under such regimes, according to this view, have acquired some measure of depth, flexibility and value, 
but not enough to ensure the regime safe passage through severe challenges. Finally, they note that 
unstable regimes are by definition highly vulnerable to breakdown in periods of acute uncertainty and 
stress. New regimes, including those that have recently restored democratic governance, tend to fall into 
this category (Diamond et al, 1989: xviii). In the case of democracy, they argue that regimes have to fulfil 
three essential conditions to be labelled democratic and legitimate: 1) meaningful and extensive 
competition among individuals and organised groups (especially political parties) for all effective 
positions of government power, at regular intervals and excluding the use of force; 2) a highly inclusive 
level of political participation in the selection of leaders and policies, at least through regular and fair 
elections, such that no major (adult) social group is excluded; and 3) a level of civil and political liberties 
- freedom of expression, freedom of the press, 
freedom to form and join organisations - sufficient to 
ensure the integrity of political competition and participation. They acknowledge that no one country 
broadly satisfies these criteria perfectly, and most do so to varying degrees (1988: xvii). All three 
conditions, then, according to Diamond et al: multi party competition in a non-violent arena, 
democratised decision making and participation and full civil and political liberties - are essential to 
progressive policymaking and implementation. As noted above with the Costa Rican and Guatemalan 
examples, this is not always the case. Nevertheless, the importance of both regime stability and 
democracy to progressive policymaking and implementation is underscored in this study. 
The relationship between regime power, instability and policy reform is another interesting angle that 
is addressed by Grindle and Thomas (1989; 1991). They assert that developing state regimes do exert 
considerable power, through their domination and control of the state apparatus vis 
ä vis other national 
actors but have very, little incentive to instigate reforms. They relate this to the problems posed 
by 
persistent political vulnerability and instability: 
"... power over the state apparatus does not necessarily ensure the strength of the 
regime... developing country governments are frequently very vulnerable to 
challenge... in the absence of established systems and traditions, constitutional or 
other, reinforced by adherence over time, that regulate political competition and 
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changes of power, the legitimacy of state actions is always open to dispute. 
Challenges to the right of regimes to remain in power can emerge easily. The view 
that coups take place with great regularity in developing countries is probably 
overblown, but it is based on the record of vulnerability of these regimes... " (1991: 
57). 
In the case of regime ideology and democracy, most analysts also recognise the complex findings that 
can emerge. On the one hand, political ideology is intimately associated with reformism and a 
commitment to progressive policymaking (Bossert, 1983; Goldsworthy, 1988). This `reformism' refers to 
"... the general orientation of the regime towards an active governmental role to the benefit of wide 
segments of society... " (Bossert, 1983: 432). Bossert, for instance, found that ideologically-progressive 
regimes were more likely than `status-quo' regimes to adopt progressive policies such as primary care and 
community participation. On the other hand, the relationship was also a complex one. As he admitted, 
regime ideology, like other regime characteristics did not operate on a single dimension but interacted 
with other actors and processes in complex ways that needed to be taken into account (1983: 438). 
Sloan's findings (1989) in his study of Colombia, Chile, Brazil and Mexico in the case of education and 
health policies and regime characteristics are as complex as Bossert's. One the one hand, he noted that 
the record of democratic regimes such as Colombia in policy areas such as education and health were as 
poor as the authoritarian Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Costa Rica was the only democratic exception. 
Additionally, systems of such `distributive justice' in `democratic' states varied widely, from high (Costa 
Rica) to low levels (Colombia). On the other hand, he however found that democratic regime were on 
balance much better for progressive policy adoption and implementation than authoritarian regimes. The 
trend towards democracy in Latin America and the policy evidence indicated that democratic regimes had 
better policy capabilities to achieve a variety of developmental goals, without suffering the high levels of 
repression of authoritarian states. They could therefore achieve both distributional justice and economic 
growth (1989: 125-6). He concluded that in terms of the policy capabilities of regime types, the flexibility 
of democratic regimes was largely positive in shifting priorities and achieving moderate progress towards 
a variety of developmental goals 
Comment: The studies of Bossert (1983), Diamond et al (1989) and Sloan (1989) all point to the 
relevance of one or more of the regime characteristics that I focus on in this study. Given the complexities 
that need further examination and comparison in policy analysis -a point recognised by these studies - we 
can make two main general conclusions at this stage: first, the importance of regime strength, stability, 
ideology and democracy; and second, that the relationship between regime characteristics is much more 
complex, intricate and interlinked than single-level hypotheses can meaningfully reveal. It is therefore 
worthy of further analysis, if only to explore these intricacies by applying them to other developing states. 
While these are the four main characteristics that I wish to apply to Caribbean health human resources 
policy processes, I also want to assess the relevance of regime maintenance as an important sub-category. 
In the next section, I briefly examine the issue of regime maintenance, which deserves separate 
examination, even though it is closely linked to all four regime characteristics types, particularly regime 
democracy. 
`Maintenance' or `survivalism' as a regime characteristic 
Regime maintenance or survival is not new to the political sciences literature, although it has been 
relatively unexplored in the policy literature. It can be broadly defined as the use and allocation of the 
values and resources of the state by regimes to satisfy the needs of client groups with the goal of 
remaining in power and retaining state control. Simply put, regime maintenance means the use and 
allocation of patronage and other values to retain and control power (Ames, 1987). Two of the main 
proponents of the regime survival thesis in developing state theory are Joel Migdal and Percy Hintzen. 
The `survivalist (strong society-weak state) state' thesis: the Migdal and Hintzen approaches: Migdal 
(1988) and Hintzen (1989) both advocate the survivalist thesis in relation to certain types of developing 
states. According to Migdal's argument, the main reason why some developing states continue to be weak 
given all the resources and agencies at the disposal of their leaders, is that they face the classic political 
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dilemma: balancing their need to survive with their promotion and support of the development of complex 
organisations and state institutions. The choice of political survival at the expense of "... enhancing state 
capabilities... " thus accounts for failure to implement reform and policy changes (1988: 236). According 
to this view, weak developing states have historically had a tenuous hold on society. This is compounded by the unhelpful balance between strong societies in these countries (characterised by ethnic, caste, tribe, 
and religious bonds) on the one hand, and weak states (with leaders willing to do anything to retain 
power, including using the military). The key issue for Migdal is the impact of pluralism on survival 
politics, and the impact of survival politics on development policy. Using the examples of racially-plural 
Guyana and Trinidad, this point is taken up by Hintzen, who also notes that in plural developing states, the 
pressures on regimes to retain support while satisfying collective social needs can under certain conditions 
also lead to the practice of the politics of regime survival which can straddle both ends of this spectrum. 
Hintzen notes in this regard: 
"... if it is to ensure its own survival, a regime might find itself with little choice but 
to allocate resources and to satisfy the accumulative demands of powerful 
individuals and groups in ways which render the realisation of the collective needs 
of society highly unlikely. To deal effectively with the consequences of this, a 
regime might be forced to employ the state for coercion and control, and 
surveillance to contain the effects of social, political and economic crisis and to 
prevent destabilising anti-regime mobilisation... " (1989: 166-167). 
Hintzen, like Migdal, cautions that he is not denying the emergence and/or existence of leaders in less 
developed countries who have been, and are genuinely committed to the collective needs of their 
populations. What he stresses is that many regimes in such plural developing states often have little 
choice but to support their patron groups to retain power. Depending on how this is carried out, it can 
affect the wider development process. He thus notes that these regimes: 
"... might find themselves with no option but to give way to the demands of powerful 
interest groups in order to survive for any appreciable period. If they do not they 
might find their control of the state quite tenuous and marked by endemic political 
and economic trauma. Thus regime survival can, and usually does, come at the cost 
of the satisfaction of the collective needs of society... " (1989: 166-167). 
The implications for regime survival as an important regime category need to be considered 
separately, if only to confirm or deny Hintzen's and Migdal's assertions about the developing state policy 
arena. However, one can presume that regime survival must have quite serious effects, and hence 
relevance to the policy process of developing states polarised by particularly problematic race, caste, and 
class divisions. In the case of regime type, Bossert's study hinted at the influence of political survival 
noting that while both conservative/status quo and radical/reformist regimes were able to adopt primary 
health care, they did it for different reasons: for radical regimes, it was more for ideological reasons; while 
for the status-quo regimes, it was for co-opting support and political survival. However the 
interrelationships between regime survival, on the one hand, and the other characteristics, on the other, 
cannot be ignored even here. Scarpaci's study of health policy in Chile (1989), as well as Feinsilver's 
(1993) and Navarro's (1972) studies of Cuba seem to confirm this complexity. They all suggest some 
linkage between regimes' survival needs and their allocation of social (in both cases health) policy 
resources and values regardless of ideology. However even here, regime ideology is muddled with 
survivalist reasons that encompass both national and international level explanations. Cuba's adoption of 
a generally progressive health policy was ideologically-rooted, but was also based on both political and 
national self-sufficiency and survival in the face of sustained US aggression. Chile's authoritarian 
Pinochet regime, with its US-supported conservative agenda, offered a minimum level of medical care for 
the poor and the working class in order to co-opt them and thus enhance the regime's legitimacy and 
survival (see also Sloan, 1989). Even here however, the need to move beyond single-level explanations is 
clear as Scarpaci's interesting, but complex findings show. He found for instance that even though both 
the Pinochet and Castro regimes were ideologically poles apart, there is one influence common to both: 
they both heavily emphasised access to curative services for all, paying far less attention to preventive 
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care. In sum then, even the value of regime survival explanations have to be related to the influence of 
other regime characteristics in any analysis of the politics of developing state policy. 
Comment: Given the above, one can conclude that despite complex interrelationships, the following 
regime characteristics: strength, stability, ideology and democracy and regime survival and maintenance - 
are not only extremely relevant to developing state policy, but need to be further fleshed out and explored, 
given the preliminary studies by Bossert, Diamond et al, Sloan, Scarpaci and others. In addition, the issue 
of regime survival needs further exploration as it relates to policy adoption and implementation. Regime 
survival; was alluded to in Bossert's study, but really developed in the political sciences field by Hintzen, 
Ames and Migdal. These studies confirm the negative implications for policy adoption and 
implementation of `survivalist' policies in weak, unstable, developing states riven by caste, class, 
ethnicity and tribal divisions where policies are used as patronage for favoured groups. This is probably 
no different to developed countries where lobbyists for dominant interests and politicians also engage in 
patronage and `pork-barrel' politics. However, it seems obvious to assume that patronage and political 
survival would take on a rather different meaning when transferred to the under-resourced, socially- 
fragmented post-colonial state policy environment. 
Nevertheless, despite no simple relationships in the literature between regime characteristics and 
policy and policy reform processes, four broad conclusions are evident from this review. The first is that 
the complexity of the relationship between regime types and policy adoption suggests that policy 
experiences are as much unique to individual states as broad geographical regions, and must be assessed 
and compared in this way, as the diversity of the findings within the Latin American region illustrates. 
The second is that although the relationships remain complex, on balance, progressive policies seem to 
stand a better chance of getting on the agenda and being implemented under democratic, reformist 
regimes than status-quo regimes. Third, even though they have little incentive to adopt progressive policy 
reforms, situations of crisis and threats to survival can trigger policy reforms in status-quo regimes. 
Finally, the overall conclusion is that regime characteristics do affect how policy processes are played out 
in the national arena whether resources are available or scarce. My objective in applying the relationship 
between regime characteristics and policy processes to the Caribbean health human resources 
development policy process thus supports Bossert's overall conclusion of the usefulness for both policy 
analysts and policymakers: 
"At the very least this study suggests that advocates of policy changes take into 
account regime characteristics when they design strategies for the adoption and 
implementation ofpreferred policies... " (Bossert, 1983: 438). 
In the next two sections, I justify my focus on regime characteristics by examining both the strengths 
and weaknesses of development theories as well as policy approaches, and assessing the theoretical ways 
forward in both instances for comparative policy analysis. I begin with the theories of development by 
examining firstly the development theory impasse and the usefulness of Giddens' concept of structuration 
to developing state policy analysis. 
2.3 THE DEVELOPMENT IMPASSE AND STRUCTURATION 
Developing state policy processes are implicitly concerned about progressive development. The main 
debates in the `development' field thus need to be briefly examined to assess the implications for 
policymaking. I begin this section by defining development. I then examine the relevance of the key 
debates between agency and structure that are at the heart of developing country policy analysis. This is 
followed by an assessment of the possible contribution to this debate offered by Giddens' structuration 
thesis as the bridge between actor-and structure-based analyses in explaining developing state policy. 
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Defining `development' 
The most common definition of development, as applied to the post-colonial state encompasses the 
notion of `progressive change' at all levels - political, social and economic. The concept has its origins in 
the establishment of capitalist society where it was assumed to be the natural state of affairs in Eurocentric 
enlightenment thought. The only question that was asked was "... how far and how fast... " until, at least, 
the post-war period when the emergence of the rapidly decolonising `third world' presented new dilemmas 
for the newly emerging `international community' (Hadjor, 1993: 98). In general though, the definition of 
development as `the process of being developed' as it relates to the progressive social, political and 
economic advancement of people and societies in developing states is the one used in this study. This 
interpretation needs to be placed into the context of the two dominant strands of post-war, post-colonial 
development thought: modernisation and dependency which are extremely relevant to developing state 
comparative policy analysis as we shall see. 
The modernisation and dependency approaches to development 
Two broad sets of approaches to `third world' development have dominated the post-war debate: the 
modernisation (or neo-evolutionary, stages of growth) approaches, and the neo-Marxian `dependency' 
approaches. The emergence of both approaches during this period was at a time when most of the former 
territories of the colonising European powers gained their independence, with questions being asked from 
both sides of the ideological divide about the `development' prospects of these states. The modernisation 
approach was essentially the conservative prescription for development, while the dependency approach, a 
variant of Marxism, was articulated by the Latin American `left', but represented the concerns of many 
within these newly-emerging states. We begin with the modernisation approach. 
Modernisation: The `modernisation' view, popularised by Rostow and Myrdal among others, was 
primarily concerned with economic growth, seeing `development' as an evolutionary process with 
Western states at the apex of modernity. It borrowed heavily from social theories, particularly Weber's 
`protestant ethic', as well as Parson's structural-functionalism, in underlining the imperative of the 
compatibility and interrelationship between economic, social, political and cultural structures to explain 
why development was not occurring in post-colonial states (Rostow, 1960; Myrdal et al, 1968; Hoogvelt, 
1978: 186)1. Prior to the two world wars, `development' was thought unable to happen in `backward' 
colonial societies. However, after 1945, these opinions could no longer be sustained as newly 
independent third world countries were themselves increasingly exploring various economic development 
strategies (Hadjor, 1993: 100). Western `modernising' theorists saw development as primarily economic 
growth occurring in progressive stages with strategies and societal constructs that modelled the 
Western 
approach. Development was therefore equated with progressive industrial capitalism. 
Essentially, the 
argument went that former colonies lagged behind because of `backward' peoples, traditions and values - 
factors that were not conducive to development. Developing countries could however `evolve' and 
`develop' as long as `modern', Western liberal-democratic cultural values, along with technology, 
expertise and capital were diffused into their societies on a sustained basis with the active participation of 
local Western-educated elites. The `modemisationists' argued that the movement towards devolution of 
powers away from authoritarianism to highly specialised bureaucracies and government agencies was 
critical to development. This factor, together with changes in social conditions through communications 
and education would generate a complexity in developing state political systems that would 
be able to 
satisfy, in the long run, as many different political interests as possible and 
in doing so further the 
development process (Robertson, (1985: 213). In essence then, the modernisation argument stressed that 
incremental change, characterised by `modern' western, liberal-democratic values was the only way 
forward for these new states, that would satisfy both the drive for democracy after colonial rule, while 
simultaneously promoting `modern' development. 
g For a comprehensive literature review of both approaches, see Hoogvelt, 197a ;k 
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Dependency: The main approach to the criticism of this hitherto generally-accepted development 
strategy in post-colonial societies came in the 1960s from the Latin American neo-Marxian/dependency 
school. Like classic Marxism, these theorists criticised the modernisation concept for its total ignorance 
of the role and influence of national and international class and power relations, particularly the role and 
influence of imperialism and `dependent' development. Far from being a natural state of affairs that 
would eventually happen to other states who rigidly followed it, Gunder Frank and others argued that 
Western economic growth and development was the outcome of a progressive system, not of 
development, but of power domination and exploitation of the peripheral regions by the core, rapidly 
industrialising countries. They essentially saw, then, development and underdevelopment as opposite 
ideas of the same process: development in one region was occurring at the expense of underdevelopment 
in another (Harrison, 1988: 150). In order to escape such perpetual underdevelopment, according to this 
perspective third world countries, accordingly had to become socialist and then either `go it alone' or 
develop links with other socialist countries (Harrison, 1988: 151). 
The main failure of both approaches was that neither could claim to explain the totality of `third world' 
experiences in the post-war period, since they essentially ignored each others main tenets. For instance, 
the modernizationists, on the one hand, ignored the international web of power relationships exemplified 
by the `core-periphery' nature of dependent capitalism, and with it, the pervasiveness of historical/colonial 
factors. The dependency theorists, on the other, ignored the persistence of capitalism, the problems with 
existing socialist models, and most importantly perhaps, in the case of policy processes in post-colonial 
states, the capacity for self-willed action - both good and bad - by developing state regimes, and political 
actors within these societies. In addition, dependency theorists could not explain the evident growth and 
rapid development of the South-East Asian former colonies. These problems with both approaches led to 
an impasse in the development debate, and was further heightened by the continued economic failures 
throughout the third world apart from the few South East Asian cases after the 1960s (Booth, 1994; 
Harrison, 1988; Manzo, 1991). This impasse led to a renewed interest in the role of actors and processes 
at the national and sub-national levels as possible clues to explaining both the occurrence of development 
and underdevelopment. These criticisms, acknowledged in the post-impasse debates of the 1980s, were 
first, an exclusive focus on the `third world' to the exclusion of the cyclical, changing nature of external 
(international) factors and their influences. The second main critique was the ignorance of societally- 
specific historical processes as well as `ad-hoc', unplanned events and an excessive focus on the national 
and international levels to the exclusion of the local or sub-national issues (Buttel and Mc Michael, 1994: 
48; Booth, 1994: 7-8). The outcome of these failures was encapsulated, thirdly, in the excessive tendency 
to generalise about or across the `third world' in the search for `universal' theoretical explanations about 
the development process. As Buttel and Mc Michael warned: 
"... the empirical realities of state-economy relations are distinct across time and 
space; developmental theory that collapses these distinctions in striving for 
universal validity across the Third World is ... inconsistent with these realities... 
" 
(Buttel and Mc Michael, 1994: 48). 
The contribution of `structuration' theory to the agency/structure impasse 
One of the main contributions to a possible solution to the `actor-structure' impasse, albeit at a general 
political-sociological level, is Anthony Giddens' structuration thesis. Although the `agency-structure' 
critiques in development studies really started in the early to mid-1980s, its origins in political sociology 
can be traced to the 1970s in Giddens' development and popularisation of `structurationist' theory. 
Unsatisfied with the polarised interpretative writings of Weber and Durkheim on the one hand and the 
deterministic and equally polarised Marxist studies on the other, he proposed structuration theory as an 
inclusive approach, set against the separate "empire-building endeavours" of the pluralists and 
structuralists/elitists respectively (Giddens, 1977: 2)2. Structuration theory, as proposed by Giddens, 
2 For an excellent critical summary of Giddens' development of structuration theory, see Cloke et al (1991) 
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sought to recognise the importance of both agency and structure. This realist or dualist approach, incorporated the essential strengths of both perspectives: first, the important recognition of human beings 
as capable actors, and not as "... cultural dupes of structural determinism... " while simultaneously 
recognising, secondly, the equal importance of structural/societal factors such as power struggles within 
organisations and its influences on interest group articulation (Cloke, et al, 1991: 95; Giddens, 1977: 2). 
After criticisms from both humanists and structuralists, two other interesting ideas were incorporated 
into structuration theory which are also useful to policy analysis and policymaking. The first was the 
`time-space' factor within which social life takes place, and an important issue in policy analysis 
(Hoogerwerf, 1990). Secondly was the `core-periphery' concept of actors and processes. This is the view 
that `core' actors have established their power and control over resources, while, as the name implies. 
`peripheral' actors are outside of this power structure. Another useful concept for policymaking and 
policy analysis in structuration theory is `regionalisation', or `zoning'. For example, in its application to 
human geography, main city districts could be described as `front zones', at the front-line of 
developments, and the centre of attention (Cloke et al, 1991: 114-115). These front zones, according to 
Giddens' thesis, operate on a different level of interaction with specific rules and resources. This is 
contrasted to those `back zones' for example neglected, decaying docklands and inner cities which are 
usually unsightly, underdeveloped, with little or no resources for regeneration. There is room in Giddens' 
formulation however for movement from one `zone' to the other on the `time-change-space' continuum 
(Cloke et al, 114-115). 
The relevance of `structuration' to policymaking 
Given the issues raised earlier about the role and importance of political versus economic factors, as 
well as the impasse in development theory in the 1980s and 1990s, structuration has much to offer post- 
colonial state policy analysis. The parallels and relevance to policy analysis are clear. It raises issues 
about policy timing, power relations of actors within states as well as states themselves, the nature of the 
policy context and perhaps its greatest contribution, the absolute necessity to relate and recognise actors to 
their inhibiting or facilitating structures, for more meaningful and accurate interpretations. Structuration 
also has much resonance in existing social theories of power such as Alford's structuralist `dominant', 
`challenging' and `repressed' policy actor categories used in his analysis of the dominance of the medical 
profession and the medical model (Cloke, 1991: 109-115; Alford, 1969; 1975). At the international actor 
level, this `core-periphery' analysis can also be applied to explain the dominance of developed states and 
para-statal institutions and their level of influence in post-colonial state' development and 
underdevelopment processes. It is an analytic model that also therefore has much in common with the 
`core-periphery' idea at the heart of the dependency approach to development. 
Finally, both Giddens' regionalisation and time-space explanations have quite a lot of resonance in 
recent comparative policy analyses in developing states, particularly Grindle and Thomas' study (1991) of 
the role and influence of policy elites in explaining policy reform. According to Grindle and Thomas, the 
influence of power (and who holds it) is as critical to agenda-setting and eventual implementation as 
resource availability. Therefore, policy areas - such as economic policy - where the stakes are higher and 
more resources are involved, will naturally command more attention from both bureaucratic and political 
elites, than those, such as health and education policy where much less stakes - power and resources - are 
involved. Additionally, Giddens' idea of the possibility of one policy moving from the `back zone' to the 
`front zone' at both the agenda-setting and implementation levels, sometimes against great odds also 
enhances its relevance to policy analysis. On the issue of the time-space policy continuum, regimes and 
leaders are as much subject to changing circumstances (the loss of elections, death, new external 
constraints) as the subjective environments in which they operate. To ignore the time-change factor in 
policy therefore is to ignore the `dynamic' element that characterises and defines policy, a fact recognised 
by Grindle and Thomas, (1989: 231) among others. 
Comment: The main reason for the development theory impasse was largely a failure to balance grand 
theorising with the consideration of other deeper and ultimately more meaningful levels of explanations, 
hence the value of approaches such as structuration. The relevance of structuration to my case study of 
the politics of the Caribbean health policy process is that I wanted to find such a balance by focusing on 
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the important, but under-explained politics issue without ignoring the important structural, contextual 
issues. The strong interrelationship between actor and structure as underscored by Giddens' study means 
that both must be recognised and accommodated in comparative policy analysis. The development 
impasse testifies to this. My concern was that the focus has been heavily skewed - for justifiable reasons - 
on the militating national economic as well as external and international political and economic factors, to 
the detriment of other explanations, particularly the role of national politics. Giddens thesis thus offers for 
the developing country policy analyst, the chance to make interpretations that are cognisant of both levels 
while not detracting from particular focus or interest in either one or the other meso- or macro-levels of 
analysis. 
My main focus in this study is on the role and influence of national regime actors on post-colonial state 
policy, within specific structural contexts and within a specific time period, characterised by much change. 
In adopting an integrative, structurationist approach to frame my study, I hope to partially redress the 
current imbalance by recognising the capacity for action by at least one dominant national actor: the 
regime. In doing so however, I also hope to show that explanations for developing state policy action 
must ultimately be sought from both levels: in this case, the national actor-based variables such as the 
behaviours and characteristics of governing regimes, as well as the prevailing structural influences that 
can potentially retard or promote development policy. In the next section, I further underline the case for 
regime characteristics analysis using an integrated, structurationist approach by showing how the need for 
some level of commensurability across paradigms, as seen in the development debate, also needs to be 
applied to the various policy analysis perspectives, particularly in their applicability to developing state 
policy environments. 
2.4 STATE AND SOCIETY-BASED APPROACHES TO POLICY ANALYSIS 
In this section, I examine the two broad approaches to policy analysis: the state- and society-based 
approaches - in order to asses their respective merits to analysing the relationship between regime 
characteristics and policy processes in developing states. I begin by examining the relevance of the state- 
based approaches to my study. 
State-based' approaches to policy analysis 
The main state-based approaches are the rational actor-; the bounded rationality-; the bureaucratic 
politics- and the state interests approaches. 
First, the rational actor approach focuses on the innate rationality of state policy actors making 
rational policy choices for the whole of society. After assessing various courses of action based on 
accumulated information, the rational actor chooses the best option based on his `rational' preferences 
and prospective societal benefits (Walt, 1994: 4; Grindle and Thomas, 1989: 219). The main problem 
with this approach is that neither optimal information nor fortuitous timing are always available in the real 
world, a fact applicable to both developed and developing states. Neither is there such a thing as a value- 
free or non-contextually-determined decision (Grindle and Thomas, 1989: 220; Walt, 1994: 46-48). The 
`bounded rationality/satisficing/incrementalist' approach is, by contrast, a much more realistic approach 
to explaining how decisions are generally made in both developed and developing states. Originating 
from March and Simon's (1958) notion that organisations and institutions operate on the basis of 
`bounded' or `limited' rationality, the argument is essentially that: 
"... because of the complexity of perfectly rational choice and its cost in terms of 
time and attention, decision-makers (whether individuals or organisations) do not 
usually attempt to achieve optimal solutions to problems, but find ones that satisfy 
their basic criteria for an acceptable alternative or ones that meet satisfactory 
standards... " (Grindle and Thomas, 1989: 220). 
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In terms of applications to developing country political environments, the middle approach of the bounded rationalists is more realistic for both analysts and policymakers alike, than the `wish-list' nature 
of rational decisionmaking (Allison, 1971: Killick, 1976). As Walt notes: 
"... the point is that one model is really an ideal model of policy making (how it 
ought to be made and the other is describing what actually happens in the policy 
process (how policy is made). Both have validity, one as a normative prescriptive 
model, the other as an explanatory or descriptive model... " (1994: 51). 
The bureaucratic politics approach focuses exclusively on the relationship between different groups 
of bureaucratic actors within the state system and their relative influences over policy goals and outcomes. 
This approach credits bureaucrats with much power in the way the use their positions, expertise, 
knowledge and resources to influence policy choices in their favour. The best example of the conflicting 
roles of different divisional bureaucracies for policy, albeit in a crisis situation, is Allison's account 
(1971) of the evolution of American foreign policy during the Cuban missile crisis. The advantage of this 
model is that it offers insights into the workings of the different arms of the state bureaucracy, which not 
only implements but helps shape the technical features of policy. This may well be influenced by any 
number of factors prevailing in the bureaucratic context. The main problem with this approach is that 
again it sidelines, if not ignores, the importance of societal factors as important influences on policy 
choice that are arguably more important than the micro-decisionmaking process within small developing 
state bureaucracies. As Grindle and Thomas note, it was primarily developed by Allison to explain a 
foreign policy crisis situation, but in the more drawn-out, `politics-as-usual' arenas where long-standing 
problems of policy reform have been extensive and prolonged, it offers little insight by its singular 
ignorance of the societal factors that are also usually responsible (Grindle and Thomas: 30). More 
importantly, its method was devised specifically for the bureaucratic/organisational study of a developed 
country's internal crisis-driven policy making process. This approach can however be a potentially useful 
pointer to regime behaviour and characteristics. Although important, powerful policy actors within 
developing states, bureaucracies have remained, until recently relatively unreformed, ineffective relics of 
colonialism which politicians have either its used or sidelined according to their needs at the time. 
However, its overall use as noted above in the small Caribbean post-colonial state context, though 
insightful, would be limited given both the size factor, as well as generally different political `assumptive 
worlds' of the developing state policy environment. 
Finally, the state interests approach posits that the state (and its policy elites) is an autonomous actor 
that is capable of recognising and defining problems and developing appropriate policies to remedy these 
situations. Among the interests of the state, according to this approach, are the achievement and 
maintenance of its own hegemony vis ä vis other societal actors, the maintenance of social stability, the 
pursuit of national development as defined by policy elites representing particular regimes and the 
particular interests of regime incumbents in retaining power (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 30-31; Stepan, 
1985; Nordlinger, 1987; Skocpol, 1985; Migdal, 1988). The importance of this `state autonomy' 
approach to understanding policy choice is that state actions may lead to policies that may not necessarily 
please powerful elites and other societal groups. The main problem with this approach is that the state's 
capacity to act autonomously can be constrained by factors such as timing, circumstances and, arguably 
more important, party politics including regime characteristics and behaviour (Migdal, 1988, Skocpol, 
1985). Nevertheless, this approach does offer the possibility of self-willed state action which has much 
relevance to the core of my thesis. 
Comment: State-based approaches are very useful in underscoring the fact that policies are actually 
made daily in developing states, despite considerable economic and other constraints and limitations. 
However these approaches negate questions of power and political motivations of policy elites when they 
make or try to influence policy. The fact that influential policy actors including politicians, bureaucrats, 
and special interests can either directly manipulate outcomes by exercising various levels of power is not 
discussed or considered. Equally we cannot ignore the fact that motivations can be both positive as well 
as negative. Bounded rationality and the state interests approaches do offer, on the one hand, a sound 
view -essentially rational - of policy making through examination of both the micro- and macro- levels of 
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policy. We need however to balance these approaches by incorporating the role of power and power- based motivations in the process if we want to have a realistic, balanced explanation of policy successes 
and failures and general experiences in the developing state. We now turn therefore to examine the other broad perspectives that places power at the centre of their analysis: the `society-centred' approaches. 
Society-based approaches 
Society-based or power-centred approaches largely comprise the pluralist- and the elitist- or neo- 
Marxian perspectives. 
The pluralist/public-i nterest/incrementalist approach has linkages to early development 
(modernisation) theory and is different from other society-based approaches in that while recognising the 
influence of power on decisions, it sees this power as divided equally among the various interests in 
society. Lindblom, its main proponent argued that developed countries like the United States comprise 
interest groups that were equally able to defend their interests through a process of `muddling through' 
incrementally within such `plural' societies (1959). The motivation element, at least according to 
Lindblom's early pluralist theory, was the common good, with no interests entirely ignored. The pluralist 
then, according to this view, sees public policy outcomes in such societies as more or less equitable 
outcomes arising out of a process of conflict, bargaining and coalition formation or `partisan mutual 
adjustment' among a potentially large number of societal groups (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 23). These 
groupings may be based on regions, ethnic groups, religion or shared values (including ideology) among 
other issues. The state is thus a neutral arbiter for the competing interests. This process is called bounded 
pluralism as no one elite dominates decisions and different groups compete and policy outcomes are in the 
public interest (Walt, 1994: 4). Through partisan mutual adjustment, issues are resolved, while the 
system of dispersed power enabled more values to be protected than a system of centralised co-ordination. 
The elitist/neo-Marxian response: 
Elitists such as Etzioni (1967: 387) and Harrison et al (1990) challenged the ignorance of the 
power/dominance question within this perspective, arguing that 1) partisan mutual adjustment favoured 
the well-organised partisans and worked against the underprivileged in society; 2) that it was not 
necessarily mutual; 3) that incrementalism neglected the issue of innovation and the fundamental 
questions which bring about change; and 4) that incrementalism was also present in totalitarian societies. 
Lindblom (1977: 346) later acknowledged the power issue recognising that partisan mutual adjustment 
was biased in favour of certain groups, such as big corporations. As Ham and Hill point out however, in 
resisting the idea of central planning, and opting instead for "greatly improved strategic policy making", 
both analytical and interactive, Lindblom virtually concedes the inequality of power distribution among 
partisans in developed society policy arenas (Ham & Hill, 1993: 96). . 
The main response to pluralism came from the neo-Marxist elitist school. The Mills/Dahl `elite 
domination' school, whose chief proponents are C. Wright-Mills and Robert Dahl criticised the pluralists, 
noting that far from being a neutral arbiter, liberal democratic states such as the USA were governed by a 
`power elite' comprising big, business, the military and state institutional interests. As Dahl put it in his 
famous `who gets what and how' thesis: "A has power over B to the extent that he can get B to do 
something that B would not otherwise do" (1957: 203). Dahl' was in turn criticised by the chief advocates 
of the `the non-decisional' approach, Bachrach and Baratz. 
The main point of the Bachrach/Baratz `non-decision-making' school was that non-decisions were 
also effectively decisions. They argued that power does not simply involve examining key decisions and 
actual behaviour: "... power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating or reinforcing social 
and political and institutional practices that limit the scope of the political process to public consideration 
of only those issues which are comparatively innocuous to A... " (1962: 948). As Ham and Hill note, this 
approach encompasses the notion of mobilisation of bias: "a process which confines decision-making to 
safe issues" as well as Easton's idea of "... gatekeepers who regulate the flow of demands in the political 
arena... " though these gate-keepers are more concerned with system preservation and political stability 
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(Ham & Hill, 1993: 67-68; Easton, 1953; 1965). It raises also the idea of the two faces of power 
argument: one `face' operating at the level of overt conflicts over key issues, the other operating through a 
process of `nondecision-making' to suppress conflicts and prevent them from entering the political process (1993: 67-68). They also points to the need to explain how and why political systems can themselves 
`control inputs into the system, rather than inputs determining political action (1993: 42). The 
nondecision-making argument is essentially that demand regulation is not neutral but "... operates to the 
advantage of the powerful and against the less powerful", with power being less plural than Dahl and the 
pluralists maintain (Ham and Hill, 1993: 68). 
In response to the pluralist critique that nondecision-making was unresearchable, Bachrach and Baratz 
(1970: 44) stated that nondecisions lay in researching "... covert grievances and the existence of conflicts 
that do not enter the political arena... ". Acccording to them, if no grievances are uncovered, then 
nondecision-making has not occurred. One of the more widely cited studies of nondecision-making is 
Crenson's comparative analysis of air pollution policy in two American cities: Gary, Indiana and East 
Chicago, Indiana. Crenson found that while East Chicago had passed a law controlling pollution in 1949, 
Gary did not act until 1962, largely because of the domination and power of a single US company US 
Steel in the latter. Despite its obvious advantages in explaining non-decisionmaking power in liberal 
democracies, this approach also had its non-pluralist critiques, the main one being Lukes. 
The Lukes `third dimension of power' school took the non decisionmaking power argument a stage 
further by advocating the idea of `latent conflict', which occurred when "... A exercises power over B, 
when A affects B in a manner contrary to B's interests... " (1974: 27). Lukes contribution to the debate 
was that the presence of consensus did not rule out the "... possibility of false or manipulated consensus by 
definitional fiat... " (Lukes, 1974: 24) Thus, Bachrach and Baratz's thesis on non decision-making was 
deemed inadequate because it did not address the possibility that power could be used to prevent even 
covert conflict and potential issues emerging on the agenda. Clegg extended this third dimension thesis 
by focusing on the diffusion of values. He argued that power could also be expressed in "... the prevailing 
set of values... [and]... works systematically through its expression in the organisation, to the advantage of 
some individuals or groups, rather than others... " (1981: 136). In the case of health policy, this view has 
some resonance in Alford's study of the dominant, challenging and repressed categories in the health 
sector (Ham, 1985; Alford, 1975). The main difference between the `third dimension' and the `two faces' 
approaches to power therefore lies in assertion of the former that power can be used to manipulate 
peoples' interests and preferences. 
Comment: Issues of power and its various manifestations, as noted in the above neo-Marxian elitist 
models are particularly important for policy analysis of both developing and developed states (Walt, 59- 
60; Leichter, 1979: 7). Leichter suggests that public policies and policy decisions are for the most part 
merely statements of governmental intent. He notes that the fact that actors have proclaimed their desire 
to do something does not guarantee that any steps will actually be taken in that particular policy direction. 
He also adds that policy impact is often complicated by the fact that the consequences of a policy may be 
intended as well as unintended. Unintended outputs may be both positive and negative and might even 
create political instability. Walt's broad definition of policy similarly incorporates these ideas of `intent' 
and `inaction' noting that policy can be seen as "... a series of more or less related activities and their 
intended and unintended consequences for those concerned... " (1995: 40-41). As she noted, this can be 
refined, in the case of government policy to incorporate all levels and combinations of action: from 
intended-, to actual- and `ad-hoc' actions, as well as inaction. In terms of inaction as policy, one often- 
cited example is American health care policy, where until the 1960s, when stronger demands for the 
reduction of inequalities were placed on the mainstream public agenda, US health policy was "... defined 
largely by an absence of interference with private enterprise in stimulating and meeting a growing demand 
for health care... " (Heidenheimer et al, 1990: 5; Walt, 1994: 41). In such a scenario, according to this 
view, the issues raised by Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes and others dominate the policy agenda. As 
Heidenheimer et al see it: 
"... government inaction, or non-decision becomes a policy when it is pursued over 
time in a fairly consistent way against pressures to the contrary... it is never easy to 
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say just when passivity begins to assume the characteristics of a public policy, but 
the growth of controversy is one good clue.. . what matters for purposes of identifying `policy in repose " is that the issue be perceived by at least some major participants 
as being on the political agenda. At that point it becomes possible to compare 
meaningfully one government's `hands-on' approach to another's `hands of' 
approach to the same issue... " (Heidenheimen et al, 1990: 5). 
The negative outcomes in the early 1990s of President Clinton's proposed health reforms, despite 
following on the heels of his popular re-election, given the power of his main opponents - the medical, 
pharmaceutical and health insurance lobbies - bears testament to the role of power-induced inaction as 
policy. This is by no means confined to developed states. Although the context is considerably different, 
the power of the medical lobby in developing countries to influence action and inaction must be factored 
into any policy analysis. 
Another society-based perspective is the `new right/public choice/private interest' approach. It takes 
the `agency/capacity for action' argument to its extreme in advocating ever more shrinkage of the state 
from society. It sees society composed of organised groups and interests. However, unlike the pluralist 
approach, it sees the state as one of these self-interested `rent-seeking' actors; not as a neutral arbiter. 
According to this view, the state competes alongside private interest actors, forging alliances and making 
decisions which may or may not necessarily be in the public interest (Walt, 1994: 4; Grindle and Thomas, 
1991: 24-26). There is, accordingly, a mutually-rewarding, power-based relationship in this self- 
interested state. Interest groups use money, expertise, political connections, votes and other resources to 
extract benefits from governments. Elected officials and governments are fundamentally concerned with 
maintaining power and are rewarded from their patrons in various ways, the most obvious being political 
and financial support (Ames, 1987: Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 24). This complementary and mutually- 
rewarding relationship, according to Grindle and Thomas, answers the question of "... why reasonable men 
[sometimes] adopt public policies that have harmful consequences for the societies they govern... " 
(Grindle and Thomas: 24; Bates, 1981: 3). 
The strength of this approach is that it explains why policies in the public interest are not always 
implemented. It thus acknowledges the influence of corruption, "... the importance of the power-seeking 
motivation of decision-makers... " and their regime maintenance instincts (Grindle and Thomas, 1991: 26). 
The main criticism of this model is its profoundly negative, right-wing and cynical view of politics that 
does not allow public officials some level of independent judgement that rises beyond personal and 
professional interests and does not countenance the existence of public officials "... who may adopt goals 
that transcend the interests of many particular group... " Grindle and Thomas (1989: 245). Toye similarly 
agrees that: "... to attribute individual self-interest as their exclusive motive to politicians in developing 
countries is to deny their sincerity, their merit and, ultimately, their legitimate right to govern... " (1993: 
135-136). In addition, as Grindle and Thomas have noted, public choice approaches reveal little about 
how such motivations are developed or changed over time (1989: 245). Both positions are valid. The fact 
that there are many honest elected officials throughout the developed and developing world striving to 
improve the lives of people through their roles as public policymakers, does not invalidate the equally 
relevant fact that many elected officials in both types of states also act in their own interests, and 
oftentimes, to the detriment of national development. Similarly, the idea that the private sector is 
universally bad and the public sector good, is much too simplistic, hence the need for developing state 
public policy analysts, in particular, to approach policy development in a balanced way. 
Comment: Three broad themes emerge from this review of the state-and society-based approaches, 
which, although formulated for developed states, have much to contribute to the analysis of developing 
state policy arenas and experiences. The first is that there is no such thing as a rational, value free 
decision. Most policyrnakers use a `bounded rational' approach to decide upon what they consider the 
best use for the best of available resources, given available knowledge. The second theme is the role and 
influence of power within any power and its relatively unequal distribution among actors. In this regard, 
the contributions of the elitist school in the contribution of Mills and Dahl are very important. Similarly, 
the importance of nondecision making highlighted by Bachrach and Baratz, and its further development 
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by Lukes and others make this a pertinent policy issue worthy of investigation for the developing country 
policy analyst. Finally, what emerged, particularly from the society-based approaches is role of the self- interested actor, be it the state or regime, the bureaucracy, professional and other interests, and possible implications for policymaking: another issue of concern in developing states. This is very often negated 
or ignored in development policy dialogues. In sum then, the societal-based approaches, through their focus on the power issue, are extremely relevant to developing state policymaking, although the state- based approaches also have explanatory value. 
A realistic understanding of the policy process should recognise that developing as well as developed 
country politicians and policy elites are at least as interested in surviving politically - maintaining their jobs, power and influence - as they are in developing progressive policies for their societies. However, 
there is the equal need to recognise that this balance for developing states is heavily dependent on 
contextual factors, the main one usually being resource scarcity. Finding out how far agency and structure 
each influence developing state policy processes thus depends on deeper comparative examinations of the 
national level. These approaches illuminate the various strengths and weaknesses of approaches to policy 
analyses. As Ham and Hill and others have emphasised however, these strengths and weaknesses make it 
imperative to "... draw on ideas from a number of academic disciplines, particularly political science and 
sociology... " (1993: 11). In striving for an integrative approach, we need therefore to consider issues such 
as development country regime and non-action, as well as the role of regime characteristics within specific 
national policy contexts. Only by doing so can we cover both the macro-level big picture (such as 
historical and structural factors) and the micro-level close-up shots referred to by Etzioni (1967). These 
issues are further explored in the next section where I assess the policy process itself. 
2.5 ANALYSING THE POLICY PROCESS IN THE DEVELOPING STATE 
In this section, I first examine the various definitions of policy This is followed by a critically 
examination of Easton's political systems analysis model. 
Defining policy and policy reform 
Policy and policy reform are essentially about the power and processes involved in making choices 
and/or changing decisions, within specific contexts (Walt, 1994: 1). The term `policy' originates from the 
Greek term `politeia' meaning government or citizenship (Scruton, 1982: 358). Most formal definitions 
of policy incorporate a `dynamic', power-based, multi-decisional element. According to Scruton, policy 
can be defined as "... the general principles which guide the making of laws, administration and executive 
acts of government in domestic and international affairs... " (Scruton, 1982: 358). Hall and Kleckowski 
similarly define it as a statement of intent or direction that provides institutions and individuals with 
guidelines for action (1978: 301). Anderson describes a policy decision as a single binding act by an 
authoritative entity "... that authorises or gives direction and content to public policy actions... " (1975: 3). 
However, the multi-actor, multi-decisional nature of policy is key, as he also states that it is "... a 
purposive course of action followed by an actor or set of actors with a problem or matter of concern... " 
(Anderson, 1975: 3). Easton suggests that a policy "consists of a web of decisions and actions that 
allocate ... values 
(1953: 130). Jenkins similarly posits that policy is "a set of interrelated 
decisions... concerning the selection of goals and the means of achieving them within a specified situation" 
(1978: 15). Given these definitions, it can be deduced that policy is also about power and the motivations, 
incentives and power-related contexts that influence can influence a variety of policy actions and 
responses. Scruton defines power as "... the ability to achieve whatever effect is desired, whether or not in 
the face of opposition... " (1982: 366). He goes on: 
"... power is a matter of degree; it can be conferred, delegated, shared and limited. 
The power of a charismatic leader may be based in consent, while that of a tyrant 
usually is not.. . power may 
be exercised through influence or through 
control... because power (unlike authority, legitimacy and right) is an indisputable 
fact, as such, because it seldom exists without also being exercised... there have 
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arisen various power theories of politics, which see power as the substance, of 
which politics is the form... " (1982: 366). 
Scruton's definition conveys the indisputable and substantive characteristics of power as well as the 
various levels to which it can be exercised. It does not however explain power motivations or covert 
power. One of the key questions in addressing policy making in developing countries is the extent to 
which power relations in these societies differ from developed country variants. Much of policy theory 
acknowledges actors' motivations (Jenkins, 1993) or assumptive worlds (Ham, 1982; 1985). Jenkins 
notes that the way to explain and analyse the relationship between policy processes and outcomes is to: 
"... establish some conceptual grasp of motivation and behaviour. Without such a 
grasp, responses to policy can be neither understood or anticipated. To assume 
individuals or organisational elites behave rationally (perhaps the most elementary 
behavioural model) is often an oversimplification. An understanding of behaviour 
and motivation is central to an understanding of policy outcomes and impact... " 
(1978: 42). 
In addition to power, motivation, dynamic processes and any number of actors, policy is also about 
timing and contextual relevance. Indeed `process' implies a time-space continuum. In the case of time, 
Anderson states that "... policy making typically involves a pattern of action extending over time and 
involving many decisions... " (1975: 10). Minogue adds that: 
"... the policy analyst... cannot ignore the overall policy process which is created by 
the interaction of decisions, policy networks, organisations, actors and events. Nor 
can he avoid the broader environment within which the public policy process is 
located; that is, he must pay due regard to the interaction of society and economy, 
in the effort to understand the political consequences of this interaction... " (1993: 
11). 
Policy is also about non-decisions as we have noted in the previous section. Heclo states that "... a 
policy may usefully be considered as a course of action or inaction rather than specific decisions or 
actions... " (1972: 84). Finally, on the issue of reform, the concept of reform itself implies a change from 
the status-quo, which essentially is at that heart of all policymaking. 
Comment: Policies can range from a written statement of intent to legislative material. It can also be 
gleaned from action, words and deeds as much as non-action and limited action. It can involve one 
decision taken by a single actor, or a series of decisions taken by a number of actors, or any other 
permutation of actors and decisions thereof. It also involves a specific time element, and related to this a 
dynamism that are part of both policy and context. Finally, policy encompasses dynamic networks of 
political, socio-cultural, economic action and interaction at various levels: sub-national, organisational, 
national, international, and regional. The above definitions are about policy, but equally apply to power 
and process in policy reform processes. This applies to both developed and developing states. Policy 
reform is conditioned by the power of actors, their motivations in exerting such power. It is also 
influenced by the content of the prospective reforms as well as the wider policy context that influences any 
policy action. My study focuses on this power and motivation in relation to national political actors 
within the Caribbean post-colonial state - as reflected in their `regime' characteristics: regime strength, 
stability, ideology, democracy and regime survival or maintenance. Having assessed both the state- and 
societal theoretical approaches to analysis, as well as the above definitions of policy, we need to see how a 
hypothetical policy system works. This will be examined in the next section. 
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The Easton model 
One of the best hypothetical models of policy is Easton's systems model. In this section, I first 
examine and critique this model, after which I explore some more realistic approaches that address the 
issue of regime characteristics - as manifested in power and motivations - that is at the heart of this study. 
Easton's systems model outlines, in a biological/organic way, the consensual character and functions 
of the policy making system (1953,1965). Political activity is explained as a biological system containing 
a number of processes, based on the `authoritative allocation of values' for society. Like a biological 
organism, the political `system' must remain in balance if it is to survive. The three key processes that 
need to be balanced are 1) inputs; 2) the `black box' of government decision making; and 3) outputs. 
Inputs are the demands, support and resources. Demands involve actions by individual and groups 
seeking allocation of those resources from the authorities. Support includes, inter alia, voting and 
obedience to the law (Walt, 1994: 16). Resources enable the governments to satisfy the demands being 
made on the system. These feed into the `black box' of decision-making or `conversion process' and 
produces outputs, namely the decisions and policies of the authorities. Outputs, according to this 
approach, are distinguished from outcomes which are the effects on citizens (Ham and Hill, 1993: 15). 
While an easily understood model of the main elements of policy, the main problems with the Easton 
model are: 1) its almost exclusive focus on the value-free `neutrality' and consensus of government 
activity rather than power conflicts and even manipulation of policy; and 2) its static nature which does 
not contemplate content or contextual-related policy changes. First, in the case of power, Ham and Hill 
warn of need to recognise that: 
"... policies may be intended to improve social conditions, but this should be part of 
the object of enquiry, rather than the assumption of research... through the 
manipulation of language and the creation of crisis, the authorities may impose 
their own definitions of problems and help to frame the political agenda" (1993: 
15). 
This point is particularly pertinent in the typical developing state policy environment where the 
political system is relatively underdeveloped in terms of active participation by interests groups at all 
levels of society. In such an environment, the agenda can be easily controlled and manipulated by 
dominant political actors, such as regimes, and their supporting elites. In relation to the time factor, they 
note that: 
"Yesterday's statements of intent may not be the same as today's, either because of 
incremental change adjustments to earlier decisions or because of major changes in 
direction... this is not to say that policies are always changing, but simply that the 
policy process is dynamic rather than static and that we need to be aware of the 
shifting definition of issues... " (1993: 12). 
The timing factor, in addition to supporting Giddens' argument of its inherent importance, also 
incorporates Hogwood and Gunn (1984) and Hogwood and Peters (1983) idea of much of policymaking 
being essentially concerned with policy termination or policy succession. Finally, Ham and Hill's critique 
of the systems model, as reinforced by Bachrach and Baratz, Lukes and others, like Heclo (1972) also 
recognises the importance of `non-decisions' or `inaction': 
"the concept of non decision-making has become increasingly important in recent 
years, and it has been argued that much political activity is concerned with 
maintaining the status quo and resisting challenges to the existing allocation of 
values... " (1993: 12). 
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Comment: Easton's systems model gives an essentially good general outline of the functioning of the 
political system that can be broadly applied to the policy analysis in developing countries. It examines 
political inputs, outputs, the environment in which `demands' evolve and feed back into the system. 
However as we have noted on our definitions above, as well as in the critique above, the power issue 
needs to be incorporated, given its `static' illustration of the process, as well as its unrealistic view of 
governments as neutral, value-free arbiters rather than as occasionally prone to `manipulation' (1993: Ch. 
1). Before addressing these issues further, we first need to examine the importance of `context' and 
`content' and their relevance to policy making, policy reforms in developing states and indeed the analysis 
of such policy. We begin by examining context. 
Analysing the developing state contexts and policy 
`Context' is about the "rightful role of the state" in policy making (Walt and Gilson, 1994: 361). It is 
important in explaining reforms and non-reforms, and recognises, among other things, those macro- 
contextual factors which influence policy and the extent to which it conditions state participation in policy 
making. As Minogue notes: 
"... The [policy] `system' cannot be understood without reference to particular areas 
of policy; areas of policy cannot be understood without reference to specific 
decisions and actions; specific decisions and actions may be interesting in 
themselves but have no meaning beyond themselves except to the extent that they 
contribute to understanding of the policy area within which they are located, and to 
the general policy system which provides the context for both decision and policy... " 
(Minogue, 1993: 11). 
One of the simpler ways of analysing contextual factors (both internal and external) and their 
influences on policy is Leichter's `accounting scheme' which he used in his analysis of health policy in 
four developed countries (1979: 41; Walt 1994). This scheme categorises `context' into situational, 
structural, socio-cultural and environmental variables (1979: 39-41). Leichter's model is itself adapted 
from Alford's contention that "... decisions, policies and government roles can be explained by a 
combination of situational, structural, cultural and environmental factors... " (1969: 2). According to 
Leichter's schema, situational factors are those relatively transient conditions and/or events that have a 
significant impact on policy making. These variables range widely from violent events such as global and 
civil wars and natural disasters, to economic depression and booms, and also to technological change. It 
also encompasses other political events and conditions such as political status change (e. g. political 
independence), political regime change, ideological shifts, political reform, political corruption and 
leadership change. 
Structural contexts also have a critical bearing on policy and include political, economic social and 
socio-cultural influences. At the political level, influencing structural factors include regime type (e. g. 
military or civilian, socialist or capitalist), political organisation type (federal or unitary), form of 
government (parliamentary or presidential), group activity (number, strength and legitimacy of interest 
groups) political processes (e. g. executive-legislative-bureaucracy relationships) and policy constraints. 
Economic-based structural factors include the overall economic system, economic base, national wealth 
and income and geographic location. Socio-demographic contextual factors include population 
composition (geographical distribution, migration levels, and education and health levels). The degree of 
urbanisation, the availability of natural resources and geographic location are also important variables. In 
relation to cultural contextual factors, national heritage, political norms and values, formal political 
ideology, religion and traditional social values. Liddle for instance focuses on culture as an important 
variable in policy making in Indonesia (1992). Finally, Leichter lists the international political 
environment (e. g. the cold war), policy diffusion, and international agreements, obligations and pressures 
as the main environmental contextual variables. in the case of the latter, the role of international 
affiliations including international financial obligations are most influential (Leichter, 1979: 41-42). 
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Comment: Thus far in this section, we have seen the complexity of definitions of policy and 
policymaking, analysed the workings of the basic Easton model, and examined the relevance of `context'. In the case of the latter, the main problem with Leichter's accounting scheme of contextual factors is its implied rigidity. It neglects the dynamic relationship between and among all four sets of contextual factors, a point recognised by Leichter (1979: 40-42). Nevertheless, this `scheme' is extremely valuable 
to policy analysis as it categorises the variety of factors that can influence and shape policy. It locates the 
influence of `regime characteristics' - my interest in this study - as a structural factor, though as can be inferred from the four categories above all are interrelated to varying degrees. We now turn to need to 
examine policy content and its influence on process. 
The relationship between content and various stages of the process 
In the rush to explore the role of policy context, content cannot be ignored. The interrelationship 
between `content', contexts and processes are extremely relevant to explanations of policy. Content can 
be basically assessed by the extent of a policy's deviation from the status-quo - whether fundamental, incremental or negligible; progressive or regressive. Cleaves study (1980) on policy implementation cites 
a number of influential content-related factors. These again include the timing factor, bur also note the 
importance of level of technical complexity within these policies, level of deviation from the status-quo, 
nature of goals (ambiguous or clearly stated) and one actor or multi-actor objectives. Cleaves study 
also emphasises the idea of a convergence of factors, akin to Kingdon's `three streams' approach to 
policymaking (Kingdon, 1984). He basically found that policies with poor timing, high levels of technical 
complexity, greater deviation from the status-quo, ambiguous goals and many actors involved, tend to 
have a high failure rate at implementation. One can surmise that this is probably also true for the earlier 
stages of policy such as agenda-setting and decisionmaking. 
In the case of the policy process itself, this interaction of actors, contexts and processes can be broadly 
analysed along its four main stages: agenda-setting, decision-making, implementation and evaluation or 
outcomes (Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Walt, 1994). 
Agenda-setting, decisionmaking and implementation and the 'high-politics/ low politics' approach: 
The main contribution here has been the adaptation of the high-low characteristics of policies from the 
international relations literature to the social policy arena (Evans and Newnham, 1992: 127; Walt, 1994: 
42; Grindle and Thomas, 1989; 1991). The policy agenda can be best defined as "... the list of subjects or 
problems to which government officials and people outside of government closely associated with those 
officials, are paying some serious attention at any given time... " (Kingdon, 1984: 3; Walt, 1994: 53). The 
main characteristic of policy agendas is that they can be broadly divided into two levels: high-level issues 
such as political stability, the economy, and various related crises; and low-level, routine sectoral issues 
such as education, agriculture or health policy making. Movement between the two though infrequent, 
nevertheless occurs. For example industrial action in either of these sections, taken to an extreme level 
can elevate such policies to the top of the agenda. 
High politics policy issues can also be defined as macro-level issues since they are basically 
concerned with "... the maintenance of core values - including national self-preservation - and the long 
term objectives of the state... " (Evans and Newnham, 1992: 127; Walt, 1994: 42). In the case of issues 
such as policy reform implementation, the meaning of high-politics can be extended to `crisis-ridden' or 
`high-risk policies': essentially issues that depart considerably from the status-quo, involve a lot of risks 
including regime instability and face considerable difficulty in being placed on the agendas and/or being 
implemented, a fact not unique to developing states (Grindle and Thomas, 1989; 1991). Policy issues 
which can be considered high-politics-oriented include decentralisation, public service reform and 
economic adjustment. As both Walt and Grindle and Thomas note, participation and hence agenda-setting 
in `high-politics' issues are often limited to, and controlled by high-level officials and the political elite 
(1994: 43). 
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Of greater relevance to this study are those `low politics' policy issues not involving "... fundamental or key questions relating to a state's national interests, or those of important and significant groups within the 
state... " (Evans and Newnham, 1992: 184; Walt, 1994: 42). These include areas such as health and 
education policies where the risks to regime and state stability and survival are relatively low. The main 
proponents of this approach are Grindle and Thomas. In the case of policy reform, they refer to these as `politics-as-usual' policies (1989; 1994). Because of their low-risk nature, more participation can 
theoretically occur in such policy processes (Walt, 1994: 42-43). They also emphasise the importance of 
circumstance, by examining: 1) whether the policy issue is crisis-ridden or politics as usual; 2) the stakes involved in both situations for politicians, beneficiaries and potential losers; 3) the status of the decision- 
makers (i. e. their in the political hierarchy); 4) whether the decision required is an innovative or 
incremental one; and finally 5) the influence of timing on policy for example under positions of crisis 
(1989). 
In their two most relevant case studies, Grindle and Thomas also found simple, very locally-grounded 
relationships between policy implementation and low politics which were not wide enough to be 
conclusive. In the case of a non-crisis, policy issue -a USAID-funded health project in Mali whose 
objective was to develop low-cost care through the training of village health workers and the 
establishment of village dispensaries - the failure of the project seemed to be due to its low level nature, 
and requisite low level political involvement, though bureaucratic self-interested motivations were also 
influential. In the second `low-politics' case. second case: bureaucratic reorganisation in Kenya - bureaucratic self-interest, low levels of political involvement as well as the perceived imposition of 
overseas management models were the main obstacles to reform (Grindle and Thomas, 1989: 233). 
Again this raises the complexity of issues even in relation to low-politics issues, although, the political 
interests and incentives in specific policy issues such as health seem to play a rather prominent role. The 
setting of the policy agenda as well as actual decisionmaking and implementation in developing states can 
be also understood in the Hall and Kingdon models of policy. 
`Legitimacy, feasibility and support': the Hall et al approach: This model devised by Hall et al 
(1975) in their study of change, choice and social policy in Britain, though fairly similar to the high- and 
low-politics approaches used the concepts of `legitimacy, feasibility and support to explain the `hurdles' 
through which issues have to pass through before they get to the policy agenda. Legitimacy "... refers to 
issues which governments feel they should be concerned and in which they have a right to intervene... " 
(Walt, 1994: 54). Some issues may be high on the legitimacy scale while others might be lower down the 
order. Feasibility refers to the potential for implementing the policy. These may include concerns such as 
shortages of staff, insufficient technological capability and capacity of implementing systems. Finally, 
support refers to "... the rather elusive, but important aspect of public support for, or public trust in 
government... " (Walt, 1994: 54). As Walt notes: 
`If [the government] has high legitimacy (government has the right to intervene), 
high feasibility (there are sufficient resources, personnel, infrastructure) and high 
support (the most important interest groups are positive -or at least not negative), 
then the issue may well come onto the policy agenda and fare well, once enunciated 
as policy ... 
(1994: 56). 
She notes however that: 
"... sometimes governments will put an issue onto the policy agenda because they 
wish to make a statement about it, to show they have a position - but they do not 
expect it to be translated from policy into practice because it has low support, or 
low feasibility... " (1994: 56). 
In the case of low politics issues such as health, legitimacy, feasibility and support also seem to relate 
to both the nature of certain policies issues as well as the idea of incentives for regime involvement and 
support as noted earlier. Low-level political involvement in issues such as health thus means professional 
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domination of the policy agenda, even though Walt alludes, regimes may well wish to the issue move 
beyond agenda-setting (Ugalde, 1979; Walt, 1994). 
The `three streams' approach: the Kingdon model: This model also underscores much of the 
dynamism, timing and circumstances as well as the complexities discussed earlier, and the necessary 
confluence of actors and circumstances that move policy from agenda-setting to decisionmaking. This 
approach sees the process as comprising three streams: the problem stream, the politics stream and the 
policies stream, with policies only emerging when simultaneous windows of opportunity open up in each 
stream (Walt, 1994: 56-57). The problem stream as the name implies relies on `feedback' from the 
community alerting the authorities to the existence of problems. This broadly corresponds to Hall's 
legitimacy hurdle in that issues emerge that demand attention to varying degrees. The politics stream is 
where visible participants (organised interests) attempt to get issues on the agenda and hidden participants 
(bureaucrats and consultants). The hidden participants - resonant of Bachrach and Baratz and Lukes' 
ideas of non decisionmaking - can both influence issues that do get on the policy agenda and propose 
alternatives for those that do not (Walt, 1994: 57). Finally, in the policy `stream', policy makers choose 
from the options available, based on both contextual conditions such technical and other information as 
well as values, public and political receptivity (Walt, 1994: 57). 
Comment: This model has shades of a `bounded rationality' approach for policymakers. However for 
policy analysts, it does not adequately consider the politics of power, specifically, how the unequal 
distribution of power within all societies can exert considerable influence on both high and low politics 
issues in favour of dominant interests. This approach nevertheless offers the hope for developing states 
that there are favourable windows of opportunity through a confluence of timing, progressive policies and 
policymakers and resources that can have a positive impact on both prospects and outcomes. It is this 
issue that makes this a valuable analytical tool for the study. 
The policy cycle, timing, crisis-driven `room for manoeuvre' issue 
One of the more interesting ideas re-introduced into policy studies on developing states is the notion 
that crises do in fact bring about change, by bringing issues to the top of the policy agenda. This goes 
back to the idea in the early development literature of `crises' and `sequences' in the development process 
(Ilchman and Uphoff; 1971; Nordlinger, 1968; Horowitz, 1989: 210). It has contemporary resonance in 
Kingdon's three streams coming together. Horowitz concurs with this noting that "... paradoxically 
perhaps, some of the most important events in a political system - major policy departures - occur when 
the system is not functioning as it usually does... " (1989: 205). While not analysing regime 
characteristics, even Grindle and Thomas assert the possibility of reform stalemate under non-crisis 
situations: 
"... they may also be without the pressured political environment that can act as a 
stimulus for change. Thus under conditions of perceived crisis, the likelihood of 
change occurring may be greater than when the policy reform is a matter of 
routine... " (1989: 232). 
Both the Grindle and Thomas and Horowitz perspective are particularly interesting since they 
effectively confirm that policy reforms placed on the agenda but not implemented under non-crisis 
situations, do actually stand a better chance of succeeding under crisis situations as a 
`pressured political 
environment can act as a stimulus for change" (Grindle and Thomas, 1989: 
232). Horowitz however 
warns against the idea that policy reform as a one-off, unilinear event along the time-space continuum, 
supporting Hogwood and Gunn's notion of policy succession: 
"... policy has a life cycle, and at some times the possibilities are far more open- 
ended than at others. When these occasions have passed, policy can also 
be made 
but under different conditions, much less conducive to broad departures, less 
hospitable to new ideas, less likely to involve elites acting alone, without interest 
groups or affected bureaucrats having a significant say-policy making is not a one- 
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shot venture; there are always further decisions to be made, especially for those 
major departures that come in times of crisis. In routine times, they will have to be 
fleshed out, pruned, amended and adjusted; some branches of the policy will be 
expanded, but others will not be. By the time this happens, the conditions that 
facilitated the major innovation may have changed... " (Horowitz, 1989: 205). 
One of the commonalties shared by the Kingdon and Grindle and Thomas perspectives respectively in 
relation to agenda-setting is this timing factor. The Kingdon model asserts that the process is not a linear 
one, but that issues may be around for a long time before "... the three streams come together and are 
propelled onto the policy agenda... " (Walt, 1994: 72). The Grindle/Thomas perspective similarly 
identifies the timing of policy responses as alterable by `circumstance' such as under crisis conditions 
when the control over policy decisions are affected (1989: 233). Under politics-as-usual circumstances, 
there was more time to study the implications for change and then proceed to implement when the time 
was right. If circumstances however changed, they would place the issue on the `backburner'. They note 
as an example that institutional reforms in Argentina, Colombia and Kenya were "... shelved for long 
periods of time when little political support was available for pursuing them... " (1989: 232). Horowitz 
sums up a holistic view of policy analysis, incorporating this time element when he notes that: 
"... Clearly it becomes necessary to take conceptions of the life-cycle of policies 
much more seriously and to follow policy - not merely to study implementation, but 
to trace how a policy works out more broadly, how it is altered, how it lapses, how it 
intersects with other policies at various stages... " (1989: 210). 
Issues of specific concern to low politics policy processes in developing states 
The developing country policy literature has identified several characteristics that indicate the 
existence of a `third world policy process' (Horowitz, 1989; Grindle, 1989,1991). Horowitz, for 
instance, notes some of these distinguishing characteristics: 
"... First, the legitimacy of many Third World regimes is in question. Second, policy 
concerns do not match those that predominate in the West. Third, the state 
structures of developing countries whatever their weaknesses are still relatively 
powerful vis ä vis their societies. Fourth, the capacity of Third World' states to 
make and effectuate policy is, in several respects, more imperfect than that of their 
counterparts in the West. Fifth, participants in the policy process are fewer than in 
developed states than in the West, and some sectors of the society are hardly 
participants at all. Sixth, the channels for participation are less well established 
and less clearly prescribed in developing countries. Seventh, information for policy 
making is much scarcer in Asia, Africa and Latin America than it is in advanced 
industrial countries. Eighth, foreign models [frequent reliance on foreign experts] 
are therefore much more common... " (Horowitz, 1989: 199-200). 
Although Horowitz' list is not exhaustive, it does point to some of the major determinants of and 
(deterrents to) developing country policy reform. We first examine regime power. 
Regime power: In terms of impact and relevance to policy, the role of power and particularly state 
and governmental power is particularly important. The state, at least up to the end of the 
1970s was 
generally the biggest employer and in some cases the largest owner of national resources 
in many 
developing states. This is why, according to Gish, important questions about developing states should not 
confine themselves to normative issues such as the `urban-rural' divide, as these are 
frequently only 
euphemisms for "... who gets what" and, also why "... under most circumstances, those who already 
have 
are likely to get even more than those who do not... " (1987: 178). Developing state regimes 
inherit, and 
have retained much of their powerful roles from autocratic colonial systems which I noted in Chapter One, 
and which explains their unwillingness to reform such assumed roles 
in the post-colonial period. Any 
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examination of the role of regime power and other characteristics in post-colonial policy making therefore 
has to be measured against the power, role and influence of actors, structures in the colonial state and the 
former's attempts to reform the status-quo. Most of Horowitz's assertions about `third world' state poster 
and participation can be traced back to the aims and objectives of the colonial system. The basic aim was 
to extract resources from the colony for the benefit of both the planters and ultimately the mother country, 
through, inter alia, taxation. The objective was to provide and/or maintain a smoothly-functioning, highly- 
centralised institutional structure - administrative, political, economic and social - that fostered a stable 
environment for this goal to be achieved. This started at the position of the colonial governor who had 
strong and extremely concentrated decision making powers. Under this strategy, entrenched animosities 
based on race class, caste and tribal differences were exploited for colonial political survival. This helped 
to create `weak states' which severely retarded the prospects for social, political and economic progress in 
the post-colonial era. This happened both in the Caribbean (Williams, 1969) and much of Africa (Migdal, 
1988). Migdal, for instance, highlights the negative impact of British `divide and rule' policy in Sierra 
Leone where various `strong-men' were co-opted, a process which has fractured and undermined post- 
colonial development to the present day. Migdal concluded that the British had "... induced a 
fragmentation of social control, an environment of conflict, during that historical window of opportunity 
when the population sought new strategies of survival... " (1988: 141). 
The limited participation of interests (with the exception of dominant interests) are also an important 
feature of the post-colonial state policy arena and also explains strong regime power. The links to 
colonialism are also evident. Jones (1987: 4) notes that the highly centralised, authoritarian and generally 
undemocratic political structures of colonialism "... discouraged popular participation in the processes of 
development and public management... ". In addition to the governor, considerable power was also 
consolidated in hands of planters and other dominant classes who "... manipulate the state machinery in 
favour of their parochial interests... " In the case of the Commonwealth Caribbean for instance, the British 
colonial system institutionalised a non-bargaining culture in colonial Jamaica, with bargaining limited to 
dominant groups. This led to popular distrust, agitation and violence by excluded or `challenging' groups. 
This type of group action, according to Jones, was mirrored in the post-independence period era of 
paternalism, and the co-optation of groups and their leaders who threatened the status-quo in order to 
reduce the activities of the `challenging' groups in society. 
Bureaucratic power and influence: The role of bureaucrats in colonial society also mirrors the reality 
of the post-independence era. In relation to the dilemmas of low-politics policy development in 
developing states, problems stemming from bureaucratic inertia and survival are also potential deterrents 
to reform. Jones study of Jamaica is instructive of the policy inertia created by bureaucrats geared 
towards system maintenance rather than reform-based development. British colonies such as those in the 
Caribbean, strong bureaucracies were cultivated under crown colony rule which were strong at protecting 
their interests and implementing colonial policy, but were weak for the demands of independent 
development due to their largely unreformed status. Unlike politicians, bureaucrats are generally divorced 
from both national and international political pressures, and their power lies in their political and 
administrative capacity to influence and even manipulate both the institution and its resources, - due to 
their command of information. Jones, in his study of Jamaican bureaucrats emphasises their ability to 
"... mute or de-emphasise issues relating to social accountability... " (1981: 129). Jones concludes that this 
overall capacity, together with their "... proximity to political power... " helped them to secure personal as 
well as professional gains from the system, and led to their "... resistance to change... " The resulting 
power-based tension between bureaucrats and politicians are important to understanding post- 
independence development policy processes and outcomes. After independence, Caribbean governments 
addressed the bureaucratic problem in one or more of the following ways: by undertaking limited reform; 
co-optation; or worse, total neglect. 
International economic actor power: Other than the state, the two main actors in the international 
economic arena: the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) are arguably the most 
powerful players in the policy reform arenas of most-developing states. This means that their power to 
influence shape and affect social life in these states cannot be underestimated (Payer, Walt, 1994; Nelson, 
1990; Caulfield, 1997). In the case of the IMF, the majority of developing states have concluded 
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structural adjustment agreements with this organisation. The effects of IMF loan conditions have been 
debilitating and damaging socially, economically and in many cases politically. The World Bank's 
increasing visibility has been particularly noticeable in the case of health policy reform in developing 
countries where its support for private sector involvement has not entirely been welcomed by health 
experts (World Bank, 1980; 1987; 1993; Buse, 1994). This international visibility commenced in the 
1980s with its health sector policy papers and culminated in 1993 with its `Investing in Health' policy 
document. Even though it has always been involved in country level health projects, the 1980s and 1990s 
marked the first time that it outlined its global health policy thinking. Both organisations and their relative 
power therefore have to be considered in any analysis of policymaking and reform, particularly since 
1980.1 now turn to those issues of particular concern to the health sector. 
Issues of particular concern to developing state health policy reform processes 
The role of medical power and dominance: The power of the medical profession is undeniably 
linked to common historical processes shared by post-colonial/developing states as noted in Chapter One. 
Navarro's Marxist studies on health underdevelopment (1982: Ch. 1). illustrates the impact of Rostowian' 
stages of growth theory on health and health human resources underdevelopment, through the negative 
effects of cultural, capital, educational and technological `diffusion in developing societies. He notes that 
development in such societies was channelled and stimulated through metropolitan-style enclaves in 
developing countries resulting in dual health systems, like dual economic systems. Using the examples of 
Latin American countries, he argues that the misuse (through inter alia, external repatriation, educational 
systems, consumption patterns) rather than scarcity of resources is the key issue for these states. He sees 
problems such as health professional migration as the logical outcome of medical dominance, depriving 
poor countries of their valuable human resources in the process. 
This medical domination cycle, according to Navarro is perpertuated by cultural and technological 
diffusion under dependent capitalism. He concludes that the main beneficiaries of this type of "highly- 
skewed" development are minority capitalists, the medical profession and international capital. In the 
case of health human resources, this means the continued deprivation of access to appropriate health care 
personnel. Navarro's earlier study (1972) cited revolutionary Cuba which promotes equitable distribution 
of health human resources. However, he later recognised the internal medical bias, even of the Cuban 
medical system, which resulted from an active policy of training more doctors in response to medical 
migration, but which once again underscores the power of medical dominance. This dilemma is also 
noted by Bossert (1984) in the case of revolutionary Nicaragua, where a combination of factors, including 
demands for curative care, which resulted in a more costly resort to such training and services to the 
underdevelopment of primary health care, which was more sorely needed. 
Jones notes the problems of colonialism as the relate to the Commonwealth Caribbean health sector. 
He points out that in relation to Jamaica, the professional groups in late colonial society - the medical, 
teaching and legal professions- were `natural community leaders', with many at the forefront of 
independence movements. In the case of health policy, the dominant medical lobby "... perceived 
themselves as some kind of support wing to the formal colonial establishment and mostly pressed claims 
and opposed policies and practises in a manner always perfectly motivated by self-interest... " with few 
exceptions (Jones, 1987: 79). Deriving much of their power and status on relationships to medical 
institutions in the `mother country', doctors were able to vigorously promote their medical ideology in the 
colonial state, to the exclusion of traditional healers who were labelled quacks. The profession was most 
concerned to retain its unique professional position in post-colonial society. Thus the major demand of 
this lobby was for "... the institutionalisation of procedures which would ensure their continuous influence 
(at the executive level) over all facets of colonial medical policy... " (1987: 79). As Jones notes: 
"Government dependence on them for the management of community health 
policies... was an effective sanction... their formal and informal linkages with the 
official circle also constituted an important political resource... reinforcing these 
levers of influence was the fact that they had the responsible and powerful support 
of the London-based BMA.. " (1987: 80). 
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Maru (1983) also demonstrates the power of medical interests in health human resources development 
policy reforms within the developing state, prevailing against even popular government policy intentions. 
He found, for instance that power of the populist Congress party which dominated politics for much of 
India's post-Independence history, was blunted against the powerful medical profession in that 
government' attempts to pursue a more integrative health human resources in a poor developing state. 
The resulting outcomes for India's health policy was wasteful doctor overproduction, urban bias and 
unemployment with lack of access to basic health personnel by a significant proportion of the country's 
population, a reality which persists to the present day. 
The role of international health policy actors: While in practical terms the World Bank's activities 
in the developing country health sector enables it to be increasingly categorised as a major health policy 
reform actor in its own right, the main technical policy actor in the case of the health sector has been the 
World Health Organisation through its various sub-regional offices. The policy role of the WHO, has 
been especially critical to developing countries health policy directions. However, its own organisational 
problems, in addition to its deeply ingrained medical ideological ethic has been the source of its main 
problems (Walt, 1993; Godlee, 1994). Its high point was undoubtedly the 1978 Alma Ata Conference, 
jointly sponsored with UNICEF where the policy goals of primary health care were formally adopted, and 
later followed by the somewhat more ambitious Health For All 2000. While it performs independently, its 
remit is to assist in the role, guidance and involvement of national policy in WHO member states. 
Although its role has been superseded by the Bank's, for these and other reasons, and despite its medical 
ethos, its technical support to developing states without basic planning facilities and know-how also needs 
to be considered in analysing policy processes, which opens up a whole new area of inquiry, for example, 
the quality and appropriateness of technical advice. Other important agenda-setters for reform - include 
three of the main social policy arms of the United Nations: the World Health Organisation and its various 
sub-regional offices, one of which is the Pan American health Organisation; as well as the United Nations 
Children's Fund (UNICEF) which also focuses on health issues and the United Nations Population Fund 
(UNFPA) (Walt, 1994,1993; Godlee, 1994). 
The media: The role of the media needs also to be included in the search for the origins and 
influences on policy. Walt notes the role of the media as an important agenda setter for reform the 
especially in the case of crisis policy issues, "... drawing attention to issues and forcing governments to 
act... " (1994: 72). As Walt note, this role and influence seems most effective in high-politics issues. It 
can thus play a role when normally low-politics issues such as health policy becomes a crisis-ridden area, 
as in the cases of the BSE and salmonella policy trajectories in Britain. In developing countries, the role 
of the media can be a two-edged sword for regimes: on the one hand its can give them free publicity for 
their prestige projects such as hospitals; on the other, bad headlines can trigger calls for ministerial 
resignations and other forms of regime action just as in developed countries. Finally, the role of non- 
governmental organisations in developing country health also need to be considered. While more 
primarily concerned with health delivery, they can influence overall policy reforms. In developing states, 
particularly small states, the role of national universities and their medical and health faculties and 
departments can play an influential policy role, particularly in training policies, determining the extent of 
shifts from status-quo to reformist policy positions, for example the level of shifts 
from curative- to 
preventive approaches in health training. 
Comment: While there are other organisations that help to shape health policy in developing states, I 
have limited this discussion to the main ones of particular interest to my study. Of these actors 
operating/or influencing developing state national and sectoral policy and policy reform agendas, the 
power of international financial actors cannot be denied. However, we can see 
from all of the other 
national-level actors, that the regime is still the pre-eminent state actor within this arena. 
While severely 
constrained by a variety of structural influences - including the activities of these 
international financial 
agencies, regimes wield considerable power in the developing state arena. 
In the case of low politics 
policies, even if there are little or no incentives to reform policies, 
decisions are still taken by ministers 
and their bureaucrats on a day to day basis in the 
health sector which constitute health policy. These need 
to be examined to determine, despite the low-politics status of health, whether or not policies and policy 
reform efforts are being adopted and 
implemented or not, and whether regime-related reasons are 
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influential in this regard. In the next section, I make the case for the usefulness of regime characteristics 
in analysing low politics policy issues such as health. 
The case for analysing regime characteristics and the `low politics' health policy process 
Quite a few studies have been done on the direct influences of regime characteristics on high-politics 
public policy. Most of these point to the relevance of regime maintenance as an important motivation in 
maintaining the loyalties of, and `strategic coalitions' with important pressure and client group, and hence 
influencing policy. In the case of regimes and high-politics policy, Kaufman's comparative study of the 
politics of implementing crisis-ridden economic adjustment in Argentina, Brazil and Mexico, found that 
1) decisionmaking was in the hands of a small insulated policymaking elite; 2) decisions to relax or 
sustain austerity measures were closely correlated to the scheduling of mid-term elections in each country 
and 3) in the case of the influence of regime type on policymaking, differences within democratic and 
authoritarian categories were arguably as important as distinctions between them. He also noted that the 
desire to maintain power under such crisis circumstances was as much heavily influenced by national as 
by international factors; with regimes "... impelled to move in converging directions by domestic and 
cross-national pressures over which they had little control... " (1989: 412). (1989: 411). Kaufman also saw 
economic development policy making as a balancing act among competing interests, "a process of 
conflict-resolution in which social tranquillity and the maintenance of power is a basic concern... " Even 
Horowitz admits the role of regime maintenance as a prime motivation in policy making 
generally, noting that "... there is plenty of opportunity for unintended consequences, including some that 
may threaten the regime itself... " (1989: 206). 
While more evident in high-politics policy issues, Bates' study of agriculture in Africa interestingly 
suggests that some low-politics policy issues can also threaten regime survival (Ames, 1987; Kaufiran, 
1989; Killick 1976: 176 Lindenberg, 1988; Bates, 1981; 1988). Grindle and Thomas, (1991: 100-101) 
equally concede in their own non-regime study that policy elites (including relevant politicians/ministers) 
have to take account of concerns about the political support available to the regimes they represent or to 
its leadership: 
"... the fragility of the coalitions that support incumbent regimes in many 
developing countries and... the limited legitimacy... makes them vulnerable to the 
performance expectations of supporters... " (1991: 101). 
As a result, how particular decisions will sustain the regime in power is a prime concern in crisis- 
ridden policies. Ames (1987) and Lindenberg (1988) have demonstrated how regime maintenance can 
affect some policies and not others. Ames in particular demonstrates the influence of political `pork' in 
maintaining power through the sustenance of `strategic coalitions' in Latin America. Others such as 
Haggard and Bates similarly show how regime actions are employed as payoffs to maintain the loyalty of 
important groups or interests. Bates' study of African agriculture policy (which incidentally shows how 
`low-politics' issues can become high-politics, and `crisis-ridden') notes that regime maintenance becomes 
the single most important factor in explaining how governments can get away with the perpetuation of 
economically-irrational development policies. According to Bates, the logic is simple: 
"... governments want to stay in power. They must appease powerful interests... and 
people turn to political action to secure special advantages... " (1981: 4; 1988). 
Thus while the case for the need to explore relationship between regime survival and crisis-ridden 
`high politics public policies in developing states seems quite convincing, for understandable reasons, the 
case for regime survival and low-politics policies seems less clear, limited to Bates' study of African 
agricultural policy processes. Health policies do not threaten regimes. And yet, there is a lot of 
explaining to do in the case of regime characteristics and low politics public policies in developing states 
as the helpful, though inconclusive studies by Bossert and others so clearly show. The fact that there have 
been very few attempts in the 1990s to `return to the regime' as a source of analysis of developing states 
makes such attempts all the more timely. Developed country environments allow sophisticated analyses 
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of government policy. However, other than for high-politics policies, developing state policy arenas as 
Horowitz and others have demonstrated, operate under quite different circumstances, particularly in terms 
of the simpler power structures, the influence of historical factors, the scarcity and apathy noted by 
Cleaves, and even the basic lack of data to make policy. All of these negate the role of regime 
characteristics in low-politics policy. Nevertheless the state and its chief actors, the regime and the 
bureaucracy are still pre-eminent, rivalled only by the increasingly prominent international financial 
agencies on the one hand, and the entrenched professional power of local medical interests on the other, 
with other groups and interests including the private sector lower down the power-influence `ladder'. This 
reality means that power is being exercised within the small developing state policy arena which needs to 
be explained by relating it to the context and the outcomes for the health sector in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean state. 
My ultimate argument then is that the state is the most powerful actor in developing countries. 
Whether it is a force for progressive or regressive policies is not all due to colonialism and the IMF and 
World Bank, dominant though they may be. There is some room for manoeuvre in making progressive 
policies. Two questions need to be asked: first, to what extent do states/governments use the room that 
they actually have, given these constraints, to make progressive policy. The second and equally important 
question, ignored by much of the development literature is what happens in terms of low politics policy 
reform when states do have room to manoeuvre. The lack of incentives in low-politics reform may go 
some way to answering this question, though it cannot explain why progressive reformist policies are 
implemented by regimes who have little incentives to gain from undertaking such reform. These and 
related questions can only be answered through case-specific analyses of regime characteristics - regime 
strength, stability, ideology, democracy and maintenance - and their influences on the reform process. In 
the next section, I briefly examine the main problems associated with regime analysis. 
The pitfalls of `regime' analysis 
There are a number of problems with regime characteristics as the source of policy which need to be 
noted. In the first place, as noted earlier, structural, historical and economic factors remain pervasive, 
conspicuous only by their negative effects. In addition to the inconclusiveness of the some of the earlier 
mentioned studies, the main problem with regime characteristics analysis is its adherence to rigid lists of 
characteristics that are analysed separately. One cannot emphasise enough the need to view these 
characteristics as not only related, but changing over time as well. A regime for instance may shift 
ideologically or even democratise while in office. Such changes need to be accounted for and 
incorporated in terms of effects on policy processes and outcomes. On the issue of power and regime 
maintenance and survival also, there is even more strident criticism. Liddle (1992) for example, criticises 
the assumption that the drive for power and survival is decisive and central to politics: 
"... [rst], it is too centred on the top leadership and their most basic policies, thus 
failing to distinguish between policy issues where the decision-makers' survival is 
genuinely at stake and those where it is not, and between policy issues settled at the 
top of the system and those decided further down. The implication from this point is 
that for any given policy issue, the motivation to attain or maintain power should be 
treated as a variable, not a constant or assumption... [second] there is less than 
meets the eye to the analytical reach of the power-as-overriding-motive' 
assumption for many strategies may be compatible with this from Hitler and Stalin, 
to Kohl and Gorbachev, to Marcos and Suharto. The power motive therefore while 
useful as a conceptual foundation, is still less than satisfactory... " (Liddle, 1992: 
797). 
Liddle by contrast argues that regime maintenance analysis denies the existence of the capacity for 
autonomous, progressive action by politicians and regimes. These criticisms must 
be therefore be borne 
in mind as I have already noted. He does conclude however that the analysis of power relations and 
its 
practice in terms of policy is essential in any 
balanced approach to examining both progressive and 
regressive behaviour on the part of regimes. He even concedes that, used 
`sensitively', regime analysis is 
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"... can carry us some way in understanding why one policy is chosen rather than another in specific 
situations... " (1992: 796). 
Comment: The analysis of regime characteristics as a source of low-politics influences, used wisely 
can potentially illuminate our understanding of health policy processes in the developing state. The 
impasse in development theory occurred precisely because there is has been much grand-theorising that 
only tells part of the story, with less culture- and societally-specific analysis. I address this central 
question in my regime characteristics analysis, by locating my societally-specific case studies within wider 
trends, even though they are grounded in national and subnational detail. Regime characteristics, as even 
Liddle agrees can provide some richer and ultimately beneficial insights about developing country policy 
processes. 
2.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
My aim in this chapter has been to examine the relative merits of exploring the relationship between 
regime characteristics and low-politics policy processes in the developing state. I began this task by 
examining the dilemma of the development process itself, through an examination of modernisation, 
dependency and Giddens' structuration approaches as a useful way forward. Modernisation and 
dependency approaches to development have variously dominated the post-war development and 
development policy debate. The polarisation of both approaches however led to an impasse because of 
their respective shortcomings. The modernisationists could not explain persistent underdevelopment in 
most of the third world, while dependency theorists could not explain development in South-east Asian 
countries. Gidden's sociological concept of `structuration' is one of the more interesting and influential 
theoretical constructs that can be applied to this explanatory gap within development theory. Giddens 
essentially advocates the need for a balanced, integrative and dynamic approach to actors and structures in 
sociological analysis which pays due attention to the specificity of time/space issues. Giddens justifies 
this approach by noting that only such an integrative approach can explain diversity and specificity at the 
micro- and meso- levels, along with L some amount of structural uniformity and pattern: effectively the 
prime objectives of social enquiry. me relevance of this impasse to policymaking is evidently the new 
opportunity it presents for taking a balanced look at developing state policy processes. At the next stage 
of my discussion, a number of themes recurred in this overview of the policy process: power, content, 
context, process, timing, and interrelationships at a variety of levels. Policy is about power and its 
influence on process, hence Dahl's famous assertion that politics is about `who gets what' and `why'. 
Power in policy making is about national and international actors, elites and interest group influences all 
affecting the decisions that affect the national policy arena. I have tried to show that in addition to 
international actors and contexts, national actors and contexts are also important. In the case of policy 
making in the post-colonial state, power is the product of a number of situational, structural, socio-cultural 
and environmental actors and contexts that vary from territory to territory, conditioned by historical power 
arrangements which have persisted into the post-independence period 
I also went on to discuss the nature of policymaking as a product also of the particular characteristics 
of policies themselves. The influence of these contextual factors cannot be seen in isolation. They 
influence and interact with each other to shape and influence policy to produce various outcomes at 
specific moments in time. The policy literature has established the general difference between `high- 
politics' policy processes such as economic adjustment and other major policy reforms, and the `low- 
politics' characteristics of health policymaking and reform. High politics policies are usually made at the 
senior political and bureaucratic levels and are risky and potentially threatening to regime maintenance. 
`Low politics' policies by contrast usually involve lower level policy elites and do not normally threaten 
regime maintenance. The policy literature has also strongly established the direct links between regime 
maintenance or survival and the adoption and implementation of high risk, potentially risky policies. In 
the case of regimes and low-politics issues such as health, however, the situation is rather more complex. 
Grindle's study of health policy in Mali showed that lack of powerful, high-level support can result in 
policy failure, although this is not always the case, as Bossert's Central American examples of primary 
health care implementation showed. The fact that the often crisis-based urgency of high-risk policies and 
their immediate environment are absent from low-politics issues are as important differences that must be 
borne in mind when considering developing state health policy experiences. However this does not negate 
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the need for studies of the influences of regime characteristics and relevance on low-politics processes and 
outcomes. Another possible contention that needs to be questioned is the issue of accounting for the 
successes and failures in policy and the culpability of agency- versus structure-based factors in this regard. 
The logic of the Mali example is that such policies stand very little chance if there is no high-level 
political support.. However, even Grindle and Thomas have strongly emphasised the capacity of 
developing state policymakers to formulate and implement progressive policies against tremendous odds - 
an assertion which does make the case stronger for further investigation of regime characteristics analyses 
of policy. A further issue to bear in mind, is the indirect effects of high-politics policy decisions - in areas 
such as economic reforms for instance - on low politics policy issues. As stressed earlier, low politics 
policies such as health - like any policy for that matter - do not occur in a vacuum. One can therefore only 
assume that there is considerable intersection and interaction between the two, thus resulting in the 
interesting, though very real idea of high level policymaking affecting low politics policy trajectories and 
outcomes. In the 1980s, many developing states at the behest of the international financial organisations 
were implementing low-politics reforms as part of the macro-economic reforms. This needs to be 
considered in regime characteristics analyses. 
The second theme is `process' as it relates to the influence of regime characteristics on the decisions 
and non-decisions that they make in relation to actual `low-politics' policy processes. Legitimacy, 
feasibility and support of policies are important in terms of room for manoeuvre in setting policy agendas, 
making decisions and implementing policies. However, until recently development theory literature has 
been reluctant to countenance the fact some regime characteristics do also affect policy outcomes. 
Bossert and others have found that regimes that are usually undemocratic and authoritarian-leaning, by 
both their direct and indirect actions can hinder policy development, This can happen through both 1) the 
implementation of policies are seen to be inappropriate, unpopular and have more to do with the 
assumptive world of the regime; and 2) or not act in areas where other interest groups are threatened. One 
has to explore the role of regime characteristics on symbolic policy symbolic policy, that is where 
progressive policies have been formalised and implemented but their outcomes are hampered by factors 
related to the behaviour and characteristics of regimes themselves, rather than structural-related factors as 
resource availability and even other actors in the policy arena. 
In conclusion, Dye has described policy analysis as "... finding out what governments do, why they do 
it, and what difference it makes... " and that all policy analysis is concerned about the same thing - "the 
description and explanation of the causes and consequences of governments actions... " (1976: 1). This 
chapter has attempted to critically examine the role, influence and relevance of regime characteristics in 
post-colonial state policy reform processes. Health policy is widely regarded as a `low-politics' type of 
policy, as it does not threaten a regime' stability or survival, and, consequentlvmay not command the 
amount of political attention (and resources) that would otherwise be allocated to `high politics' policy 
issues. My main reason for examining regime characteristics is essentially through recognition of the 
limits posed by structural explanations of health policy, pervasive though they may be. As in other fields, 
the health literature recognises the role of politics but, as Reich notes, many usually consign it to a line or 
two about the relatively meaningless `political will' at the end of such studies (Reich, 1991). The lack of 
commensurability across disciplines is especially regrettable. The health economics literature recognises 
the importance of political processes in developing country health care, but pays far less attention to it, 
focusing instead on abstract notions of supply and distribution, the influence of wages and remuneration 
on worker retention and productivity without attempting to ground them, at least partially, in political 
explanations (Lee and Mills, 1983: 216-217). The health manpower economics literature likewise ignores 
discussions of politics (Ferster and Tilden, 1983). However all is not lost. The planning literature by 
contrast, recognises the importance of political factors (Hall and Kleckowski, 1978; Green, 1995). 
Similarly, the primary care implementation literature has also given much room to political power and 
influence of politics (Bossert and Parker, 1984; Segall, 1983). While all of this may seem obvious, they 
do reflect the failure to see the value of integrative approaches to health policy. The need for an 
integrative approach that places politics at the centre of analysis, but importantly links and relates it to 
other factors is needed, if only to support a fundamental belief in the primacy of power and politics. 
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Although it is nearly impossible to use a rational approach to developing country policymaking that 
considers all the possible determinants, it is nevertheless clear from the preceding review that an 
integrated approach that focuses on actor-based approaches within their structural constraints is at the 
very least a potentially useful analytic method. This chapter has broadly advocated two things, first, the 
need to recognise an explanatory role for regime characteristics in the developing state low-politics policy 
process; and secondly, the need to also recognise the importance of aiming for a balanced, non-determinist 
theoretical approach in comparative policy analysis that considers objectively both sides of the agency- 
structure divide. This structurated approach, therefore, may well be the only accurate way to identify and 
realistically appraise the effects of specific policy phenomena. 
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CHAPTER 3 
STUDYING REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND LOW-POLITICS POLICY AND POLICY 
REFORM: INTEGRATING GROUNDED THEORY WITH COMPARATIVE CASE STUDIES 
3.1 INTRODUCTION 
The following chapter describes the method that supports this comparative analysis of regime 
characteristics and health policy processes in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad. Its aim is to examine the 
evolutionary methodological process that led to my focus on the role of regime characteristics and their 
influence on the policy process in the decolonising state, and the subsequent choices of focus for my study 
of health human resources. It is divided into four sections. In the first section, I describe the background 
to the study. This is done in three progressive stages: preliminary interest; preparation; and data 
collection and analysis. It traces the initial personal observations and questions raised by various studies 
on the relationship between regime characteristics and public policy processes in the post-colonial state. 
In the second section, I describe the general methodological approach that framed the study. I outline the 
integrated method that I adopted using grounded theory and comparative case study. I then describe my 
application of Bossert's concept of regime characteristics within this comparative case study/grounded 
theory-oriented approach. The role of theoretical sampling of concepts and the link between grounded 
theory and comparative analysis is then discussed in order to assess the relative merit of the integrated 
method of comparative analysis and grounded theory. In the third section, I describe my method. I 
conclude with a discussion of the limitations of this integrated method. 
3.2 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
The discussion of methodology is important to any study because it is the framework or `conceptual 
lens' through which data is collected, presented and analysed. It guides the researcher throughout the 
entire process and the logic of its design will inevitably influence the validity of the findings. Issues such 
as appropriateness, justification, replication and ultimately `good science' are therefore of utmost 
importance. To be useful, appropriate and innovative at the same time, the chosen method needs reflect 
the relationship between the objectives of the study and the actual methodological tools used for collecting 
and analysing the data. One therefore needs to justify the approach, based on its stated merits in 
preference to other possible approaches. Another important issue in relation to the conduct and role of 
social science inquiry is that of innovation and/or contribution. Innovation and contribution in the case of 
social science inquiry does not always mean a paradigm shift in terms of method. It more often than not 
entails a more realistic examination of data in different or `innovative' ways. For example, the 
manipulation of existing methodologies can yield new, richer and potentially more realistic insights 
regarding a phenomenon. The limitations of such an approach however, together with (potential) uses in 
the area of social inquiry also needs to be explicit. Only then can one assess whether the methodological 
`innovation' was useful and by extension, whether any contribution was made. In most qualitative 
research, the choice of method is influenced by the subject matter. The subject matter is progressively 
refined as is the research process itself as more and more data is collected and analysed. This evolution of 
both subject and method therefore occurs at different stages; from the initial planning to the collection and 
evaluation stages. As Becker points out, the natural history of research 
involves: 
"... presenting the evidence as it [comes] to the attention of the observer during the 
successive stages of his conceptualisation of the problem... " (Becker, 1958: 660). 
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This study was the product of such an evolutionary method based on a combination of observations 
and experiences in the Commonwealth Caribbean. These experiences prompted me to question the way in 
which policies were determined. I also wanted to know by whom, how, the influence of changes and with 
what consequences in and for the region, especially during the difficult decades of the 1970s and 1980s. It is with these broad questions in mind that I approached this study of the politics of the human resources 
policy process in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago. In the following sub-sections, I describe 
and discuss the evolution of the study and the method. 
Getting started - preliminary interest 
My interest in the study of the role of politics in policy-making and in the specific area of human 
resources policy in the public health sector of the Commonwealth Caribbean had its genesis in two 
experiences These experiences shaped the evolution of both the central focus on regime characteristics 
and public policy as well as my choice of Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (hereinafter referred 
to as Trinidad) as the countries that I wanted to study. The first experience relates to my background and 
interest in Caribbean politics and social policy-making since Independence. I studied politics at the 
University of the West Indies in Mona, Jamaica from 1986 to 1989 at a time when Jamaica was 
experiencing the severe `aftershocks' of tough International Monetary Fund (IMF)-ordered structural 
adjustment policies. The negative impact was very clear in relation to social conditions: drastic cuts in 
state expenditure including cuts in social expenditure and job losses, increases in poverty-related illnesses, 
and increasing poverty due partly to higher unemployment. The concept of `independent development' 
was itself under question. It seemed evident that whatever limited level of national `agency' or `ability to 
act' that had been gained from political independence was slowly being eroded by these new externally- 
derived policies. 
In Guyana, much of the same was occurring. Trinidad, which had escaped the worst of the 1970s 
recession by virtue of its oil-exporting status began to experience similar economic problems as prices fell 
in the early 1980s. The International Monetary Fund was also approached by the Trinidad government 
and the first structural adjustment package approved in 1988. By the end of the 1980s, all three countries 
had therefore adopted some form or other of Fund-prescribed adjustment policies, which meant among 
other things, significant reductions in social expenditure. Another important component of the 
`conditionalities' was the `rationalisation' of the public sector. The main objective of this rationalisation 
was administrative reform through decentralisation (and even some measure of deregulation) of public 
services including health. However, another underlying objective was greater efficiency in the public 
sector, which while laudable, also meant severe social impact in terms of, inter alia, public sector cuts in 
resources and job losses. Trinidad's oil-based economy boomed in the middle of the 1970s while 
Guyana's and Jamaica's dependence on oil imports saw them slide into recession. The net effect of `fiscal 
discipline' in the 1970s and 1980s in all three states (at varying periods) was social, economic and 
political tensions. In terms of economic policy, the devaluation of national currencies in all three states 
brought with it the inevitable negative social impact. In Jamaica, this manifested itself directly and 
indirectly in, inter alia, industrial unrest and relatively sustained political/electoral violence. In Guyana, 
there was also industrial unrest and more significantly, the heightening of the call for democratic elections. 
In Trinidad, industrial action by among others public sector workers, rising crime and unemployment as 
well as political crisis and change characterised the period. One of the more `visible' consequences of 
these `adjustment policies' was in the area of human resources in the health sector. The numerous 
instances of industrial action was the most obvious evidence of the fact that working conditions for health 
sector professionals had deteriorated considerably. The health sector unrest in Trinidad formed at least 
one component of the socio-political backdrop to the almost-successful attempt by Muslim extremists to 
topple the democratically-elected Robinson government. The continued expenditure on a new medical 
school at a time of scarce resources was another. Migration to the metropoles from all three countries of 
thousands of professionals (with nurses forming a significant proportion) was one of the more popular and 
non-violent outlets and was the essentially the end-product of the difficult economic conditions in the 
region at that time as well as the seeming inability of national governments to address the problems facing 
the health sector. 
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The second experience which influenced this study relates to my short stint as a research officer in the 
Caribbean Community Secretariat (Caricom) in Guyana from 1991 to 1992. One of the principal aims of 
this regional body (in addition to closer integration of member states) is to foster functional co-operation 
in social policy in such fields as health and education, among others. From my own preliminary readings, 
observations, experiences as well as discussions with colleagues, I discerned a generally low priority 
being accorded to health policy issues, particularly human resources development at the regional level 
which made me question the state of national health policy processes. Despite some successes for 
example in implementing a Caribbean regional nursing examinations policy, the policy reorientation 
towards primary health care and its impact on the medical school curriculum of the University of the West 
Indies, human resources development in the health sector still seemed to be a rather neglected area. I was 
particularly surprised at what seemed to be the relegation of nursing policy issues at the various 
ministerial and technical meetings. Indeed many of the health ministers were themselves medical 
practitioners who seemed more interested in the concerns of their own professional group. I wondered 
whether or not this was a symptom of events and indeed reality at the national political and policy levels. 
Such `apathy' seemed quite surprising since, as noted in chapter one, health has always been in most 
senses one of the major success stories for Commonwealth Caribbean governments. Health issues 
(including expenditure) have always been a top national-level priority for the vast majority of these states. 
The commitment by Caribbean governments to universally accessible health care evidenced by 
innumerable speeches, party manifestos and legislative instruments seemed clear enough. This 
commitment was cemented in the post-1978 period in the adoption by member states (including the 
Caribbean Community) of the UNICEF/World Health Organisation-sponsored 1978 Declaration on 
primary health care, and a few years later, the related adoption of the health for all 2000 objectives. The 
high rankings of Caribbean Community member states (excluding Guyana) in the annual global health 
statistical tables only served to confirm the high status of health and indeed primary health care itself in 
the region. Despite all of these positives however, problems in the health sector persisted throughout the 
1980s and early 1990s. I was convinced that lack of financial resources must be the main problem, a 
conclusion which did not answer the entire question satisfactorily. I also wondered whether regional 
governments were really concerned about the loss to the region of expensively trained human resources at 
a time when nurses seemed to be either engaged in industrial action or migrating en masse to the United 
States, Canada and even to Saudi Arabia on contract. There seemed to be no policy initiatives or 
directives on this most important of issues. 
I had therefore observed two paradoxical events. On the one hand, there were the excellent rankings 
in the international health tables; on the other there appeared to be a somewhat apathetic situation with 
what appeared to be poor utilisation of policy space at the national and regional levels. In the case of 
human resources, this manifested itself in nursing and junior doctor industrial action, nurse migration, 
apathy at the regional level and a general disenchantment by the citizenry about the state of health care 
within these countries. I wanted to find out firstly whether these paradoxical events and state of affairs 
could be explained only and adequately by economic factors. If not, I wanted to find out whether the 
national political arena, and in particular regime politics, could shed any further light on the problem. I 
wanted to find out whether plausible relationships or linkages could be made between non-economic 
variables and developments in the human resources policy process that I had observed. The difficult 
policy choices faced by the governments or `regimes' in each country during that period seemed clear 
enough in terms of the impact of external (and to some extent internal (economic) impact on social policy- 
making during the 1970s and 1980s. These conditions had limited the financial resources and by 
extension the policy choices available to governments. 
As a student of Caribbean politics however, I felt that this explanation, pervasive though it might be, 
was much too deterministic even in small, vulnerable states like Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad. I believed 
that alternative explanations had to be sought, examined and assessed at other levels if only to prove or 
disprove the overwhelming view about the importance of economic factors which was itself being 
questioned in the development literature (Booth, 1985; Seers, 1981; Harrison, 1988; and 
Schuurman, 1993). For this study, I wanted to focus on the national policy arena. I was particularly 
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interested in exploring government or regime policy space and requisite use/non-use of that space in 
relation to the human resources policy process. I also wanted to examine policy impact when regimes 
changed. In terms of day-to-day policy-making, varying levels of financial and other resources are 
continually allocated by even the most cash-strapped governments or regimes in all developing states. 
This factor almost instantly empowers these regimes within the context of the national public policy 
arenas, vis ä vis other actors in society. Indeed, regimes are undoubtedly the most dominant policy actors, 
with somewhat limited policy challenges from the relatively underdeveloped interest groups, with the 
exception of the general trade unions and some traditionally-powerful interest groups such as the medical 
profession. In the case of health, the public health sector still largely dominates the health care system of 
each country and is therefore the dominant purchaser and provider of services. It must be concluded from 
these facts that national governments/regimes in developing states are important policy actors, arguably 
the most important policy actors within their national boundaries. I was essentially curious to discover the 
outcome of a study of Caribbean policy-making if one controlled the economic variables and focused 
exclusively on those political factors that influenced regime behaviour in the national policy-making 
arena. 
On the question of the evident diversity as well as commonality between and among the three 
countries, I wanted to examine the extent to which regime characteristics were viable explanations of 
policy action and inaction, given the varying contexts. In order to apply the concept of regime 
maintenance to human resources policy, I needed to look for evidence of `policy-space availability', its 
use, and its relationship to regime-based factors such as strength, stability, ideology and democracy. This 
had to be balanced against militating structural factors such as resource availability and institutional 
characteristics. I also had to `discover' from the field which particular regime characteristics were 
relevant to the study. The influences and consequences of ethnicity and ethnic politics on general 
development, particularly in relation to Guyana and Trinidad, have been the focus of much research 
(Hintzen, 1989; Premdas, 1993; 1994; Ryan, 1972). Hintzen's study (1989) of the influence of regime 
survival and political control in Guyana and Trinidad prompted me to question whether it could be 
logically extended to policy analysis. Hintzen's findings on the role of regimes and racial mobilisation in 
each state was particularly significant. I was not interested in the direct role of racial factors in public 
policy. Rather, I was interested in the study of the implications and outcomes for social policy making 
within such potentially divisive political arenas. The dominance of racial groups in the various health 
professions, or health care provision in geo-ethnic regions of Guyana and Trinidad would undoubtedly 
make for interesting studies. However this was not my interest in particular study. I wanted to analyse the 
linkages between (as well as the consequences of) regime power and action (and indeed inaction) in the 
planning, training and management in relation to doctors and nurses. 
Comment: These questions formed the basis of my initial conceptualisation of the study. I wanted to 
apply them to human resources development in the Commonwealth Caribbean health sector for two 
reasons. The first already highlighted earlier, was my basic interest in trying to find explanations and 
linkages for my initial observations in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad. The second was that virtually no 
non-technical, policy-based research had been done on Commonwealth Caribbean health policy using a 
political economy approach that borrowed from political sociology as well as broader concepts of political 
theory. I believed that adequate qualitative data existed to enable applied, comparative policy studies to 
be undertaken in analysing - what appears to be at first glance - an obscure and irrelevant link between 
regime survival and health policy processes. In the next section, I discuss briefly the evolution of my 
preparatory work. 
Preparation 
My choice of Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad as the `policy arenas' under focus was therefore informed 
by familiarisation as well as observation of policy evolution in the three states. While I did briefly 
contemplate including a non-Commonwealth Caribbean developing state for further interesting outcomes, 
limitations of time and money meant that I had to confine myself to this region. I was also familiar with 
the obvious similarities in general development experience which characterised them. There are however 
important differences in political systems and regime characteristics that have significantly influenced 
each country's overall political and policy development. I therefore decided that I wanted to compare and 
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contrast their policy-making experiences in the post-Independence period based upon the broad concepts 
outlined earlier. I was particularly existed in the post-1970 period because for all three states, this was 
their second decade of self- rule after what seemed to be a relatively unsuccessful developmental decade 
of the 1960s. In terms of background research, there existed few comprehensive comparative policy 
studies on the specific area of human resources development in the health sector in developing countries. 
As far I was aware, there was none on the Caribbean region, with the exception of numerous technical 
consultancies. This made it a potentially daunting task in terms of searches for previous references 
despite my belief that it could be done. 
According to Marshall and Rossman (1995: 5-6) researchers who conduct qualitative research face at 
least three challenges one of which is `want to do-ability' - that is, the researcher's engagement with the 
topic. My experiences as undergraduate politics student in Jamaica, my stint at the Caribbean Community 
Secretariat as well as my own interest in health policy provided the personal commitment to undertake the 
study. I applied to and was accepted by the University of Hull to pursue studies leading to the M. Sc in 
Health Services Research in October, 1992. Having settled into the course I decided to undertake a 
qualitative study of the politics of the health policy process with specific to English-speaking Caribbean 
countries. After the first term of study, I was upgraded after discussions with my course director, now 
supervisor, to a Ph. D in health policy administration. I informed him of my interest in regime influence 
and its impact both directly and indirectly on policy-making for health professionals -in terms of planning, 
production and management - in the three countries that I had chosen to study. I had to decide with the 
help of my supervisor which was the best method or combination of methods that would help me to carry 
out the aims and objectives of my research. He urged me carry out an initial literature review of the area 
and prepare a proposal as well as an itinerary for the field-work. 
During the first term, I carried out an initial survey of the general area of health policy in developing 
states. This was largely confined to journal articles which examined health policy experiences in post- 
colonial Africa, Latin America and a few island states, such as Mauritius and those of the South Pacific as 
well as a literature search of Caribbean health policy which, in spite of a few notable exceptions (Cumper, 
1986; Cumper, G. E., 1983; 1993; Hezekiah, 1989) was markedly deficient. Second, I found that the 
available `health' and health policy literature seemed to negate the politics of the policy process, while 
paradoxically the field of health economics rapidly expanded in the aftermath of the 1980s adjustment 
period as demands for such quantitative information increased. Even the approaches were different. 
Navarro (1982) and Doyal (1979) among others used Marxist and dependency approaches in their 
respective examinations of the politics of health in developing countries. These studies helped enormously 
in forming an important part of the context for conceptual development of the study. I found however that 
economic determinism limited their usefulness for my study. They helped me however to focus on those 
issues common to the developing state experience in the case of health policy. This equally applied also 
to my own readings and prior knowledge of the Caribbean political, social and economic environment. 
The structural-functionalist approaches to health and social policy analysis were also important sources. 
Of these studies, Heidenheimer, Heclo and Adams (1990); Ham (1980); Hill (1993) and the cross- 
national aggregate approach of Leichter (1979) were the most detailed. The focus of these studies on 
`developed world' social policy processes though somewhat inappropriate, were nevertheless extremely 
helpful, given the dearth of relevant comparative policy literature in the initial conceptual development of 
the research proposal. 
In addition to engagement with the topic, Marshall and Rossman (1995: 5-6) also pointed to another 
important challenge for the social researcher: `should do ability' or, the need to develop a conceptual 
framework for the study that is thorough, concise and elegant. I had decided to examine the concepts 
`regime characteristics' and `policy space availability' while controlling for economic factors. I needed 
therefore to find a method that would enable exploration of those particular `regime characteristics' that 
were most influential in determining the use of that `policy space'. I therefore needed to develop a 
suitable and methodologically-sound framework that would analyse available data in a systematic way that 
at least partly allowed a `non-determinist' look at events/happenings. Theory development in the field 
would only occur if I found and linked repeated evidence of those observations that were not sufficiently 
accounted for by dependency theory. The second issue that I wanted to highlight was the `process' 
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variable. This I believed, could be done by comparing regime influence and its composites on policy. 
Comparing the decades of the 1970s and the 1980s would also address the `time/transition' element of this 
question. 
The third of Marshall and Rossman's challenges is `do-ability' or the feasibility of planning a design 
that is systematic and manageable, yet flexible. In terms of `do-ability' the fact that human resources 
policy analysis in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, and indeed health policy analysis generally, was 
relatively under-researched meant that I needed a flexible method which would incorporate the limitations 
of data collection `in the field' as well as time and money constraints. The choice of national policy 
`arenas' as well as the focus was informed by the need to explore, uncover and attempt to fill the research 
gap on human resources policy processes. It was equally informed by familiarisation, observation of 
policy evolution and the similar developmental experiences between them. There were also, however, 
important differences in political systems and regime characteristics that had significantly influenced each 
country's overall political and policy development. I wanted to compare and contrast these differences 
and similarities in relation to policy action and process in the post-Independence period. I was uncertain 
as to whether method(s) existed in the social sciences that would give me the necessary flexibility, 
especially given the fact that I was uncertain as to the quality and accessibility of data on Jamaica, Guyana 
and Trinidad in relation to human resources development in the health sector. I expressed my concerns to 
my supervisor. He suggested that I consider an `open approach' to the study which would allow 
theoretical categories to emerge, rather than a more closed approach on which categories were imposed. 
Strauss and Corbin (1990: 176) described this method as "... theoretical sampling on the basis of concepts 
that have proven theoretical relevance to the evolving theory .... " I agreed to adopt this approach as the 
most suitable way to operationalise the study at this stage. I wrote letters of introduction to the ministries 
of health in each country and gained approval to collect data from their respective documentation centres 
and libraries and also interview selected personnel from their respective ministries. I then prepared and 
submitted my initial proposal and gained approval for the following itinerary from my supervisor: 
Table 3.1: Itinerary 
Period 
September, 1993- October, 1994 
October, 1994 
November, 1994 
January August, 1994 
September, 1995 
Activity 
Undertake preliminary analysis of secondary sources in Hull and the 
Caribbean 
Visit Guyana: data collection 
Visit Jamaica: data collection 
Trinidad and Tobago: data collection 
Return to Hull to complete write-up 
Comment: I decided to begin the `open approach' by first re-establishing my initial contact with 
colleagues and acquaintances as well as health sector personnel in each country. This was to 
be 
complemented by extensive documentary analysis on site in each country at both the broad political 
level 
as well as the actual technical/policy level. My initial observations of the concepts of `regime 
characteristics', `policy space' and `policy action and inaction' were just that: initial observations of 
broad 
concepts. The next step was to begin the simultaneous tasks of data collection and theoretical sampling 
in 
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad in order to find out whether these observations had any foundation. 
Collecting and analysing the evidence 
Using the `open' approach, I decided that a two-pronged method of unstructured, open-ended 
interviews, coupled with extensive documentary evidence would allow theoretical concepts or `categories' 
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to emerge. I would then analyse records of incidents and events relating to production, planning and 
administration/management policies. The next step for my research would then be to explore the potential leads and linkages that I hoped to find by assessing the evidence for them, against my already collected data on regime variables. I returned to Trinidad in September 1993 to begin the open-sampling process. I 
started with a broad analytical review of the available data on politics, development and health policy in 
general and specifically human resources development in the Caribbean. The objective was threefold. First, I had to review all of the political concepts that had been used in Caribbean political analysis with 
specific reference to the state and public policy. I then had to identify from this data, those concepts that 
could be deemed significant. Significance would be determined by the repeated presence of a 
phenomenon in the literature. 
Finally, I had to make a pragmatic judgement, based on the above sampling, as to which of these 
significant concepts had direct as well as indirect linkages to the planning, production/training and 
administration/management policy processes in the health policy processes of each country. Equally 
important for the meaningfulness of the research, I needed to know that adequate supporting data for these 
significant concepts could be found. Linkages would then be sought and developed between these 
`political' concepts and the human resources policy process. In relation to the main political themes 
generated by Caribbean researchers since the 1960s, I found that regime-related variables comprised a 
significant proportion of the focus of analysis. Though not the only area under study, it was clear that 
regime variables were emerging as a factor in Caribbean policy. In terms of the Caribbean as a whole, 
regime-related issues covered general politics (James, 1962); the development of regime typologies 
(Stone, 1980); the impact of regime policy on public administration and bureaucracy (Mills, 1970; 1973 
and 1981 and Jones, 1974b; 1981), authoritarianism (Thomas, 1984; 1988); local government (Singh, 
1972) and most interestingly to me, regime survival (Hintzen, 1989). 
Specific country-based studies ranged from the influence of regime ideology and race relations in 
Guyanese and Trinidadian national politics (Premdas, 1970, in Payne and Sutton 1993) to regime 
ideology and development policy in Trinidad (Sandoval, 1983); Guyana (Thomas, 1984; 1988) and 
Jamaica (Stephens and Stephens, 1983; Kaufiran, 1985; Payne, 1976; Edie; 1991 and Mandle, 1977). 
Stone's analyses of regime democracy in Jamaica (Stone, 1976; 1980; 1983 and 1986) as well as Greene's 
study of democracy in Guyana (in Henry and Stone, 1983) further highlighted the importance of regime 
variables for Caribbean political researchers. Of these Caribbean studies, I was particularly interested in 
the studies by Stone, Thomas, Edie and Hintzen. In Stone's (1980) typology of Caribbean regimes, both 
Trinidad and Jamaica were classified as competitive party systems, while Guyana (before its first fair 
elections in 1992) was categorised as a one-party dominant system. Most of the above researchers 
however use the broad regime categorisations that I have used in this study to describe Guyanese, 
Jamaican and Trinidadian politics in the 1970s and 1980s. I decided that I wanted to apply these broad 
regime categories across the three states over the period between 1970 and 1990. The question of 
authoritarianism raised both in connection between Burnham's Guyana and Williams' Trinidad presented 
the opportunity for a promising comparison, given Trinidad's classification as a competitive party system. 
This had potentially good prospects for the explaining the relationship between health policy and regime 
characteristics. 
In addition to the above, I was also interested the issue of public policy inaction raised various 
Caribbean public administrations studies in terms of its direct and indirect implications for human 
resources development (Mills, Jones, 1974b; 1981; Jones and Mills, 1976; 1989; Mills, 1973a; Mills and 
Slyfield, 1987). The question of governmental centralisation was a recurring complaint in the literature in 
terms of its negative impact on policy formulation and implementation. The concepts of `inaction' and 
`limited action' at the bureaucratic level seemed to reflect a general lack of attention paid to public and 
indeed health service reforms since the 1950s. It was thus an issue that had some potential linkages with 
regime characteristics. I was using the `open approach'. I therefore wanted to see whether ample evidence 
existed for validity of these conclusions in the public administration and human resources data. The 
justification for selecting the regime as a conceptual variable was therefore grounded in existing research 
on the region. I next had to decide which regime variable had overall proven theoretical relevance. The 
two studies that pointed `the way forward' were Bossert's (1983) study of regime characteristics and 
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primary health care in Central America and Hintzen's study of the influence of regime political survival 
on politics in Guyana and Trinidad. I wanted to explore the feasibility of incorporating Bossert's 
typologies with Hintzen's `regime survival' as a potential framework in explaining both policy action and inaction. I wanted to analyse the extent to which regime-based analysis could explain and compare policy 
processes in 1) ethnically-plural, undemocratic Guyana; 2) ethnically plural, democratic Trinidad, and 3) 
the class- (rather than race-) divided two-party, democracy in Jamaica, where an extensive patronage 
system was nevertheless entrenched along class- rather than ethnic lines (Edie, 1991). 
I also wanted to incorporate into this potentially useful framework, the concept of `process'. I wanted 
to examine the determinants of the different stages of policy making and reform: from agenda-setting, to 
decision-making and implementation. This aspect of the analysis would underline the importance of 
policy `flow', `transition' and succession (Hogwood and Gunn, 1984). It would also explain the 
transaction that defined policy analysis, i. e. the relationships between the actors in the policy arena. In 
terms of the time factor, it would also enable me to compare and contrast the influence of the regime 
typologies, especially ideology and democracy, in each country across two decades and also afford cross- 
country comparisons of any `discovered' relationships. If regime characteristics were found to be 
important determinants of policy that encompassed to varying degrees Bossert's typologies, I also needed 
to examine the impact (if any) of regimes changes on policy outcomes. It was only by including an 
analysis of the `process' question that I believed that I could either establish or diminish the role and 
importance of the post-colonial regime and its characteristics as important sources of policy. 
In relation to health human resources development, I adopted the World Health Organisation's re- 
definition of health human resources development (formerly the politically-incorrect health manpower 
development) as the production, training and management of health workers (Simmonds, 1989). Again I 
used an `open approach' to determine both the importance and categorisation of incidents and concepts. 
They either had to be repeatedly present or absent in the data that I would collect from both my interviews 
and more important, the available documentary analysis. Attempts to determine whether conclusive 
linkages existed between these concepts/incidents/events and regime variables would then be made. Only 
then could I proceed to further detailed sampling. 
Another issue was the categorisation and actual `grounding' process, that is, the relating of policy 
actions and inaction to regime characteristics. During my fieldwork, I discovered evidence of `action', 
`limited action' as well as a significant level of `inaction' in human resources policy at all three levels of 
health human resources, that is, in the planning, production/training and management/utilisation processes 
for health professionals. At this stage, I could only speculate about the possible relationships between 
regime variables and their probable influence(s) on policy outcomes as well as the dimensions of those 
outcomes. The question of `inaction' was particularly interesting as I found evidence of this during my 
preliminary reading. I found in Trinidad, for instance, no formal written health human resources 
development (or health manpower) policy. I wondered whether the same applied to Guyana and Jamaica. 
The implications of this for my research was also problematic, though I recalled that inaction and by 
extension absence of formal policy could itself be considered a policy action (Bachrach and Baratz, 1963; 
Lukes, 1974). I accessed the necessary finances that allowed visits to Guyana (four weeks, October 1994 
and Jamaica (five weeks November/December 1994). I conducted a limited number of open-ended 
interviews with senior officials at the Ministries of Health and Public Services respectively in Jamaica, 
including the director of health planning. In Guyana, I requested and subsequently gained interviews with 
both the current and past ministers of health as well as the head of the Pan American Health Organisation 
(PAHO) mission. I also interviewed a former minister of health in Trinidad. I tried without success 
however to gain interviews with health ministers, present and past, in Jamaica. I discovered from these 
interviews and documents evidence of action, limited action as well as inaction in all three countries. 
While in Guyana, I made extensive use of available documentary material/data including technical 
consultancies at both the Pan American Health Organization office as well as the Caribbean Community 
Secretariat in Georgetown. In Jamaica, I established contact with a lecturer in public health at the 
University of the West Indies' School of Public Health, who introduced me to other senior public health 
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academics. I also managed to access pertinent documentary data on human resources development in 
Jamaica from the Pan American Health Organization in Kingston, in addition to establishing contact and 
carrying out interviews with some senior ministerial officials in the health human resources field. Because 
of the relative short stays (six weeks each) in Guyana and Jamaica, I knew that I had to carry out most of 
the analysis and corroboration on the ground because my financial situation precluded any return to these 
two countries. 
I collected and analysed pertinent data in both countries at various locations, mainly those already 
mentioned. Based on the information in these documents, I arranged interviews with the relevant sources 
(authors, consultants and health policy officials). The open sampling approach also meant that the process 
was essentially a cyclical one. Most of the interviewees guided me towards more richer documentary 
sources of data as well as other potential interviewees. Due to various reasons, the main ones being 
unavailability and limited resources, I was not able to meet every potential interviewee on my list. In 
Guyana, I carried out interviews with seven of the (10) that were on my original short-list. While in 
Guyana, however, I met four Amerindian midwives who were able to shed considerable light on past and 
present government policies in relation to the rural hinterland. In Jamaica, the response was much the 
same with six (7) actual out of ten (10) potential interviewees, though I did meet three additional 
interviewees through recommendations. Table 3.1 below lists the designations of the interviewees. I 
collected and analysed as much data as I could from these sources (both interviewees and documents) in 
the first two weeks of my visit. The final two weeks in each country was reserved for further examination 
of the collected data. I basically had to find supporting or negating evidence (by examination of events, 
processes, incidents) for the linkages between regime categories (strength, stability, ideology and 
democracy) and regime maintenance; and specific aspects of human resources development policies 
(planning, production and administration and management) and processes. I also had to find and account 
for the type(s) of action (positive action, limited action, non-action). The preliminary `open' approach 
thus had to give way to a much more detailed and focused approach. 
Table 3.2: List of interviewees 
Cotpaorv Guyana Jamaica Trinidad 
Ministers of Health 






















10 ! 10 
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Interviews with senior officials in both Guyana and Jamaica provided a range of data as well as their 
own views about the state, causes and consequences of doctor and nurse planning, production and 
management. The data that was accessed, although uneven, yielded valuable information on the role of 
the developing state regime in the following areas of these categories: 
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Table 3.3: List of frequently-cited problems by categories 
Category of health human The main non-economic problems frequently 
resources development (HHRD) cited in the data 
Planning 
Training or production 
Administration or management 
Lack of written health policies to guide health human resources 
Dominance of curative training, despite primary care policy adherence 
Government 'ad-hoc' and/or inadequate policy responses to meaningful 
administrative reform and decentralisation of health; and such policy 
responses as a factor in dissatisfaction and migration 
I had also `discovered' this pattern in my preliminary fieldwork in Trinidad. I therefore decided to use 
these specific areas as the second stage of my fieldwork to guide the study. I spent the last two weeks of 
my fieldwork examining documentary sources and conducting second interviews to get more details on 
particular incidents pertaining to these categories. The information that I gained in the time available in 
both Guyana and Jamaica was enough to assure me that analysis was possible in relation to each category. 
On my return to Trinidad, I continued the analysis of the collected data from Guyana and Jamaica. I also 
conducted further second interviews and additional documentary searches at the Ministry of Health, the 
University of the West Indies and the Pan American Health Organisation's country office. As the 
categories unfolded, I decided to further explore the data relating to the Williams' government's policy 
decision to build the medical school in Trinidad and its possible relationship to regime politics. In the 
process of doing so, I managed to collect a wealth of information - documentary, newspapers, 
consultancies and national reports - supported and supplemented by the interviews while there, as was the 
case in the other two countries. The good quality of the data on this particular policy was demonstrated 
by the fact that I was able to trace the main phases of the policy process, from formulation to 
implementation and outcomes/consequences. This was done by cross-comparing data from a wide variety 
of sources including cabinet notes and newspaper reports with unstructured interviews. This technique 
enable me to uncover the regime-based political elements which I then subjected to further cross- 
comparison for factual accuracy. I reported this to my supervisor who pointed out that this data could be 
used most effectively in a case study. Financial problems, together with the late collection of data 
precluded an early return to Hull. I however secured British Council funding to assist with the write-up 
period, returning to Hull in late 1995. The analysis of the data and the final write-up were however 
interrupted by personal problems in February 1996. I did not return to Hull again until November 1996 to 
complete the final write up. 
Comment: My particular interest in this study was to explain the role and influence of regime 
characteristics and behaviour on policy action and inaction in the post-colonial state. My empirical 
knowledge of the area suggested that ideology and democracy were particularly significant determinants. 
Hintzen's analysis of regime survival, in particular, convinced me that if added to a wider examination of 
regime characteristics generally - done along Bossert's four regime characteristics sub-categories - might 
be the best way to synthesise and analyse the data. As I started the collection and analysis process, what 
emerged was a relatively complex process of action and interaction that pointed to their usefulness as 
analytic tools in developing state policy processes. I adopted the World Health Organisation 
definition of 
human resources development as the planning, production/training and management and utilisation of 
health workers and professionals. I limited my human resource `professional' categories to 
doctors and 
nurses simply because these are the main health human resource categories. However, 
in the case of 
Guyana, I included two other categories: community health workers and medex - both being the result of 
important government policy strategies which were introduced during the period under study. Similarly 
in 
the case of Jamaica, I also included data on community health aides - the equivalent of the 
Guyanese 
community health workers, and also an important social policy plank of the 
democratic socialist Manley 
regime. I also limited the study to the public 
health sector, since lack of basic data on the private health 
sector precluded any exploration of linkages, though they clearly existed. 
I now turn to the formal 
methodological approach used in the 
data analysis. 
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3.3 THE GENERAL METHODOLOGICAL APPROACH 
I defined the objective of my research as an examination of the influence of the post-colonial regime 
on the human resources policy processes in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad in the 1970s and 1980s. Using 
theoretical sampling, I had discovered evidence, including incidents and events relating to planning, 
production and management - the three broad components of health human resources development. I 
needed to further refine this `open approach' into an analytic method. I had to search for and analyse 
possible relationships by comparing categories and their similarities and differences at the dimensional 
level. I also needed to find a method that would integrate the `open' approach to theory building with a 
cross-comparison of cases at both the national and conceptual levels. In this section I shall discuss the 
two-pronged methodological approach that guided my research, beginning with the grounded theory 
approach. 
Grounded theory 
Grounded theory was developed by Glaser and Strauss for medical-sociological studies of death and 
dying (1965; 1967). Its further application to policy analysis was however developed by Strauss and 
Corbin (1990). Strauss and Corbin note that `concepts' are the basis of grounded theory research and that 
all grounded theory procedures are aimed at identifying, developing and relating these concepts (1990: 
177). The approach can be best described as `hypothesis-generating' or `hypothesis-creating', where the 
researcher is actively involved in selection, analysis and interpretation. The predominance of economic 
explanations in the national policy arena of developing states left little room for alternative explanations. 
I wanted to examine possible linkages within this `limited room' between human resources policy and 
regime characteristics using the `open approach'. I would then make a (determination as to whether regime 
politics constituted a significant (or insignificant) influence on human resources policy action and 
inaction. In doing so, I hoped to answer the `how', `why' and `with what consequences' questions for 
both health human resources specifically, as well as the wider questions about, and implications for 
development. 
Grounded theory is described by Strauss and Corbin (1990: 23) as a general methodology that is 
"... inductively derived from the study of the phenomenon it represents... ". Accordingly, the theory that 
develops is grounded in data that has been systematically gathered and analysed. It evolves during the 
actual research through continuous interplay between analysis and data collection with the central feature 
of the method being constant comparison of data. Glaser also describes the method of "... generating 
theory and doing social research [as]... two parts of the same process... " (1978: 2). The researcher 
therefore has to perform three different but related types of analysis or coding in grounded theory. The 
first, open coding is described as the process of breaking down, examining, comparing conceptualising 
and categorising data (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 61). The second is axial coding, where the 'broken- 
down' data, having been categorised, is then put back together to make connections or linkages between 
categories. This is carried out using the paradigm model. In this model, one specifies a category 
phenomenon in terms of the causal conditions that give rise to it; the context (its specific set of properties) 
in which it is embedded; the action/interactional strategies by which it is handled, managed, carried out; 
and the consequences of those strategies (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 97-99). According to Strauss and 
Corbin, these specifying features of a category or phenomenon gives it precision, and therefore can be 
termed sub-categories. Causal conditions are defined as events, incidents, happenings that lead to the 
occurrence or development of a phenomenon. The phenomenon or core category is defined as the central 
idea, event, happening, incident about which a set of actions or interactions are directed at managing, 
handling, or to which the set of actions is related. The context relates to the specific set of properties that 
pertain to a phenomenon; that is, the location of events or incidents pertaining to a phenomenon along a 
dimensional range. Context represents the particular set of conditions within which the 
action/interactional strategies are taken. The intervening conditions are defined as "... the structural 
conditions bearing upon action/interactional strategies that pertain to a phenomenon... " which either 
facilitate or constrain the strategies taken within a specific context (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 99). The 
action/interaction category incorporates strategies devised to manage, handle, carry out, or respond to a 
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phenomenon under specific sets of perceived conditions. Consequences are basically the outcomes or 
results of action/interaction 
The third or selective coding stage describes the process of selecting the core category, systematically 
relating it to other categories, validating those relationships, and filling in categories that need further 
refinement and development. Here the core category is the central phenomenon around which all the 
other categories are integrated. The core category is in essence the conceptualisation or storyline; the 
narrative about the central phenomenon under study (Strauss and Corbin, 1990: 116). A later innovation 
of grounded theory was the `conditional matrix', which essentially enables the analyst to both distinguish 
and link levels of conditions and consequences at the sub-national, national, regional and international levels with many and usually include the various sub-organisational components found even within these levels (1990: 158). It basically traces the theoretical/conceptual storyline of the study through these 
various levels. This is done by examining the interactive nature of events through the tracking of an event, 
incident or happening from action/interaction through the various conditional and consequential levels, 
and vice versa, in order to directly link them to the central phenomenon or core category. 
In terms of similarities with other methods, grounded theory is an interpretative and redefined method 
with interpretations sought for understanding the actions of individuals or collective actors being studied. 
Additionally, sources are basically the same, for example, interviews and document reviews. In relation to 
sampling of incidents, Strauss and Corbin (1990: 176) point to the importance of theoretical sampling, 
dimensionalised differences and similarities and flexibility. They stress the importance of `proven 
theoretical relevance' in this regard: 
"... concepts [that are] are deemed to be significant because they are repeatedly 
present or notably absent when comparing incident after incident, [and] are of 
sufficient importance to be given the status of categories... " (Strauss and Corbin, 
1990: 176) 
Comment: Grounded theory methodology is used in qualitative policy studies to examine issues such 
as context, influences at various levels and consequences or outcomes. While solving at least one part of 
my research objectives, I was however only able apply the hypothesis-generating element to my study, 
given the aforementioned constraints of the study. Similarly, while not interested in high-levels of 
hypothesis-generating which I did not think was fully applicable to a complex area such as policy analysis, 
I was nevertheless more concerned to use grounded theory in order to critically re-examine the more 
pervasive theoretical norms in Marxist and neo-Marxist approaches to development. In doing so, I hoped 
to find enough support, through proven theoretical relevance of the linkages between the various 
components of regime characteristics and health human resources policies in the developing state. One 
such tenet was the negation of national level political action and inaction -whether positive or negative. In 
terms of using theoretical sampling in a cross-national comparative study, the usefulness of grounded 
theory is therefore obvious. Theoretical sampling of `policy action' and `inaction', the dimensions of such 
action and their relationship to specific regime characteristics provided the methodological link to 
comparative analysis for my research. To summarise then, I applied only one half of the grounded theory 
approach - the hypothesis-generating element for its usefulness a non-deterministic `open' approach to the 
study of the post-colonial politics, that did not either fully accept or reject existing theories, but rather 
questioned them. In addition, I decided that hypothesis-testing in the comparative policy field, at least for 
this study would be less useful, than an application of the broad techniques of this component of grounded 
theory to the data. I shall next discuss the comparative method. 
The comparative case study method 
Comparative policy analysis can be basically described as a cross-national study of public policy, 
where public policy comprises "... a series of goal-oriented actions taken by authoritative usually 
governmental actors... " (Leichter, 1979: 3). This definition emphasises state activity, with public policies 
usually contained in legislative enactments including budgets, executive and administrative orders and 
decisions, judicial decisions, among others (Leichter, 1979: 3). Typical methods used in the early days of 
60 
comparative policy analysis included cross-national aggregate analysis. Leichter himself used cross- 
national aggregate analysis in analysing health policy across four developed countries. However, such 
studies have been criticised for not developing sufficiently complex descriptions of regime characteristics (Bossert, 1983: 419). Heidenheimer et al (1990) trace the origin of `cross-cutting' or comparative 
perspectives from Aristotle to Macchiavelli in the 16th century, noting that the systematic comparative 
study of public policies emerged only in the last thirty years or so. In contrast to its ancient ancestors, it is 
pointed out that the modem field of inquiry took as its starting point the nation state and the intellectual 
framework of 20th century social science. In supporting the usefulness of integrated approaches, they 
note the increasing shift away from single factor deterministic theories and acceptance of the need to 
integrate diverse perspectives in order to produce plausible accounts of policy development 
(Heidenheimer et al, 1990: 9). This view is shared by those grounded theory proponents, Strauss and 
Corbin who also see the need for plausible relationships among concepts and sets of concepts as the prime 
conceptual components of theory (1990). On the issue of means and methods in comparative case study 
analysis, Heidenheimer et al pointed to five problematic issues: 1) fording truly comparable 
measurements; 2) appropriate indicators; 3) `collinearity' of variables; 4) the dynamic quality of public 
policy development and 5) uniqueness (1992: 9-12). Though they emphasise the need to see similarities 
and underplay differences, I thought that differences also had to be explained and hence incorporated into 
any meaningful analysis. 
In terms of case studies, Hakim (1992: 61) points out that this method can take as its subject one or 
more examples of actors or relationships which can then be analysed using a variety of data collection 
techniques. The usefulness of the case study approach lies in its provision of rich detail to substantiate 
observed patterns and processes. In terms of multiple case study, Hakim adds that these are done either to 
replicate the same study in different settings or to compare and to contrast different cases. The flexibility 
and diversity of case studies in dealing with either actor-related or event/relationship, interaction-type 
studies as well as its well-established reputation in international comparative studies of national 
government (1992: 65-72). Hakim also adds that relationships, events, roles and interactions are a more 
diffuse category of case study, highlighting the role of the interviewee in case studies as both respondent 
and informant (1992: 73). She further pointed to the importance of prior knowledge of the subject area as 
an important starting point for such studies. Case studies often involve specialised interviewing of 
informants, professionals, and organisational or public role-holders which is quite different from standard 
research interviewing. Hakim concludes that the criteria that informs any study influences its rigour 
between descriptiveness, on the one hand, and the rigorous test on the other. However, as this study 
focuses on the influence of regime characteristics on the policy process I wanted to be neither too 
descriptive, on the one hand (which would not yield valuable insights), nor too hypothesis-oriented (which 
as I have already noted, would have been, in my opinion, too rigid for this type of study). 
This method thus specifically focuses upon comparisons between initial expectations and actual 
outcomes which are frequently different or sometimes altogether ".. unforeseen, undesirable and 
unintended... " (1990: 3-4). Importantly for my work, the limitations involved in studying this little- 
analysed and relatively unresearched area, Heidenheimer et al noted that what mattered for comparative 
policy analysis was not so much identification of this or that decision and how it was made but "... the 
string of decisions that add up to a fairly consistent body of behaviour sanctioned by governmental 
authority... " (1990: 5). They added that there must be some underlying logic in and justification for the 
choice of cases. Therefore, configuration of `movement' and `activity' are crucial when analysing policy, 
guided by a central concern for the larger general trend. The fact that comparative policy analysis draws 
from many different disciplines is also recognised in the Heidenheimer et al approach. They state that 
because of this it can never become a self-contained discipline, since the how question often draws heavily 
from the fields of comparative government, public administration, political science generally, as well as 
political theories of development in the case of this study; the why question veers into areas such as 
political sociology, history, social psychology and political economy, among other fields; and the to what 
effect element covers the field of implementation analysis, economics and "... ultimately, when one 
evaluates results in terms of the kind of society we would like to live in, social philosophy... " (1990: 6). 
However, as Geertz noted about the overall advantages of comparative political analysis: 
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"... It is through comparison (and comparison of incomparables) that whatever heart 
we can get to can actually be reached... " (1983: 233). 
Comment: The usefulness of integrating the comparative case study approach with the hypothesis- 
generating element of grounded theory allowed the most suitable approach to my analysis, given both the 
nature of the study and its inherent limitations. Leichter has stated that because public policy had several dimensions, the study of public must include: 
1 an analysis of the intended purpose of state activity; 
2 the steps taken to enforce these intentions and related 
explanations; and 
3 measures of their consequences (1979.8). 
He added that there was no one inherently superior analytic approach to such studies. For 
Heidenheimer et al however, there are good reasons for engaging in comparative policy research, the 
prime one being to gain a deeper understanding of how government institutions and political processes 
operate as they deal with concrete problems. They point to the fact that comparative policy analysis 
occupies the middle ground between `pure' and `applied' research, noting the following advantages : 
"... it broadens our understanding of particular policy problems and the lessons to 
be derived fr om experience. It helps us to test general theories and hypotheses by 
exposing the varied nature of policy decision-making as it confronts concrete issues 
and it also illuminates the various and subtle ways in which politics works to 
produce choices of a collective or social nature. Accordingly, sensitivity to that 
process helps us to begin seeing beneath the surface of political events in our 
rapidly changing and inter-dependent societies... " (1990: 2). 
Heidenheimer et al also noted the importance of the fundamental tenets of comparative policy, namely 
the conceptual distinctions between the how, the why, the to what effect and the courses of action and 
inaction (1990: 3). They emphasised the need to address the specific issues surrounding how governments 
chose to act and the various structures and processes which framed such actions and/or inactions. Beyond 
this, they emphasised the need to examine the influence of the: 
"... constellation of interest groups, public opinion, program beneficiaries... the ideas 
of policy makers present, which, no less than the power they seek to exercise, 
constitute the raw materials for explaining why policy similarities and differences 
occur... " (1990: 3). 
Qualitative studies of the policy process in the developing state also demand a certain level of 
flexibility and innovation in both framing the study and accessing the rich data that exists but is not 
catered for in some of the more inflexible and deterministic methods. Grounded theory with its raison 
d'etre as a theory building method gives precisely this flexibility, albeit within specified structures for data 
collection, breakdown and re-configuration to yield new insights. It focuses on the tracing of a 
phenomenon through its context, action/and interaction and consequences. It also enables the utilisation 
of existing theories where the are found to be adequate, and new smaller theories are then built to fill the 
existing theoretical gaps. In terms of actual policy there is however basic agreement about the importance 
of action and process in comparative study. Heclo (1972), like Leichter acknowledges that "... a policy, 
like a decision can (also) consist of what is not done... ". Heidenheimer et al (1990: 1-3) are more specific 
in defining comparative public policy as "... the study of how, why and to what effect different 
governments pursue courses of action or inaction... ". The role of inaction as a policy decision was 
particularly significant to my study of Caribbean policy-making, as I wanted to analyse whether this was a 
significant policy outcome of regime politics or simply the absence of adequate resources. Policy 
comprises both action and process. Comparative analysis - whether by country, by regime by decade - 
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enables analysis of similarities and variations in action. It also encapsulates the `process' and `time-space' 
factors which are vital to any attempts at policy theory-building.. As Strauss and Corbin put it: 
"... Knowledge is after all, linked closely to time and place. When we carefully and 
specifically build conditions into our theories, we eschew claims to idealistic 
versions of knowledge, leaving the way open for further development of our 
theories... " (Strauss and Corbin, 199: 276). 
To summarise, then, the insights from grounded theory, when combined with the comparative case 
study method offered the breadth, variety and contrast that are useful in comparing policies both within 
and across nations and regions. The advantage of the hypothesis-testing element of grounded theory is 
that it allows one to find and establish theoretical linkages in a non-predetermined way that can be applied 
both within and across country policy. The advantage of the comparative case, in contrast to single case 
studies is that it also allows one to examine selected dimensions of policy across states, enabling patterns 
of both similarities and differences in action, interaction and consequences to be observed 
3.4 MY RESEARCH METHOD 
Before, explaining my actual method, I outline, in Table 3.4 below, the main characteristics of the 
regimes under study. These categorisations are generally underscored in the Commonwealth Caribbean 
political science literature. However, it must be noted that the concept of changing circumstances, for 
example, the change from boom to bust within a short period, is difficult to replicate in a table. 
Nevertheless, Table 3.4 lists the regimes under study in the 1970s and 1980s. In the data chapters to 
follow, I outline the specific regime characteristics for each decade. 
Table 3.4: Regimes under study by country, year and political party 
COUNTRY YEAR REGIME POLITICAL PARTY 
Guyana 1970-1986 The Burnham regime Peoples National Congress 
(PNC) 
1986-1991 The Hoyte regime Peoples National Congress 
(PNC) 
Jamaica 1971- 1980 The Manley regime Peoples National Party 
(PNP) 
1980-1989 The Seaga regime Jamaica Labour Party 
(JLP) 
Trinidad and Tobago 1970-1981 The Williams regime Peoples National Movement 
(PNM) 
1981-1986 The Chambers regime Peoples National Movement 
(PNM) 
1986-1991 The Robinson regime National Alliance for 
Reconstruction 
(NAR) 
In my research, I applied the dominant regime characteristics listed in the two main data chapters - 
Chapters Four and Five - from the political sciences data for the specific years as shown above - to the 
health policy data, based on theoretical sampling of policy incidents/events, This process led to the 
development of the study at three levels. These comprise first, a general three-way comparative case 
study of health human resources planning, training and management policy processes generally under 
successive Guyanese, Jamaican and Trinidadian political regimes in the 1970s and 1980s. The second 
level is also a three-way comparative case analysis of regime responses to doctor and nurse migration 
which also focuses on the 1970s and 1980s. Finally, the third, and most 
detailed of the levels is a single 
case study which compares regime characteristic 
influences within one country on one policy issue: 
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medical training. This level focuses on the role and influence of regime maintenance on the Williams 
regime's policy decision to build the medical school in Trinidad 
`The general three-way comparative case study: planning, production and management in Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad in the 1970s and 1980s compared 
At this level, my primary concern was to undertake a comparative analysis of the influence of regime 
characteristics and change on the human resources policy process generally across the three states and 
across two decades: the 1970s and 1980s. The aim was to explain similarities and differences at the cross- 
national level in line with my hitherto unsubstantiated assertions. The focus was therefore on the 
influence of regime characteristics on selected policies related to planning, training and administration in 
the 1970s and 1980s for which data could be accessed. In the case of planning, my research concentrated 
on available health plans, the existence of policies, the speeches of politicians and senior level 
bureaucrats. 
In terms of training and production, I examined and assessed the relative influences of regime 
characteristics and medical influence on established training and `training innovation' policies for doctors 
and nurses. The focus here was both on the role of the medical influence in training, as well as the 
attempts by regimes to reform the traditional medical curative bias. It also focused, in this regard, on 
appropriateness in regime responses to the goals set out in each country in relation to the United 
Nations/World Health Organisation's guiding principles on primary health care. `Process' is also 
incorporated by comparing the policies and policy responses of successive regimes in the 1970s and 
1980s. In the area of administration and management, I focused on policy action and inaction at two 
levels: the sectoral or health ministerial level; which I related to the second level, i. e. the context of reform 
efforts (or non-efforts) at the national administrative level. In the case of the first, I limited my 
interpretation of the term `management' to mean the politics involved in managing and/or administration 
of the health professionals after training. In this section, I progressively examined the following issues: 
the influence of regime variables (including regime change) on migration; regime responses (by 
characteristics) and approaches to retaining health professionals, including methods such as post-graduate 
and post-basic training, job incentives and creation of new professional categories; and the successes, 
failures and consequences involved. In terms of the second, I focused on the state of national 
administrative reform processes, particularly regime actions with regard to decentralisation, as well as 
independent assessments from the development administration policy literature in relation to the three 
states. 
The three-way comparative case study of migration: doctor and nurse migration in Guyana, Jamaica 
and Trinidad in the 1970s and 1980s 
This section was developed as a comparative case study, by regime and country of nurse migration in 
the 1970s and 1980s. Policies relating to nurse migration in the Caribbean has been explained at two 
levels : first as a social safety valve and as a symptom of underdevelopment (Duany, 1994: 95-122). The 
second relates to the rights of health workers to migratory freedom which inevitably favours the developed 
countries (Fulop and Roemer, 1982: ix). The costs incurred by developing countries of health 
professionals are enormous, therefore it is critical that explanations of the problem assume a balanced 
approach. The argument for such an approach is qualified by the very limited and limiting available data 
for doctor and nurse migration in the region. Nevertheless, the dominance of this issue in the health field 
in the Caribbean as well as my success in progressively accumulating more relevant detail through 
theoretical sampling in each country was an important factor in its selection for the single level case study. 
Migration by its very nature can be also both a determinant and output of policy processes, so I had to 
distinguish between these two factors in the analysis. There are a number of key issues here that were 
considered. These included: 
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1 The relative role and influence of regime characteristics on nurse migration in the 
1970s and 1980s within the three countries and their respective regimes; 
2 The context of health professional migration - as both an international 
phenomenon and as an output of national/sub-regional policy processes; and 
3 Action/interaction/inaction and policy responses generally at various levels; 
national, regional and international - and the wider implications for future policy development. 
The single country case study: the medical school complex policy in Trinidad 
This level of analysis was the most detailed of the study, its major aim being to analyse the influence 
of regime characteristics on the decision to build a medical school in Trinidad. Using theoretical 
sampling, I found that questions over the democracy of the regime itself, as manifested in the authoritarian 
nature of leadership of Prime Minister Eric Williams was very conspicuous by its recurrence in the 
political science literature. The analysis thus traces the events, leading up to the decision to establish a 
medical school in Trinidad in the early 1970s, the actors involved, their interactions, the levels of 
interaction (national, sub-national, international) and the output and consequences of such decisions, 
actions, and interaction for health human resources development in Trinidad. In addition to this regime 
`power/characteristics' component, the `process' issue was also pertinent to the analysis as it applies to 
regime change and its influence on policy. In this section, I also examine and assess the influence of 
regime characteristics on the decisions made by the successor Chambers and Robinson regimes in the 
1980s to proceed with this policy. 
Comment: I used the integrated method, based on theoretical sampling of policy incidents/events 
which led to the development of the study at three levels. These comprised first, a general `three-case, 
comparative analysis of human resource policy action, inaction, initiatives, processes and outcomes in 
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad during two specific time periods: the 1970s (in Chapter Four), and the 
1980s and part of the early 1990s when fundamental policy reforms began to be implemented (in Chapter 
Five). The second level is a `three-case, comparative analysis' which discusses the relevance of regime 
characteristics to doctor and nurse migration in the three states from 1970 to 1990 in Chapter Six. Finally, 
the `single country case study' compares the role and influence of regime characteristics in the decision to 
build and commission a medical school in Trinidad by examining the actions of the three main regimes 
involved in the process between 1970 and 1990 in Chapter Seven. 
Collecting and analysing data: documentary analysis 
As mentioned earlier, primary data in the form of interviews and secondary data in the form of 
documents constituted the main sources of my data. This data - accessed from documentary analysis and 
open-ended, unstructured interviews - was then subjected to progressive and inter-linked theoretical 
sampling. These two methods proved quite useful in the collection and analysis process. As noted earlier, 
this was because the absence of human resources policy studies made it a somewhat difficult area to 
corroborate. Few studies had been done in this area in the Caribbean or in relation to Jamaica, Guyana 
and Trinidad. Where such research existed, most were Pan American Health Organisation-generated 
technical reports, commissioned by the national governments and their respective ministries of health. I 
therefore had to use interviews as well as documentary as a means of both eliciting and corroborating 
information on lead concepts against each other. Additionally, human resources policy in the health 
sector was often seen as not actual `health care' policy, despite its central role in health. 
Pertinent information in line with the goals, aims and objectives of my study thus had to be collected, 
analysed and extracted using both these methods. This was done using theoretical sampling which 
incorporated both my own prior knowledge as well as documentary sources and interviews. As I collected 
the information, I discovered and allocated categories based upon both frequency and absence of 
incidents. Categories were also allocated in accordance with their level of relevance to regime 
(characteristics) influences, both direct and indirect as noted in the findings in Table 3.3. In relation to 
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other sources of documentary evidence, I relied heavily on newspapers from the period, especially in 
relation to the single case study of the medical school project in Trinidad. I also relied heavily on official 
documents (published and unpublished) such as consultants reports, many commissioned by regional and 
international organisations such as PAHO which proved extremely useful in terms of data quality. Other 
important documents collected, reviewed and analysed included annual reports of the three ministries of 
health which provided information - both statistical and analytic - of human resources policy issues such 
as staff numbers, posts, vacancies, and policies being adopted or followed by regimes/governments. The 
other sources included various issues of the Caribbean and West Indies Medical Journals which provided 
me with important leads on most aspects of the human resources policy issues or sub-categories. These 
were particular helpful in the area of production of health professionals, particularly their obvious concern 
for doctors as an interest group. In relation to nurses, I relied on the International Nursing Review which 
contained articles on nursing development in the region. 
Interviews 
In the course of this study I conducted interviews (some of them follow-ups) with thirty-two (36) 
persons, all of whom were connected in some direct or indirect way to health and human resources policy 
in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad. The interview process did not always follow a set pattern since a 
significant amount of cross-comparison of sources had to be done. The integrated approach of grounded 
theory and comparative case study also implied a considerable amount of on-going analysis of the data 
provided by interviewees and the secondary data to ensure both accuracy and cogency. Table 3.1 earlier 
noted the categories of personnel interviewed. My interview technique was essentially based on lead 
questions, at two broad levels to which the interviewees were asked to respond. 
The first level: The `first-' or `open-sampling' level was designed to search for concepts that had some 
proven theoretical relevance; the second, to explore those issues that had proven theoretical relevance. 
The `first-level' questions were generally along the following lines: 
1 How would you describe the state/status of health policy in your country?; good?; 
poor?; neglected?; mixed?; Explain. 
2 How would you categorise/rank the different influences on health policy in your 
country generally and who or what are they?, 
3 How would you categorise in order of importance these influences (international 
and national economic, political, social, organisational factors) and 
combinations of influences?; 
4 Which national group(s) in your opinion exert considerable impact (or dominate) 
health policy in your country (doctors, politicians, bureaucrats, non-governmental 
organisations, multi-lateral organisations? ); and 
5 Have governments used resources wisely and generally done as best as the can in 
developing health human resources given various adverse factors: colonialism, 
resource scarcity, the IMF etc? 
Most of the respondents expressed the view that international and to some extent national economic 
factors were quite powerful actors in small developing states. However, there was general agreement that 
there existed some level of national policy space that varied from country to country that could be used by 
national actors. The main user of this space was stated to be the regime or national governments of these 
states. 
Other than the debt crisis, colonialism and third world underdevelopment, the other key concepts that 
emerged during this preliminary process (and common to all three countries) centred upon the politics of 
regime action, inaction and limited action. In terms of 
incidents, almost all of the respondents mentioned 
the concept of poor planning of regionalisation and administrative reform and the `mixed' experiences of 
regimes in relation to health generally. At the national 
level, the medical school issue was recalled again 
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and again in Trinidad in terms of its `political' origins and its relevance, as did the migration issue. 
Incidents relating to the ideological influences of the Manley and Seaga regimes on health policy emerged 
in Jamaica. In Guyana, the key incidents that surfaced seemed to be contradictory: on the one hand, 
decentralisation and other `progressive' formal policies in relation to health, on the other, authoritarian 
and corrupt regime influence that seemed to have negative effects on health status, health policy and the 
overall quality of life of the population, irrespective of the `scarce resource' factor, which was undeniably 
important. I needed to subject incidents and concepts such as these to further analysis. 
The second level: This level of sampling was basically relational and variational sampling of the 
emerging concepts: the politics of regime action, inaction and limited action and the consequences of such 
action. As the name implies, the aim was to discover relations and variations in these dimensions. Strauss 
and Corbin's `paradigm' model which essentially traces the contextual or causal conditions, the actions 
and interactions and their consequences thus influenced my questions as well as the supporting 
documentary analysis. In Trinidad, this on-site sampling and analysis process occurred at different 
periods since I was based there. In Jamaica and Guyana however, it occurred in the course of the same 
interviews. Although the precise content of the questions varied according to the hierarchy of the 
interviewee in the health field as well as the country, questions like the following, based on what I had 
gleaned earlier, were asked: 
Question How would you describe the role of national regimes in Guyanese/Jamaican/ 
Trinidadian health human resources policy processes after independence when 
compared with other factors (historical, national political, economic, 
socio-cultural, environmental)? " 
Question How would you describe the relative influence of the following broad regime 
characteristics on health human resources policy: strength, stability, ideology, 
democracy and regime survival/maintenance in the policy process in your country 
(the Caribbean generally); what is the level of significance compared with other 
actors, contexts and processes including economic problems? "; and 
Question Have these regime variables positively/negatively influenced health human 
resources policy action and processes in your opinion? If so How?; Were these 
policies/actions beneficial or regressive? Mixed? Strategies and consequences? 
Give examples ". 
From these questions, the following are just three samples of interviewees' responses which generally 
seemed to confirm that while economic factors and colonialism were uppermost in their minds, many were 
concerned to note that national governments had not acted as responsibly as they should have in placing 
health reform on the agenda. This assertion of course varied from country to country and from regime to 
regime. Nevertheless, the recurrence of concepts related to `neglect' and `inaction' were as commonly 
used (to varying degrees of course) in all three countries as were the terms `innovation', `policy reform', 
though to be sure, the recurrence of `debt crisis' and IMF and World Bank power was an equally- 
dominant theme during the course of my interviews. 
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Response 
... While I accept the reality of the generally negative influence of international 
and national structural factors -particularly the importance of structural 
adjustment policies in the 1980s, there cannot be any doubt that national political 
processes and political party characteristics have also influenced health human 
resources policy action, limited action and inaction after independence. Manley's 
democratic socialism was doomed but his regime's emphasis on community and 
preventive health policies proved very effective.. ". (Senior health human resources 
manager, Jamaica). 
Response 
... The role of regime type and characteristics is obviously very important. We in 
the Caribbean have been generally successful in achieving quite impressive health 
statistics, but when you look at the individual countries, the politics of 
policymaking begins to emerge. For instance, Guyana's experiences cannot be 
solely due to lack of resources, but also to [President] Burnham's and the PNC's 
authoritarian political practices. .. It is shocking that under colonialism at least the 
colonial authorities had implemented a decent public health policy ... after the Burnham years, we are worse off in health than when we started... " (Economist, 
Guyana). 
Response 
... Trinidad's recent experiences in health policy need to be placed not only in the 
context of the oil boom, but also in the context of the PNMpolitics behind the use 
of the windfall and in the case of the health sector, its implications for the 
development of a sustainable health service... the PNM squandered the wealth of 
the country and the NAR were too busy pleasing the IMF to deal with the health 
crisis... " (Hospital medical doctor, Trinidad and Tobago). 
In the case of Trinidad, the domination of one particular aspect of health human resources policy for 
much of the 1970s and the 1980s - the medical school project - meant that I was particularly interested in 
the responses of the medical profession to this particular policy. My question to Trinidadian interviewees 
was along the following lines: 
Question How would you describe the policy decision by the Williams government to build 
the medical school; can it be linked to party politics?; Williams' own motivations; 
the oil boom; underdevelopment; how would you categorise these and other 
factors in order of importance? 
This question yielded somewhat different responses from the medical profession, based not 
surprisingly on those involved in implementing decisions taken by the previous regime and those outside 
of it, but nevertheless harbouring deep reservations about it: 
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Response 
... We had no choice. The decision was made long before we assumed office. I did 
not like it at the time but there were no feasible alternatives but to go through with 
the implementation process... " (former NAR minister and medical doctor). 
Response 
... This policy was (Prime Minister) Williams' 'baby' along with that of those 
institutional doctors who wanted a fancy place to practice their hi-tech medicine. 
Under the NAR, instead of spending some of the already scarce resources on 
reforming health services, they chose to spend it on this much-hyped institution, 
which is of questionable value to Trinidad's health problems currently... we at this 
hospital have to deal on a daily basis with the failure of successive governments' 
health policy failures - the medical complex epitomised this failure. The IMF's 
structural adjustment policies just make matters worse. The new government was 
in a positions to act but did not have the courage to fight the medical lobby and 
curtail the project... " (Hospital medical doctor). 
These sample findings proved just how divergent the views were even about this particular policy. In 
the case of migration, responses also varied from economic to political. However, the one theme that 
resonated was that of poor working conditions due to lack of any meaningful reform of the colonial 
system. This criticism was heard more in Guyana and Trinidad, it has to be said, than Jamaica, a finding 
which furthered my interest in whether there were any regime characteristics-related reasons for this, as 
economics did not explain it adequately. 
Comment: These and other questions were intended to serve two main purposes. The first objective 
was to provide more detailed information on the context, causes, actions/interactions and consequences of 
policies (and non-policies). The second objective was to get pointers towards more detailed information 
on the relative levels of importance of regime characteristics - strength, stability, ideology, democracy and 
regime maintenance - as well as the dimensions or level of impact of policy for example, explanations for 
types of policy actions, and their effectiveness, as well as reasons for limited action and inaction. Based 
on the information collected and analysed at the first two levels, I re-visited documentary data pertaining 
to migration, training policy and administrative reform of the health service in each country. In Trinidad, 
I also re-interviewed three of the original interviewees on these issues in addition to returning to some of 
the relevant documentary evidence. I also checked newspapers to corroborate the facts as well as the 
processes. 
Delimitations and limitations 
In terms of delimitations, human resources development covers quite a broad area. I however wanted 
to focus specifically on the possible links between regime characteristics and the three main areas of 
health human resources development - planning, training or production and administration or 
management in a cogent manner, the choice of which was to be based on theoretical sampling. I knew 
that there would also be variations in the data which were totally dependent on the quality and quantity of 
data that I collected. I thus limited the study to the influence of regime characteristics and change on 
administrative reforms (or lack of); the migration issue; and finally the allocation of scarce resources to 
(and the resultant impact on health human resources development of) the building of the medical school in 
Trinidad. I believed that this was a rational delimitation, given the data, finances and time available as 
well as the requirements of the dissertation. I also kept my cross-comparisons down to three states and 
two decades which I believed was adequate for the objectives I had set out the study in consultation with 
my supervisor. I was initially concerned about the number of regimes to be cross-compared: seven (7) 
across two decades. However, I believed that the sampling process using grounded theory served as a 
conceptual guide to both eliminate unnecessary data and afford greater conceptual 
detail and focus. 
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Limitations 
In relation to limitations, the main limitation is obviously and regrettably my inability, due to reasons 
of time and money, not to mention the nature of the PhD process, to also do the `hypothesis-testing' 
element of the research, which would have involved essentially testing out my findings for the Caribbean 
region within another developing area or combinations of developing countries. While not undermining 
the study, it makes my findings heavily subjective, although, as I try to show throughout the study, 
there are pertinent examples within both developed and developing states that support some of my 
conclusions. In addition, have already mentioned the limitations of money that precluded a follow-up 
collection of data in Guyana and Jamaica. This was the other major limitation of the study. It prevented 
me from following up leads and potential interviewees who might have provided richer information for the 
study. It also precluded the follow-up examination of some areas such as migration. Having said that, I 
think that the delimitations helped since I scaled down and refined my aims and objectives as the 
collection and analysis progressed. Overall then, despite these two limitations, my belief is that the 
essential aims and objectives of the study were not compromised by either the methodological limitations 
or the actual data collection and analytic procedures of my actual fieldwork although further follow-up 
work in the future is clearly necessary. 
3.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
According to Macridis, comparative analysis is an integral part of policy analysis and its function is to: 
"... identify uniformities and differences and to explain them. Explanations require 
the development of theories in light of which similarities and differences come, so to 
speak, to life... " (1955: 1-3). 
Social science researchers have at their disposal a number of broad approaches to social inquiry. The 
choice of approach is inextricably bound up with a number of important factors. Qualitative approaches 
are most suitable for policy-behavioural related research where context, action and outcomes, among other 
things have to be measured in an analytical as opposed to statistical way. To examine and compare the 
impact and influence of variable factors on a phenomenon, the most suitable method must be chosen. 
Suitability has to be conditioned naturally, by the aims and objectives of a study. I adopted an analytic 
approach which integrated elements of grounded theory methodology and comparative case study to 
examine whether regime characteristics and regime change influenced human resources development in 
the health sector in the 1970s and 1980s. This method had four related advantages: first, it enabled me to 
be both systematic and flexible in my collection and analysis of data, given the lack of previous research 
in the Caribbean on human resources. Second, it enabled me to analyse three progressive levels of human 
resources policy processes in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad in the 1970s and 1980s, based on data type 
and availability. Thirdly, it provided a rich variety of cross-comparisons of the independent variable of 
regime influence manifested in four characteristics. This approach was used at three levels. At the most 
general level, I compared specific policies relating to human resources policy across the various regimes 
in the three state using Bossert's regime characteristics, but augmented by my introduction of regime 
survival as an important explanatory variable in Guyana and Trinidad as noted by Hintzen (1989). At the 
second level, I selected one policy issue: migration which I also cross-compared by regime characteristics 
over the same time period across the three states. At the most detailed level, I examined the influence of 
regime characteristics and regime change by tracing one human resources issue across three regimes in 
Trinidad in the 1970s and 1980s - the role and influence of regime characteristics in the policy decision to 
build of a medical school. 
The flexibility of grounded theory with its in-built allowances for on-site collection, theoretical 
sampling of concepts and analysis was quite useful, given the very obvious limitations relating to time, 
finances, accessibility to research sites, limited material and previous policy research in the field. 
Comparative analysis gave the study a decisive advantage in terms of realistic applicability in its cross- 
comparisons of policy in similar states within this one geographical region. I believe therefore that the 
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essence of the broad human resources policy processes in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad was effectively 
captured and analysed using this method. My use of comparative study, much like my use of grounded 
theory evolved from the collection and open sampling of data from the three countries. In addition to 
`discovering' the more pertinent categories through the data coding process, theoretical sampling 
constituted the direct link between the two methods. In terms of the former, the core category of regime 
characteristics was already `discovered' n Bossert's study of Central America, while regime survival or 
maintenance was also already `discovered' in various studies, including, pertinently, Hintzen's 1989 
political study of regime survival in Guyana and Trinidad. My preliminary analysis of the data showed 
that there was adequate level of applicability of these sub-categories to Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad. I 
thus decided to use them to `discover' possible `variations' in the relationship between regime 
characteristics and health policy formulation and implementation in the Commonwealth Caribbean state. 
In terms of comparing cases and finding categories, the process was somewhat complex since I was 
comparing regime influences across three countries as well as across three broad sub-components of 
human resources development. I was also incorporating the concept of `process' by analysing successive 
regimes in two successive decades (the 1970s and the 1980s). I therefore chose to focus primarily, though 
not exclusively, on the regimes of each country - two in Guyana, two in Jamaica and three in Trinidad 
which governed during this particular period. In relation to the actual sub-components of human 
resources policy, my preliminary data analysis pointed first to the role of regimes in health services reform 
and its impact on human resources development as an important issue. The area of production of doctors 
and nurses was the second major area and undeniably a core area of human resources policy in the health 
sector. In terms of migration, the same logic applied. The data pointed to this issue as both a symptom 
and sign of regime action and inaction in managing human resources policy in the health sector, as much 
as a product of economic crisis. The interrelationships among the three however needed to be clarified. 
The question of the availability of room to manoeuvre by developing states and the role and influence of 
regime strength, stability, ideology and democracy also warranted further clarification through the 
progressive analysis of these sub-components. 
I then had to address the question of levels of analysis, based on the types and levels of detail that I 
had collected and subjected to preliminary analysis. As pointed out earlier, the dominance of the medical 
school policy issue in Trinidad in the 1970s and 1980s, and even in the 1990s warranted a special case 
study of policy making at the national level. There was also adequate documentary data on the specific 
issue of migration that would allow a cross-comparison on this particular issue. However, I did not 
manage to access - either in Guyana or Jamaica - the type of information that I got in Trinidad relating to 
the medical school. This factor influenced my decision to adopt three levels of analysis in my approach. It 
should be noted finally that I deliberately ignored the question of size and smallness in this study, which 
although a useful concept, questions still remain about whether a country's size retards development, with 
Singapore being often cited as an exception to this `rule'. Given my focus on national-level policy action 
and responsibility in the post-colonial state, In conclusion, then, the guiding rule in my decision upon 
methodology is in line with Schahczenski's conclusion (1990: 69) about small, developing state that 
"... any government, no matter how small does have some capacity for autonomous action... ". 
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CHAPTER 4 
COMPARING REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND HEALTH HUMAN RESOURCES UNDER 
THE BURNHAM, MANLEY AND WILLIAMS GOVERNMENTS IN GUYANA, JAMAICA AND 
TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO THE 1970s 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this, the first of my four data chapters, I examine the influence of regime strength, stability, ideology 
and democracy and political survival on the post-colonial state policy process. This is done by examining 
and comparing health human resources policy within the three Commonwealth Caribbean states during the 
1970s. I examine the context of policy action and processes in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad under the 
Burnham (1970-1980), Manley (1972-1980) and Williams (1970-1981) governments respectively. The 
1970s was an important `developmental' decade for small post-colonial states, like Guyana, Jamaica and 
Trinidad, which had gained independence the previous decade, and which were now formulating and 
implementing a variety of public policies as fully-independent states. I critically examine and compare 
whether regime characteristics can realistically explain the policy action, limited action, and non-action 
(with specific reference to health human resources policy) that ensued, given constraints and limitations 
exerted at other levels, particularly the economic and historical. The chapter is divided into two main 
sections. The first examines and compares the contexts and characteristics that shaped health and health 
human resources policies in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad in the 1970s. The second section assesses the 
relevance of regime characteristics in the policy process, given the influence of these other factors. 
4.2 REGIME CONTEXTS, CHARACTERISTICS AND HEALTH HUMAN RESOURCES 
POLICY REFORMS IN THE 1970s 
In this section, I examine the influences regime characteristics by applying Bossert's characteristics, 
discussed in Chapter Two, to the Caribbean region. I analyse the dominant characteristics of these regime 
as illustrated in Table 4.1 below. I begin by examining the Burnham regime in Guyana. 
Table 4.1: Regime characteristics applied to the Guyanese, Jamaican and Trinidadian 
political regimes in the 1970s 
Regimes The Burnham regime The Manley regimes The Williams regime 
(Guyana (Jamaica) (Trinidad) 
Year 1970-1980 1972-1975 and 1975-1980 
Characteristics: 
Strength Weak Weak 
Stability Unstable Stable-Unstable 
Ideology Cooperative -socialist/ Democratic- 
Reformist socialist reformist 
Democracy/ Democratic/non- 











The Burnham regime in Guyana (1970-1980) 
Policy context: The policy environment of the 1970s in Guyana was dominated by the authoritarian 
and illegal nature of the Burnham government, within a crisis-ridden economic context. Politically, 
Guyana in the 1970s was governed by the weak, unstable Peoples' National Congress (PNC) under prime 
minister Forbes Burnham. Like many socialist states, it was characterised by both ideologically-reformist 
and authoritarian, survivalist tendencies. In 1970, Burnham declared Guyana a cooperative socialist 
republic which set Guyana on a distinct road to non-democratic, authoritarian rule unlike the rest of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean region. Guyana's electoral politics, like that of Trinidad was based on a 
similar pattern of Indian-African polarised ethnic pluralism. However, the implementation of a 
proportional representation system of government, as well as the fact that the regime had assumed power 
through rigged general elections in 1968 differentiated Guyana not only from Trinidad, but also from 
Britain's other former Caribbean colonies. Effective power was thus in the hands of an authoritarian 
prime minister. Economically, the negative effect of the oil shock in the post-1973, in addition to poor 
commodity prices saw the government forced to adopt unpopular measures, including drastic cutbacks in 
recurrent and capital expenditure which resulted in massive retrenchments of state employees and the 
removal of food subsidies and consumer essentials (Hintzen, 1989: 68). Balance of payments deficits 
forced cutbacks on imports, leading to severe shortages of essentials. The cumulative effective of these 
and other economic conditions, not only affected the ability of the state to deliver basic services including 
health care, but when added to the politics of the regime, created an untenable social, economic and 
political situation for the Guyanese population. 
Ideologically, the government had announced in 1975 its adherence to the concept of party 
paramountcy within its new cooperative-socialist ideology. Party paramountcy established the 
supremacy of the party over the state - the hallmark of authoritarian rule. Cooperative socialism was 
advocated as the ideological framework for achieving economic, political and social development under 
`paramountcy'. Burnham underlined his determination to make Guyana a `cooperative republic' where 
the main goal was "... the organisation of our human and material resources through the co-operative 
movement, with government providing financial assistance, management, training and administrative 
direction... " (Spinner, 1984: 136). Under this ideological direction, all Guyanese were urged to "... grasp 
the value of coming together as a group, of pooling... physical, material and human resources... " (Spinner, 
1984: 137). 
The impact of cooperative socialism was immediate and contradictory. The bauxite industry, a 
mainstay of the economy, was nationalised as were all other major foreign economic assets, excluding 
banks and insurance companies. In the 1970s, the Burnham government also managed to maintain what 
within the cold war context, a rare, but rocky foreign policy achievement of being friendly with Cuba, while 
maintaining links with the USA. In 1972, diplomatic relations were established with Cuba, a decision which 
was to prove particularly beneficial to Guyana in relation to human resources development in the health 
sector over the next two decades in terms of the contracting of Cuban doctors to the Guyanese public 
health sector. As American impatience grew with Burnham's increased friendly relations with Cuba and 
other socialist states, as well as his authoritarianism in the late 1970s however, the regime would become 
increasingly isolated. Even the ideals of cooperative socialism were undermined by party paramountcy, 
resulting in generally negative outcomes. In the case of public policy reform, according to Mars, party 
dominance resulted in governmental priorities and decisions being "... usually initiated and promulgated 
within the decision-making framework of the paramount party, before they are legitimised or implemented 
as government policy... " (Mars, 1990: 3). Party paramountcy constituted a de facto declaration of 
authoritarian and non-democratic rule by the government. As the respected Guyanese historian, Walter 
Rodney somewhat cynically noted: 
"... paramountcy is one of Burnham 's fancy words. He announced the doctrine of 
PNC paramountcy or domination over parliament, the courts, the press, everything 
else. In fact, paramountcy' was the official statement that a minority party which 
was growing smaller and smaller intended to maintain dictatorial rule... " (1979: 8). 
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Diplomatic relations between the Burnham regime and his original benefactors, the USA and Britain, 
though still friendly for much of the 1970s, had now begun to cool. This factor coupled with the claim on 
a significant part of its territory by Venezuela influenced a vigorous foreign policy and presence by the 
government at international `socialist' forums, like Jamaica, during the 1970s. Part of the reason for this 
diplomatic thrust, it has to be said, was also to achieve legitimacy and support from other countries, both 
within and outside the region. The country was not only financially and institutionally weak, but riven by 
race-based politics, making it quite unstable. Burnham's authoritarian tendencies and his desire to cling to 
power resulted in considerable political and policy turmoil in the 1970s. 
Regime characteristics and health and health human resources policy responses: It was within this 
national context that attempts were made to reform the health system. The government, despite its 
illegality, began reasonably well in attempting to outline its health policy and policy reforms. In 1969, a 
full-time planning unit was established in the Ministry of Health, under the direction of the national 
planning commission to develop a ten-year plan for the sector. This plan, A Blueprint for Action, 
completed in 1970, contained the broad principles of universal coverage and access to health services, 
similar to those principles developed by other Commonwealth Caribbean states (Harry/PAHO, 1989: 6). 
Developed with technical support from the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), it provided for 
the principles of regionalisation, given Guyana's size, through the definition of five levels of care, ranging 
from primary through to tertiary care. Though the majority of Guyanese lived in urban and/or accessible 
areas, levels one and two were aimed at providing primary care services through health posts and clinics 
for the country's small indigenous population who lived the vast hinterland of this 82,000 square mile 
country, while levels three, four and five provided for care at the secondary and tertiary/urban levels 
(Sagala et al, 1990: 32; Government of Guyana/Ministry of Health, 1970: 60). 
To achieve these goals, the plan noted that administrative reform was needed at both the national and 
sectoral levels, given the still-pervasive colonial bureaucratic structure. The ministry and government thus 
recognised the need for comprehensive administrative reform as a priority. These reforms, according to 
the health plan, would incorporate cooperative socialist principles, with decentralisation, relevance and 
self-sufficiency as the guiding strategies for program formulation and implementation. In line with the 
five health levels, the plan also proposed the creation of two administrative levels - the central and the 
regional - as the way forward for the health reform process. The country would be divided into five (5) 
health regions to facilitate the implementation process. These two levels of administration were duly 
created. At the central level, the Minister would be supported by a national health board, which would 
include a chief medical officer, the chairmen of the five (5) regional boards, technical consultants from the 
ministry and a representative of the central planning office. According to the plan, the central level would 
be regulatory and policy-making in terms of its overall function and would provide general direction, 
interpretation of government policy consistent with the government's ideological objectives. It would 
provide national planning and evaluation of health activities throughout the country. Human resources 
development in the health sector was identified as one of its most important priorities. It was envisaged 
that the regional administration would administer day to day health services, within this newly 
decentralised system. In terms of expressing socialist ideals, the plan could be considered very 
enlightened and quite impressive (Mars, 1990: 1). It placed equal value on both the preventive and 
curative aspects of health care. According to the Ministry, the aim of the health administrative reform 
process was to reduce the preventive-curative division within the health services by integrating them 
wherever possible. It also aimed to provide egalitarian access to health facilities throughout the country 
and committed the government "... to the task of bringing the benefits of modern medical knowledge to the 
greatest number of people... " (1970: 3). 
In order to assess the role and relevance of regime characteristics in Guyanese health human resources 
policy action and processes in the 1970s, we need to first examine the health human resources process 
and policies espoused or taken during this period. The Burnham regime emphasised the importance of 
health human resources development in all sectors within its new developmental `path'. The nature and 
extent of the task ahead was reflected in the health plan's assertion that: 
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"... the most striking deficiencies in the health services are caused or aggravated by 
quantitative and qualitative lack of human resources. Priority must be given to 
recruitment, education, training, deployment and supervision of health 
manpower... " (Government of Guyana/Ministry of Health, 1970: 60). 
Planning: In terms of health human resource planning, among the key strategies outlined in the plan 
to remedy these existing problems was the creation in 1970 of a health planning unit to "... provide 
leadership in the training and development of staff and to co-ordinate all training programs... " (1970: 60- 
61). The fact that this plan was never fully implemented was a sad indictment of the Burnham regime's 
priorities. The government was clearly focused more on enhancing its own security, with the already 
limited resources available, than on health policy reform or other social policies. The health planning unit 
was disbanded the same year, so that for the ensuing nineteen year period (1970-89) when one health 
planner was finally appointed, there was no health planner employed by the Guyanese government. 
Economic problems and the resultant scarcity of disposable resources for the health and education sectors 
was defmitely a causal factor. However, policy non-implementation was also due to the politics of 
survival and neglect which dominated the regime's behaviour within the national policy arena. Both 
overall health and health human resources policy formulation and implementation had no guiding policy 
other than the draft plan. Thus, both continued to be, like the rest of the health sector, un-reformed, `ad 
hoc', `numbers and ratios' oriented, highly centralised, and based on highly unreliable statistics. Even a 
Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) commissioned report, the Neal Report of 1982 had to admit 
by the end of the 1970s that health human resources development was: 
"... still being conducted without any clear policy strategies and had not been 
planned or controlled to produce adequate numbers or types of health manpower 
responsive to the nation's needs. As a general rule, manpower development is still 
conducted independently of actual requirements of health programs and without 
response to projections of needs or coordination between existing vertical 
programs... " (Pan American Health Organisation /Neal, 1982: 6). 
To summarise, then, planning by the end of the 1970s was basically non-existent due to a combination 
of economic problems and policy reform neglect by a regime preoccupied with its own survival and 
perpetuation of its undemocratic rule. 
Training: In the case of training, Guyana's fortunes in the 1970s were somewhat better, though still 
mixed, with some notable successes in spite of the failure to implement the health plan in its entirety. In 
small developing states like Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, the government largely assumes the costly 
financial responsibility for training health personnel. Hence allocation of training resources is quite 
important. Training fell under on two broad categories however: first the almost automatic, though less 
than satisfactory maintenance and support of the still intact colonially-based nurse training system; and 
secondly the innovation of `new' policies in an ad-hoc manner. In keeping with the government's new 
ideological direction, as well as global trends in the 1970s, the health plan explicitly stated that health 
human resources would be developed through "appropriate" training programmes. Consequently, the 
training and use of auxiliary personnel were to be emphasised alongside the traditional professional 
categories, with subsequent deployment throughout the country in order to "... help achieve the aim of 
providing some form of basic medical care to every situation... " (1975: 61). In 1977 and 1979 
respectively, the regime's high point in health human resources was the implementation of quite 
progressive training programmes for the medex and community health worker (CHW) categories of 
auxiliary workers for assignment to rural areas. This will be discussed in more detail in the next chapter 
on the 1980s, the period when the programmes were fully implemented. The medex (from the French: 
`medecin extension', literally extension to the physician) training programme was introduced into Guyana 
in 1977, and enacted in 1978, was pioneered at the University of Washington in 1969, and developed and 
refined at the university of Hawaii in 1970s for application to rural areas in developing countries. The 
problem with this `ad-hoc' implementation was the lack of adequate organisational and other support for 
these categories and goes back to the generally chaotic planning and coordination situation. The ministry 
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requested from the central government substantial increases in budgetary allocation for both the training 
and salaries of both auxiliary and professional staff. Having started late in the 1970s, these programmes 
understandably had little to show the end of this decade, and hence cannot be fully assessed until the next 
chapter. 
In the case of the two main categories - doctors and nurses - the policy situation was grim. In the case 
of nurse training, government policy could be defined as the continuation of the status quo, which, in an 
environment of political and economic crisis and the urge to migrate, was short-sighted. Thus, nurse 
training programmes continued under the ministry of health, like other Commonwealth Caribbean states, 
with the private sector (in the form of private hospitals) training for their own needs. The health plan had 
proposed that nurse planning, training and discipline be retained at the central ministerial level "... to 
provide professional direction at the regional level... " (1970: 61). However, there was little change here. 
In the case of physician training and supply, the situation was more problematic. The main policy seemed 
to focus on overseas recruitment and training of limited numbers of Guyanese medical students. Plans 
were also outlined to attract overseas doctors. Guyana produced no doctors and depended almost entirely 
on sponsoring, at full cost, the training of medical students at both the University of the West Indies 
medical school (which it chose not to be a part of) and in North America and the UK. Many however 
failed to return, given the poor working conditions, salaries and lack of other incentives. Places were 
extremely limited in Jamaica, so the government engaged itself in funding limited numbers of medical 
students and contractually binding them to the ministry for set periods as well as soliciting scholarships to 
the former Eastern `bloc' as well as Cuba for Guyanese medical and dental students. The ministry 
acknowledged the doctor shortage and its primary causes: 
"... the need to improve the doctor population ratio by active recruitment of doctors, 
preferably Guyanese. This may be done through active encouragement of medical 
education and improved conditions of service. It is unrealistic to expect good 
doctors to work satisfactorily under present conditions... " (Government of 
Guyana/Ministry of health: 81). 
Comment: Like planning, training problems at the three main levels remained unresolved by the end 
of the decade. The auxiliary programmes started too late to be significant at this point in time. Nursing 
standards remained high by developing world standards but poor salaries and living and working 
conditions forced many to migrate in search of better rewards. Problems at the medical training level 
stemmed from the Burnham regime's unwillingness to be part of the UWI system, the reasons for which - 
medical dominance and costs - though understandable, meant that it was itself 
deprived of doctors. The 
country's health system suffered as a result, having to solicit, instead, funds from Eastern Bloc 
countries. While economic factors were instrumental in this state of affairs then, they were intertwined 
by 
political choices and decisions as well that, though partly understandable, disregarded the needs of the 
majority of Guyanese and was compounded by regime survival. 
Administration and management: A number of political problems were identified at the 
administration and managerial levels within the ministry of health, one of which was coordination. 
The 
Neal report (1982) noted the failures at all three categories of the human resources development process: 
planning production and management/utilisation, adding that no coordinating unit was set up 
"... to 
develop human resources in order to provide an adequately staffed health service, both quantitatively and 
qualitatively.... " (1982: 6). Another major political problem was bureaucratic politicisation and the 
increasingly debilitating problem of migration for a combination of both political and economic reasons. 
The lack of support by the regime for public sector non-party supporters who were committed to the 
health development process, coupled with declining economic conditions made migration a sensible 
option for such professionals. The majority of the emigrants consistently stated that their 
dissatisfaction 
with the national policies of the PNC regime and dissatisfaction with the political situation 
in Guyana 
were major factors influencing their decision to stay abroad (Hope, 1985: 38). As Hope observed, 
if high- 
level and sufficient manpower was not available then there could be no lasting and significant process of 
growth and development. Bureaucratic politicisation through excessive regime patronage was, not 
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surprisingly, another regime `characteristic-influenced' reason for the failure to implement the health plan 
and consequently human resources development policy reform and rationalisation. As Hope noted of the 
character of the Guyanese bureaucracy under Burnham's tenure: 
"... The situation in Guyana is one where politics is centred on individuals. Personal 
loyalty to politicians therefore plays an important part in the process of political 
identification and decision-making. Administration under such leadership cannot 
remain wholly impersonal. The bureaucrat is nurtured more in the politics of 
agitation than in concepts of nation-building... " (Hope, 1985: 112). 
Inefficiencies and incompetence therefore became a hallmark of bureaucratic professional life which 
made even the most laudable of policy efforts by the government in the area of human resources 
development seem `ad-hoc' and `crisis-ridden'. The ministry's positive efforts in implementing the 
PAHO/Caricom-designed auxiliary program and the subsequent placement of the medexes and community 
health workers in the late 1970s thus has to be seen within the context of an overall health and 
developmental policy vacuum during this period. These workers would eventually be called upon in the 
1980s to undertake duties (many times without payment) that, under normal conditions would have been 
carried out by primary care nurses in a fully-reformed and resourced health system. Instead, as the decade 
closed, and the Burnham regime was focusing more on its own survival given the economic crisis, than on 
adequately supporting such programmes, administrators along with many doctors, but especially nurses 
either migrated overseas or into the local private sector. 
`Party paramountcy' thus extended to and permeated the bureaucracy. The ensuing patronage resulted 
in the further ascendancy of the political apparatus over the state bureaucracy. Under these conditions, 
politicians were able to use the political apparatus and state machinery to foster a growing personalisation 
of political power. This created, according to Hope, a ".. highly centralised system of administration and 
sycophantic policy-making... " on the part of senior civil servants, which led to inefficiency in the 
administration of national development while at the same time making it costly (Hope, 1985: 35). Any 
attempts at greater coordination at the systemic level were resisted by this vested political interest (1985: 
34-36). Hope noted in this regard the following: 
"... civil servants in Guyana lack a sense of purpose and commitment to their 
responsibilities. They do not believe that they are serving anyone else but their PNC 
bosses and themselves and they exploit their positions for personal gain... " (1985: 
37). 
There was therefore widespread pessimism about the future of the overall post-independent 
development management process, as the permeation of party politics continued. As Hope concluded of 
the problems within the Guyanese bureaucracy: 
"... of primary importance among the factors affecting the bureaucratic machinery 
is that of the lack of the leadership's support and commitment for increasing the 
efficiency of the administrative system. The political leadership can, in the same 
manner in which they inspire political allegiance, inspire the bureaucracy to higher 
levels of performance. Additionally, government functions are generally dispersed 
among an excessive amount of ministries and agencies. Since independence, new 
agencies ... 
have been superimposed without a prior review of costs and 
benefcts... administrative leadership then tends to be lacking. It has been replaced by 
politicised and centralised decision-making at the party and cabinet level. This 
centralised nature of the bureaucratic machinery contributes to the destruction of 
the channels of communication and tends to immobilise the administration of 
national development. The ultimate result of all these manifestations is a lack of co- 
ordination of policies among departments and a lack of dissemination of 
information for effective decision-making... The effect is, necessarily, either 
procrastination and long delays and/or inadequate and inept policies... " (1985: 38). 
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Comment: The Burnham regime's time, policy efforts and resources were therefore, throughout the 
1970s increasingly concerned with its own survival, and based on `party paramountcy', not policy 
development within a democratic society. As economic conditions worsened in the late 1970s so did the 
authoritarian policies of the regime, thus aggravating the already considerable exodus of administrators 
and professionals. There was little mention of health in the national budgets speeches of 1977 and 1978. 
The latter mentioned the formation of a state planning commission as the key to planning and monitoring 
the entire economy, "... an essential step towards the goal of rational application of human, natural and 
financial resources... " under the government's stated policy of cooperative socialism (1978 Budget 
Speech, Minister of Finance). Self-reliance and cooperativism was emphasised in the 1980 budget speech 
by the then economic development minister Desmond Hoyte as a response to the increasing economic 
crisis. However little or no mention was made of the health sector crisis or attempts to remedy the health 
situation. 
The role of Cuban and other assistance: The establishment of diplomatic relations with Cuba in 
1972, followed by the Soviet Union and Eastern European states was a boon to the faltering health human 
resources process during the mid to late 1970s. These relationships proved particularly beneficial to the 
training of doctors with a number of scholarships offered to Guyanese medical students by these states. 
Cuba also played a particularly critical role in filling Guyanese public health sector vacancies with Cuban- 
trained Guyanese doctors comprising a significant proportion of medical staff during, and since the 1970s. 
Teams of Cuban doctors also held periodic clinics throughout the country. In 1978, Cuban medical 
workers treated over 200,000 patients during a fifteen-month stay in Guyana (Feinsilver, 1993: 162). 
Significant numbers of contracted Cuban doctors thus manned the Guyanese health services during this 
period providing the vast majority of specialists for the public sector: a situation that continued well into 
the next two decades. However, this strategy still represented an `ad-hoc', short-term, `stop-gap' policy 
response at a time when some room for state action existed, but was being occupied and set by `political 
survival' rather than development. By its very nature, there was little or no political incentive to 
adequately support and reform `low-politics' policy issues such as health, given this context. 
This `ad-hoc' approach was also evident in the heavier than usual reliance by the ministry of health on 
PAHO's technical assistance and support as `de facto' health policy formulator and implementer than 
obtaining on other countries. Like the Cuban policy, PAHO's assistance though quite laudable, was in 
effect providing short-term, crisis-based solutions to what was essentially a national policy situation 
thwarted by the regime's illegality and its desire to cling to power. Other forms of assistance had little 
impact on the on-going human resources situation. In 1979, with a US$9.2 million grant from the Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB) and technical support from PAHO, the ministry of health adopted a 
new plan to reform and "strengthen" the health care system to accommodate an emphasis on primary 
health care in line with the Alma Ata objectives agreed at the international level a year earlier. The 
project was designed to train, inter alia, nurse administrators and other categories of workers and to 
develop both local and overseas training programs. This programme was a response to the crisis situation 
of the late 1970s by the government in collaboration with the two international organisations to prevent 
the total collapse of the health system. However, a PAHO team in 1980 found that planning 
methodologies for even this new plan had not yet been designed, and that activities were being carried out 
without a systemic, comprehensive, integrative character (PAHO/Lopez, 19 8 0: 1). 
In relation to human resources, the team also found that programmes had not been developed in the 
priority area of training and management/utilisation. Inter-sectoral co-ordination and rationalisation of 
administration remained `ad hoc' at best, while the formulation of an integrated human resources 
development plan was still non-existent. The report strongly urged the Burnham regime to prioritise both 
planning and programming, as well as the development of human resources within an overall policy of 
regionalization (PAHO/Lopez: 10-15). However, the increasing preoccupation with regime maintenance 
being practised by the regime limited, if not precluded, any positive action on these issues. 
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The conclusions and recommendations of the Lopez report were supported by the 1982 Neal report - 
which itself lamented the lack of adequate numbers of doctors, nurses and auxiliaries needed to serve at 
key posts in the proposed referral (five-tier) system contained in the first health plan (NeaUPAHO, 1982: 
6-7). The report similarly painted a gloomy picture of health policy neglect, concluding that the failure of 
the 1979 initiative was due to the continued absence of a written policy. It noted also problems including 
the failure to rationalise training programs for all categories of nurses; the irrelevance of curriculum 
design; limited opportunities for upward mobility; and falling nursing standards. This report also pointed 
to the negative influence on health planning of the continued lack of reliable basic statistics on the health 
care system. In the case of politics, the report was uniquely blunt, describing the policy process as one 
which stressed `who one knows', and the Guyanese situation as one which had resulted in "... a stifling 
stultification of individual initiative and consequently low productivity... " (1982: 46). The report 
cautioned the government that: 
"... formulation of manpower development plans must take into consideration the 
short-run investment required and long-range dividends in achievement of improved 
human performance, increased worker satisfaction and increased commitment... " 
(PAHO/Neal, 1982: 47). 
Consequences by the end of the 1970s: As in other Commonwealth Caribbean former territories, 
health care reform in Guyana had been designated a priority by the Burnham regime at the end of the 
1960s because of the failures associated with the colonial health system. Health conditions, though 
stabilising in the early 1960s then deteriorated considerably making the need for action urgent as well as 
comprehensive in scope. Like other Caribbean territories, doctor and nurse migration had started in the 
late 1950s, and steadily increased during the political crisis period of the early 1960s. The chronic 
shortages of these two major categories of health professionals that followed were also instrumental in 
plan formulation. 
The formulation of the 1971-1980 health plan which noted the importance of human resources 
development in the health sector, was an acknowledgement of the problem. Despite this however, the 
Burnham focused instead, not on plan implementation, but on allocating much of its scarce resources for 
its own short-term political survival goals. Thus, while the ideological underpinnings of cooperative 
socialism seemed initially progressive and reform-driven, the policy arena as well as the agenda was 
dominated by the politics of survival and not development, as Burnham had pledged in 1970. By the end of 
the 1970s therefore, the health sector and its human resources, like much of Guyana's other sectors was in 
a state of crisis. The intention of the new regime was clear: the maintenance of power, despite the 
considerable developmental cost. The process of co-optation and control of the state through patronage 
left little or no room for development policy (Hintzen, 1989: 65-70). Military and policing expenditure 
rose steadily in comparison to the social sectors, so that even scarce fmancial resources which should have 
been going towards the development effort were being used for political survival and control (Greene, 
1983; Hope, 1985; Thomas, 1988). 
Even on the administrative front, the hallmarks of regime characteristics were clear. According to the 
government's own health bureaucrats, the health services in Guyana in the 1970s suffered progressive 
deterioration due to excessive centralisation, lack of planning, lack of adequate and reliable data for 
planning, poor co-ordination, lack of managerial capabilities, lack of inter-sectoral co-ordination and a 
general lack of procedures (Sagala et al, 1992: 33). The consequences were therefore predictable by the 
end of the decade. Reports that nursing care by the end of the 1970s was being provided mainly by 
nursing students rather than qualified nurses cannot be confirmed. However, given the situation by the 
end of the decade, this is hard to dispute given the increased nursing shortages caused by migration which 
progressively worsened as economic and social conditions deteriorated. Political harassment, 
discrimination and continued lack of democratic governance also contributed to the outflow, which seems 
to confirm this generally less than satisfactory state of affairs. 
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One ironic by-product of the use of socialist medical scholarships offered the regime in the 1970s was 
some level of deterrence in migration of such personnel. For instance, most of these newly-qualified 
doctors returned to Guyana, unlike many others trained in the traditional countries. Although some 
subsequently migrated, many stayed in the public sector, but partly because of their contractual 
commitment to the government, and partly because their qualifications were not generally recognised in 
other Caribbean and non-Caribbean countries, and in some cases by their own `western' and/or West 
Indian-trained private sector colleagues in Guyana (Singh, 1990: 10-16). However availability and access 
to public sector personnel still remained appalling by Commonwealth Caribbean standards. The power 
of the professions were muted by the emerging health situation in Guyana. Most doctors worked in the 
private sector, while some straddled both sectors. The evidence suggests a limited impact in terms of the 
power of the profession. However, the medical bias was still clearly evident, particularly given the 
growing resort to the private sector by the population. Relations with the medical and nursing 
associations were also influenced by the political situation, which in turn influenced the level and quality 
of participation in the process. Mass migration of many members of both of these groups meant that those 
who remained tended to be either strong supporters of the regime. Those who could not migrate for 
various reasons or (especially in the case of doctors) those who were able to secure employment in the 
mushrooming private hospital sector given the decline of the public services during this decade. The 
political and policy influencing roles of both professions as pressure group action was evidently limited, 
given the increasingly `hustling' nature of the society as poverty increased. 
Numerous problems thus remained by the end of the 1970s. An assessment of the quality and 
appropriateness of medical qualifications and nurse training standards in Guyana in the 1970s is difficult 
to judge, though the available evidence suggests that conditions were worse, even when compared to 
conditions under late colonial rule. Despite the adherence to the principles of Alma Ata, the system 
continued to be heavily curative and urban-oriented, with questions even raised about the excessively 
curative training of the Cuban trained Guyanese doctors (Singh, 1990: 10-16). Similarly in terms of nurse 
training, there seemed to be no evidence of any studies commissioned on the quality of nurse training both 
in the public sector and especially the private sector. Guyana's nursing training used to be of a similar 
standard to that of the rest of the region. However it is difficult to imagine that the circumstance of the 
1970s, including migration - due to both political and economic oppression did not affect the quality of 
nurse trainers as well as the availability of other essential resources, a reality confirmed by the Neal 
Report among others. 
The parlous state of the health system at all levels - human, physical and material - by the end of the 
1970s therefore reflected not only economic circumstances, but a clear case of neglect and lack of 
commitment to policy implementation by the regime. This neglect was partly understandable given the 
economic as well as political predicament facing the regime at that time. The postponement of elections 
due in 1978 and the rigging of elections again in 1980 were manifestations, according to Thomas, of 
"... the extent to which authoritarianism had become entrenched in Guyana... " (1988: 354-355). Attempts 
at developing and implementing a comprehensive human resources policy for the health sector under these 
conditions were therefore limited and ad-hoc at best, and both negligible and negligent at worst. 
Comment: `Weak, unstable, socialist, authoritarian, survival-oriented' regimes and policy: In the 
case of regime characteristic influences, the co-existence of weakness, instability, formal adherence to 
socialist principles, authoritarianism and `survivalism' seems to have contradictory outcomes 
for policy 
implementation in the post-colonial state. The state under Burnham was weak at extracting and allocating 
resources for areas such as health, yet strong at doing so for its own security and survival 
like so many 
other post-colonial authoritarian states. It was also weak in terms of its `negative politicisation' of the 
bureaucracy. The state was also unstable, yet there was little incentive for it to fundamentally reform 
health administration for political reasons. Even where this was done, it was not only uncoordinated, 
but 
political cronyism affected its functioning. The undemocratic, survivalist state was willing to use various 
means to retain power, despite enormous social problems. Although regime strength can 
be directly 
linked to economic circumstances, the other factors are clearly political and did have a great effect on the 
functioning of the health sector. Even economic decline was, arguably, partly due to regime 
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mismanagement and corruption. The fall in commodity prices was undoubtedly influential, as was the 
weakness of interest group articulation which resulted in either non-participation or cooptation. However, 
given the above evidence, the influence of regime characteristics is clearly evident. The resort to ad-hoc, 
crisis measures such as reliance on Cuban doctors was one symbol of the overall deterioration of health 
planning, training and administration of human resources for much of the decade and well into the 1980s 
under the Burnham regime.. 
The Burnham regime's weakness, instability, and authoritarian/survivalist nature thus negatively 
affected its policy performance in the case of the health sector. Aided by a favourable American foreign 
policy during the cold war period, although a `socialist' state, the regime still struggled to achieve the 
democratic legitimacy required of its Commonwealth Caribbean counterparts - such as Jamaica - and also 
required of the development process, given the regime's increasing authoritarianism. The Burnham 
regime's 1970 five year health plan was a reasonably impressive document outlining the importance of 
primary, decentralised care at a time when it was not yet fully on the international agenda. Yet this plan 
was not fully implemented by 1980. The regime also began implementing a decentralisation policy that 
would in turn extend to the health sector. However, health, like health human resources depends on a 
complex degree of interactions at varying levels. The regime's increased authoritarianism and coercion of 
opponents, as well as its excessive use of patronage affected not only the quality of life and job 
opportunities in the country, leading to mass disaffection which will be discussed in greater detail in 
Chapter Six, but also affected health human resources planning, training and management prospects. The 
underlying feeling of the Burnham years in the 1970s was that despite the praiseworthy and progressive 
nature of state and even some implemented policies, the regime itself was undermining the very outcomes 
of these policies through its actions in the political sphere, notwithstanding the admittedly difficult 
economic problems it faced. 
To summarise then, the policy process under a weak, unstable, socialist undemocratic, survivalist 
regime, given the Guyanese experience of the 1970s, seems to have essentially contradictory policy 
implications, with idealist, socialist goals on the one hand, which actually made it to the implementation 
stage, but which were greatly undermined by the other characteristics particularly regime maintenance. 
We now turn to the Manley regime in the 1970s to compare health human resources experiences with 
another `socialist' state within the Commonwealth Caribbean.: Jamaica. 
The Manley regime in Jamaica (1971-1980) 
Policy context: Like Guyana, Jamaica was also financially and institutionally weak in the 1970s, 
despite a decade of growth in the 1960s. Jamaica was however characterised by reasonably democratic, 
legitimate, and stable rule which had persisted from the partial self-rule period in the mid 1940s, despite 
an extensive party-based patronage network with related inter-party electoral cycle violence. Although 
not affecting the legitimacy of electoral outcomes, this violence affected the country, worsening according 
to the severity of economic problems particularly by the mid-1970s (Edie, 1989). However, it was 
confined to the electoral cycle. The main developmental problem for Jamaica, like Guyana and other 
post-colonial states, was the urgent need for comprehensive administrative reform to provide the support 
for policy implementation. The increased popularity of the Peoples' National Party (PNP) at the end of 
the 1960s, coincided with disenchantment at the failure of former prime minister Hugh Shearer's 
conservative, but weak Jamaica Labour Party (JLP) government to arrest economic and social decline 
through its industrialisation by invitation policies. 
In 1972, the democratic socialist People's National Party (PNP) under Manley assumed power in 
relatively free and fair elections. As in the case of the Burnham regime in Guyana, the Manley 
government's democratic socialist principles were also influenced by `cold war politics', given the 
tensions between the United States and the many `leftist' liberation movements in Latin America, 
particularly Cuba, just ninety miles to the north of Jamaica. The subsequent establishment of 
full 
diplomatic relations with Cuba, and the considerable assistance received from Cuba saw the resulting 
heightening of tensions with the USA which was to become a major source of problems for the Manley 
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government by the end of the decade (Kaufiran, 1985: 88). This is contrasted to Burnham's friendly 
relations with the Americans, in spite of his illegal regime and his party's socialist ideology. As Thomas 
points out, the main difference between the two states that could explain this policy was that Guyana's 
main opposition party was Marxist, while that in Jamaica, Seaga's JLP were conservative and market- 
oriented (Thomas, 1984). Nevertheless, Manley's promise to bring `good government' and social reform, 
coupled with his reputation and charisma played decisive roles in the party's 1972 electoral victory 
(Kaufiran, 1985: 71). In terms of general policy reforms, between 1972 and 1974, the government 
undertook a limited reform agenda, limiting nationalisation of public utilities, and carefully nurturing its 
relationships with the business and middle class (Kaufman, 1985: 73-75). By late 1974 however, the 
regime had shifted further to the `left', outlining the broad formulation of the principles of `democratic 
socialism' during the mid-1970s. 
Like the Burnham regime's cooperative socialism, Manley's democratic socialism emphasised an 
increased role for the state in the economy and society and community `grassroots' participation along 
broad socialist lines. Unlike the Burnham regime however, the Manley government's legitimacy was 
unquestioned. The possibilities of this legitimate, democratic-socialist `third path' thus received 
considerable international attention and support from developing states through the publicity generated 
from Manley's own high profile for much of the 1970s in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and 
Socialist International. Despite his party's clear socialist rhetoric, Manley was committed to the principles 
of a two-party democratic state. Overall, government policy thus stressed self-reliance, and the optimising 
of appropriate human resources through education and community participation as critical social elements 
of democratic socialism. 
Economically, the 1970s was an "unmitigated disaster" for Jamaica (Stone and Wellicz, 1988: 83). 
Between 1973 to 1980 real gross domestic product (GDP) declined by 18% an overall decline of 23%, 
leading to a general collapse of the economy ( Stone and Wellicz, 1988: 83). This led to migration at all 
levels, especially by professionals taking advantage of a more generous US immigration changes (Stone 
and Wellicz, 1988: 80). Some of this migration was due to the government's increased socialist rhetoric, 
though rapid economic decline was probably closer to the truth. Jamaica was one of the first recipients of 
the IMF structural adjustment medicine, with Manley's PNP government forced to negotiate a 'standby- 
facility' at the end of 1976. In July 1977, a US$ 79.6 million loan was made available. However, 
Jamaica failed to pass the IMF's performance test in 1977 and the loan agreement was subsequently 
abrogated. This decision was however partly due to American influence in an effort to pressure the 
increasingly radical Manley regime. In 1978, a US$ 240 million was eventually signed with the IMF 
which called for comprehensive structural reforms, devaluation, taxes rises, wages ceilings, and spending 
cuts. As Stone and Wellicz note, this agreement effectively called for the abandonment of the PNP's 
entire development policy thrust. The Manley government's failure to fully conform to the agreement saw 
the IMF suspend this facility in 1979, with negotiations finally broken off by the government in 1980. 
Manley lost the general elections in 1980, with at least 800 people killed in the ensuing electoral violence. 
Although this electoral violence was due to the nature of the political process in Jamaica, its severity was 
nevertheless due to a combination of the regime's own mismanagement, but more important, American 
political pressure and the high demands exacted socially by the economic crisis. 
This `third path' was formulated because `industrialisation by invitation' development strategies 
implemented in the region in the 1960s, had failed to achieve significant social and economic progress. 
Although reasonably successful, it had not improved living conditions for the majority of Jamaicans by 
1970. The Manley government's democratic socialist principles encompassed a `mixed' approach where 
nationalisation and abolition of `exploitation' were merged with a policy of private sector cooperation, 
despite the evident contradictions. As Kaufman has noted, the term `democratic socialism' was itself 
"... rich in ambiguity... " and "... was usually defined by the political conjuncture and the audience being 
addressed... "(1985: 78-79). Nevertheless, the Manley government's democratic credentials, its legitimacy 
and its relative stability were remarkable given the economic crisis of in the latter half of the 1970s, and 
negative American influence at international financial level. In the case of health human resources, 
despite problems, including the economic situation and US foreign policy, the regime's democratic 
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socialist ideology and its strong commitment to democratic-led development held out possibilities for 
progress in policy development and reform. 
Regime characteristics and health and health human resources policy responses: The Manley 
government outlined its health policy proposals for discussion in 1974 - two years after assuming office - in a `green' paper, titled `The Health of the Nation - Proposals for a National Health Service' 
(Government of Jamaica, Ministry of Health, 1974). Given the arduous preparatory process involved, it 
was nevertheless doubtful whether the ministry of health anticipated that the plan would only be 
formulated and adopted until three years later!. Nevertheless, the discussion paper acknowledged both the 
`ad-hoc', crisis-driven nature of the planning and policy processes in the past along with the limitations 
posed by the lack of "... a clear political commitment, adequate data, financial resources and health 
manpower... " (Government of Jamaica, 1974: 1). The regime accused the previous JLP government in the 
1974 document of patronage in the allocation of resources and outlined the need for development of "... a 
systematic and orderly approach to the establishment of priorities and the development of priorities... " 
without which "... no action can hope to achieve long range social and economic objectives... " 
(Government of Jamaica, 1974: 1). The actual health plan was not published however until another three 
years, in 1977, with the intervening period seeing the PNP's re-election to power in 1975. The plan 
offered a similar `wish list' type vision of socialised health care to the Guyanese plan in its stated health 
policy. It was based on health as a fundamental right, on intersectoral co-ordination with other sectors 
including private sector providers, and on a health service that balanced preventive with curative health 
through increased focus on community participation. In this regard, the role of decentralisation was seen 
as key to health improvement. This was in line with the prevailing context of the Jamaican (and the 
Commonwealth Caribbean) tradition of universal health care, and also within the context of the thrust 
towards primary health care at the global level, adopted one year later. As Mitchell noted of the 
heightened reformist anticipation of the implemented plan: 
"... the PNP had been in power long enough to be aware of the intrinsic and 
extrinsic health problems of Jamaica, to have some awareness of where the 
roadblocks to change lay, and some appreciation of the effects, and the limitations 
of the politics of change... " (1981: 464). 
Despite these criticisms levelled by Mitchell and others relating to inconsistencies between goals and 
objectives, the general consensus was that the policy agenda was now firmly set by the Manley 
government's democratic socialist credentials, and buoyed by its renewed mandate from the electorate. 
The explanatory power of regime characteristics on specific health issues such as human resources policy 
implementation, though important, as we shall later see, has to be balanced by other explanations. The 
government's hopes for the implementation of the plan assumed a position of economic strength and 
socio-political stability. However, the changed circumstances of the late 1970s and the relative absence of 
these two factors threatened both the government's survival and the implementation of its health policy 
plans and programmes. 
The need for health human resources reform in Jamaica was recognised within the wider context of 
post-colonial reform well before independence. This ranged from both wider administrative as well as 
narrower health sectoral reforms. After independence in 1962, the conservative Jamaica Labour Party 
(JLP) regime under Prime Minister Hugh Shearer in its 1963-1968 development plan had acknowledged 
the serious human resources problem facing Jamaica's health sector, given the inadequate numbers of 
professional staff and high migration levels. The Shearer government also recognised that the high cost of 
training doctors, combined with limited financial resources would constrain any short-term growth in the 
areas of need (Barrett, 1979: 66-67). Limited action by this government saw its own `ad-hoc' proposals 
within the national development plan on planning, training and utilisation/retention of doctors and nurses 
remained largely undeveloped up to 1972. Action was however concentrated up to this period, as in many 
post-colonial states on physical infrastructure. One major human resource achievement before 
independence from a regional perspective of particular benefit to Jamaica was establishment of the of the 
medical school at the Mona Campus of the University of the West Indies (UWI) in the late 1940s, and its 
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fully accredited status by the 1960s. The Shearer regime's successes in health human resources were thus 
were limited both in terms of its reform aims as well as in achievements. 
Addressing medical shortages it pledged to expand the Commonwealth Caribbean-funded medical 
school in order to double medical intake. In relation to nurse training, a second nursing school was 
established. It was also recommended that the successful `enrolled assistant nurse' course, introduced in 
the late 1960s be expanded (Barrett, 1979: 66-67). However, a comprehensive health policy had not been 
formulated during that government's tenure within which a health human resources policy could itself be 
defined. Administrative problems hindering the overall functioning of the health system were identified 
but reforms never undertaken. The government also failed to establish a proper `bonding' system which 
aggravated the external migration flow that was brought about by declining economic and social 
conditions. Like Guyana, data unreliability proved a major problem in formulating human resource 
policy. To give an example of this problem: the number of doctors registered to practice in 1973 was 
1,254. However, the national planning agency (NPA) data suggested a total of about 490 practising 
physicians in 1972, a figure which may be incomplete but closer to the real number. In relation to nurses, 
the Pan American Health Organisation reported that in 1973 there were 7,287 general nurses on register. 
However, the NPA reported only 1,437 nurses and 666 assistant nurses practising in public sector health 
facilities for the same year. 
By 1972 therefore, health human resources development and indeed the health sector as a whole was 
in urgent need of reform primarily through the definition of a clear, comprehensive policy. This challenge 
was recognised by the Manley government on assuming office in 1972, although it was two years before it 
published its `green' discussion paper, the Health of the Nation. In relation to the medical profession, the 
paper identified a curative-based training system, mal-distribution of services and a chronic shortage of 
doctors and nurses due to steady migration as the main problems facing the health sector. The regime's 
big ideological challenge in the case of the health sector was transforming the inequitable and ineffective 
status-quo a into truly socialised public services including health care. This challenge was recognised in 
the 1974 `green' paper. In relation to medical training, the Health of the Nation expressed the 
government's unhappiness with the curative orientation of the university medical school's curriculum, and 
underlined the need for community health reform as an integral part of the training process. The `green' 
paper bluntly stated in this regard that those older physicians trained in North America and the UK were 
"ill-equipped" to provide for the health needs of Jamaica, and proposed to implement a system whereby 
Jamaican medical students would be required to serve for a set period in rural areas before receiving their 
degrees. The paper also recommended a one-year mandatory period of service by doctors in community 
medicine, which together with re-allocation of doctors from health districts to health centres would put 
more doctors into the community. The need to upgrade physical infrastructure in an effort to both retain 
local staff as well as to recruit, on a part-time/notional basis, private sector doctors was also identified. 
Finally, the 1974 Health of the Nation document advocated external recruitment, like Guyana, in order to 
meet the existing and anticipated shortfall. 
The regime made a good start in relation to a community-oriented approach to health human resources. 
The political support by the Manley government for a primary care approach to human resources 
planning, production and utilisation was evident in the regime's advocacy of a more integrated, 
community-based approach for the nursing profession. The Health of the Nation paper urged greater 
dialogue with the nurses association in Jamaica (NAJ) in plan formulation. No similar call was however 
made in relation to the medical association, an omission which would later lead to a breakdown in 
relations between the government and the profession with negative consequences for the health care 
system in the 1970s. By contrast it actively courted the nurses by proposing in the Health of the Nation 
document to establish a permanent committee consisting of inter-ministerial nursing personnel and 
representatives of the nursing association. The government was particularly interested in nursing 
development for ideological reasons, given the fact that nurses comprised the largest professional group as 
well as the profession's utility, flexibility and cost-effectiveness within a community-based health care 
approach. Plans were thus outlined for, inter alia, the expansion of the profession through the 
development of a new nursing category, the nurse practitioner. This programme was developed in 1971 
by the Nurses Association of Jamaica (NAJ) and was accepted enthusiastically by the receptive PNP 
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regime, and in particular the health ministers, Dr. Kenneth McNeill, and later, Douglas Manley 
(Seivwright, 1982: 22). 
In terms of overcoming the anticipated nursing shortfall in the mid 1970s, the paper also reflected 
government concern and intention to act. It alluded to a proposed program of local and overseas 
recruitment, estimating that over six thousand Jamaican nurses in training and in practice abroad might be 
willing to return home "... if proper nursing opportunities consistent with their experience and status 
exist... " (Government of Jamaica, 1974: 29). The two main nursing schools, the Kingston school of 
nursing (government-funded but independently run) and the UWI's nursing school together produced 200 
registered nurses each year with the Kingston School also producing 150 enrolled assistant nurses 
(EANs). The government hoped that with the commencement of training at another regional hospital, this 
number of nurses would increase by 50 more, and by 1975 to a total annual production of approximately 
600 nurses. 
Other health human resources policies in relation to nursing were proposed in the `green' paper 
included the additional expansion of the assistant nurses category which was expected to fill the gap left 
by the better utilisation of the registered nurses. It was also asserted that the health planning process 
would also be based on the proper staffing of the health service and was to be phased in within a period of 
three years at which time it was hoped that the service personnel would be 75% full strength. (Government 
of Jamaica, 1974: 29). Local recruitment for training, according to the paper, would not be a problem 
since there were usually long waiting lists. To support its community health program, the ministry also 
pledged its full and expanded support for the community health aide (CHA) programme which was 
eventually implemented in collaboration with the university in 1973. Finally, in order to achieve all of 
these aims, the government recognised in the green paper, the need for urgent reorganisation of the 
administration and management system, a position restated in the 1978-83 health plan. The `green paper' 
was essentially the Manley regime's framework for an eventual comprehensive health plan within which 
its human resources development programme could be implemented. 
The contextual conditions for implementation of these policies were however not good during the mid 
to late 1970s, despite the democratic re-election of the Manley government in late 1977. Worsening 
economic conditions, political violence and an ideological struggle with the `left' of the party over future 
development strategy created a climate where rational, coherent long-term planning was very difficult. 
Nevertheless, the achievements of the government's first term between 1972 to 1975 yielded favourable 
results that could be directly linked to regime characteristics as we shall now see. The implementation of 
the 1978-83 by the Manley government three years after the `green paper', though late for political and 
other reasons, was generally welcome by all, except some members of the medical lobby. This was also 
the period when attention was focused on primary health care influenced the government to this 
commitment, even though it must be said that this had framed the regime's policy actions since 1972. 
Nevertheless, the new plan committed the government to primary health care and the `health for all' (HFA 
2000) strategies. The emerging international consensus on primary care was thus seen as a vindication of 
its own radical, community-based approach to the health policy process. 
In line with the aims and aspirations of the health plan, some important policies were implemented in 
the case of nurse training in the 1970s. The first was the training of greater numbers of general and 
enrolled assistant nurses. In terms of training reform, the nursing curriculum was revised within the 
context of the new approach as well as resource constraints. In its 1977 policy statement the government 
noted that: 
"... we must continue to ensure that the skills of all health workers are constantly 
upgraded to make maximum use of health manpower resources... no health worker 
should perform tasks which a lesser-trained member of the health team could do 
equally well... the training of health workers must be relevant to health needs... " 
(Government of Jamaica/Ministry of Health, 1983: 3-4). 
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The Manley regime and the Jamaican nurse practitioner programme: By far though, the Manley's 
government's biggest achievement in the case of appropriate training - and a direct outcome of its 
ideological orientation - was the formulation and implementation of the nurse practitioner policy in 1977. 
It was developed as a joint program between the government, the Nurses Association of Jamaica (NAJ) 
and the advanced nursing education unit of the university. Selected registered nurses and certified 
midwives who had developed clinical competence undertook the one-year basic course, with further 
training in their area of specialisation. They were not intended as substitutes for the doctor, but trained to 
assist the doctor and to reduce workload by carrying out certain functions under specific guidelines 
(Barrett, 1979: 114). These nurse practitioners would, upon completion of the intensive training program, 
be posted throughout the country in line with the government's economic and ideological justifications: it 
was appropriate to developing country needs, and the cost of training the number of doctors needed to 
keep pace with health care demand was impossible to sustain in the longer term. 
There were however problems during the health implementation process which although not 
questioning the government's ideological commitment to the programme, reflected its difficulty in 
grappling with sectoral as well as wider bureaucratic reform. Problems relating to supervision, 
remuneration, and especially legal status threatening the programme within its first two years. In terms of 
supervision, the nurse practitioners were found to prefer doctors rather than nurses as their supervisors, 
which reflected more an attempt to define a professional status above that of nurses than regime 
negligence (Akintunji, 1979). In addition, remuneration and incentives did not reflect their new skills and 
duties, clearly an economic problem, given the government's financial problems after 1977. The lack of 
legal status to prescribe even antibiotics threatened to curtail the programme, as pharmacists refused to 
honour their prescriptions. The omission/neglect of these policy details, were thus partly economic and 
partly political naivety in relation to the importance of administrative factors and resulted in delays in 
fully legitimising, and thus implementing the program well into the 1980s (Cumper, 1986; Akintunji, 
1979: 130). Nevertheless, such events while not entirely dispelling the notion of administrative 'ad- 
hocism' that characterised the policy implementation process in Jamaica after 1978, did not dent the 
morale among nursing staff and students about the benefits of the programme (Seivwright, 1982: 58). 
The health plan was under greater pressure because of the strained relationship, noted earlier, between 
the government and the medical profession since 1974. The medical profession was firstly, not happy 
with its exclusion from the policy formulation process about primary care inclusion in medical training. A 
confrontational tone had been set by the government when the `green paper' noted that: 
"... the unfortunate characteristic of most discussions about training of primary care 
physicians is the acceptance of the medical school as the proper seat of learning for 
this type of practitioner. It is assumed that the medical faculty can be persuaded to 
revolutionise itself to achieve a focus antithetical to its own history and its own 
interest in hospital based practice... no establishment is in the business of dis- 
establishing itself.. if and when the revolutionary changes come about in medical 
care, the forces for change will tend to come more from outside than from within... " 
(Ministry of Health, Jamaica 1974: 21). 
The government, in its effort to provide a more socially and preventive-oriented health service saw the 
profession's curative `bias' as anathema to its plans. It thus reacted to what it thought was a irreconcilable 
conflict of interest by excluding the profession form the plan's formulation. Instead, the main actors in 
the process were committees and sub-committees comprising technical officers from the ministry of health 
(which included the ministry's own doctors), the nurses association and other health-related ministries. At 
the regional level, technical advisors from the University's school of public health, the Caricom 
Secretariat and the Pan American Health Organization were the main actors in the formulation process 
(Carr, 1984: 19). This exclusion, though understandable, given the agenda and the economic 
circumstances, was nevertheless a risky and counterproductive strategy since the profession's cooperation 
and presence was necessary for successful implementation. Primary care was, after all an integrated `three 
tier' approach in which all professional categories played a role. Despite the good intentions of the 
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government, and even though it stated that it had no problems with private practice, this covert policy of 
exclusion of the medical profession from the process succeeded in alienating many doctors, particularly 
those directly affected in the public health sector. Deteriorating doctor-regime relations also extended to 
administration and management. The proposed administrative reform process under health 
decentralisation, whereby doctors, the traditional heads of regional health districts, would function under 
area health administrators was highly unpopular. The Jamaican Medical Association (MAJ) pointed out 
that the proposals represented a threat to the independence of the profession as well as the right to private 
practice (Barrett, 1979: 89-90). Doctors were essentially resentful of reporting to administrators in 
interventions which directly affected the care of their patients (Mitchell, 1979). 
The Manley government's expressed policy contracting overseas health personnel, mainly Cuban 
doctors and nurses, also attracted criticisms from the profession and added to the strained relationship. 
This was one of the policies emerging following Manley's 1972 visit to, and the subsequent establishment 
of full diplomatic relations with Cuba. In 1976, the government recruited fifteen (15) Cuban doctors, 
which was increased to fifty (50) by the end of the decade (Feinsilver, 1993: 162). The medical 
association was not consulted, and expressed its concerns about the qualifications and competence of 
these doctors as well as their eligibility for registration under the laws governing medical practice in 
Jamaica. In spite of the controversy, which escalated into press exposes and investigations, the 
government maintained its position though the profession's intervention forced the government to screen 
and orient new and potential Cuban recruits (Barrett, 1979: 90). At least a quarter of these doctors 
provided service at the regional hospital level (Feinsilver, 1993: 162). Whatever the concerns, the 
services of the Cuban doctors and nurses were important in supporting the health sector during the crisis 
period of the late 1980s, particularly at the regional primary and secondary levels, and hence constituted a 
vindication of the Manley government's ideologically progressive policy thrust in health human resources. 
Despite disputes with the profession, the government did however manage to achieve important policy 
goals in relation to medical education, with the medical school faculty eventually endorsing the need for 
curricular reform process to include the primary care approach, a long advocated policy. It has to be said 
however that international health trends in reforming medical education in developing countries was as 
influential as governmental pressure in effecting the change, as predicted in the `green paper'. 
In terms of the government's second priority, administrative and management reform, the regime's 
achievements in its second term, 1975-1980, were also severely limited by both economic and political 
constraints. Fundamental administrative reform was identified as an early `first-term' target, but had 
mixed results. The establishment of a ministry of the public service was intended to reform administrative 
practice. However the central bureaucracy failed to respond "... effectively, expeditiously and 
sensitively... " to changed internal and external environmental conditions which had ripple effects on the 
functioning of public sector health administration (Jones and Mills, 1989: 113). The continued excessive 
centralisation of power within the three core institutions with direct relevance to health policy - the 
ministries of finance and the public service as well as the public service commission - imposed serious 
constraints on sectoral ministries, such as the ministry of health. Slow and weak decision-making, 
cumbersome procedures, structural rigidities, shortages in funding and staff shortages in critical 
administrative areas therefore continued to characterise the bureaucracy by the end of the 1970s. Because 
of the IMF-ordered budget cuts, decision-making by heads of department and permanent secretaries were 
being taken on an `ad-hoc', `day-to-day' and `crisis-ridden' basis within a now under-resourced and semi- 
reformed (at best) public health sector (Jones and Mills, 1989: 114; Mills and Slyfield, 1987: 395-412). 
Politically the Manley government was still committed to fundamental reform. However, because of 
the crisis situation, feasibility was increasingly questioned and there was greater unwillingness to tackle a 
bureaucratic system still dominated by colonial tendencies, given the crisis-driven pressures being exerted 
by the International Monetary Fund and World Bank (Mills and Slyfield, 1987; Carr, 1977: 83; Stone and 
Wellicz, 1988). Caught in the middle of wanting to implement its development programmes, the 
economic problems constraining such action, bureaucratic resistance, and its own internal ideological 
wrangling at the time, the Manley government seemed incapable of acting effectively during its second 
term. Despite its achievement in actual health policy then, the health bureaucracy, linked as it was to the 
central bureaucracy remained therefore virtually unchanged well into the 1980s with the colonial style of 
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management and administration still dominant and little or no sign of inter-sectoral co-ordination. This 
had negative consequences even for the government's progressive policy achievements (Carr, 1977: 134- 
136). As Can noted about the conservatism of the Jamaican bureaucracy in contrast to the radical Manley 
regime in the1970s: 
"... civil servants are very often inadequately informed on the issues before 
them... even where informed, because they have been conditioned by the 
bureaucratic environment to think in incrementalist terms, and to maintain the 
existing power structures within the society, any policy suggestions tend to be aimed 
at adding to what already exists rather than at making any fundamental change... " 
(1977: 83). 
Accounting for regime-based influences and health human resources policy under Manley: The 
economic problems facing the Manley government was a major factor in its policy failures. The 1970s 
was an "unmitigated disaster" for Jamaica as the economy rapidly declined (Stone and Wellicz, 1988: 83). 
This had a grave effect on the largely economically-driven mass migration of nurses and doctors in the 
late 1970s, who were simultaneously taking advantage of American immigration changes which gave 
professionals a better chance of naturalisation, explored later in Chapter Six. Yet, the government's 
health human resource achievements were all the more remarkable given this situation, which were largely 
to due to its characteristics. Its power to extract and allocate its scarce resources for health human 
resources policy implementation, though diminishing by the end of the decade was still impressive. Its 
socialist ideology as well as its democratic credentials were clearly influential factors in this regard. By 
the end of the 1970s, the Jamaican health human resources policy, despite the growing resources problem, 
was well on the way to officialising an integrative approach, emphasising primary health care within its 
health sectoral planning, training and management processes, in spite of the economic crisis. 
The comparisons with the Burnham regime are instructive. Both governments had experienced similar 
economic problems during the decade. The major problem facing Guyanese health human resources 
policy other than resource scarcity and debt was regime illegitimacy. The other problem constraining the 
Manley government in addition to resource scarcity and demands for reduced spending by the 
International Monetary Fund was the slow pace of administrative reform and to a lesser extent the 
antagonism of some elements of the medical profession. The Manley government underestimated the 
importance of fundamental bureaucratic reform as a basic pre-condition of the policy development process 
(Carr, 1977,134-136). Strong and sustained support for the policy process was thus very difficult under 
such conditions. Both regimes managed to formulate policies that were eventually implemented in the 
1970s: the community health worker and medex in Guyana; and the community health aide and nurse 
practitioner programmes in Jamaica. Both also suffered from health sector migration in the late 1970s, 
Jamaica, largely due to economic factors, Guyana, to political as well as economic factors. The defining 
difference however was regime democracy and survival which was reflected in the divergent outcomes for 
both countries. The Manley government was democratic; the Burnham regime, undemocratic, and 
interested in retaining power by whatever means. This factor, coupled with mismanagement and corrupt 
practices explains Guyana's worse plight in the case of health human resources compared to Jamaica's, 
despite that country's own political and economic problems, by the end of the 1980s. Finally, in terms of 
pressure group activity and influences in Manley's Jamaica, the evidence indicates both considerable 
nursing influence and hence positive reforms for both that profession as well as the primary health policy 
thrust in the 1970s, which was largely due to the policy aims of the regime. Although an independent, 
regionally-governed institution, even the shift in the medical school curriculum towards a more preventive 
approach was due in part to the regime's own policy goals during this period. Despite alienating some in 
the medical profession, then, health care outcomes in the area of health human resources development was 
still impressive given the militating circumstances. 
Comment: weak, stable, socialist, democratic, non-survival-oriented regimes and policy: The above 
evidence from the Manley government's health human resources policy experiences in Jamaica in the 
1970s demonstrates the possibilities as well as the pitfalls of progressive policies by democratic regimes 
in the post-colonial state. On the one hand, it suggests that weak, even unstable, but democratic, 
ideologically progressive regimes can achieve far better results in policy formulation and implementation. 
Despite financial and bureaucratic weakness, it was able to use its limited resources progressively to 
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support social policy implementation. Unlike survivalist regimes, like Burnham's in Guyana, 
policymaking can be undertaken as resources are not being diverted for questionable and/or regime 
maintenance policies, despite a shared ideology. Compared with Guyana therefore, adherence to 
democratic, non-survivalist principles seems to be the main difference. 
On the other hand, there are other policy influences to consider. Jamaican example in the 1970s 
demonstrates that external political pressures cannot be ignored, given the might of American political and 
economic pressure exerted on the regime for its relationship with Cuba in the 1970s, a punishment not 
exerted on the Burnham regime for largely strategic reasons. This makes the Manley regime's 
achievements all the more impressive. In terms of the actors within the policy process itself, the evidence 
suggests that participation by challenging interests such as the nursing profession, actively championed by 
ideologically progressive, democratic regimes resulted in considerable policy innovation and change in 
achievement of human resources development goals, medical antagonism and despite regime weaknesses 
at the resource and bureaucratic capability levels (Abel-Smith, 1988: 88-90). Before any serious 
comparative assertions can be made about the post-colonial state policy process in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean in the 1970s, we need, finally, to examine the Williams regime's policy experiences in the 
1970s. 
The Williams regime in Trinidad (1970-1981) 
Policy context: The Eric Williams government which governed Trinidad from self-rule in 1956 
through to 1981 presents some interesting comparisons and contrasts to both the Burnham and Manley 
governments. The Williams regime began the 1970s economically and politically weak. However, the 
1974 Arab oil embargo saw Trinidad's oil economy rapidly expand for the rest of the decade, and with it 
the fortunes of the ruling party. The government was therefore not only strong for most of the 1970s, even 
lending to its Commonwealth Caribbean neighbours, but was also able to proceed on its developmental 
path in a way that the weaker Guyana and Jamaica could not envisage, given their oil- importing status 
and increasing debt problems. Given Trinidad's wealth and the regime's longevity, the regime was quite 
stable in the post-boom period. Williams political ideology was essentially `non aligned'. However, 
given its strength in the 1970s and its subsequent decision to develop along a capitalist-based `third path', 
rather than socialism as in Jamaica, it can best be characterised as `state capitalist' (Sandoval, 1983). In 
terms of democracy and regime maintenance instincts, the lack of parliamentary opposition for the first 
half of the decade, coupled with Williams personalised and centralised rule saw the government continue 
along the survivalist politics mapped out by Williams in the early 1970s in the aftermath of the black 
power riots and attempted military overthrow of the government. 
The black power uprising and attempted military coup resulted partly from the failed `industrialisation 
by invitation' development strategy followed by the Peoples National Movement (PNM) regime like its 
other Caribbean counterparts. The failure of the `strategy' by the early 1970s which had been 
incorporated in the government's two preceding five-year development plans since independence, had 
resulted in rising cost of living, unemployment and considerable migration from all social classes and 
races. Like Guyana and Jamaica in the early 1970s, a continued decline in social, and particularly health 
conditions reflected not only the need for a new economic development strategy, but also the need for 
fundamental reform the colonial administrative system into a development-oriented one. The ensuing 
social unrest culminated in the failed coup attempt and forced the Williams to search for another 
development and reform strategy. The rocketing oil prices in the post-1973 period however precluded 
these difficult tasks. 
In 1976, the Williams government received a fresh mandate based on the oil boom. Between 1973, 
when the boom started, and 1978, when it reached its peak, central government revenues increased five- 
fold (Sutton, 1984: 50). With this strength however came a form of `presidential' government (Sutton, 
1984: 60). The prime minister's distrust of even some of his own ministers and the bureaucracy, or 
conversely the incompetency of both groups was one cause (Ryan 1981; Emmanuel 1991, Hintzen, 1989; 
Sutton, 1984: 59-60). This led to the creation and concentration of decision-making powers by Williams 
himself, in tandem with new supra-national, policy groups that appropriated power from the bureaucracy 
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and whom were wholly responsible to the prime minister personally (Macdonald, 1989: 192). One of 
these organisations, the National Advisory Council (NAC) was created in 1976 and charged with, inter 
alia, defming policies for almost all sectors including health. Regime survival was thus key. As Samaroo 
notes, the "... PNM's obsession with political survival and the maintenance of power at all cost; a situation 
which has resulted in the alienation of large sections of the population... " meant that reform was needed 
through democratic participation in the decisionmaking process through decentralisation and 
administrative reform (Samaroo, 1985: 164). 
Regime characteristics and health and health human resources policy responses: The Williams 
government's plan, the ten-year national health plan (1967-1976) was prepared by the Ministry of Health 
with technical support, like Guyana and Jamaica, from the Pan American Health Organisation (PAHO) 
during the early 1960s. The document underscored the need for fundamental administrative reform, with 
the health ministry recommended to be reorganised along three levels of authority: policy decision, policy 
formulation and policy implementation. This was not the first attempt at reforming the health system under 
self-rule. At the start of partial self-government in 1956, a commission of inquiry set up by the Williams 
government into the poor state of health care services resulted in the 1957 Julien report. This report 
found that the causes of dissatisfaction by hospital-based doctors and nurses were largely due to poor 
working conditions that urgently required decentralisation, rationalisation and integration of the health 
sector. This report was however not implemented by the new government for economic reasons, but also 
political factors, since there was little enthusiasm for decentralising power by Williams, as the countries 
largely symbolic, impotent local government system aptly demonstrated in the post-independence period 
(Ragoonath, 1991). 
Like the two other countries, an outline of a universal health care system was at the heart of the 
Williams regime's policy. It consisted of three other components: assessment of the health situation 
including the technical and administrative problems of the health service; the criteria for establishing 
priorities; and the implementation of plans that were defined under three major programs - integrated 
health care, environmental health and epidemiology (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 1967). In 
relation to the first priority, plans were outlined, for example, for the integration of curative and 
preventive services, including the reorganisation and relocation of the existing district services, thus 
decentralising services to the regional level (Hezekiah, 1989: 87-88). Both bureaucrats and health 
advisers emphasised the importance of decentralised-based reform. Decentralisation and policy defmition 
were integral parts of the health plan. The ministry of health's performance was affected by the 
concentration of power and decision-making, a situation that could not be improved without "... breaking 
the circle: through decentralisation and effective delegation of authority... " (PAHO, 1963: 19-20). 
However, as in Guyana, and to a lesser extent in Jamaica, the first national health plan was never 
implemented. The government's own `health bureaucrats' admitted that the plan was at best implemented 
selectively, with no fundamental administrative reform of the health sector as recommended (Jordan, 
1979, Quamina, 1984). Quamina justifies this by noting that much change occurred simultaneously: 
change in administrative structures, change in the attitude of senior bureaucrats who were not convinced 
of the need for it; and importantly, changes/reshuffles of ministers and permanent secretaries which itself 
confirmed the nature of the regime's authoritarianism. All of this, she conceded, resulted in confusion as 
well as stasis (1984: 3). The causes of partial and ad-hoc implementation, then, go far beyond Quamina's 
assertions, since policy action so heavily depended on an facilitating political environment, including 
Williams' willingness to decentralise power and clear indications that his government was willing to do 
so. However, this was lacking, given the political and economic context of Trinidad after 1970. The 
omens were not good for health. Other sources of policy also gave cause for concern. There was also no 
mention of the health sector in the PNM party's general election manifesto of 1971. Subsequent 
manifestos in 1976 and 1981, aside from pledges to universal and primary health care, also remained 
silent on health policy and administrative reform as possible solutions to the health crisis (PNM, 1971: 
16). It was not altogether surprising therefore that the sector suffered from selective, and hence non- 
effective implementation of the plan during this decade by those committed bureaucrats due to the non- 
reformist, centralising tendencies of the Williams government. 
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Comment: The `state capitalist' stable, democratic, yet `authoritarian' Williams regime in Trinidad 
was shaped by a two main factors: the attempted `revolution' in 1970 which saw Williams exert 
`presidential' control over the party and the state in the 1970s, and the 1973 oil boom (Sutton, 1984). 
Both of these factors heavily conditioned the national political and policy process in Trinidad and Tobago 
for the rest of the decade, and beyond. In discussing Williams' political authoritarianism, the question has 
to be one of relativity. It can hardly be equated with the dictatorships of Pinochet's Chile or Moi's Kenya. 
Nevertheless, political confidence and power gained from the oil boom in Trinidad in the 1970s coupled 
with the reality of the political problems of the early 1970s triggered the creation of a personalised, 
`presidential' form of rule by Williams that had serious implications for post-independence policy 
reforms, including health and human resources development (Sutton, 1984). Aside from the 1957 Julien 
report and the 1967-76 health plan both of which strongly recommended health sector decentralisation and 
appropriate training, there were numerous other reports that alluded to the sources of Trinidadian health 
and health human resources problems in the subsequent years. The problem, then, was known by the 
Williams government long before independence in 1962. The 1967-76 health plan had noted that "... the 
greatest single obstacle to successful implementation of this or any other health plan is the shortage of 
trained personnel... " (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, 1967: 62). 
Even the 1967-76 health plan itself contained no detailed proposals for health human resources within 
a decentralised health sector, other than the moderate incrementalist goals of reiterating the need for more 
`in-service' training and a revision of the terms and conditions for all categories of staff -a fact that 
reflected both the enormity of the need of reform as much as the neglect of health human resources 
(Government of Trinidad and Tobago/Hansard, 1965: 587-608). In its own survey of nursing needs in 
1968, the health ministry noted that the increasing migration problem was hindering attempts to provide 
adequate health services. This report also highlighted problems stemming from acute shortage of teaching 
staff at the schools of nursing, an imbalance in institutional/district nursing allocations, unbalanced 
training needs and job instability (Government of Trinidad and Tobago/Ministry of Health, 1968: 46). 
These findings confirmed that the problem was as much related to management and planning factors as it 
was financial. The absence of clear policy on both general health policy and human resources 
development 1973 however made any improvements impossible in the short-term. 
The issue was not really one of instability, although this was an important contextual factor. Health 
sector reform was a `low-politics' situation which would not have threatened the government. Yet, the 
government was still recovering from the political events of 1970, and with it, the increased concerns 
about centralising power and control by Williams himself. Without the much-needed reforms to the 
sector, due to the prime minister's growing distrust of the other actors in the public policy arena, the 
ministry continued to function along colonial lines with only superficial reforms implemented on an 'ad- 
hoe' basis. Hints at nursing and medical policy reform were usually advanced in parliamentary statements 
expressing concern about `on-going crisis' situations, the migration problem, the need to train more staff 
and the need to recruit foreign nurses. By 1973, this policy vacuum saw migration increase, resulting in 
both nurse and doctor shortages. During the pre-1973 period, government policy in relation to health 
human resources amounted to providing scholarships for study abroad and financial support for the 
medical campus in Jamaica. In the case of nurses, policy continued along colonial training structures and 
institutions with little emphasis on preventive care. In terms of medical education however, regime policy 
seemed decidedly active on another front, its further discussions with the World Bank over that 
organization's willingness to fund a medical school for the Eastern Caribbean, to be located in Trinidad. 
This is fully discussed in Chapter Seven, but the increasing preoccupation with this project mirrored the 
neglect of the more important and immediate organizational and policy problems not being addressed the 
government, as much as it did medical professional influence on the prime minister and antagonism with 
the Manley government at this time. In sum then, the first three years of 1970 saw little or no concerted 
action to implement long-outstanding policy due to Williams presidential hold on power. This resulted in 
an all-but-abandoned ten year plan, and with it the necessary reforms which might have curbed if not 
prevented health personnel migration. 
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Comment: The 1967-76 health plan was essentially short on detail, contained no clear sense of the 
aims and objectives of the state health system other than a generalised recognition that the situation 
needed to be improved, and was on hold or neglected because of Williams unwillingness to decentralise 
any type of power, even for the health sector. Assuming that it was essentially a framework document, the 
lack of policy detail in the plan, given the recommendations of both the planning team and the 
government's own pre-plan ministerial report, was noticeable. This even led to a less than satisfactory 
position by the admission of the ministry's own technical officers of partial implementation and 
undeveloped details. It became instead a `framework' document that broadly guided health services in a 
country without a clear, written policy: a situation that would persist well into the 1980s under PNM rule. 
The health human resources recommendations of the 1978 National Advisory Council: By 1976, 
the Williams government received a fresh mandate on the strength derived from the oil boom, and, 
correspondingly, Williams own presidential authoritarian style of government, even in relation to his own 
ministers increased (Sutton, 1984: 60). Policy decisions remained in his hands, but were prepared by his 
select group of favoured technocrats on the National Advisory Council (NAC). The limited planning 
attempts in the 1960s were thus replaced by a cash-driven, physical infrastructural boom (including 
hospital and health centre construction and repairs) that was centrally managed and controlled by 
Williams personally, and executed by his small select groups of technocratic advisers. The government 
embarked upon numerous grandiose projects, all cash-intensive, and quite a few questionable including 
the medical school and complex project. Still, no basic written health or health human resources policy 
existed for the country at this point. The gains for the health sector were mainly physical and technical 
improvements, which though good, still did not address the core organisational and management-related 
problems facing both health personnel and the health services that might have been forthcoming in such a 
policy. Instead, ad-hocism at the policy level and crisis management at the institutional and district levels, 
dominated, and were usually solved by financial allocations rather than organisational reform. Trinidad 
however was not alone in this situation. One concerned doctor asserted: 
"... at the root of all accomplishment lies the definition by each country of a health 
policy that takes account of its own circumstances and sets out concisely the 
priorities and the precise objectives of the health services... Hardly any Caribbean 
country has written such a policy... " (Massiah, 1975: 44-45). 
Reporting to the National Advisory Council on the health sector, the consultancy report by Peat 
Marwick and Mitchell was critical of the poor conditions of the health sector at a time when vast amounts 
of resources were being allocated to the medical complex. It noted that medical professionals were in 
scarce supply, not because of training shortages, but because current methods of compensation tended to 
aggravate the problem. It also significantly added that one of the main problems was that the health care 
system was highly medicalised with emphasis being on cure rather than prevention and that as a result, 
programmes and activities were being adversely affected by this "inappropriate emphasis" (Peat Marwick 
Mitchell Report, 1978: 15). In this regard, it questioned the dominance of medical professionals in the 
health ministry (Peat Marwick Mitchell Report, 1978: 15). 
In relation to human resources development, the final NAC report recommended, and the government 
agreed, to the establishment of postgraduate facilities at the proposed medical complex from its inception. 
It also proposed to increase scholarships for medical specialisation. In relation to nurses, the government 
had already initiated the NAC's recommendation to increase the number of nursing posts in the 
establishment. In addition, a strengthened administrative framework with the creation of a nursing 
division with a chief nursing officer and two sub-officers responsible for policy formulation and 
implementation in relation to institutional and community nursing was recommended. Though 
praiseworthy, these recommendations were ad-hoc, limited, curative-oriented and did not solve the main, 
political/organisational problem. This failure to address this problem emerged in various crisis-ridden 
forms, including migration overseas and to the private sector by both doctors and nurses, as well as 
innumerable protests and other forms of industrial action. Another was the examination failures of a large 
number of nursing students in 1977, which forced the government to order a commission of inquiry into 
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the profession. The remit of this commission suggested that only crisis situations would yield urgent 
government attention away from its numerous prestige projects in the throes of the oil boom. The regime 
was strong and stable, yet had little short-term political incentive in reforming the health services. Hence 
attention was paid to `showpiece' projects such as the medical complex, to the detriment of smaller, more 
community health oriented policies - which the government persistently claimed was its central policy. 
Policy failure however such as the nurse practitioner issue which will now be examined and compared 
with the Jamaican situation support the criticisms of government policy. 
The failure of the nurse practitioner policy: The failure of the nurse practitioner policy issue in 
Trinidad was due to a combination of influences and cannot be blamed entirely on the government, which 
in fact introduced the issue to the health agenda in the mid 1970s. Like Jamaica, implementation of the 
nurse practitioner policy would not have solved problems like nurse migration, poor salaries or 
deteriorating working conditions. However, is would have certainly helped to promote the profession's 
status in a country, like Jamaica that was producing a significant number of highly trained nurses annually, 
but seemed incapable of retaining many of them. It was first introduced, ironically, in the health 
minister's 1975 address to the Trinidad and Tobago Medical Association (TTMA), where he outlined the 
government's intentions to introduce the category to the health sector. Nurses were obviously the main 
supporters, though some progressive doctors did support adoption and implementation (Massiah, 1982: 
40). 
Given this support, the government requested the National Advisory Commission to consider the 
merits of introducing this professional category and the role of such nurses in relieving medical officers of 
certain routine functions of the profession in this regard. The question would also crop up again in the 
remit of the 1981 Toby Commission on public health reform. The continued failure of this policy to make 
it beyond the agenda-setting stage, despite political support, implied covert medical influence to 
undermine the policy. The recommendations of both commissions - both with medical professionals it has 
to be said - were generally unsympathetic, a fact which was also confirmed in the course of my interviews 
(La Touche, S 1994, interview). The final 1978 NAC report suggested increased posts, better 
remuneration, and a modest lowering of the entry requirement for prospective students to remedy nursing 
shortages. On the nurse practitioner issue however, it was silent. The 1981 Toby report however went a 
step further, noting that it was a good idea. However, this report recommended that the policy should not 
be considered in the short term. No justification for this decision was given. The fact that Toby himself 
was a doctor may itself be instructive. 
Like Jamaica then, the Trinidadian situation reflects a pattern of regime willingness to consider policy 
implementation. However, unlike Jamaica, the Trinidadian policy lacked adequate support from a wider 
variety of important actors, including the persuasive powers of the state. Equally important, the issue of 
regime characteristics was also important as the Williams government seemed unable to follow through, 
due both to a lack of ideologically-driven goals like the Manley government, and the government's own 
limited understanding and appreciation of the possibilities of nurses in policymaking. It has to be noted 
however that the less than satisfactory lobbying efforts of the nurses associations also played a role. 
Added to this was medical professional dissatisfaction with the policy to an extent that was significant 
enough to preclude policy adoption and implementation. In this case therefore, regime characteristics 
seemed as equally important as nurse apathy and medical influence in preventing the policy issue 
from 
making it past the agenda-setting phase. 
By Williams death in 1981, the economic situation had already begun to change. The human resource 
policy costs of the government's failure to adopt and implement progressive policies were now 
being 
counted. The ministry of health's annual report in 1981 noted, for instance, that community 
health 
nursing had suffered from its failure to implement the policy of providing primary care nurses 
in the 
community. This was said to be due to shortages, lack of staff and poor research 
data on needs 
(Government of Trinidad/Ministry of health, 1981: 7). In terms of relationships between the regime and 
the medical profession in the 1970s, there was barely-disguised mutual distrust. The 
health minister, 
Kamaluddin Mohammed continually berated the profession for not performing its duties in the public 
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interest, while the profession resented his confrontational, `ad-hoc' style and seeming inability to grasp the 
need for comprehensive reform of the sector. In 1979, relations between Mohammed and the TTMA 
worsened when he threatened to restructure the medical board to include government members: a 
suggestion dismissed by the association as a joke (Thomson, 1979: 66-67). 
Accounting for regime characteristics-based influences and health human resources policy in 
Trinidad in the 1970s: The main question in attempting to explain the determinants of Trinidadian health 
policy at the end of the 1970s was essentially how a financially strong, reasonably democratic, and 
reasonably stable regime could squander such a golden development opportunity. The problems 
associated with post-colonial states, namely colonial institutions and structures, as well as corruption are 
part of this explanation. The state was reasonably democratic and stable, yet it had emerged out of the 
attempted overthrow in 1970 with a prime minister more concerned about securing his hold on power, 
than on attempts at rational progressive policymaking. Effective power was in the prime minister's hands, 
and decisionmaking delegated to a small group of trusted bureaucratic advisers and cabinet ministers. 
However, the seeming unwillingness of the regime to reform basic state institutions and instead impose 
advisory group type policymaking which did not necessarily address needs was clearly observed in the 
health and health human resources sectors. The policy chaos that ensued included contradictory policies 
as well as questionable justifications for those policies. The medical complex absorbed considerable 
funds while conditions declined. Ironically enough, it was the increased funding of existing health 
systems rather than fundamental reforms that prevented further deterioration. While an effective tool in 
the boom years, as the debt crisis mounted in the early 1980s, and resources were no longer available, one 
justifiable conclusion was that even if one accepted some level of misuse of public funds -a reality of 
public policy in both developed and developing states - the Williams regime seemed to have clearly 
squandered its policy reform `window of opportunity' to a great degree. 
As Ehrensaft pointed out in 1968, before the oil boom, the incrementalism of the Williams government 
in its maintenance of the status quo at all costs, rather than the search for progressive change was 
detrimental to development. He noted that the regime's recourse to weak or `pseudo' planning to spur 
development was bound to create problems in the long term. By reacting to `short-run' pressures as 
against changes for the long term and the need for political mobilisation, it was stated that the country 
would not be able to harness its developmental potential (Ehrensaft, 1968: 373-374). The authoritarian 
and status quo characteristics of the regime were thus clearly instrumental. To be fair, however, the 
problem though largely one of mismanagement, was not entirely due to this factor in the case of health 
human resources development. The medical profession dominated ministerial policymaking as well as 
`advisory group' policymaking in Trinidad throughout the 1970s, despite ill-founded concerns about them 
yielding power to other professionals such as administrator/managers (Quamina, 1976). The profession 
also scuppered the nurse practitioner policy, aided by a weakly articulated position from the nursing 
profession, despite the regime's willingness to move the issue beyond the agenda-setting stage. In light of 
these realities, Quamina's statements rang somewhat hollow. International fmancial agencies were quick 
to sense an opportunity in the boom years. Hence, various loans from the World Bank and other lending 
institutions were entered into by the regime. The Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) in 1974 
funded the constructing health centres throughout the country, while the World Bank funded a family 
planning programme, driven by the Bank's own policy priorities at that time. The World Bank also 
funded a significant proportion of the medical complex. 
Calls for reform by many doctors and nurses nevertheless remained unanswered. In the last three years 
of the health plan, from 1973 to 1976, the government's `health policy' was concentrated almost 
exclusively on the building of health centres, upgrading of hospitals as well commissioning the feasibility 
study for the expansion of the Mount Hope hospital into the medical `complex'. While the concerns of 
the professions were noted, there was no coherent attempt, during the entire duration of the plan to act on 
these concerns, which traced its origins back to 1957. What was most needed, and what the government 
steadfastly refused, was to formulate and implement a clear health policy, listing the priorities for the 
country based upon an integrated, primary care-oriented, decentralised and ultimately reformed system. 
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In the case of health, the ten year plan (1967-76) signified a positive start by the regime in addressing the 
problems facing the country in the late 1960s. However, political as much as economic factors precluded 
the implementation of the plan and its main recommendation, the reform of the health services. Though 
not surprising given the same government's reluctance to heed similar recommendations in the Julien 
report as far back as 1957, the failure of this attempt was to prove particularly frustrating for both 
committed health bureaucrats and professionals alike. Ehrensaft's assertions were much in evidence 
therefore, by the end of the 1970s in relation to human resources development in the health sector, 
especially by 1980 when the oil boom was about to turn into an oil `bust'. 
Comment: Strong, stable, authoritarian-democratic, state capitalist, survival-oriented regimes and 
policy: The above evidence suggests that regime characteristics exert influences on post-colonial state 
policy processes even where regimes have considerable resources for implementation. This suggests two 
things, firstly, that like two other cases, there was little incentive to implement such low-politics policy 
reforms; and secondly; that despite the nominal adherence to democratic norms, when regime leaders 
exhibit undemocratic, authoritarian tendencies the implications for low politics policies tend to be 
negative. Rather than reforming antiquated institutions, policymaking is left to small groups of trusted 
advisers who may 1 or may not be ignorant of the public need, and biased towards one type of . policy 
ideology to the detriment of long-term policy. The Williams government unlike Burnham in Guyana and 
Manley in Jamaica was financially strong enough to undertake the type of policy reforms that would have 
had considerable long term benefits. However, due to political events in 1970 and Williams subsequent 
authoritarian, `survivalist' style, ad-hoc, short term, grandiose, capital intensive, prestige policies seemed 
to dominate within this brief window of opportunity. These choices had negative `ripple' effects on low- 
politics policymaking generally. 
Much-needed policy reforms such as decentralisation of the health sector and reduction in medical 
dominance within the health planning process and training process were needed. Instead the colonial 
bureaucracy remained unreformed as in Jamaica and Guyana, health policy remained centralised and 
heavily curative and health personnel, particularly nurses as will be seen in Chapter Six, continued to 
migrate. Medical interests, exerted considerable influence on the policy process, dominating the health 
ministry senior bureaucracy as well as policy advisory groups, while nurses appeared less organised and 
able to lobby effectively to further their concerns as shown by the failure of the nurse practitioner policy. 
In sum then, the Trinidadian experience suggests a complex picture, like both Guyana and Jamaica on the 
issue of regime characteristics influence. Regime characteristics exerted considerable power on policy, 
arguably more so in the affluent post-colonial state especially in determining the allocation of abundant 
resources. However the evidence also suggests that the unequal power of interest groups as well as the 
persuasive role of international financial actors in unquestioningly funding `elephantine' tertiary projects 
in developing states where simpler solutions might be both necessary and appropriate are also contributing 
factors 
4.3 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
In this chapter, I have examined the role of regime strength, stability, ideology, democracy and regime 
maintenance or survival on the health human resources policy process under three post-colonial regimes in 
three Commonwealth Caribbean states in the 1970s. All three regimes experienced mixed policy 
outcomes that indicated a general pattern of influence of regime characteristics. The Burnham regime was 
weak, unstable, nominally ideologically progressive, but undemocratic and interested primarily in its 
political survival. While the causes of weaknesses were primarily economic, there was also bureaucratic 
co-optation, which undermined those ideologically progressive policies such as the community health 
worker programmes, as well as the workings of the health ministry. Regime maintenance, as enunciated in 
`party paramountcy' however seemed to be the most influential regime characteristic in the 1970s. In 
undermining democracy, it affected every aspect of social, political and economic life, which made life 
for even the most committed professionals extremely difficult. The paradox of progressive 
policies occurring simultaneously with deteriorating living conditions as Burnham's oppression increased 
by the end of the 1970s thus cannot be omitted from any explanation of development policy in Guyana in 
the 1970s, and, as we shall see in Chapter Five, for most of the 1980s as well. Not even considerable 
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American political and economic support could solve what was essentially a question of regime legitimacy 
and democracy. 
Health human resources policy in Jamaica under the Manley regime in the 1970s provides some 
similarities with the Guyanese situation and points to both the possibilities as well as the pitfalls facing 
post-colonial regimes. The Manley regime also espoused a socialist path and also governed within the 
context of a weak, declining economy and an unreformed bureaucracy, with urgent reforms 
necessary for smooth and effective implementation. The Manley regime also, like the Burnham regime in 
Guyana, formulated and implemented progressive policies in the case of health human resources. In 
addition to supporting the medical school and influencing university thinking on curriculum changes to 
reflect its preventive approach for both doctor and nurse training, the regime also implemented its two 
other impressive achievements in the 1970s: the nurse practitioner and community health aide policies. 
The fall in bauxite prices on the global markets in the mid- 1970s affected resource availability. This 
made it impossible to increase wages and improve general conditions that might have stemmed 
deteriorating working conditions and, ultimately migration. The Manley regime's resort to the 
International Monetary Fund and the harsh conditions attached to these loans, and the political and 
economic pressures being exerted by the American government because of the regime's friendly relations 
with the Cuban government, only compounded matters. It also makes the government's attention to 
policies such as the nurse practitioner policy, and other allied health programmes, and its continued 
training of the traditional categories all the more remarkable. The Jamaican example of the 1970s 
suggested that explanations for health human resources policy must take into account the "democratic" 
socialist, non-survivalist characteristics of the Manley regime. Any doubts about the role of the regime in 
radically reforming perceptions of health care was demonstrated in its support of nurses and its impatience 
with the conservative medical profession in forcing the profession to consider policies such as the nurse 
practitioner issue. Although this proved influential in some doctors' decisions to migrate, the main 
problem in the case of both doctor and nurse migration, as well as the limited achievements on health 
sector decentralisation were related to economic factors and priorities in Jamaica at that time, rather than 
questionable regime characteristics as in Guyana. 
The Williams regime's authoritarianism tendencies in the early 1970s, resulting from political 
instability, an operating within the context of political legitimacy, was nevertheless harmful for the health 
human resources development process. The Williams regime's unwillingness to reform the state 
machinery for development purposes left it totally unprepared when the oil boom occurred. It was 
essentially faced with the post-colonial politician's dilemma. On the one hand, it faced the question of 
whether to support sustainable, relatively unglamorous policies such as health sector decentralisation 
which though not threatening its survival, could set a precedent in the reduction of central policy control. 
The alternative was physical infrastructural `prestige' projects that had much political - if not policy - 
utility. The outcome was a complex mix of regime platitudes about primary health care, especially after 
Alma Ata, coupled with the huge allocation of resources towards the medical school policy. The regime 
chose to avoid the state machinery and adopt and implement policy helped by trusted special advisers. 
One argument can be advanced that reform was not a short-term issue for a regime eager to proceed with 
the development process. The problem with this view is that the eventual decisions that were actually 
taken and implemented were ad-hoc, with little consultation from the wider society, and dominated by 
interest articulation from the medical profession in the case of health and health human resources. Even 
worse, these plans had to be eventually integrated into national goals and policies, which were not even 
written at this time. The failure to reform at this critical juncture was to have even worse consequences 
for the policy process in the impending decade of structural adjustment for all three countries as we shall 
see in the next chapter. The considerable policy `window' provided by the oil windfall was thus 
effectively squandered by 1980. 
Bossert's 1983 analysis of regime characteristics alluded to the need to consider regime-based 
explanations in policy analysis. My examination of policy-making found that while there was a significant 
degree of similarity in terms of context and problem definition, different approaches to the policy process 
were made. These were influenced by, among other factors regime characteristics. I introduced to 
Bossert's original typology the characteristic of regime maintenance or regime survival. I found that this 
96 
regime characteristic also had some explanatory power in two of the three cases examined, with Guyana, 
under Burnham exhibiting the strongest influences in this regard. However, it interacted with other 
regime influences such as democracy and ideology as well as non-regime factors such as economics. I 
found in the case of Guyana in the 1970s that under conditions of non-legitimacy, authoritarianism and 
limited resources, the urge to maintain control of the state results in the allocation of resources for regime 
survival. This in turn has the effect of negating and undermining the nominal progressive ideological 
policies being espoused in the policy arena, leading to policy neglect, `ad-hocism' and underdevelopment. 
Policy `ad-hocism' and neglect characterised the policy development process in Guyana in the 1970s, as 
significant amounts of the state's scarce financial resources were directed towards regime survival. The 
resultant poor conditions for the rational planning, training, management and utilisation of heath 
professionals thus triggered a sustained level of migration of health professionals and a marked decline in 
all aspects of health. 
By contrast, in the case of the Manley government in Jamaica in the 1970s, I found that under given 
conditions of regime legitimacy and progressive ideology, and some level of political will - despite 
Reich's critique - and room to manoeuvre can be found in making and implementing policies, even under 
militating internal economic conditions and external political pressures (Reich, 1994). Regime 
characteristics such as ideology were found to be more important than regime maintenance. Hence, the 
main problem for the Manley government was economic, despite the occasional lapses as we saw in its 
poor relations with the medical profession. Inexperience, the size of the task, its failure to effect the 
required administrative reform as a precondition for implementation, a chronic lack of resources due to a 
sustained economic problems, also added to its problems. Importantly, even though the government's 
own increasingly radicalised political agenda was a symptom of its tenuous situation, it never made any 
moves that constituted a wish to retain power undemocratically. This legitimacy along with its ideological 
commitment to preventive, community-based care was its greatest contribution to policymaking for the 
health sector, although its hands were effectively bound by IMF dictates. 
Finally, in the case of the Williams government in Trinidad, I found that under conditions of personal 
authoritarian, any strong desire to centralise power for regime survival had deleterious effects for 
reforming implementing institutions of the state in preparation for development policy despite nominal 
democracy and legitimacy. This tendency became quite strong with grave consequences for long-term 
policy and development processes even when favourable `intervening' conditions in the form of 
unexpected resource acquisition have created policy windows of opportunity for policy reform. For the 
1970s at least, then the role of regime characteristics was influential to varying degrees in each country, 
though economic factors, professional interests and international economics and politics were also very 
important. In the next chapter, we assess and compare these developments with those in the 1980s. 
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CHAPTER 5 
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT, REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND HEALTH HUMAN 
RESOURCES POLICY AND POLICY REFORMS IN GUYANA, JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD IN 
THE 1980s: THE BURNHAM AND HOYTE (GUYANA), SEAGA (JAMAICA) AND 
CHAMBERS AND ROBINSON (TRINIDAD) GOVERNMENTS COMPARED 
5.1 INTRODUCTION 
In Chapter Four I examined the influence of regime characteristics on health human resources in the 
1970s by examining the policy trajectory of the main policy issues placed on the agenda in Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad. I found that while the incentives for reform and continued support of low politics 
policies such as health remained limited, and while economic, historical and medical dominance factors 
were critical, the levels of action of the three regimes in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad also reflected the 
varying influences of individual regime and leadership characteristics. I found, for instance, that while 
economic boom and crisis as well as medical interests conditioned the various stages of the process, 
regime strength, stability, ideology, democracy and political survival also exerted varying degrees of 
direct and indirect influences on agenda-setting, choices made and ultimately implementation. Different 
regime influences also seemed to influence different phases of the process. Regime ideology, for instance, 
seemed important in policy formulation, but was conditioned by regimes' democratic status at the implementation 
stages. The differences between the socialist Burnham and Manley regimes were marked in this regard 
given their different positions on the regime maintenance question. Policy outcomes by the end of the 
decade had therefore been affected to varying degrees by regime characteristics, despite the importance of 
economic and `medical interest' -related factors. 
In this chapter I analyse and compare those policy actions and outcomes with that for the decade of the 
1980s to determine first, whether these influences which persisted during the 1970s were as important in 
the 1980s, given the advent of regime change/succession within an equally changing economic context 
during this decade; second, whether (and how) regime attention to health human resources policy changed 
given the new even more serious national and international economic context of the 1980s; whether the 
usual `crisis-reform' pattern of development occurred in the case of health human resources; and fourth, 
whether reform outcomes yielded by the end of the 1980s were compatible with national health policy 
aims and objectives, and the influence of regime characteristics in this regard. As in Chapter Four, I 
underline the need for a balanced, integrative approach to explaining individual developing state policy 
processes. I acknowledge that unique historical factors, resource scarcity and medical dominance do exert 
limitations on what developing state regimes and their policymakers can and cannot do in relation to 
health human resources policy, regardless of regime typologies. I however argue three things: first, that 
the unique influences of regime political characteristics in low politics policy need to be grounded in 
particular local experiences; second, that these unique regime influences and circumstances need to be 
integrated with other contextual factors in attempting to realistically explain developing state policy 
actions, processes and outcomes; and third, that sometimes even low-politics policy issues such as health 
can assume high-politics features which can in turn influence regime survival. The chapter comprises 
three main sections. In Section One, I compare and contrast the influence of regime characteristics on 
health human resources policy in the first half of the 1980s. In Section Two, I examine and compare 
influences on policy developments in the second half of the 1980s. In the third section, I briefly examine 
developments in the 1990s. In the final section I conclude by assessing the main findings for health policy 
in the 1980s and developments in the first half of the 1990s. 
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5.2 POLICY CONTEXT, REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND HEALTH HUMAN 
RESOURCES POLICY IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1980s 
During the first half of the 1980s, all three countries experienced sustained deterioration in economic 
conditions, but also experienced political/regime changes. Burnham remained Guyana's president until his death in 1985, followed by his successor Desmond Hoyte until 1992. In Jamaica, Manley's PNP was heavily defeated by Edward Seaga's Jamaica Labour Party which remained in power for from 1980 to 
1989. In the case of Trinidad, Williams death in 1981 saw a new prime minister, George Chambers lead 
the PNM to victory in the general elections later that year. The PNM under Chambers was heavily 
defeated in the 1986 general elections by the reformist NAR coalition led by A. N. R. Robinson. In this 
section I apply the broad regime characteristics listed below in Table 5.1 to explain regime influences 
during this period, beginning with policy under the last years of the Burnham regime. 
Table 5.1: Characteristics applied to the Guyanese, Jamaican and Trinidadian political regimes 
in the 1980s 
Regimes Guyana: Guyana: Jamaica: Trinidad: Trinidad: 
the Burnham the Hoyte the Seaga the Chambers the Robinson 
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Regime characteristics and health human resources policy reforms in Guyana in the first half of the 
1980s: the Burnham regime (1980-1986) 
Policy context: Guyana's unfeasible and non-facilitating policy context was due as much to the 
Burnham regime's authoritarian as it was other factors. When combined, these factors meant that 
meaningful policy reform was difficult in the early 1980s (Premdas, 1994: 54; Spinner, 1984). First in 
relation to economics, falls in commodity (sugar and bauxite) prices saw approaches by the Burnham 
regime to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) between 1978 and 1981 (Thomas, 1988: 263; Spinner, 
1984: 206). The devastating impact of both cooperative socialism and the economic environment was 
evident. An Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) report noted the fact that since 1970, no economic 
growth had occurred in eight of the nine years of nationalisation of the main industries under cooperative 
socialism (Spinner, 1984: 184). By 1982, Guyana's most basic of foreign exchange needs could not be 
met, which, when added to declining productivity, a soaring national debt and a generally poor all-round 
economic performance resulted in even fewer resources for policy implementation. Renegotiating 
Guyana's loans with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in 1982, the Burnham regime 
agreed to concede a larger role for the foreign and national private sectors. Meanwhile, education and 
health conditions declined considerably. A team of Yugoslav experts even urged the regime to undertake 
bureaucratic and economic reform but was ignored (Spinner, 1984: 201). An IMF team visited 
Georgetown in April 1983. The regime rejected their loan conditions and strikes and shortages continued 
well beyond the mid-1980s. The government was bankrupt. The IMF declared Guyana ineligible to 
receive further loans because of failure to meet its performance criteria. The cost of living spiralled 
upwards, followed by continued emigration of skills. Guyana became a remittance economy as the 
"... underground economy stepped in where cooperative socialism had failed... " (Premdas, 1993: 118). 
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Economic crisis was however complemented by increased regime authoritarianism, which was equally 
not conducive to progressive policy development. A new constitution was promulgated by the PNC 
regime in 1980, inspired by cooperative socialism and party paramountcy, which effectively legislated for 
the regime's survival. The paradox of cooperative socialism was that on the one hand the 1980 
constitution included what could be considered a progressive policy of regionalisation and 
decentralisation of administration. On the other however, it entrenched the position of the executive 
president thereby ensuring Burnham's own absolute control over the party, the state and the society which 
undermined such developmental potential. Under party paramountcy, the army swore allegiance to the 
ruling party, not the state. There were increasing calls for political democracy in Guyana in the late 1970s 
as social conditions worsened. A series of industrial strikes and the increased agitation by opposition 
parties and citizens' groups for a restoration of democracy was seen by the government as a threat to its 
grip on power. It responded by failing to hold elections due in 1978, the ban on general strikes by trade 
unions, the use of the state's coffers for the reinforcement of security apparatuses, the use of terror, 
thuggery and violence and the intimidation of critics (including the media) were just some of the methods 
used to ensure regime survival (Premdas, 1994). Even the rapid promulgation of the 1980 constitution 
was part of this survival strategy (Spinner, 1983: 182). The fraudulent nature of both the hastily-called 
referendum on the constitution in 1978 and following that, the 1980 elections, added to the belief that 
Burnham and the inner party elite had chosen regime maintenance over progressive policy development 
(Hintzen, 1989). The regime's complicity in the murder of the prominent historian and opposition 
politician Walter Rodney in 1980 also demonstrated the extent of this resort to `survival politics. To add 
to the political crisis, Burnham was also engaged in a battle for control of the PNC party with his main 
rival, Hamilton Greene. In the midst of increasing national and international condemnation of its human 
rights record in the late 1970s, the Peoples' National Congress (PNC) regime intensified its campaign 
against a growing opposition. 
International politics was, like in the 1970s also influential, as we saw in the last chapter with both 
Guyana and Jamaica in the 1970s. However, even this context was changing. American foreign policy 
shift also played an important role in Guyana's policy context. The ending of the `cold war' saw the 
Americans lose interest in their onetime ally, which had serious effects on both Burnham regime's 
economic and political prospects. The Reagan administration's response in blocking an Inter-American 
Development Bank (IADB) loan as well as severely curtailing its aid program was therefore as much due 
to the decreasing communist threat especially after the 1983 Grenadian invasion, as it was to the State 
Department's concern about Burnham's increasingly authoritarian and `radical-leftist' behaviour (Thomas, 
1988: 263). Prior to 1980, the regime had managed to receive the highest per capita aid in the world from 
Washington for various sectors including health (Spinner, 1984: 184). However, in the early 1980s, even 
these funds had been considerably diminished. Burnham shifted ideologically from left to right as it 
suited him, despite the continued rhetoric about cooperative socialism and party paramountcy (Premdas, 
1993: 117). He had alternately courted both the socialist bloc and the American government. However, 
his failure to criticise the 1983 Soviet downing of a Korean airliner brought the wrath of the Reagan 
administration on his regime with the USAID's Georgetown branch closed and Guyanese applications for 
loans from the multilateral agencies blocked. This had serious repercussions on policy and policy 
reforms. Even a 1983 US State Department report on Guyana was forced to admit that "... since 
independence, the political scene has been marked by fraudulent elections, wholesale emigration, 
frustration of the educated and politically aware middle class, and repression of the political opposition... " 
(Spinner, 1984: 211). As the Latin American Bureau noted of the Burnham years: 
"... Guyanese politics over the past three decades has revolved around the rise 
and consolidation in power of Forbes Burnham. The beneficiary of constitutional 
irregularities and political fraud, of inept opposition and timely international 
support, Burnham has turned all to his advantage. By adopting the most convenient 
ideological posture of the moment... he survived a series of crises. He insisted not on governing 
but 
on governing absolutely... ambitions of Burnham and those around him could not be 
contained within the framework of a democratic constitution, so they took the 
ultimate step of writing a constitution around their ambitions... " (Latin American 
Bureau, 1984: 88). 
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Between 1980 and 1985 then, economic and geo-strategic problems, was compounded by the 
oppressive and negative constitutional and other political responses of the Burnham regime. This meant 
that regime power was "... firmly rooted in coercion and control... " with less opportunity for effective 
policy reform as long as political freedoms were denied (Hintzen, 1989: 190). 
Impact of regime survival on development policy reform: This chaotic political and economic 
context made policy reform unfeasible, though as noted in chapter two, crisis conditions can trigger 
fundamental reforms of low-politics policy even by survivalist regimes. The negative impact on the 
policy process of the diversion of already scarce resources to coercion and control was however apparent 
everywhere. The deterioration of basic public infrastructure such as water and electricity supplies, basic 
medical care, malnutrition, rising unemployment and impoverishment increases, though due in part to 
Fund (IMF) -influenced retrenchments were also due to the regime's desire to retain power by non- 
democratic means. Education deteriorated as the regime concentrated on ideological indoctrination rather 
than training. Guyanese students scored worst in regional secondary examinations. No development 
plans were formulated to replace the unrealised 1972-1976 development plan, despite the establishment of 
a state planning commission in 1979. 
At the national bureaucratic level, one initially progressive policy reform which had direct implications 
for the health sector was national decentralisation. Under the new decentralised system enshrined in the 
constitution and implemented in 1980, decisionmaking was devolved to ten semi-autonomous regions. 
Each region had its own administrative council and administrative centre. Regional chairmen were chosen 
by the central authorities, while an overall governing body, the regional democratic council, and all 
subject ministries and certain agencies were to be represented within the regional administrative councils, 
including health. These regional administrative councils were meant to operate independently of the 
ministry, preparing and submitting their own budgetary proposals, deciding on staff requirements and 
receiving their funds directly from the treasury. In the case of health, the councils were to have a central 
role in ensuring the effective operation of the health delivery system, as yet still centralised. In each of the 
regions, a regional health officer was to be responsible for the `day-to-day' management of the health 
sector, supported by a staff of district health officers who would monitor and supervise the various health 
facilities (Sagala et al, 1992: 32; Mars, 1990: 3). 
While this national decentralisation policy was implemented in 1980, not without some problems, 
many problems also arose, both administratively and politically with the process as it related to the health 
sector. First, there was general delay and confusion as the ministry of health was decentralised five years 
after the rest of the administrative system, but was still expected to effectively co-ordinate the regional 
administrative councils. Second, the regional administrations were not held accountable to either their 
local populations or to the ministry of health. Third, a complete breakdown of the public auditing system 
meant that regional administrators could not be held financially accountable to the central government. 
Fourth, funds allocated for the regional health service were being diverted to cover both expenditure in 
other sectors as well as corrupt practices. Finally, spending on health in the regions was determined by 
the regional health officer's negotiating position (and often political allegiances) within the regional 
administration. All of these factors made it difficult to plan and budget for the regional health system, and 
the ensuing systemic problems aggravated the already poor effectiveness of public health services 
provision (World Bank, 1993; Sagala et al, 1992; S. Gordon, interview). 
Regime characteristics and health policy responses: In the case of direct health policy reforms, 
similar contradictions were evident. On the one hand the regime tried to reinforce its `socialist' 
credentials by an enunciating its overall health policy in support of primary health care in 1982, with a 
planning and programming process instituted, "... at least nominally... " in the following year (Drayton and 
Caleb, 1993: 4). On the other hand, progressive cuts were being simultaneously made to already small 
and shrinking health and education budgets, as resources were diverted for political survival (Spinner, 
1984: 174). In 1980, for example, at a time of severe resource constraints, 10% of the budget was 
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earmarked for the security forces, while only 5% was designated for health needs (Spinner, 1984: 184). 
The `cause and effect' cycle during the period was evident as these cuts in government health expenditure 
resulted in increased doctor and nurse migration. This was in turn exacerbated by the continued lack of 
co-ordination between training, planning and management agencies as noted earlier, high levels of 
inefficiency, persistent equipment and drug shortages and the fragmented and neglected organisation of 
the sector. 
Regime characteristics and health human resources responses: The combined influence of 
economic weakness, instability, ideology and non-democratic, survival-based rule was also seen in the 
human resources development process. As conditions worsened, a group of doctors wrote to the health 
minister expressing grave concerns about their deteriorating working conditions, pointing out that "... the 
shortage of basic drugs, medical supplies, surgical dressings, and antiseptics make meaningful health care 
difficult, if not impossible... " (Spinner, 1984: 202). In the case of nurse training, the failure to reform 
nurse training meant that highly-skilled professionals were being produced but were highly unlikely to 
remain in Guyana as both political and economic conditions deteriorated. As Drayton and Caleb (1993: 
7) noted, the professional group that suffered the most during this period were nurses, resultting in the fact 
that "... in some cases, "production" just could not keep pace with losses due to migration... ". The impetus 
to migrate was strong as those who remained in public institutions faced a deteriorating work 
environment, coupled with poor remuneration, which compounded the crisis situation. 
Even those positive policy reforms implemented by the regime in the late 1970s and fully `coming on 
stream' in the early 1980s to address the paramedical skills problem - the community health worker 
(CHW) programme; the Medex (medical extension) programme as well as other new non-medical 
auxiliary categories such as the health service management programme - all ideologically progressive and 
cost-effective regime responses to health human resource needs, were undermined by a combination of 
regime characteristics and economic crisis as we shall now see. 
The Community Health Worker (CHW) program: This programme was implemented in 1980 along 
the lines of other similar programs such as the Chinese `barefoot doctor' and the Jamaican community 
health worker programs. Unlike the Jamaican programme however, the Guyanese programme was 
targeted mainly at the isolated Amerindian population in the Guyanese hinterland. Community health 
worker trainees were nominated by their communities and/or village captains. The three month training 
period was mainly `on the spot' with tutors travelling from the capital, Georgetown to these communities. 
A number of non-regime, logistical-related factors limited the effect of the program during 
implementation, for instance the Amerindians' migratory lifestyle within the Amazonian hinterland. 
However, the major problem remained the long-standing regime neglect of the needs of this almost 30- 
40,000 strong indigenous community in policymaking. The often late and variable payment of paltry 
stipends to these workers, which the government initially insisted should be paid by the poverty-stricken 
communities themselves was symptomatic of neglect as much as the country's economic woes. The 
eventual agreement to pay the workers by the communities themselves was driven by their own urgent health needs, 
Many years of neglect and a general mistrust of central government had given rise to community self- 
reliance. In the case of health, this meant either the reliance on traditional medicine as well as informal 
strategies such as the use of health facilities in northern Brazil by the border Amerindian communities (K. 
Davis, interview, 1994). 
By 1984 however, this negative regime policy changed, with the decision to establish sixty (60) 
community health worker posts in the health establishment and to be paid a small salary for the first time. 
In addition, the existing training program was increased from three to four months. Most of the workers 
were evaluated and found to perform effectively despite political, economic, social, educational and 
geographical constraints (K. Davis; S. Gordon, interviews, 1994). However political mismanagement 
affected the programme. Poor supervision and the lack of refresher courses due to lack of funds - the 
direct result of political confusion at the central level about the role and status of the training agency, 
GAHEF, was responsible for the policy stalemate and lack of support (G. Tesheira, interview, 1994). The 
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general consensus therefore was that though progressive -a direct result of the regime's socialist ideology 
- it could have been potentially more effective because of its community health orientation, with more 
government attention and resources. The indirect effect of the mismanagement and corrupt practices of 
some regional administrations was particularly important in this regard, despite the best efforts of 
committed trainers and community health workers alike. This combination of low-politics policy neglect 
of its own policies, added to the regime's economic weakness and the channelling of limited resources 
towards political survival also affected the medex programme to which we now turn. 
The medex program. `Medex' or `medical auxiliary' workers training started in 1979 as a USAID- 
funded and University of Guyana-certified programme, devised by the University of Hawaii and adopted 
and implemented by the Burnham regime as a major policy response to the continuing doctor and nurse 
shortage throughout the country. In 1978, legislation was introduced and approved to provide for the 
registration of medexes to provide primary health care as auxiliaries to medical practitioners, and 
employed by the government (Lutchman, 1989: 303). A 1979 PAHO-commissioned report on the 
planning of a regional health system outlined a number of policy recommendations to ensure quality and 
utility of the programme, given Guyana's circumstances. It was first recommended that every medex 
should be a qualified nurse, which was accepted. The regime was also urged to consider either the 
additional training and upgrade of medexes or, alternatively, to replace the medex category with public 
health nurses and upgrade the existing public health nursing program, which, it also noted, "... does not 
equip nurses adequately to carry out assessment, diagnostic and treatment skills... " (PAHO/Burke, 1979: 
30-35). The 1979 report also recommended that the medex and public health nurse programs be merged 
into a `nurse-medex' classification after five years. Although the programme continued, these latter 
recommendations remained underdeveloped and affected by political and economic chaos within the 
context of the Burnham regime's survival politics. Even the medex training and management processes 
were thus similarly affected by regime survival politics as the following account demonstrates: 
One medex's experience: training: 
"... I was in the first batch of medex trainees. At that time there was a general 
nursing strike in connection with meal allowances. Midway through the medex 
courses, the trainees were ordered to fill in for striking nurses. We medex trainees 
however supported our nursing colleagues. We were also unhappy because the 
course had been interrupted, having only recently started. We were sent to Camp 
Madewini and Camp Timehri during the strike for ideological training and political 
awareness courses, run by the party machinery. About 50% of the course was 
strongly political. The vast majority of the medexes felt that it was totally unrelated 
to their work. The general feeling was that we were being victimised for standing up 
for our fellow health workers. We were lectured about the 1975 Sophia Declaration 
as the government tried to rally political support for its policies. While no attempt 
was made to directly coerce us students, it was strongly implied that party policy 
should be followed. During this six-week period, we were rigorously taught the 
goals of the party and shown Soviet films, while hanging over our heads was a 
heavy political atmosphere of indoctrination and coercion. Workers did not speak 
out for fear of being victimised. The senior health minister (Hamilton Greene) was 
a good listener and action-oriented. However, there was a general feeling that 
he 
was responsible for interrupting the training of the medexes and imposing this 
action. Another problem was that about five of the initial twenty-six trainees could 
be said to be under-qualified and were allowed in the course for political reasons. 
In addition, given the political climate of the time, attempts were also made to 
kill 
the co-ordinator of the course [Dr. Frank Williams] who was a leading opposition 
party member... " (Interview with a former medex). 
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The post-training working environment: 
"... Once trained, the medex was basically on his own, with little contact with the 
doctor, performing a variety of tasks: delivering babies, dental extractions, giving 
health education talks in schools and villages, home-visiting as well as mobilising 
hinterland communities for the arrival of the health visitor. Medexes who were not 
members or supporters of the ruling party were often sent off to the hinterland (for 
longer periods) while party supporters tended to remain in urban areas. Some parry 
supporters managed to stay almost always in the urban/settled areas of 
Georgetown, Essequibo and Berbice with letters of recommendation from the party. 
Additionally, there were many problems between the medexes and the regional 
councils mainly related to shortages of supplies and late arrival of salaries and 
allowances. The medex totally depended on the regional councils to provide these 
necessities, as the ministry of health had re-directed this function through the new 
system. Thus problems at that level affected us. In addition, the USAID program had 
supplied vehicles specifically for the programme. However, PNC-dominated 
regional councils used them for political and personal purposes. The councils also 
tried to manipulate the use of radio sets which was a vitally important tool for the 
largely rural-based medexes.... " (Interview with a former medex). 
In the case of physician supply, one controversial policy placed on the policy agenda by the regime, 
and arising out of the existing shortage was the medical practitioner training programme. 
The medical practitioner programme: As in Trinidad, the Guyanese medical school strategy similarly 
reflected the `ad hoc' nature of the post-colonial state decision-making process. There was little doubt 
that doctors were needed, given the major migration problem. The provision by the Guyanese 
government, since 1974 of full-cost scholarships to five (5) students to attend the UWI medical school in 
Jamaica - (Guyana had opted out of the regionally-funded university) in addition to offering overseas 
scholarships to Guyanese students, was by the early 1980s deemed insufficient and ineffective for 
the country's needs (PAHO/Guyana, 1982). The question of whether the implementation of a full medical 
school by Guyana alone was the most feasible way forward, a question that was still not fully answered in 
the late 1990s (Drayton, 1997). The decision was nevertheless taken by the government to build Guyana's 
own medical school. This policy was driven as much by need as by the self-sufficiency, `we can go it alone' 
cooperative ideology of the socialist regime, in spite of calls for the government to join the University of 
the West Indies system. It was initiated by the government with the collaboration of the University of 
Guyana and the Pan American Health Organisation, with some cooperation from the University of the 
West Indies as well as Cuban technical assistance. The plan seemed sound in its objective of producing 
locally relevant community doctors. In 1980, visits were made by a university-government team to 
Colombia, Cuba, Mexico and Canada where `locally-adapted' programs were observed as potential 
models. A report was then submitted to the ministry of health in 1983 and work initiated on project 
development with a mandate from the regime that medical training should become a part of the 
programme of the University of Guyana's Faculty of Health Sciences by September 1985 (Dr. C. Charles, 
interview). However, even this policy eventually began to suffer from political as well as economic 
events at the national level, with questions raised about lack of staff, and inevitably, standards (Drayton, 1997). 
While laudable in one sense then, the policy still required considerable resources from an overstretched 
treasury for effective implementation. ; It was not helped either by the chaotic political context of the early 1980s. 
Comment: The above cases illustrate the fact that despite extremely progressive health policies, 
regime factors were as much responsible as economic crisis for the difficulties experienced at the 
planning, training and management states. These policies were based on legislative provisions for the 
right to health, which linked civil and political rights with social and economic rights under the new 1980 
`socialist constitution (Lutchman, 1989). However, the cycle of deteriorating working conditions, lack of 
basic supplies and equipment, health worker dissatisfaction, poor salaries, staff shortages, migration, 
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overwork of remaining staff and unsupported, though progressive, programmes was clearly linked to both 
sets of factors. Preventive care was, in the main, limited to immunisation and maternal and child care, 
both of which were supported in part by international organizations; but poorly-resourced public health 
and health education programmes which depended almost solely on the state's coffers (World Bank, 1993; 
Hintzen, 1989: 173). The effects of political and economic factors on the entire health system - including health human resources - by the mid-1980s was very evident in the extremely low quality, understaffed 
state-funded health care services available at the lower primary and secondary levels. This meant that 
people bypassed them for the main hospital in Georgetown, in the hope of accessing better services and 
available staff, though this was not always the case. 1. In general, then, health policy became one of 
crisis management during Burnham's last five years. In distorting the system, regime survival and 
economic problems had reduced equity of access especially for poor rural people who were unable to 
travel to Georgetown or afford private care, and who typically delayed treatment until seriously ill. Those 
who could afford it used one of the seven private hospitals operating in the country. Occupancy rates 
were very low at the poorly- supported and managed public regional hospitals. The regime's commitment 
to health by 1985 was now more questionable with actual expenditure declining from 5% in 1982, to 4.6% 
in 1983 and 4.5% in 1984 -a fact which as Lutchman notes was not only bound up with economic and 
social factors but also the politics of the Burnham regime (1989: 311). 
The weak, unstable, socialist/survivalist regime and low politics policy 
Regime characteristics such as economic weakness as a result of resource scarcity undoubtedly 
undermined government health policy reform intentions and outcomes. However, the evidence presented 
above shows a clear pattern of the negative influence of the political environment on even the best 
ideologically-progressive policies. The Burnham regime's record in relation to health sector expenditure 
and policymaking between 1980 and 1985 continued to be full of contradictions, as it was in the 1970s, 
conditioned as it was by an attempt to implement progressive policy within this undemocratic, resource- 
scarce context. The limited resources -human, material and financial - available to those (remaining) 
committed bureaucrats in the ministry of health and the training agencies undoubtedly impeded the ability 
to effectively formulate, implement and provide continuing support for even their most progressive 
policies. But these factors were also inextricably linked to Burnham's desire to retain political power. 
The limits placed by scarce resources such as poor working conditions and lack of basic equipment and 
supplies were, if anything, worsened by the lack of democracy, political harassment and mismanagement. 
The mass migration of one third of the population overseas during this period thus included skilled 
professionals such as doctors and nurses which the country could least afford to lose (Thomas, 1983). 
Guyanese health human resource policy, then, though full of innovation on the one hand, was severely 
affected by the internal political and economic policies of the Burnham regime, as by external economic 
and political developments and national historical factors. Lutchman thus rightly concluded that despite 
its radical departure in 1980, the health model followed in Guyana still reflected, like the rest of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean, the a combination of a historical medical model, but placed under great 
pressure in the 1980s by not only economic, but also political factors: 
"... in Guyana, the ubiquitous presence of the state in the health field (which is 
attributed to the adherence of a socialist ideology) is likely to impact both positively 
and negatively on rights... " (1989: 310). 
For the rest of the period which culminated in Burnham's death in 1985, the effectiveness of efforts on 
the production side continued to be dogged by stagnation and neglect in the face of survival politics. 
Thus, even laudable efforts such as the medex and community health worker programs were harmed by 
the regime's desire to maintain power. Nursing also continued to be hindered at both the production 
levels, by an unreformed and duplicated training system; and at the management level by high levels of 
migration due to the impact of regime politics. In the case of the medical school policy, the problem was 
Ia 
good review of the legal rights to health in Guyana and the rest of the Commonwealth Caribbean and Latin America is found in 
Fuenzalida-Puelma and Scholle-Connor (1989). 
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essentially one of long-term feasibility based on a political decision which was questionable even at this 
stage, given the country's extremely limited resources (Drayton, 1997). The policy itself was 
praiseworthy, but the fact that linkages were not established with other institutions at the Caribbean level 
saw it suffer problems of quality and sustainability. This issue was still not resolved in the late 1990s as 
we shall see later. I next examine and compare the experiences of the Seaga regime in Jamaica. 
Regime characteristics and health human resources policy reforms: the Seaga regime (1980-83) 
Policy context: The 1980 Jamaican general election was won by the conservative Jamaica Labour 
Party (JLP) under Edward Seaga. After the progressive social policies of the 1970s, even under 
tremendous constraints, given US foreign policy at that time, the possibilities for policy development and 
reform under the US-leaning Seaga regime were hopeful. Jamaica, like Guyana was in considerable 
economic and political turmoil in 1980, despite the democratic transfer of power in the former. Seaga's 
overwhelming victory over Manley's now discredited (at least by its ideological critics) `third path' 
radical development model signalled another radical turn, this time towards conservative market-led 
policies. Despite electoral violence, both the main Jamaican political parties - the PNP and the JLP to 
their credit, remained committed to the democratic process in the run-up to and aftermath of the elections 
(Payne, 1991: 45). Nevertheless, Seaga's market-led policies had dire social effects on the Jamaican 
society. The new regime's popularity during its first three years in office was increasingly threatened 
given the slow pace of economic recovery under stringent IMF conditions. By April 1983, there were 
civil service strikes protesting wage ceilings and rising food prices. As the regime faced increased 
difficulties at home, one external event restored its waning fortunes: the October 1983 US-led invasion of 
Grenada, in which Jamaica under Seaga played a leading role. Taking advantage of this new-found 
popularity, and fearing that new austerity measures which the regime was forced to adopt would erode 
government support, Prime Minister Seaga called and subsequently won a snap election in December 
1983, two years before it was due (Stone and Wellicz, 1988: 105). This election was boycotted by the 
PNP which accused the Seaga regime of electoral impropriety, thus enabling virtual `one-party' 
governance for the next five years. 
The Seaga government's adherence to a conservative, US-leaning market ideology saw its sustain its 
reform efforts and in so doing, reversed many of the policies of the previous Manley government. By 
early 1984, the IMF-instigated reform process was well underway with bureaucracy cuts the first 
`condition' implemented (Mills and Jones, 1989: 127). The impact of the stabilisation policies forced 
onto a reluctant, but powerless Manley regime in the late 1970s by the IMF were particularly damaging to 
the health sector and largely contributed the victory of the Jamaica Labour Party regime. However, 
Seaga's assumption of office was accompanied by the almost immediate consideration of similar austerity 
measures. The health budget was thus cut in line with newly negotiated agreements with the IMF on terms 
more lenient than the Manley regime was able to acquire, with the active support of the Reagan 
administration (Edie, 1991: 118). During its first three years in office, the Seaga regime also received an 
amount equivalent to 65% of all American assistance to Jamaica in the previous 30 years (Thomas, 1988: 
232-233). Despite this evident generosity by the grateful Americans, the Jamaica exchange rate and the 
economy continued to decline, while the national debt grew. Living standards predictably fell with a 
simultaneous rise in the incidence of malnutrition. The health sector-particularly at the regional 
primary/community level suffered badly. Many smaller regional hospitals were closed and staff cuts 
implemented. These cuts and closures were part of the conditions attached to the IMF loans. Their 
effects led even the market-reformist Seaga government to protest to the IMF as a fifth of the country's 
entire public sector workforce was laid off within a one year period between October 1984 to October 
1985 (McAfee, 1991: 128). As Stone and Wellicz noted, the country had come full circle by the mid 
1980s (Stone and Wellicz, 1988: 105). The outlook for progressive policy reforms, including support for 
the previous Manley government's progressive health policies especially during this time of rising social 
and health needs was thus not hopeful. 
Regime characteristics and health policy responses: The Seaga government, to its credit, started well 
in terms of its health aims and objectives. In 1984, it outlined its health policy in a programme that was 
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similar in many respects to that of the Manley regime. The document retained much of the previous 
regime's progressive rhetoric about linking health with development, noting the paradoxical problems 
facing Jamaican health services by so-called modem `lifestyle' diseases co-existing with traditional health 
problems such as malnutrition. In terms of management reform, it noted its intention to establish a 
national health committee to co-ordinate inter-sectoral action in health. Policy reform was also outlined in 
relation to general health administration as the country was to be divided administratively into four (4) 
health areas, and ten (10) regional health boards. The regional health boards were to be legal entities 
responsible, inter alia, for hospital administration and community health with ministerial support 
(Government of Jamaica/Ministry of Health, 1984: 3-4). However there were even more far-reaching 
reforms. In addition to the principle of universal access to health care, the statement outlined for the first 
time the regime's commitment to private sector involvement in public health services. It noted that 
efficiency and cost-effectiveness in the health services through public and private health sector 
cooperation would boost efficiency and productivity, given were the country's dwindling resources, an 
overburdened health system and increased demand (Government of Jamaica/Ministry of Health, 1984: 1- 
2). Although public-private cooperation was not altogether diabolic within the Commonwealth Caribbean 
region, having been an integral part of the overall health services system for decades, both public sector 
preventive and curative services - but particularly the former - suffered as government attention focused 
inordinately on facilitating such `market-led', `IMF-driven' health reform programmes. Between 1981 
and 1985, total Jamaican government per capita spending on health fell by 33% (Government of 
Jamaica/Ministry of Health, 1983; 1984). As a consequence, health capital stock and equipment 
deteriorated. Patient care generally deteriorated, with patients often asked to take their own linen and 
food to the hospitals. The regime had very limited policy space to manoeuvre in health care partly due 
both structural adjustment, but also due to its own political/ideological position. The targeting for 
`rehabilitation' (cuts) in programmes at the primary and secondary levels of the system revealed a regime 
following both its own ideological principles which hardly questioned the socially damaging IMF loan 
conditions. 
Regime characteristics and health human resources policy responses: The main problem facing the 
regime in the case of health human resources continued to be the "severe drain of health manpower form 
the island; nurses, doctors and to a lesser extent other health professionals... " (Government of 
Jamaica/Ministry of Health, 1983: 11). Migration is fully discussed in Chapter Six. The government 
responded with policy strategies for both doctors and nurses. For instance, an aggressive recruitment 
campaign to fill the many vacant posts of physicians and other health categories in both primary and 
secondary care was implemented. Importantly, the government also committed itself the upgrading of 
salaries and fringe benefits for both doctors and nurses (Government of Jamaica/Ministry of Health, 1983: 
4). Migration overseas and to the local private sector was driven, unlike Guyana, largely by poor 
remuneration, with the real incomes of doctors, nurses and other health personnel unable to keep up with 
inflation (Government of Jamaica/Ministry of Health, 1984). In terms of improving on the policy lapses 
of the Manley regime, legislation was finally prepared and enacted to regulate nurse practitioners and 
nurse anaesthetists who were found to be particularly effective in the regions/parishes and the community 
(Cumper, 1986). In the case of allied/auxiliary health training, the regime stated its intention of forging 
closer links with the University of the West Indies and the College of Arts, Sciences and Technology 
(CAST) "... to facilitate and expand manpower training... " (Government of Jamaica, 1984: 15-16). In 
relation to midwives, innovative policies - including the targeting and training of midwifery students 
straight from high school, so that, lacking a registered nurse qualification, they would be less likely to 
emigrate, and their training, like doctors, would be tied to a contract - were suggested (Mitchell, 1981: 
483). In terms of the overall improvement of health professional status, the government accepted that 
health manpower policy needed be strengthened "... to provide the necessary staff, which in addition to 
recruitment would also mean constant upgrade of skills through a variety of `in-service' and other 
programs... " (Government of Jamaica, 1984: 15-16). Although there was no development in the 
document of any specific, detailed plans and programs the fact that these issues were being discussed was 
generally positive. 
On another front, given the medical profession's poor relations with the Manley regime, the Seaga 
government was urged to review and change the situation by developing parallel structures in the 
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reorganisation of the system so that doctors no longer reported to their peers. According to this view, Jamaica would never halt out-migration if doctors were made subordinate to non-professionals in other fields. The only viable route was the co-optation of the profession into working with managers in a 
consensus way. The regime and the bureaucracy were urged to appreciate and empathise with the doctors, 
"... or change will never mean movement towards the desired goals... " (Mitchell, 1981: 484). As Mitchell 
noted further: 
"... Political change always brings administrative change. Whether one concurs with 
it or not, doctors deeply resent being forced to report to administrators, and to 
having decisions which they feel directly affect the care of their patients being made 
by non-medical personnel, whether these decisionmakers reside locally or in 
Kingston. To alleviate the current medical disenchantment with the administration, 
it may be necessary to reorganise the health care system even it means creating 
parallel structures... doctors will work long and hard despite old, inadequate 
facilities if they know that these are truly unavoidable. They will not tolerate non- 
medical interference with patient care. Nor would any patient want them to... the 
route to lasting success, is to co-opt the medical profession into working with 
management, getting them to see for themselves the other side of the coin and then 
jointly working out a consensus for action within the administrative structure... there 
will be a few medical die-hards but the majority of caring physicians will respond to 
this approach. If the die-hards occupy strategic positions, then some way must be 
found to promote them out of harm's way... for those politicians and bureaucrats 
wrestling with the politics of change, this may seem like the last straw. But it must be 
borne. Just as the physician must come to understand, to appreciate and to 
empathise with their patients.. . so politicians and the bureaucrats must come to 
understand, appreciate and empathise with their professionals, in this case the 
physicians... this approach is always good politics, it is an essential strategy for an 
emerging nation seeking to change... " (Mitchell, 1981: 484). 
This view was a middle solution to the problem, compared with the socialist Manley's regime's 
somewhat more confrontational policy of pursuing alternative human resource strategies. Both 
approaches had their flaws. Seaga's approach, shaped albeit by structural adjustment and a recognition of 
the need to provide incentives for both professions, was effectively to return to curative care type policies 
added to active private sector collaboration, compared with the Manley regimes approach of searching for 
community-based, alternative methods of care that could be economically achieved, and made financial 
sense, given the continued migration of highly skilled health personnel. The need for reform then of the 
Jamaican health sector was heavily influenced by Seaga's market-based ideology, which although 
incorporating decentralisation as a major plank, also ran the risk of undermining much of the Manley 
regimes' real health human resources achievements. 
Comment 
The health human resources policy window available to the weak, stable, democratic, non-survivalist 
Seaga government, like its predecessor, the Manley government was severely restricted by structural 
adjustment policies as well as its own strong market-led ideology which triggered both positive as well as 
negative regime responses in the case of health human resources reforms. The problems that faced 
Jamaican health care in the early 1980s thus largely emanated from both IMF action as much as from the 
government's own ideological position on the need for radical market-led reforms of the public services 
including the health sector. Curative-dominated health care policy persisted at a time of both primary 
health care neglect, despite its emphasis in official policy as well as increased doctor and nurse migration - 
both of which were problematic for the Jamaican health services by the mid-1980s. The government 
sought to address the migration problem in the case of the medical profession by mending fences in the 
1980s noting in its 1984 health manpower policy document that "... the involvement of professional 
associations in the setting of standards and the monitoring of professional performance will be 
encouraged... " (Government of Jamaica/Ministry of Health, 1984: 23). In the case of nurses, the eventual 
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legalising of nurse practitioner categories were partly effective. The government also recognised and 
made efforts to improve salaries and working conditions for health professionals. However, despite both 
adherence to the primary health care rhetoric and expressed concerns about the social impact of 
adjustment, the regime continued with its market-led, though IMF-driven reforms. For the health services 
and health professionals alike, the policy message was clear as the closures, staff cuts and continued 
migration demonstrated. The increased funding of the health services and the implementation of a 
comprehensive national health service were policy responses that were needed but not considered in this 
market-led reform policy response (Omawale (1982: 14). The overall picture for health human resources 
policy and policy reforms in the early 1980s, given these policies was generally negative for health human 
resources, with the main exception of its remedying of the nurse practitioner legislative issue. The policy 
focus however remained a confusing `mix', complicated by deteriorating economic and political 
conditions. Both thus exerted negative effects on policy over the Seaga's final five years in office as we 
shall see later. We now turn to compare developments in Trinidad after Williams death in early 1981, and 
the appointment of the new PNM prime minister, George Chambers.. 
Regime characteristics and health human resources in Trinidad and Tobago in the first half of the 
1980s: the Chambers regime (1981-86) 
Policy context: The appointment of George Chambers as Prime Minister after Williams death in 1981 
was smooth and democratic, and a direct contrast to the continuity and illegality of the Burnham regime 
during the first half of the 1980s in Guyana. In terms of policymaking, Chambers' much-vaunted 
technocratic style after almost thirty years of Williams' presidential politics signalled the possibility of a 
move from authoritarianism and towards more democracy and openness in public policy development. 
His declarations of "what is wrong must be put right" and "the fete over, now its back to work" indicated a 
recognition of the need for reform at all levels of government, given the now-falling oil prices - still the 
backbone of the Trinidadian economy (Sutton, 1984: 65; MacDonald, 1986: 200). The halting of two of 
the Williams' government's more controversial projects -a racing complex and a housing project - as well 
as various pronouncements on decentralisation and public service reform were signs of this new approach. 
In the case of low-politics policy under the Chambers regime's tenure however, the first half of the 
1980s in Trinidad turned out to be one of policy stasis and inaction despite the government's main policy 
reform initiative: the commissioning of the Demas Report on national development and reform strategies. 
Attention was now increasingly focused on the crisis-driven management of the declining oil economy. 
Economic and political problems had set in almost as suddenly as petroleum prices fell in the early 1980s. 
High petroleum prices in the 1970s had helped to postpone economic crisis in Trinidad, unlike Guyana 
and Jamaica, the Commonwealth Caribbean region's only producer of substantial amounts of oil and 
natural gas. There were also persistent questions of corruption (MacDonald, 1986). In addition to 
economic decline and policy stasis, then, the PNM regime continued to be dogged by accusations of 
corruption and mismanagement of the oil windfall. The visit by a joint IMF/World Bank 'team' in mid- 
1982 to advise the government on financial management and control in the midst of a general decline in 
most sectors including education and health revealed the gravity of the economic situation. Despite 
winning a snap election in November 1981, the problems facing the Chambers regime mounted as social 
and economic conditions deteriorated. As it sought to control the national budget, the Chambers 
government's popularity declined sharply within a year of the 1981 general elections as local government 
elections. One outcome of the combined effect of political and policy stasis under the Chambers years 
was the formation of both a new coalition of opposition parties - the National Alliance for Reconstruction 
(NAR) - united mainly by the need to defeat the PNM. To be fair to the regime, 
in addition to its 
appointment of the Demas Committee on national, its other major asset was its adherence to democratic 
principle, which although not perfect, was significantly different from his predecessor, and a far cry, of 
course from Burnham's Guyana (MacDonald, 1986: 209). While the prognosis for democracy remained 
good however, the same could not be said for policy making and reform as it was effectively sidelined by 
the economic crisis and political survival, given the almost certain political defeat facing an increasingly 
unpopular regime after almost thirty (30) years in office (MacDonald, 1986: 207-208). Like Guyana and 
Jamaica, the need for administrative reform and accountability was a major call not only from the 
109 
international financial institutions but also from bureaucrats and citizens alike, fed up with a deteriorating 
situation and a regime paralysed by the new economic reality of the post-boom period. 
Faced with impending crisis, the Chambers government's main attempt at beginning policy reform in 
Trinidad was the appointment of a group of local experts, the Demas Task Force, in 1983 to prepare a 
long-term development plan for the country, including the health sector, for the period 1983-1986, 
(MacDonald, 1988: 207-8). Much of the country's economic resources had been wasted in the previous 
boom years both short-term amelioration and/or political projects and long- term, ultimately unfeasible 
projects. This precluded the possibility of any rational approach by the Williams regime to policy reform 
and development. Little attempt was however made by the Chambers regime in this immediate post- 
Williams period to consider policy issues such as health reform, in addition to the long-term impact of 
contentious policy issues such as the medical school programme. 
Regime characteristics and the health policy reform response: The regime's main health policy 
concern for its entire period in office - in typical crisis-driven mode - was the need to maintain health 
services at an acceptable, tolerable level. However, the appointment of the Demas Committee at least 
signalled its intentions to introduce health care reforms, as it also pondered the future of the medical 
school and complex. As economic problems worsened, the Chambers government's decision to continue 
with Williams' medical complex policy, as planned and agreed by the previous regime had more to do 
with the fact that the contract was already signed. However, the regime's unwillingness to re-open the 
issue was evident in the beginning of construction in 1981 in the middle of the economic crisis was 
questionable to say the least. Questions now increasingly dogged the feasibility and scale of the project. 
However the role of political calculation through a combination of influences - the medical academic 
lobby, the reality of a signed contract, the work already `on the ground' as well as the potential benefits 
both for health care and for the party's reputation as a caring government undoubtedly contributed to the 
final decision. Though a difficult policy decision for the regime. the fact that the project was now 
underway and absorbing a significant percentage of the country's revenue (as well as governmental policy 
attention) when compared to the existing situation of increasingly cash-strapped, antiquated health service 
was not however lost on either the population, or striking health professionals at the country's health 
institutions. As the president of the medical association noted: 
"... efficiency is the watchword and accountability to the public can be 
demanded... it is a poor record for the ministry of health when the population can 
only hear the truth when doctors strike... " (`Facts behind doctors protest, Dr. R. 
Thompson, Pres. TTMA, Trinidad Express, 7/5/81: 4). 
This need for urgent health reform was supported by most health staff. One doctor -a prominent critic 
of government' health policy priorities at this time - noted in 1983 that "... compared to other third world 
countries, health services in Trinidad and Tobago are fairly good, but will be much better if administration 
was efficient with the great amount of money being spent... " (Welch, Trinidad Express, 18/10/83: 36). By 
1984 however, the Chambers regime was so convinced that its policies were still not being recognised by 
a critical public, that the extremely low-profile minister of health, Dr. Neville Connell noted the need to 
"... speak of the good as well as the bad... " (Trinidad Guardian, 16/3/84: 3). As the expensive complex 
neared completion in 1983, the government continued to insist that primary health care was its guiding 
principle. In light of the existing reality of an under-funded, still unreformed and essentially colonial 
health system, even senior ministers were prone to making such contradictory policy statements. Finance 
minister Anthony Jacelon's admonition, for instance, to a national primary health care workshop at a time 
when millions of dollars were being spent on the expensive medical complex only underscored the gap 
between the policy rhetoric and reality of the Chambers regime: 
"... unless scarce national resources are carefully husbanded and allocated to bring 
about the maximum possible gain, development cannot proceed, and without 
development, the goal which is now within our grasp may become an illusion... " 
(Government of Trinidad and Tobago/Primary Health Care Workshop, 1983: 5). 
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The most serious indictment of health development under this government was that despite a broad, 
and quite avidly-stated adherence to the goals of Alma Ata and universal health, it had by end of its tenure 
in 1986 still not produced a single document that could be called Trinidad's health policy, This policy 
lapse was underscored by the Demas Task Force report which was itself part of the response to this 
underlying problem, and which noted that the two main problems hindering effective health systems 
development were the absence of clear policies and the failure to implement and adequately support the 
first national health plan (Government of Trinidad and Tobago/Demas Committee Report, 1983). In light 
of the health crisis and the regime's persistence with the medical school policy, calls increased for 
decentralised-based health sector reform. These calls, as noted in Chapter Four, had started well before 
full independence with the 1957 Julien report, which was followed by a series of reports in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s including the National Advisory Council report (1978), the Toby report (1981) and the 
Holiday Inn Report (1983). These reports had all recommended fundamental health reform of Trinidad 
and Tobago's health services system). The politics of the failure to reform by this stage was not lost even 
on the health ministry's own technocrats. In an indirect criticism of the both the past and present regimes, 
the Holiday Inn Report and subsequent reports suggested that political will and resistance to change were 
among the key factors hindering health services reform (Holiday Inn Report, 1983; Drayton, H and D. 
Ray, 1987: 1). The 1983 Demas report recommended, inter alia, the creation of three separate health 
boards for the country's three main hospitals, with the ministry of health focusing exclusively on policy- 
making, monitoring and evaluation. This view was supported by the 1983 Holiday Inn Report. In terms 
of the way forward in health policy, the Demas Report recommended, like those health sector reports 
before it, the adoption of primary health care with emphasis on health promotion and inter-sectoral 
linkages among the various levels including policy formulation, community participation, the 
reorganisation of the ministry of health and some form of decentralisation, where hospital boards, on the 
one hand and county medical officers of health on the other, were given various levels of autonomy and 
administrative support. 
The recommendations of the Demas report were largely neglected by the Chambers regime in its 
preoccupation with the looming general elections in 1986, despite the appointment of a new 
`management-oriented' health minister. Health conditions meanwhile worsened for both health 
professionals and the population as the economic decline and policy stalemate continued. During a senate 
debate on the 1985 budget, one independent senator and former doctor concluded that administrative 
problems were no different (and in some cases worse) than they were under colonial rule ('Health 
problems even worse', Harnarayan, Trinidad Guardian, 24/1/85: 1). He criticised the previous under- 
performing minister of health Dr. Neville Connell and his successor during the last two years of the PNM 
regime, John Eckstein for the lack of clear policy. He also criticised the PNM government's poor 
decisionmaking and management in relation to the medical complex policy, noting that: "... if we do not 
pay attention to the problem now, a lot of money would be wasted on the Mount Hope Medical 
Complex... ". He warned, in this regard, of the consequences for the rest of the health system of too much 
emphasis on "this institution" ('Health problems even worse', Harnarayan, Trinidad Guardian, 24/1/85: 
1). Addressing doctors in early 1986, Connell's successor as health minister, John Eckstein, also 
questioned why the health services were attracting such increasing criticisms at a time when medical staff 
were being "... highly trained both at home and abroad... " and especially when Trinidad had moved into 
the "... expensive, hi-tech field of tertiary health services... " (Address to 9th medical update, Trinidad 
Express 11/1/86: 3). The criticism, he noted, could not be about expenditure, when compared to other 
developing states, or the technical competence of doctors and nurses. He added that the health surcharge 
introduced by the government to meet the funding shortfall had yielded TT$100million (US$ 33.5 
million) in 1986 out of a total health budget of TT$ 600 million (US$ 142 million). By March 1986 
however, the press concluded that the new philosophy outlined by the former management consultant, was 
effectively an admission that the ministry had been unable to provide an efficient health service 
Health human resources policy responses: In relation to the medical complex, the `face-saving' 
approach and its political utility in this regard was evidently the main justification for its continued 
popularity with the government. The minister insisting that the imminent opening in December 1986 
represented: 
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"... a tremendous opportunity for the development of our health services, a 
tremendous opportunity... since it brings strengthened university presence to the 
health services of Trinidad and Tobago and stimulates continuing medical 
education and research... " (Trinidad Express, 4/12/86: 1). 
In addition to its support for the medical school policy, the Chambers government was also cognisant 
of other health human resource policy concerns. A 1981 report of a committee to study the health 
`manpower' needs of Trinidad alluded to the reality of government policy neglect particularly in relation 
to migration. This report also alluded to the fact that the host of planning and production problems, 
including the need to redress the balance between community health nurses and curative nurses were also 
due to the absence of reform as well as resource scarcity (Government of Trinidad/Ministry of Health, 
1981). In terms of management, other problems stemming from economics, as well as lack of health 
reform, included the low morale among doctors, nurses and other staff, personnel shortages, inadequate 
incentives, cumbersome bureaucracy and inflexible recruitment procedures, and employment practices all 
of which made it impossible to attract and retain much-needed health professionals. The lack of provision 
for nurses in particular to be recruited at appropriate levels commensurate with academic training and 
experience was, according to the 1981 report, particularly problematic, given the chronic staff shortages 
throughout the 1980s. In addition, insufficient in-service and external post-graduate training, the sub- 
optimal use of human resources, the inability to regulate private practice privileges, in addition to the 
insufficient support for highly qualified personnel all contributed the crisis in health services in the early 
1980s. The report stressed the need for improved health human resources planning, an intensification of 
the recruitment process, both locally and abroad to fill vacant posts, and the need for local in-service 
training programmes, with emphasis on management and planning and the development of a reformed 
personnel system to facilitate rapid recruitment and discipline in addition to responsiveness to employee 
needs. 
These recommendations were accepted in principle, but in practical terms ignored as the Chambers 
regime responded by doing little by way of implementation, given the impending elections. In the 
meantime it was pre-occupied with the `ad-hoc', `day-to-day' crisis management of policy, which included 
the active courting of the electorate, including public sector employees. Doctors and nurses were among 
the first to protest at the declining conditions (both infrastructural and remunerative) at all levels of the 
health system. However, on the eve of the 1983 local elections, public servants were awarded huge pay 
increases of approximately 57% that, although welcomed by these workers, helped push government 
expenditure up by 76%. This, at a time also when the country's balance of payments went from US$283 
million surplus to US$ 909 million deficit between 1981 and 1983 (MacDonald, 1986: 206). Again then, 
the exigencies of regime maintenance were placed before the interests of policy reform and development. 
Despite this electoral `sweetener' however, health professionals - especially nurses - remained unhappy 
about an unreformed and neglected working environment and poor professional and status-based rewards. 
In terms of general health policy, the Chambers government had reiterated that a multi-sectoral 
primary health care approach to health was being implemented. The reality however was that there was 
little evidence, other than the consideration of the 1983 reform proposals as it became more and more 
preoccupied with its own survival. By late 1986 nevertheless, health reform, based on the broad thrust of 
the Demas report recommendations was placed on the national policy agenda, partly under international 
financial pressure, and partly also due to the new health minister's own recognition of the need for reform. 
In his last statement just before the PNM were defeated by the NAR coalition, Minister Eckstein noted 
that proposed the hospital authorities would be the beginning of the decentralisation process, and would 
eliminate `red tape' with these authorities functioning with the ministry focusing on policy formulation 
(Trinidad Express, 4/12/86: 1). In supporting the reform process, he noted that between 1981 and 1986, 
despite the severe economic recession and subsequent attempts to adjust to lower public expenditure, 
funding of the health sector was still generous. He recognised that the main problems facing health 
included management as doctors had to act as managers thus encroaching on their working hours, and 
stated in this regard that professional managers would be recruited as well as lay administrators. 
112 
However, regime survival would also impede developments on this front by the time of elections in 
December 1986. 
The Chambers years then can be explained as transitional, with a recognition of the need for reform, 
given economic conditions, but aware of its own need to survive politically as the oil resources dwindled. 
One the one hand its appointment of the 1983 Demas task force on development reform - though much of 
the final report was effectively ignored - was far-reaching in terms of an overall recognition of the need 
for urgent health care reform in the post-Williams era. Falling oil prices in the early 1980s impeded 
implementation, but also saw the government curtail many of the Williams regime's oil boom `mega- 
projects', with the notable exception of the medical complex policy, which though still being supported by 
the treasury, was now effectively on hold after construction as the government was financially-unable to 
commission. Its health-related political symbolism was exploited for electoral purposed. Its use in both 
the local elections in 1983 and in the runup to the general elections in 1986 (despite being 
uncommissioned) as a symbol of the regime's care and commitment to public health, and a modernised 
one at that. In the case of both the wider population and disgruntled health professionals working within 
the public health service however, this symbolism was lost, being seen more as wastage, despite the award 
of huge pay increases to them on the eve of local elections. By ignoring the basic problems outlined in the 
Demas report and resorting instead to `ad hoc' strategies such as training ever more personnel, recruiting 
nurses from abroad and using the complex for political purposes as a response to questions about its 
record on health services, the Chambers regime demonstrated that it too, like the Williams regime was 
concerned more about its short-term survival than any rational, concerted approach to the reform agenda. 
Although without the structural adjustment pressures facing both the Burnham and Seaga regimes in the 
early 1980s, the decision by the now weak and unpopular, though stable, democratic and still relatively 
non-survivalist Chambers government to spend its way out of the crisis - including continued funding of 
the now `on-hold' medical school/complex - was to have serious consequences for the new NAR policy 
reform opportunities in 1986. 
Comment: Compared to the 1970s, regime characteristics influences in the first half of the 1980s is 
less clear as economic factors assumed greater importance given the crisis. In tandem with these 
influences, however, was the continuing effect of regime weakness, instability, ideology and political 
survival on the policy reform trajectory. The first half of the 1980s can be seen as the start of a transition 
period for Commonwealth Caribbean health human resources policy with the recognition by all three 
governments - excluding the Burnham regime - of the need for political/administrative as much as 
economic reforms. This recognition was due both to international financial adjustment conditions, as well 
as a recognition at home of the failure of centralised policies in the previous decade. In some states, 
particularly Guyana, and to a lesser extent Trinidad, policy reform was however jeopardised by the 
exigencies of political survival. In Guyana for instance, the Burnham regime's authoritarianism was 
actually enhanced during this period as economic problems worsened. This was an extension of its 
behaviour in the 1970s. The result was increased neglect and undermining of its own theoretically 
progressive health policies by mismanagement and co-optation of resources for its survival. Regime 
neglect was thus both evident the lack of support for implemented administrative structures as well as 
political interference in training and management policies such as the medex and community health 
worker programmes and its effects felt in the decision to proceed with the questionable medical school 
policy (Drayton, 1997). Williams' death and the appointment of Chambers, saw reform action in Trinidad 
initiated with the appointment of the 1983 Demas task force. The need for health and health human 
resources policy reform was recognised through a number of preceding reports. However, little was done, 
with the exception of the policy decision to continue funding the medical school programme, and the 
continuation of the training status quo in relation to doctors and nurses. This was due as much to the 
waning political fortunes of the PNM, which in itself was due both to the fall in oil prices as it was the 
mismanagement of the ensuing oil windfall for political survival. 
In Jamaica, there was also strong evidence of the impact of intervening economic conditions on policy 
along the lines of Guyana and Trinidad. The Seaga regime enjoyed both the active support of the Reagan 
administration especially after the 1983 Grenadian invasion and maintained its democratic credentials in 
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the aftermath of the snap December elections boycotted by Manley's PNP in late 1983. Despite its 
national popularity, and buoyed by American support, the health policy reform dilemma facing the Seaga 
regime in this period remained essentially similar to that facing the other two regimes: how to balance development reform with political survival at a time of economic crisis. Timing, coupled with the 
economic crisis militated, in all three cases, against reform. However regime characteristics, particularly ideology and political survival played critical roles. Despite signalling its policy intent of public-private 
sector partnerships and better management of health services, the Seaga regime's `market-led' ideology 
considerably undermined both community health services and the personnel charged with delivering these 
services in addition to economic factors. However, unlike Guyana, it retained its democratic credentials, 
as did the Chambers regime, which although unpopular, also turned away from blatant authoritarian 
governance. 
The recognition of reform within all three countries' health services was evident in varying levels of 
regime health human resource policy responses in the 1980s. Each government responded based on not 
only historic, economic and international contexts, but also on their individual regime characteristics. As 
economic conditions worsened, policy windows of opportunity were severely limited, there was 
nevertheless room for meaningful organisational and technical policy reform. To summarise then, while 
increasing economic problems made policy reforms more difficult, the role of national political/regime 
characteristics continued to be influential. As in the 1970s, policy inaction and neglect was still a favoured choice in the case of health human resources policy agenda-setting, formulation and 
implementation, although economic climate, medical interests, and the preoccupation of government with 
crisis-ridden, potentially destabilising issues also contributed to the failure of the reform issue to get on 
the agenda, and, in the specific case of specific policies for health human resources policy, the curtailment 
of spending. In sum then, a combination of economic and political/regime influences was evident in the 
case of health human resources in the first half of the 1980s. We now to analyse the second half of this 
decade to see whether these trends persisted. 
5.3 HEALTH HUMAN RESOURCES IN THE SECOND HALF OF THE 1980s: THE HOYTE, 
ROBINSON AND SEAGA REGIMES COMPARED 
Given the findings of the previous section, I examine and compare, in this section, the determinants of 
health human resources policy action, inaction and reforms in the second half of the 1980s when regimes 
changed in Guyana, and Trinidad, but remained the same in Jamaica. I examine policy responses during 
this period, then, under the Hoyte regime in Guyana, the Seaga regime in Jamaica and the Robinson 
regime in Trinidad. I begin with the Hoyte regime. 
Guyanese health human resources policy in the second half of the 1980s: the Hoyte regime (1986- 
1992) 
Policy context: President Burnham's sudden death in August 1985 signalled a potential end to regime 
maintenance politics in Guyana by presenting for the first time in decades the possibility of democratic 
politics and with it progressive policy reform and support that would improve health human resources at 
the planning, training and management levels. This expectation was however dashed when his successor 
Desmond Hoyte oversaw yet another rigged election in December 1985 (Premdas, 1994: 55). As the 
support of the socialist bloc - excluding Cuba, at least at this stage - dissipated, Hoyte's hold on his 
illegally-acquired power faced sustained pressure from the United States, the PNC's sometime external 
sponsor, for democratic reform. Guyana also continued to suffer severe economic problems in the mid- 
1980s: serious trade deficits, balance of payments problems, lack of foreign exchange, high inflation, and 
inability to meet production levels in the major sectors of the economy. The devaluation of the Guyanese 
dollar added to further impoverishment and poor working conditions. This in turn led to high levels of 
mass emigration, particularly of skilled and professional personnel. The Hoyte regime launched its 
Economic Recovery Program (ERP) in 1988. By the end of the PNC's term in office in 1992, much of the 
reforms requested by the International financial institutions were in place, but with extensive negative 
social impact. The Inter-American Development Bank estimated that in 1989,67% of the Guyanese 
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population was living in poverty although official calculations put the figure closer to 86% (World 
Bank/Guyana, 1993: 73). 
Regime characteristics and health policy reforms: The effect on the health sector was particularly 
severe. The World Bank country report noted the decline of the health sector in the 1980s and the impact 
of the shortages of staff, equipment and basic drugs on the already quantitatively and qualitatively poor 
services being offered. The report attributed this to severe shortages of resources, fragmented 
organisation of the sector, lack of coordination between relevant agencies and "... lack of accountability of 
agencies to client populations... " (World Bank/Guyana, 1993: xv). It also recognised the need for a major 
increase in public sector wages along with a significant increase in health expenditure in the medium term, 
as well as greater cooperation with the private sector. The mismanagement of the Burnham years, though 
not mentioned underpinned these criticisms. In the case of actual policies, despite severe economic 
problems and continued lack of democracy, the regime proceeded with its three main policies: 
decentralisation, the establishment of the medical school in 1985 and the creation in 1988 of the health 
training institution, the Guyana Agency for Health Science Education and Food Policy (GAHEF). The 
decentralisation of the health sector, implemented in 1985, five years after the other ministries, was one 
sign of the unexpected progressive policy development and transition under Hoyte. Under the new 
PAHO-supported policy, responsibility for most health functions were passed directly to the newly created 
regional administrations. The ministry of health remained largely a central quality control unit whose 
function was to formulate policy, monitor conditions and ensure that equal standards of care were 
provided across the regions, as well as retain responsibility for preventive health. Despite this newly- 
implemented health system however, the Guyanese health service continued to deteriorate over the next 
four years, given the combination of poor economic performance and utilisation of much of the limited 
resources for political survival. By 1989, for example, the country's chronic drug shortage was being 
`remedied' by an illegal trade in (often expired) drugs from Venezuela and Brazil (Tesheira, interview, 
1994). Hoyte's recognition of such problems along with the reality of an overall deterioration of the 
quality of life for Guyanese, coupled with increasing regional and American political pressure meant that 
the days of undemocratic rule were numbered. By April 1989, the government had negotiated an IDB- 
financed US$27.9 million loan for its Health Care II project to meet the cost of physical infrastructure and 
medical supplies for the health service. While most of this money was targeted at the Georgetown 
Hospital, the health transitional process had begun, aided by the democratisation process being pushed by 
Guyana's Caricom neighbours as well as the Atlanta-based Carter Centre - founded by the former US 
president to foster democratic governance (Daily Chronicle, 4/4/89). In sum, reforms began because the 
Hoyte regime had limited room to manoeuvre either politically or economically. 
Health human resources responses: Although no fundamental reforms occurred initially under the 
Hoyte regime, the impact of this new scenario was reflected in the regime's responses to health human 
resources policy. In the case of training, the medical school programme was implemented by the state-run 
university with PAHO and Cuban government support. Though it remained problematic, the medical 
school was seen to be potentially useful for the country. In terms of training outcomes, collaboration with 
regional institutions such as the British-oriented University of the West Indies (UWI) medical school 
remained cordial during this period with some technical support. However, the active involvement of 
PAHO, with heavy reliance of Cuban and North Korean expertise were its main support. This lack of full 
cooperation with the UWI medical school, combined with the cost of training doctors at this Guyanese 
university were found by some to be unjustifiable given the state of the economy and the attendant 
qualitative and quantitative risks involved (Drayton, 1997). The argument was essentially that even if the 
policy could be considered visionary in attempting to solve the doctor shortage for poor developing states 
like Guyana, the long-term feasibility of the programme, coupled with the sustainability of quality controls 
must be questioned in terms of whether this was the most feasible use of Guyana's scarce resources, given 
Caricom-level regional training capability at the Jamaican medical school. 
In the case of day to day medical care provision, Cuban medical foreign policy coupled with active 
PAHO technical and financial assistance and support continued to be important components of Guyanese 
health policy under the Hoyte regime. The ratio of physicians for example, increased slightly 
in 1990 due 
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to the recruitment of Cuban medical interns on short-term contracts. In terms of overall Cuban health 
human resource aid, the numbers of doctors had also grown from 15 in 1972 to 54 in 1988. By 1990, the 
Cuban medical brigade totalled 120 professionals serving six regions of the country, effective forming the 
backbone of the public health system (Cotman, 1993: 156). 2 Given the heavy reliance on Cuban and 
other expatriate medical staff, the Hoyte regime discouraged these physicians from setting up private 
practice and prohibited them generally from working outside the public sector. 
Another human resource problem that was compounded in the late 1980s, by regime politics as much 
as economic crisis was the `disassociation' or separation of the production sub-system (the university) 
from the policy-making, planning and management component (the ministry) (Drayton and Caleb, 1993: 
7). Under both Burnham and Hoyte, no genuinely systematic co-ordination mechanisms were established 
to complement the needs of both health personnel and the demands of the population, which reflected the 
continuing confusion at the heart of the health system under the new regime (Drayton and Caleb, 1993: 7) 
Health was thus effectively split into three levels: the ministry of health, the regions, and the main 
Guyanese training agency, GANEF, with the ministry, GAHEF as well as the University of Guyana all 
carrying out their own training programmes without any inter-sectoral coordination. Additionally, the 
Ministry was responsible for allocating staff to the regions but had no say on these staff once allocated. 
The failure to recognise these and other problems and their effects simply meant more of the same with 
the government's response continuing to be the training of ever more nurses to keep pace with migration. 
According to the state-controlled Daily Chronicle, the policy being followed was one of "... not too much 
or too little... " as an allocation of G$120 million (approx. US $1 million) was made for increasing the 
training programmes for nurses, nursing assistants, midwives and community health workers (Daily 
Chronicle, 26/4/89). The regime's `official' policy nevertheless remained one of emphasising the familiar 
PAHO/WHO cries, i. e. the need for inter-agency co-ordination for the production and management of 
health personnel, support for the concept of different human resource `mixes' and appropriate curricula 
for Guyana's health needs (Chin, W, interview). 
Meanwhile as programmes were formulated with these goals in mind, the management component was 
undermined by regime political survival as much as economic and environmental context. Inter-sectoral 
coordination remained a major problem for the Hoyte regime, particularly the need to build into the policy 
process a direct link between production and need, within the context of scarce resources. In the case of 
health human resources, a 1987 PAHO consultancy on the decentralisation process noted this lack of 
clarity in relation to the regime's new primary health care policy A general confusion was found between 
some of the roles of the primary health care team. Physicians did not understand the role of the medex. 
The medexes and health visitors, when placed together, had competing roles in terms of community 
outreach. Regional differences also meant that the role of each class of personnel might be different 
(PAHO/Zakus/Guyana 1987: 29; Drayton and Caleb, 1993: 13). In terms of the medex policy in the mid 
1980s, conditions remained much the same with little or no policy incentives such as the rotation of 
workers. While medexes tried to be flexible, adapting and improvising as they went along, working 
conditions remained poor and complaints almost impossible without a representative union or a 
professional association (K. Davis, interview, 1994). There were also continuing disputes over 
professional and managerial seniority between medexes and public health nurses `in the field'. While 
these problems were more managerial and economic than political, they revealed still reflected the chaotic 
policy situation that also bore the hallmarks of regime action, inaction and neglect. Regime 
characteristics' influences was also evident in the creation in 1988 of the main training institution, 
2 Cuban medical aid throughout the 1970s and 1980s often included free medical care in Cuba, particularly for complex procedures 
in particular those requiring hi-tech medical equipment and facilities. In 1983 for example, Cuba agreed to provide hospital 
treatment for a specific number of Guyanese during that year, as well as to extend for another two years, the terms of the 24 doctors 
already serving in Guyana. Later agreements called for the continued treatment of Guyanese children in Cuba 
between 1986 and 
1988. Cuba also assisted in the construction and staffing of the medical school (Feinsilver, 1993: 164-168). The ratio of nurses 
however declined. 
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GAHEF3. Policy formulation was placed with GAHEF, while responsibility for employment and 
management of health workers remained with the ministry of health: a move which was seen as politically 
motivated and opportunistic (G. Tesheira, interview; Drayton and Caleb, 1993: 7). 
In general then, the overall breakdown of the health system due to both political and economic 
mismanagement as well as factors outside the regime's control was increasingly apparent. This in turn 
affected professional productivity. For instance, doctors especially at the country's regional hospitals 
were often under-utilised because of the low occupancy rates, as patients chose to go to the main hospital 
in Georgetown instead, because of the anticipated lack of basic equipment and drugs and staff. By July 
1987, a opposition motion urging the government to remedy the critical deficiencies in health services and 
specifically the staffing and supplies/drugs crisis in the rural health centres was defeated by the 
government. The health minister (and Burnham's son-in-law) Dr. Richard Van West Charles denied the 
charge, pointing to the new regionalised system, and the new health worker categories created by the 
government. Despite these claims, the working conditions for all Guyanese health personnel at the end of 
the Hoyte regime's tenure was described as "... bad beyond belief... " (Working Peoples Alliance 
Manifesto, 1992: 65). Various consultants, including the World Bank continually noted the non- 
facilitating political as well as economic environment for policy reform. Opposition parties such as the 
Working Peoples Alliance, in addition to calling for free elections also urged the regime to improve 
wages, working conditions and training facilities for health workers as well as the adequate teaching, 
supervision and material resources for medical students (Working Peoples Alliance Manifesto, 1992: 65). 
The unsatisfactory nature of the overall situation was reflected in the ministry's own figures for 1990 
which showed a general staff vacancy rate of approximately 40% (World Bank/Guyana, 1993: 80). 
The Hoyte regime had taken some limited steps but the continued combination of extremely poor 
working conditions - despite the ambitious decentralisation program - and regime illegitimacy continued 
to encourage large scale emigration of trained and qualified health manpower (1993: 80). As the 
government's own health technocrats noted of the state of the Guyanese health service in 1992 after more 
than two decades of PNC rule, there was a general weakness in evaluation systems for both programmes. 
Quality assurance was not only attributed to geographical peculiarities and manpower shortages, but also 
to the tendency by regional organisations to take politically-influenced decisions without taking into 
consideration the views of health workers (Sagala et al, 1992: 36). Similarly, management weaknesses, 
which led to the high attrition rate among all categories of health workers, were also attributed to a 
combination of political and economic factors, with Sagala et al noting that: "... until we can come up with 
some genuine solution to enable to help retain the personnel, the problem is bound to multiply... " (Sagala 
et al, 1992: 36). Another `management' problem that persisted by the end of Hoyte's tenure was the poor 
relationship between the ministries of health and the regions, and the related inability to do anything about 
local level health systems-building until the other issues were resolved. The questions also hinted at the 
3Interestingly, the Guyanese health minister, Gail Tesheira linked regime characteristics, particularly political survival with health 
policy responses and outcomes in my interview with her. She noted first that the creation of the Guyana Agency for Health 
Education and Food Policy (GAHEF) was President Hoyte's way of "getting rid of"the former Minister of Health (and Burnham's 
son-in-law) Dr. Richard Van West Charles. After Bumham's death, Dr. Van West Charles was shifted to the Ministry of 
Education. Another minister Dr. Noel Blackman, a clinician assumed office, but did not have a primary health care focus and 
focused his energies on physical infrastructure. His "fall from grace" resulted in Hoyte's chief rival for the party leadership, 
Hamilton Greene assuming office. Greene did not however physically occupy his offices at the ministry, leaving the ministry under 
a non-performing junior minister, Jailall Kissoon. Tesheira asserted that the ensuing power struggle between President Hoyte and 
Greene, combined with the cuts to the health budgets and other conditions imposed by the IMF loan resulted in the health sector 
being "ravaged" by the late 1980s, and early 1990s. The impact, she noted, was worse on the poorer and middle classes who relied 
on the public health services. She also linked the increased incidence of communicable diseases including malaria and 
tuberculosis, to regime neglect, and inaction and its failure to acknowledge Guyana's AIDS problem until 1992. The high infant 
and maternal mortality rates, she asserted, were also denied as data was "doctored" to shore up the regime. 
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regime context and remained well after democratisation and concerted policymaking efforts as we shall 
see later (Drayton, 1997: 18-20). 
Comment: Despite considerable IMF constraints, Guyana's poor health and health human resources 
situation was not only due to economic problems, but regime illegitimacy and survival in what was 
effectively a continuation of Burnham-styled undemocratic rule by the weak, authoritarian though 
reformist Hoyte regime. An important factor in this regard was the regime's mismanagement of public 
funds to retain power. The net result was a further deterioration in already bad services as many health 
workers including doctors and nurses migrated or moved into the private sector. The introduction of new 
health worker categories such as medex and community health workers was commendable. However, the 
influence of politics even on these programmes, as I have shown, was palpable. While the Hoyte 
government showed its recognition of reform by decentralisation of services including health, albeit five 
years after it was announced by the previous regime, it nevertheless still intended to retain power in the 
traditional PNC way: by undemocratic means. There is also another factor here. American foreign 
policy, given its linkage to IMF financial packages is arguably the least best option to foster democracy 
and trigger much needed political and policy reform given its history in the Latin American and Caribbean 
region - including Guyana. However, this linkage in the post cold war era between political 
democratisation and economic assistance was good for Guyana politically and socially in presenting the 
Hoyte regime with a clear policy choice: either democratise or suffer the economic as well as political 
consequences at the national and international level. These extremely limited options severely 
discouraged the PNC regime's favoured option of regime maintenance in the Burnham tradition. The 
eventual choice of the regime in the late 1980s to reform and democratise and the implications of this 
decision for health policymaking, including health human resources policy has to be seen within this no- 
win political, economic and developmental context (Premdas, 1994: 56). The limited room for policy 
manoeuvre, brought on by international level factors, as well as political and economic pressures 
nationally were important influences on the Hoyte regime's moves towards gradual political reforms. This 
had important implications for the implementation of health human resources policy reforms by the time 
the new Jagan regime assumed office as we shall see later. In the next section we examine the influence 
of regime characteristics on health human resources policy during the final term of the Seaga government 
and compare it with the Guyanese situation. 
Regime characteristics and health human resources policy reforms in Jamaica: the Seaga regime 
1983-1988 
Policy context: Like Guyana under Burnham, Jamaica under Seaga also enjoyed the lucrative benefits 
of a cold-war generated relationship when it suited the American administration. However, like Guyana 
also, such benefits lasted for a short period, but the problems of development in the post-cold war 
developing world remained the same. In spite of considerable US assistance as reward for its the support 
of the 1983 Grenadian invasion, Jamaica was no better off in 1986 as it was in 1980 (Thomas, 1988: 232- 
233). The Seaga regime's administrative reform program was initiated in 1984 with the goal of improving 
the performance of the public service. Like their contemporaries in Guyana and Trinidad and indeed 
many similar developing countries, the lack of effective decentralisation, duplication of services, skills 
scarcity and low employee morale were just some of the problems that faced the Jamaican government 
and its technical policy formulators. The prime minister, as chairman of this committee was actively 
involved in the reform process. In the case of health policy, the ministry of health's 1984 policy 
statement essentially outlined the government's need to balance policy maintenance with policy reform in 
a declining economy. This policy balance however proved hard to achieve as policymaking slid into crisis 
management mode rather than rational development, compounded by situational factors ranging from the 
end of the cold war to the devastating effect of Hurricane Gilbert in 1988. Nevertheless, 1986, the 
restructuring process was implemented within the ministry of health focusing mainly on management 
systems reform and a rationalisation of facilities in line with new primary and secondary health care 
functions, with the assistance of financial agencies such as the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), 
the Pan American health Organisation (PAHO) and the USAID-supported Project Hope for medical 
training. By 1988, the reform process was continuing with the launch of a programme to restructure social 
services including health systems as well as an increased emphasis on the role of the private sector in 
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health services delivery. However, Hurricane Gilbert in 1988 devastated the island in September 1988 
and forced national health priorities to be turned to disaster response. 
The net effect of the last five years of the Seaga regime was mixed for health policy generally. On the 
one hand, the curative focus severely curtailed the emphasis on primary care, though it certainly existed. 
Several clinics and regional hospital wards were closed or downgraded, while the remaining facilities 
were ostensibly up-graded and rationalised. Hospital beds declined from 6408 in 1984 to 5,753 in 1985. 
However, this rationalisation program was implemented without sufficient warning and forward planning, 
and the remaining facilities whether rationalised, upgraded or not, frequently lacked the most basic 
supplies with many being poorly staffed - ironically part of the rationalisation programme. New fees 
imposed in 1984 and some existing one for all public health facilities under the terms of the World Bank 
loan to achieve "... a more efficient delivery of services, and optimum utilisation of health facilities.... " 
compounded the situation (Levitt, 1991,51). The government later exempted disadvantaged groups, 
children, the elderly, food aid beneficiaries from the rationalisation programme. However, by now the 
situation had returned to the worst conditions of the late 1970s. By October 1987, even the monetarist 
Seaga regime was forced to admit that despite "the necessity" of the structural adjustment programme, the 
social costs were extremely high for Jamaicans. As the government's social adjustment policy paper 
noted in 1987: 
"... The strategy adopted by the government of Jamaica has been based on the 
stabilisation and adjustment of the economy so it can better cope with changing 
economic conditions and maximise the benefits from the resources available to the 
country. In the early 1980s, the government gave high priority to stabilisation and 
structural adjustment policies in recognition of the importance of the severe 
financial constraints imposed on the country by the prolonged internal and external 
disequilibria; [and] secondly, the realisation that long-term welfare gains can only 
be obtained form a solid economic foundation. The high priority given to adjusting 
the economy during Phase I however does not mean that the social/human 
dimension of the Jamaican problem was completely ignored. The government of 
Jamaica recognises that adjustment policies must have positive and negative effects; 
positive in terms of stabilisation; and negative in terms of certain byproducts... " 
(Government of Jamaica, 1987: 1-2). 
A health sector initiatives consultancy also urged the government to contemplate concepts such as 
means testing, fees for service, private insurance and contraction of services as possible policy responses 
to the funding and management crises after 1986. 
Regime characteristics and health human resources policy responses: In the case of 
health human 
resources in the latter half of the 1980s, policy statements continued to acknowledge these adjustment 
'by- 
products' at all levels of the process: training. planning and management. In the case of management, the 
1987 document expressed particular concern about the migration problem, outlining a progressive strategy 
that focused on the needs of both community based and curative-based personnel, within the context of 
its 
reform programme for wider public sector (Government of Jamaica/Ministry of 
health 1984). The 
situation actually worsened as the harsh consequences of adjustment (including migration) continued with 
widespread retrenchment of health workers and the abolition of several nursing posts. 
As Levitt noted of 
the Jamaican health service in the late 1980s: 
"... We now have a situation where there are posts which the ministry is unable to 
fill and areas where there are not enough posts to accommodate all the available 
personnel. The ministry itself is deficient in human resources, particularly 
in 
planning, evaluation and supervision because it is unable to attract and retain 
suitably qualified and technically competent personnel. 
The deterioration in the 
health service has undermined the capacity of the sector to provide quality 
health 
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care and has adversely affected the poor, who are the main users of public health 
facilities... " (Levitt, 1991: 51). 
The 1987 social adjustment paper noted that special attention would be focused on planning, training 
and overall health human resources policy process, given the increasing crisis in this area. The "by- 
products" mentioned in the 1987 paper however included the health sector and its personnel who were 
now enveloped in a cycle of deteriorating physical, material and financial working conditions, coupled 
with increased demands on the system due in large part to the social effects of the adjustment process 
(Boyd, 1988). However, the influence of adjustment was pervasive as was management-based problems 
such as the confusion in the linkages between the training and management levels of the local system as 
we noted in the case of Guyana. The training of nurses, though intermittently stopped, continued 
throughout the reform period of the mid-1980s, without being costed and assessed against needs as well as 
the retention factor. The report added that training would be centralised and that the intake of registered 
nurse, enrolled assistant nurse and midwifery trainees would be increased with a view to training, inter 
alia, 100 registered nurses and 100 enrolled assistant nurses annually. The document further stated that 
the regime would make available to the ministry of health "... incremental resources for training and filling 
existing vacancies on the establishment... " which it noted would make for a "... more efficient service 
providing quality care based on established norms and procedures (Government of Jamaica, 1987: 25). 
In spite of these pledges however, structural adjustment conditions combined with the government's 
ideological stance saw contradictory developments occurring. Nurses were needed, and were being 
trained, but were also migrating in significant numbers once trained. Thus, even the ad-hoc cutting of a 
number of nursing posts as part of the entire civil service reform process in the middle to late 1980s were 
not helpful at this crisis stage. The result was a large drift of new graduates overseas - after training at 
considerable government expense - from state-funded schools as well as into the local private sector (La 
Touche, interview). Many other trained nurses meanwhile went into the local private health and general 
insurance industry. Active recruitment of nurse trainees was intermittent, stopping occasionally. The 
ministry cut back its training from 200 to 100 nurses per year in the mid 1980s. While the civil service 
was bloated, it was hardly the case that nursing posts were over-staffed. As a result of this contradictory 
policy situation of cuts in numbers trained as well as posts, parish hospitals and health centres were also 
scaled down considerably with severe consequences for primary and secondary health care (La Touche, 
interview). One reason for this confusing situation was resource scarcity. However, as Carr noted, the 
non-utilisation of a draft health manpower plan was also a problem (PAHO/Carr/Jamaica, 1987: 47-48). 
Other programmes were likewise affected, particularly at the community level. The hitherto successful 
community health aide (CHA) complement, introduced by the Manley regime was reduced by 
approximately 50% (Ennever, 1988). 
All was not however gloomy in the case of the primary care approach, increasing acceptance and 
integration into policy. Public health nurses (PHNs) were given higher salaries, had access to a vehicle 
and in the normal course of their duties did not do night work. Additionally the nurse practitioner 
programme continued to be supported by the regime despite the threat of abolition by the medical lobby. 
However, despite these two areas, the general (and unsurprising) trend was one of steady decline at all 
levels of the system. In 1989 a nurse manpower proposal developed for the ministry of health by PAHO 
consultants confirmed that this decline was due to the weight of IMF driven policies adding, inter alia, that 
the government was unable to supply the quantity of nurses needed to meet health service demands. As 
the report noted "... such shortage has jeopardised the quality of even the basic level of care... " 
(PAHO/Jamaica, Adair et al, 1989: 6). This report, as did others preceding it, also reiterated the familiar 
problems of posed by nurse migration, shortage of well-qualified students, weaknesses in education and 
physical infrastructure and resources; and the imbalances in nursing categories. However, the regime's 
unquestioned acceptance in implementation of some of these areas, given its ideological position, was also 
a contributing factor. 
Comment: A early as 1983, the initially strong, but now weak, though still democratic and market- 
reformist Seaga regime had begun to lose legitimacy in eyes of the Jamaican population (Edie, 1991: 
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139). The perceived deception of the country deeply undermined the government with Seaga's technocratic and insensitive response to the labour protests in 1985 Seaga's being limited to a speech stating that the adjustment period had to be endured (Kaufman, 1985). Later in the same year, the general strike led to the regime's downward spiral. By 1989, the country reeling under adjustment, re-elected Manley to office. According to some analysts, internal factors such as the regime clientelist political 
structure in Jamaica had a similar negative effect to the ethnic factor in Guyana and Trinidad in impeding 
policy and policy reform through diversion of resources for political survival (Edie, 1991: 141). It is however hard to believe that policies such as the community health aide programme would be cut by 50% because of the regime's need to survive politically in the face of economic crisis. The undeniable fact was that the structural adjustment policies affected and undermined the ability of government to implement 
and support policy, as Seaga, as well as the returning Manley regime and his successor, P. J. Patterson found in the 1990s. Like the first Manley government in the 1970s, and like other regimes in post- 
colonial states including Trinidad and Guyana, Seaga justifiably blamed the international financial actors, 
especially the IMF. The limited policy room available to manoeuvre even saw Manley's PNP forced to 
re-think its ideological approach to the development process in this new globalised order, like many other developing states. By the late 1980s therefore, much of the policy room for manoeuvre made available to 
Jamaica, due the US's generous politically-motivated aid policy had eroded, due as much to Seaga's 
policy failures as it was Jamaica's inability, like so many poorer developing states, to control its destiny in 
a post-cold war, adjustment-oriented and rapidly globalising world (Fauriol (1988: 124). In the case of Jamaica then under the last term of the Seaga government, while regime ideology continued to be 
significant, the effect of the structural process was debilitating to say the least, and mirrors that of other 
developing states during this period. We now turn to see how the new NAR government under ANR 
Robinson tackled the problems left by both the PNM and structural adjustment. 
Regime characteristics and health human resources policy reforms in Trinidad in the second half of 
the 1980s: the Robinson regime (1986-1991) 
Policy context: The politically strong, democratic reformist though financially weak National 
Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) won power on a tide of discontent with the performance of the PNM 
regime under Chambers that even managed to bridge for the first time the African-Indian ethnic divide, a 
defining feature of Trinidad's, like Guyana's politics. Its pledge to bring back morality and equity into 
politics was a very popular one. The regime however almost immediately found itself with very limited 
room for policy manoeuvre for both political and economic reasons. The regime's lack of economic 
options meant that it had to continue with the IMF-imposed economic austerity measures started by the 
Chambers regime, this time negotiating Trinidad's first IMF adjustment `package' in 1988. Like many 
regimes in developed and developing countries, the NAR's political strategy comprised the 
implementation in the first few years of the `harsh' adjustment policies. According to the stated 
government strategy in its 1988 Draft Medium Term Macro-economic Policy Framework paper, by the 
eve of the next elections due in 1991, an anticipated improvement in economic, fiscal and administrative 
conditions would enable huge spending on social projects including health. The regime justifiably blamed 
its policy predicament on thirty years of PNM rule, and which would, of course, ensure its re-election. 
The NAR regime effectively had limited room to manoeuvre even at this early stage. However, in 
addition to the financial crisis, it added to its own political woes by jettisoning the important, majority 
Indian-based Alliance component of the governmental coalition within only five (5) months of assuming 
power. This expulsion left the party extremely politically vulnerable from the start as it continued on its 
adjustment path (Hintzen, 1994: 70). 
In terms of development policy formulation, the Robinson/NAR government outlined its main national 
policy and planning document, the Draft Medium Term Macro-Economic Policy Framework in 1988. 
This policy document explicitly justified the regime's strategy of harsh but necessary adjustment reforms 
as a precursor to improved social conditions. In line with this strategy, a series of adjustment-based 
measures were imposed. The currency was devalued twice within three years. Many state-funded projects 
were curtailed, abandoned or privatised. Utility rates were increased and many subsidies were eliminated, 
while a 15% value added tax (VAT) was imposed on most goods and services. Government workers' 
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(including public sector nurses and doctors) salaries were cut by 10% while many others - including 
temporary and special projects workers - were retrenched at a time when the unemployment rate was 
already close to 23%. These measures were compounded by various food shortages and price increases. 
The outcome of these successive measures over a three year period included rising poverty in this once oil 
rich economy, almost continual industrial unrest and the increasing unpopularity of the regime. The NAR 
government was seen by many as the instrument of the international financial institutions, since many of 
its efforts seemed confined to creating the conditions for debt servicing through a program of structural 
adjustment rather than social and economic development (Ryan, 1989: 318-342; Hintzen, 1994: 70; S. 
Smith, interview, 1994). 
Regime characteristics and health human resource policy responses: In the case of health human 
resources development, despite the existence of the 1983 Demas recommendations on overall public 
sector and ministerial reform which were supposed to be the framework of a new health policy, the health 
system remained had remained unreformed, while policy remained ill-defined during the Chambers period 
(Harewood, 1984). Instead, during the post-1983 period the Chambers regime, as noted earlier, was 
preoccupied with achieving some political utility - mainly status - from the completion of 
the medical complex in time for the celebrations of the 10th anniversary of the republic in September 
1986, but with an eye on the impending elections just three months away. The fact that the electorate read 
the symbolism of both events differently reflected the mood of disenchantment which led to the 
Chambers/PNM regime's defeat. The sad reality post-Chambers, in the case of health, was that the first 
national health plan (1967-1976) was still being used a guide in the 1980s in the absence of any 
comprehensive contemporary health policy. By the time the NAR regime assumed office, there was no 
single formal document that could be considered Trinidad's health policy - it had to be found in various 
speeches and scattered sources - which, in many cases, followed the format of a stated adherence to 
primary health care, followed by statements of programmes, such as physical infrastructure-building or the 
increased training of categories of staff. Nevertheless, a 1987 health ministry mission statement contained 
a basic commitment to a universal, modem, community-based health care system reflecting the need of the 
primary, secondary and tertiary levels with emphasis on primary health care and preventive medicine. 
This document however also warned of the potential implications of the recessionary period for health 
policy, noting that: 
"... a strategy for HFA 2000 cannot be thoroughly addressed without examining the 
economic situation in any country especially since recession is a global problem. 
As a consequences, we in Trinidad and Tobago anticipate shortcomings with regard 
to the implementation of some of our planned health programs. Our new 
government has inherited severe budget deficits from our predecessors, thereby 
making it rather difficult to project our anticipated programs of development of 
which health is paramount.... " (Mission statement, Ministry of Health, Trinidad and 
Tobago, 1987). 
The NAR government's policy pledge in 1987 was to monitor the economic situation "... so as not to 
create any imbalances in the promotion of [the] nation's welfare... " which would jeopardise Trinidad and 
Tobago's favourable health record vis ä vis the developed world (Government of Trinidad/Ministry of 
health, Mission statement, 1987). The overriding goal, it noted, would be 100% access to health services 
(Mission statement, 1987). The 1988 publication of the Draft Medium-Term Macro Planning 
Framework 
document also raised the possibility for the first time of a new comprehensive health policy complemented 
with a reform action plan and timetable. The report firstly articulated the new regime's overall policy 
commitment to universal health care as well as preventive and promotive health care based on the primary 
health care and `health for all' strategies, pointing to the problems associated with 
heavy traditional 
reliance, and consequently, diversion of a greater proportion of resources to tertiary care. 
The document 
however pointed to the need for harsh but necessary administrative reform, stating that: 
"... particular emphasis will be placed on promoting efficiency in the management 
and use of resources thereby securing greater cost effectiveness in the 
delivery of 
health services so that health care costs can be minimised... " (Government of 
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Trinidad/National Planning Commission, Draft Medium-Term Macro Policy 
Framework, 1988: 174). 
This new management ethos was also outlined in the regime's support for reform in order to counter 
implementation-related problems at the primary level (Government of Trinidad and Tobago/Draft 
Medium Term Framework, 1988: 73-89). One issue highlighted in this regard was policy imbalances 
between primary, secondary and tertiary care, for instance, the limited opening hours of health facilities 
and the consequent resort by the public to either expensive private care or the free emergency health 
services at hospitals. This practice, it was noted, not only affected the poor, but demonstrated how 
inefficiencies at the primary health level could negatively affect the entire health system. In order to solve 
these and other problems, the document noted that primary care would be given more direct resources. 
Although no details were presented in the document, it nevertheless reflected a clear commitment by the 
new NAR regime to reforming the health system. The NAR regime, and its health minister, Dr. Emanuel 
Hosein were clear about the priority of health reform. Under continued attack throughout 1989, the 
minister restated his commitment to effective health services management reform through decentralisation 
and the introduction of user charges. Both of these, he noted, had been neglected during the boom years. 
The biggest policy dilemma however facing the regime in addition to implementing fundamental 
decentralisation was whether to commission the `frozen' medical school. The minister reiterated his 
regime's position that proper management and cost recovery was the best decision for all concerned, 
despite his evident dislike of the options placed before him, having previously been a vocal critic of the policy as we 
shall see in Chapter Seven. Nevertheless, this was to become the main goal for the NAR regime, given the 
time factor and the losses through continual funding for its upkeep in its uncommissioned state (Trinidad 
Guardian, 5/4/89: 1). The NAR's policy dilemma in the case of the medical school/complex as well as 
wider health policy, given the political and economic context was an unenviable position for the 
government, and especially in the case of the medical training complex, revealed the rise of health policy 
to a high-politics issue, eventually contributing to a volatile environment that led to the attempted 
overthrow of the regime. 
Even though the draft national health plan had been completed for the period 1987 to 1991 and its 
policies and strategies included in the draft 1989-95 Medium Tern Macro Planning Framework, time 
factors, as well as the political crisis meant that health policy reform was not implemented, though the 
NAR, to its credit did start the process. The government's political crisis was thus inextricably linked 
with health in the period preceding the attempted overthrow. The minister's somewhat unfair nomination 
by a national newspaper as `non-achiever of the year' somewhat unfairly ignored both the PNM legacy 
and the impact of economic circumstances. The emergence of AIDS and drug addiction as major health 
problems that needed health human resources responses also added to its problems. However, the general 
feeling in Trinidad was that the regime had not only broken its policy promises but seemed incapable of 
manoeuvring within its limited policy space (Sunday Guardian, 24/12/89: 11). Hosein was even quoted as 
saying that the objective of the regime was "... to move the public health care system out of the public 
service sector and into the private sector... " which did not help his popularity with health workers or the 
population (Hosein, 1990: 8). His eventual failure to give interviews to the press at this stage because of 
his fear of misinterpretation did not remove this perception. For many, the biggest irony in terms of health 
human resources policy was the fact that the health minister claimed its biggest future achievement would 
be the phased commissioning of the PNM- formulated medical complex which he had previously 
criticised. The spectacle of funds being allocated for the complex, while the rest of the health sector was 
languishing was not likely to win much support. The years 1987 and 1988, the worsening economic 
situation saw a fall from 11% to 9.7% fall in public health expenditure (PAHO/Nicholls, 19 89: 7). This 
response negatively affected Trinidad's relatively modest health budget which was never more than 
TT$550 million anyway. Given the active efforts made almost simultaneously to commission the medical 
complex which required an estimate recurrent expenditure of TT$ 200 million alone, Nicholls noted that: 
"... these figures indicate the financial implications of the medical sciences complex 
venture, especially in view of the fact that over the past two decades, between 60- 
65% of annual expenditure was for hospital care-secondary and tertiary... " 
(PAHO/Nicholls] 989: 7). 
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Health policy was thus contributing slowly to the unpopularity and eventual downfall of the NAR 
regime. In a move calculated to win popular support for his religious group, the leader of the Jamaat al Muslimeen, Yasin Abu Bakr offered the government in December 1989 medical assistance in the form of 
drug supplies as well as the provision of five (5) visiting doctors in medical caravans from the World 
Islamic Call Society, of which the Jamaat was a local affiliate to operate throughout the country (Trinidad 
Guardian 15/12/89: 1). This offer was subsequently refused by a regime now under unmitigated pressure 
to ease the burden of adjustment. The implementation, instead by the government of its social 
amelioration programme, targeted at the poor and including the removal of VAT on some basic food 
items was seen to be piecemeal, and did little to alleviate either the health situation or the government's 
unpopularity, despite its popular mandate less than five years earlier. In an attempt to harness this mood, 
the Jamaat al Muslimeen engineered a coup on July 27,1990. On the issue of stability however, despite 
the widespread unpopularity of the regime, there was virtually no popular support for this attempt at 
destabilising democracy - an ironic fact which despite Trinidad's two attempts at destabilisation in two 
decades, still renders the stability argument not entirely feasible. Equally surprising was that when the 
Prime minister and seven members of his cabinet, including the Minister of Health were held as hostages 
in the parliament building for six days while their freedom was negotiated, there was very little sympathy 
from a population reeling under five years of difficult adjustment after the prosperous years of the 1970s 
(Hintzen, 1994: 71). While stability returned to the country very soon thereafter and a newly-chastened, 
but severely traumatised NAR government - without the resigned, though not entirely disgraced health 
minister - completed its last year in power, the administration reform process, including that for the health 
sector - already formulated by the Robinson government - was subsequently implemented by the new 
PNM regime under Patrick Manning in 1992. 
Regime characteristics and health human resources policy responses: The 1988 Draft Medium 
Term document outlined the new NAR regime's policy goals of making available the full complement of 
doctors, nurses and pharmacists at all health centres during clinical hours, along with the provision of 
improved management and supply systems. It also pledged to implement, through effective human 
resources management, a new system which would inform decision-making and coordination in relation to 
education and training of personnel and the establishment of a staff development unit responsible for co- 
ordinating the training for all categories of personnel, including management training for doctors and 
nurses. Interestingly, the document also expressed the NAR's intention to reintroduce the nurse 
practitioner policy - mooted in the mid-1970s by the PNM under Williams in the draft policy document, 
stating that: 
"... manpower planning will address the issue of optimal use of trained 
personnel... as a result, consideration will be given to the introduction of new 
categories of personnel, such as pharmacy aides and nurse practitioners and a re- 
thinking of traditional roles will be encouraged... " (Draft Medium Term Macro 
Planning Framework, 1988: 188). 
This issue is further explored in the next chapter. However, suffice it to say that the policy was to be 
effectively undermined yet again by a combination of medical lobbying and the somewhat questionable 
belief of the minister himself that Trinidad did not need such a category (La Touche, S; Hosein, Dr. E; 
interviews, 1994). In the case of doctors, the main question facing the government at this stage, given the 
un-commissioned status of the medical school, was whether there was a shortage or an oversupply in 
Trinidad. The draft document pointed to shortages in a number of categories of staff including doctors 
(Draft Medium Term Macro Planning Framework, 1988: 73-89). However, this directly contradicted the 
findings of a health manpower consultancy a year earlier. Two Pan American/World Health Organisation 
(PAHO/WHO) consultants commissioned by the health ministry to study the five-year health human 
resource needs of Trinidad found that in addition to the total lack of health planning, the actual number of 
doctors grew from 723 in 1980 to 1103 in 1986, contradicting both the 1988 Draft report as well as a 
1980 ministerial report which had also suggested a shortfall by 175 doctors by 1985 (Drayton and Ray, 
1987: 1-4). Drayton and Ray pointed out that their findings were supported by another ministerial report 
in 1986 which had warned of the potential for oversupply. This 1987 report also cautioned that since the 
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avenues for emigration of doctors were gradually closing, due, inter alia, to US government restrictions on 
medical immigration, the need to act in preventing oversupply was vital. The consultants had also noted 
the potential problems that might be experienced in placing the 35 Trinidadian doctors graduating 
annually from the medical school in Jamaica, in addition to those graduating from outside the region, 
given the low attrition rate and the advent of the new medical school. They concluded that "... if at all 
contemplated, (the medical school] should take into consideration demand and ability to pay... " from 
overseas students (PAHO/Drayton and Ray, 1987: 11). These findings undermined much of the 
justification for the medical school policy and by extension the government's health and health human 
resources policy). 
The 1987 report was even more sceptical about the need for a dental training school - also a part of the 
medical training complex - noting that in order to improve the supply of dentists in the country, no more 
than 5 or 6 were needed annually which could be easily funded at overseas institutions: "... the 
establishment of a dental school in the Eric Williams Medical Sciences Complex appears to be an 
extremely expensive solution... " (Drayton and Ray, 1987: 4). They concluded that any feasible policy or 
plan must give "... highest attention to the resource constraints... " given the fact that the health budget was 
estimated to be shrinking by 3% (PAHO/Drayton and Ray, 1987: 11). They noted by contrast the need for 
lower categories of health personnel, adding that the number of public health nurses was woefully 
inadequate if community health was to be emphasised, and that in spite of the government's commitment 
to primary health care, spending on secondary and tertiary care was still outstripping spending, and indeed 
policies, on primary care. The consultants added that while acute, there was no need for extensive 
numbers of public health nurses to be trained. They recommended, in this regard, the switching vacant 
institutional posts to the community health services. They finally urged the government to consolidate all 
training under one agency and to implement a proper information system to assist in the training, planning 
and management of health personnel. In relation to nursing assistants, they urged the minister to delay 
restarting this programme which had been suspended in 1984 and 1986. Drayton and Ray also 
recommended in this regard that a steering committees be implemented to oversee the training of each 
category of health personnel, while the follow up discussion workshop two years later recommended that a 
manpower planning commission be appointed to formulate and implement human resource policies and 
the need to move away from "... simply adding more people to the service... " towards a more qualitative, 
community-based system (PAHO/Nicholls: 7). 
In 1989, a PAHO-commissioned workshop convened to discuss the above progressive proposals 
echoed similar sentiments. This workshop report identified a number of other chronic organisational 
problems including the absence of personnel planning and information systems resulting in continued 
reliance on `ad-hoc decisions' in training and management. In addition, optimal staff utilisation was 
found to be hampered by shortages of staff at the personnel level, the absence of procedural manuals, the 
lack of clarity in terms of institutional and health staff functions, the lack of evaluation methodologies, and 
finally an unsatisfactory referral system due to poor co-ordination between community health services and 
hospitals (PAHO/Nicholls 1989: 7). 
At the human resource management level, problems identified included poor work organisation and 
utilisation of health personnel, inappropriate training and lack of co-ordination between the employer (the 
ministry) and the trainers (the institutions). In addition, the lack of promotional prospects by merit due to 
the continued use of the seniority system and the lack of opportunities for continuing education and 
research and its impact on deteriorating medical and nursing skills and knowledge were also mentioned 
(PAHO/Nicholls, 1989). This poor state of affairs plaguing such basic areas of support services in the 
post-boom era revealed the somewhat misplaced policy priorities of the Robinson government in the 
late 
1980s, but moreso, that of its successive PNM predecessors. Some of the above recommendations were 
implemented. However, the overall tone of both the report and workshop suggested a chaotic, unreformed 
policy context by the end of its tenure with training, planning and management based on tradition rather 
than need, and with the NAR regime preoccupied with the dilemma of the already 
built but 
uncommissioned medical, dental, veterinary and pharmaceutical training schools. As one 
health human 
resources advisor noted: 
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"... the fundamental challenge continues to be the absence of a clearly-thought-out 
and articulated health policy in order to outline the decision-making and execution 
of health care consideration, including health manpower planning. Linked directly 
to this lack of a national health policy is the failure or neglect to implement the 
stated commitment of primary health care This failure is currently being highlighted by the opening of the [medical complex] which unfortunately is being 
perceived as being put into operation at the expense of the rest of the health care 
system and the health of the nation. This conflict is clear, for despite the stated 
commitment to primary health care, the scale continues to be tipped in favour of institutionally-based health care. Approximately 60% of the health care budget is being allocated to secondary and tertiary health care. This figure is more than likely 
to increase, given the escalating costs of putting the complex on stream... The 
challenge then is to make secondary/tertiary care work for primary health care btu 
effecting closer and more direct linkages between both systems... " (PAHO/Bryan, 
1989: 16-17). 
The economy, of course, conditioned the regime's entire period in office. While health jobs had 
generally been preserved during the regime's first three years in office, 10% civil service salary cuts in 
line with the ubiquitous IMF adjustment loans common to all three countries during this period which 
severely affected the morale of doctors, nurses and other health categories. However, like Seaga in 
Jamaica, one of the main critiques of the Robinson tenure was its uncritical implementation of IMF 
policies, although evidence questioning the formulation and application of these policies to Trinidad 
persisted (S. Smith, interview). Health worker morale was further affected by the absence of drugs, basic 
equipment and routine maintenance. By the time of the attempted coup in July 1990 then, protest action 
by nurses and doctors against a backdrop of deteriorating conditions could be explained by a combination 
of previous policy decisions by successive PNM regimes in the 1970s and first half of the 1980s. 
The rising commissioning costs of the medical complex - the NAR's stated health human resource 
priority - at a time of limited public resources and declining health care posed a major policy dilemma for 
the regime. This dilemma was made even more difficult by criticisms about the complex's questionable 
status and usefulness from local doctors and international technical advisers alike. Like the Chambers 
regime before, the reasons for the Robinson's government's pursuit of this policy's implementation was 
based partly on the predicament facing the regime. The minister clearly disliked the choices placed before 
him, given his sustained criticism of the entire project even from his party's stint in opposition. An urgent 
decision needed to be made, within a short time period given the situation `on the ground'. Added to this 
was the NAR regime's desire to rehabilitate its battered image as an uncaring government as well as its 
need to re-create a political identity for itself through the achievement of a successful commissioning 
process. It was therefore arguably a `no-win' policy situation for health policy, but seen to be worthy, 
nevertheless, for the regime's image as we shall see further in Chapter Seven. However, the fact that the 
financially weak, but market-reformist seemed preoccupied with the programme - which came to dominate 
health sector spending and priorities throughout the 1980s - to the exclusion of much of the rest of the 
health service - not only undermined these goals but reveals how health policy can assume the 
characteristics of a high-politics character based on regime motivations, such as survival, but which can 
paradoxically threaten this very regime survival. 
Comment: Health human resources policy reform and progress in the 1980s continued to be influenced 
by a combination of political, economic, environmental and situational factors, with regime characteristics 
still quite influential, but giving way to global realities. The beginning of the end of the cold war after 
1983 saw diminishing American interest in the region, and the emergence of good governance and 
democratisation as the new political/developmental canons. In the case of health policy, the advent of the 
global primary health care focus in 1978 was also a significant policy development, and saw considerable 
efforts to incorporate this policy goal into all aspects of health policy though not without problems. Thus, 
on the one hand, economic factors were particularly powerful determinants of change and reform, which 
held out better prospects for the 1990s than the previous two decades. Developing country regimes - even 
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those survivalist ones like the Hoyte regime- had little choice but to reform if they wanted further loan 
guarantees and assistance from international financial organisations. Without such external pressure the 
progressive policies of the Burnham and Hoyte regimes in Guyana - which were already failing due to 
political and economic mismanagement - the chances for the success of health human resource policies 
such as the medex, community health worker and even the medical and nursing programmes were slim. However, on the other hand, the contradiction with the new adjustment-driven status quo was such that 
even the primary care approaches and responses were now under direct attack, given the perception of the 
anti-public sector bias of the new policy thrust, and worse an uncritical questioning of these policies. As 
the Seaga regime's second term and the policy dilemmas facing the Robinson regime in Trinidad show, 
the problem of balancing wider reforms with the pursuit of progressive health policies was a problematic 
one: heavily conditioned by economic circumstances, but, although partly unfair given the PNM legacy, 
also just as heavily conditioned by the political choices made by the NAR during this period. In the next 
section, I briefly assess and compare developments in the first part of the 1990s. 
5.4 REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND HEALTH HUMAN RESOURCES POLICY 
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE 1990 
The main attempt to remedy the parlous Guyanese health human resources situation came after the 
October 1992 elections when Guyana elected its first democratic government after 27 years of PNC 
regime rule. The Peoples Progressive government under Cheddi Jagan had been ousted twice in the 1950s 
and 1960s for its orthodox Marxist credentials which was seen by the American and British governments 
to be worse that of his rival, Burnham. However resource scarcity threatened even this newly-re-elected 
democratic regime in the 1990s. In 1994, the World Bank urged the Jagan government to cut staff in all 
sectors, but health and education ('Government must cut back on personnel', Sunday Chronicle, 
17/4/1994: 1). The years of political instability, mismanagement and political survival were partly to 
blame for Guyana's ranking as the 16th poorest country in the world with a GNP of only US$ 250 in the 
United Nation's Development Programme's (UNDP) Human Development Index by the early to mid- 
1990s. 
The advent of a new democratic era raised the hopes of improved public health administration and 
management by the new regime, given the decades of either limited or non-effective action. Guyana's 
first comprehensive health policy document under democratic rule was presented in 1994 by the new 
minister of health Gail Tesheira, whose personal pro-active style raised the status of health within the 
government during the first half of the 1990s. In relation to health human resources, the neglect of 
previous years was evident. The new ten-year national health plan noted that while there was no general 
shortage of medical staff, there remained nevertheless a heavy reliance of overseas personnel: over 90% of 
the specialist staff in the public sector continued to be either Cuban or North Korean (Guyana Health Plan, 
1993: 63-66). While vitally needed to support the system, these expatriates were seen as not necessarily 
committed to training and managing of Guyanese health human resources in the longer-term (Tesheira, 
interview, 1994). They found also it very difficult, according to the minister, to discipline young interns - 
mainly Guyanese who were basically doing much of the work. Discipline, motivation and attitudes of 
health professionals were among the biggest constraints to improved health services provision and 
efficient operation of the Guyanese health system (Tesheira, interview, 1994). The plan also recognised, 
among other things, that low salaries and a poor working environment (for example, deteriorated 
infrastructure, shortages of drugs and medical supplies) made it very difficult to attract and retain staff to 
work in Guyana's public health care system (Guyana Health Plan, 1993: 63-66). The disincentive of 
public sector salary levels to newly-graduated nurses saw most of them, including other health sector 
personnel `buying off their contracts and migrating either to the rest of the Caribbean, or overseas. These 
responses were however predicted in the Plan which noted that given the limited opportunities for upward 
mobility offered in the public health sector, the temptation to migrate would continue to be great in the 
1990s. 
There were also problems identified in the case of training. The 1994 plan pointed to the fact that 
some training programs, such as nursing, which had been previously over-subscribed, were in the early 
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1990s experiencing considerable difficulty in attracting applicants. Because of the decline in education 
over the 1970s and 1980s, many applicants could not meet course entrance requirements. This was a 
major problem, particularly for applicants from hinterland regions, who did not have the same educational 
opportunities as people from coastal areas. The plan also noted the continuing problems due to poor 
intersectoral co-ordination between the ministry of health and the other training institutions: GAHEF and 
the University of Guyana, which resulted in duplication and wastage of scarce resources. The new 
minister responded by establishing a `tripartite working committee' as a co-ordination mechanism, but by 
the mid- 1990s, the body was yet to work effectively or efficiently. The Jagan/PPP government also 
reintegrated the training institution GAHEF into the ministry of health as part of this overall reform 
process, where "... training, curriculum development and staff placement would then be the responsibility 
of one institution... " (Guyana Health Plan, 1993: 65). Another continuing problem was the shortages of 
various categories of teaching staff and management expertise, which also complicated the policy 
responses of the government. The minister could however count on some early health human resource 
successes. One such success was the negotiation with a hostile nursing council that led to the basic 
training in midwifery procedures of 16 of the 130 mainly Amerindian community health workers as a 
precursor to the full professional programme within two years (Tesheira, interview, 1994). This policy 
ensured the reach of skilled midwifery services to these neglected hinterland communities, demonstrating 
in the process that all of Guyana's problems were not solely due to economic factors. 
Many problems however remained, much of it related to previous years of neglect as well as economic 
crisis. One political obstacle was that the Hoyte regime had extended the life of the PNC-dominated 
public service commission for another year. This, the minister noted, made it extremely difficult for the 
new regime to immediately tackle staff incompetence and other related matters (Interview, 1994). Guyana 
also continued to have a high maternal mortality rate compared to the rest of the Caribbean region due to 
both poorly trained and/or lack of adequately trained staff. Additionally, by 1994, the government was 
counting that most if not all of the 24 Guyanese doctors due to return to the country from government 
scholarships abroad - 19 to the ministry of health would ameliorate the shortage (Tesheira, 1994). Living 
and working conditions though marginally improving in terms of activities on the ground, were still 
appalling given the both PNC legacy and the debt crisis, hence precluding too much optimism about such 
returns. In the case of the oppressive debt, President Jagan blamed these for the underpayment of, inter 
alia, health workers: the minister of health in the 1994 budget debate noting, for instance, that nursing 
assistants after 18 months training received just US$33 per month; professional nurses after four years 
training, US$ 44; and professional midwives US$ 41 (Jagan, "Consider our plight", Daily Chronicle 
17/4/94: 16-17). Guyana's mental care services also suffered from lack of adequate human resources: the 
country's lone psychiatric institution for instance had only one psychiatrist whose time was spent on 
general medicine. Of the 180 nurses and nurse aides in mental health services, only 4 had undergone 
psychiatric nurse training (Tesheira, interview; "Mental health in Guyana", D. Wintz, Stabroek News, 
1/5/94: 12-13). Despite these and other problems, the general feeling in the 1990s was that improvements 
were being made with the transformation to democratic rule, given the ideological commitment of the 
reformist, though still socialist-leaning PPP regime and its dynamic health minister to effect reforms after 
years of authoritarian rule. The implications for political instability, given this situation revealed itself in 
early 1998, although political manipulation by the now opposition PNC under Hoyte was also agitating 
the situation, thus ensuring limited optimism, despite the good start in the 1990s. 
In the case of Trinidad, the reform process, was well underway in some areas by the late 1980s, 
despite the predicament of the NAR regime. One important policy outcome of the concerted efforts of 
local health bureaucrats, PAHO/WHO as well as the Ministry of Health was the integration of nurse 
training under one body, NIHERST through the establishment of a College of Nursing in 1990 as 
recommended by Drayton and Ray in 1987. There was also some collaboration with the university 
medical school, but the new college became an autonomous tertiary institution in its own right, offering, 
inter alia, a basic nursing degree which reflecting the need for locally-grounded health education reform 
while maintaining the some of the strengths of the traditional nursing programme common to the other 
Commonwealth Caribbean programmes. By 1996 four such programmes had been completed in 
collaboration with the nursing council, the registered nurses association and the ministry of 
health. The 
early 1990s however revealed continuing hitches in planning, training and management 
intersectoral 
128 
coordination with the lack of employment for many of these nurses. However, despite these problems, 
this particular reform provided nurses with somewhat better career improvement prospects within the 
country, especially given the new opportunities available with the eventual 1994 implementation of the 
health sector regionalisation and reform programme by the PNM/Manning government which succeeded 
the NAR/Robinson government. While short on detail on health human resources policy, this 
development was a major step forward both organisationally, politically and policy-wise, despite 
understandable concerns about health worker tenure (Phillips, 1994). The document noted that policy and 
funding would be driven by need rather than the historic patterns of resource allocation and would be cost 
effective with higher quality services as the outcomes. The ministry of health would be limited to a 
coordinating role while the planned five regions would be given jurisdiction for the daily operations of 
health services. This was the first comprehensive policy document in Trinidad since 1967 the National 
Health Plan (1993-1998). Despite severe criticisms also about lack of adequate consultation with health 
personnel in its preparation, there was general relief and optimism that the health sector reform process 
was finally underway almost forty years after the Julien report was presented to the country's then chief 
minister, Eric Williams. 
Problems remained with the new reform efforts as well as the maintenance of a basic health care 
service. The costing of the reform objectives identified to remedy the human resources problem -a 
strengthened ministerial administrative capacity in terms of policy development, training and 
management; the establishment of minimum health manpower standards, the development of criteria for 
health human resources shortage areas and the improvement of quality of staff through well developed 
training curricula - remained undone as late as February 1997 (Drayton, 1997: 18-21). The country's 
health human resource situation by the 1990s then was still somewhat paradoxical. The country's single 
post of forensic pathologist remained vacant in a country of 1.3 million people at a time when the 
expensive medical school was producing 65 medical graduates a year, over half of them overseas students, 
with the locals supported by 50% state subsidies, in addition to the government's continued -though now 
considerably reduced - subventions. In addition, nursing assistants were being called upon to assume 
registered nurse duties, because of the numerous vacancies -in spite of nursing vacancies - contravening 
nursing regulations in the process. This situation culminated in the 1993 `egg-nog' incident at the 
country's lone psychiatric hospital, where fourteen patients died after ingesting contaminated eggnog, 
directly linked by the investigating Hyatali Commission to chronic staff shortages and the performance of 
nursing duties by nursing assistants ("22 negligent", Trinidad Guardian, 22/5/93: 1). The press reacted by 
blaming nurses as slackers ("No more going the extra mile", Sunday Express, June 6,1993: 8). However 
such episodes demonstrated both the failings of past neglect by successive regimes and the necessity for 
fundamental reforms. Although problems persisted into the 1990s, the fact that fundamental reform of the 
health services was finally on the agenda after a forty-year wait was cause for some optimism. 
In the case of Jamaica, the health reform echoed to varying degrees the efforts being pursued in the 
1990s in the other two states, as well as many other developing states. The health mission statement of 
the new PNP regime under Manley and later after his resignation, P. J. Patterson in the early 1990s thus 
retained the idea of a continuation of the reform process within the primary health care approach with the 
goal of HFA 2000 started by the Seaga regime. The government's main priority as set out in its five year 
plan (1990-1995) included the general upgrading of health management systems with a US$ 70.5 million 
dollar loan from the World Bank, which in the case of health human resources ominously found that the 
government's human resources development was "found to be compatible" with the government's wider 
economic restructuring and public sector investment program (PAHO/WHO, Report of the Director, 
1990: 80; World Bank, 1990: 5). The health ministry outlined its intention to also continue those policies 
of the Seaga regime, including health promotion with the collaboration of the private sector, in an effort to 
ensure effectiveness and accessibility at all levels of the system. In line with these reforms, the 
government noted the need for mechanisms to ensure a high level of quality assurance in both sectors as 
well as the need for rationalisation of all resources through inter alia decentralisation. In the case of 
health 
human resources, the government stated that systems would be put in place to recruit, train and retain 
health professionals and acknowledged the gravity of the migration problem, in particular nursing. In this 
regard, attempts to attract nurses back into the profession and prepare potential recruits to enter nursing 
schools through non-traditional means (PAHO, 1990: 80). Regime proactiveness was evident in these 
129 
innovations, reforms, programmes and policy thrusts. However, as noted earlier, the positives of these 
new reform efforts in the 1990s in the case of the health sector and health human resources development, 
were balanced by the continuing negative resource-based influences and spending constraints placed on 
the developing state social sector, which continued to undermine the effectiveness of the very policies 
both agencies and regimes were trying to promote. 
5.5 CONCLUSION AND SUMMARY 
In this chapter we have examined and compared the influence of regime characteristics and health 
human resources in the 1980s. In Guyana in the first half of the 1980s, the ideologically progressive 
policy initiatives such as the medex, community health worker and even the medical practitioner 
programmes continued to be undermined by the Burnham regime's undemocratic rule and intention to 
hold on to power. By his death in 1985, an unsympathetic international environment and a deteriorating 
political, economic and social context meant that the room available for policy was could not be expanded 
without fundamental reform. To his credit, Hoyte began the reform process, and ceded power gracefully 
in 1992. The achievements of the new Jagan regime in the case of health human resources policy give 
much cause for optimism of desperately needed improvement in health status. However, economic and 
political problems, as noted in the previous section, persist. Any explanation of the appalling health 
conditions in Guyana since independence, including health status, health policy development and health 
human resources development while acknowledging the role of economic factors, thus has to recognise 
the role of regime characteristics in underdeveloping health in the 1970s and 1980s in the cause of PNC 
political survival. 
In the case of Jamaica in the 1980s, explanations of the balance between regime characteristics and 
economic and other factors in determining health policy and would fall more favourably on the Seaga 
regime's side given the poor state of the economy after Manley. Nevertheless, his regime's free-market 
credentials were also much in evidence during the 1980s, and with devastating effect in the case of health 
human resources when combined with the IMF's loan conditions. While even Seaga himself came around 
to questioning these conditions, the damage - in the case of nurse and doctor migration, including staff 
and post cuts, elimination of community health aide posts, hospital closures and spiralling inflation that 
made increased public sector pay packets useless - had already been done. Unlike Guyana, there was 
never any question of regime survival or undemocratic rule. Explanations of Jamaican health human 
resources policy in the 1980s however must incorporate a number of factors at various levels and 
dimensions including the regime's free market ideology, as well as its limited bargaining position vis ä vis 
the IMF at a time of severe economic crisis and declining US financial support. In terms of outcomes, the 
price paid by the Jamaican health sector and its professionals was arguably bad, though a quick 
comparison to the Guyanese situation which was greatly-defined by the added influence of political 
authoritarianism makes it seem marginally less traumatic. 
In Trinidad, the health situation was not significantly or greatly improved or even qualitatively better 
in the post-boom, recessionary 1980s -a great irony given the vast resources that passed through the 
country's coffers. By the time the Chambers regime assumed office, recession had already hit. Under 
these last five years of PNM rule, the country changed from a creditor to a debtor nation. Health human 
resources policy, like the other two countries during this period was subsumed to crisis-driven needs, 
although the Chambers government had also recognised the need for reform. Its inability to act and the 
questionable nature of the previous PNM's regime under Williams' persistence with the medical complex 
made this policy all the more questionable in the 1980s when after being used for electoral purposes, it 
could not be commissioned as planned. This policy also came to dominate the tenure of the Robinson 
regime in the mid 1980s, when it had to decide on short notice what to do. The eventual choice of a 
phased commissioning and the subsequent resources allocation at a time when the health sector could least 
afford it, as we shall see in Chapter Seven, contributed in part to the image of an uncaring government and 
the eventual the 1990s coup attempt, as well as the government's massive loss at the 1992 general 
elections. The medical school policy not only symbolised the backlash of NAR regime policy, but of the 
arguably bigger policy failure of the previous Williams regime - for largely political reasons since the 
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1950s - to implement fundamental decentralisation of the health sector. The implementation of these 
reforms by the new Manning regime in 1994 signalled a new start for the health sector and particularly for 
health planning, production and management. However, like the other three countries in the 1990s, the 
role of the new economic and international policy context of IMF-driven reforms were also had their own 
negative implications for the rest of the decade. 
The role and relevance of regime characteristics in the 1980s and the early 1990s varied from by 
country and individual regimes. The situation in this decade however are not as clear cut for regime 
characteristics influences as in the 1970s, largely because of the pervasive and largely negative influence 
of economic crisis and the accession to, and fallout from structural adjustment policies adopted by all 
three countries - starting with Jamaica as early as 1977. However as we have seen throughout this 
discussion, regime political factors are intertwined even given these factors. In short then, while 
economic factors dominated policy non-achievement explanations across all the regimes in the 
three countries, the role of politics is clearly evident in the examples outlined throughout this chapter. In 
order to deepen the analysis, in the next chapter - the first of two case studies, I assess this structure- 
versus-action, regime characteristics-versus-resources scarcity' argument by looking at the issue of doctor 
and nurse migration. 
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CHAPTER SIX 
CASE STUDY (1): REGIME CHARACTERISTICS, AND POLICY RESPONSES TO 
PHYSICIAN AND NURSE MIGRATION IN GUYANA, JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD: 1970 - 1990 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this first case study, I compare and assess the influence of regime characteristics against other 
factors in regime policy responses to professional migration from the post-colonial state. My aim is to 
compare and assess its role and relevance as a push factor in health professional migration from the three 
countries in the 1970s and 1980s, given other influencing structural factors. The chapter is divided into 
six sections. In the first section, I examine the historical context of Commonwealth Caribbean migration, 
with specific reference to the post-war period. In the second section I briefly analyse the regional and 
international context and determinants of doctor and nurse migration in the 1960s. In the third section, I 
examine and compare the influence of regime characteristics on physician and nurse migration during the 
1970s in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad. In the fourth section, I examine these effects in the 1980s. In the 
fourth section, I briefly examine developments in the first half of the 1990s. In the fifth, I conclude with 
an assessment of the role and relevance of regime characteristics in health migration from the Caribbean 
developing state since independence. 
6.2 CARIBBEAN MIGRATION: THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT 
In this section I examine the national and international context of migration, the policy context of 
health migration and the role of regime characteristics in health migration in the 1960s. 
The international and national dynamics of the Caribbean migration process 
Any study of the role of national politics in physician and nurse migration has to be placed within the 
broader historical context of Caribbean migration. Undoubtedly the movement had picked up over the 
last two decades. Of the nearly two million Caribbean emigrants who have migrated to the USA since 
1820, nearly one half arrived in the 1970s and 1980s (Pastor, 1985: 2). The roots of such regional 
movements therefore go back a long way and though sporadic, has been nevertheless consistent. Between 
the immediate post-war years and the end of the 1970s, emigration from Jamaica and Trinidad increased 
almost tenfold, with Guyana also registering significant increases (Pastor, 1985: 6). This pressure to 
emigrate from the Caribbean in the post-war era - especially in the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s - can 
be 
explained by internal social and economic as well as political crises, but also by periodic overseas demand 
for skilled and unskilled labour. Blackman (1985: 262-4) has identified four historical phases in 
Caribbean migration which helps explain the linkage between these pv°' and pull factors. Phase One 
comprised migration from the smaller islands/colonies to the larger on.,.,, as well as the immigration of 
contract workers into the Caribbean region from Europe and Asia from the 1830s through to the early 
1900s to satisfy labour needs after British slave emancipation. Phase Two began with severe 
unemployment brought on by the collapse of sugar prices in the 1880s and the ensuing economic 
depression which reduced intra-Caribbean migration flows and introduced a new outward movement that 
lasted until the end of World War I. This resulted in substantial emigration between 1890 and 1920 
from 
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the British West Indies to Cuba, the UK and the USA. Other outlets included South American countries, 
particularly Panama with the building of the Canal and Costa Rica with railroad construction. 
Phase Three began in the inter-war years and was marked by the gradual reduction in opportunities 
for migration and by the return of a large number of migrants following the `crash' of 1929 which was 
followed by global economic depression, a slump in the Cuban sugar industry in the 1920s and the 
implementation of controls by many formerly receiving governments. Despite the opening of 
opportunities within the region, for e. g. the Trinidad oilfields, the employment situation deteriorated in 
most countries, given the shrinkage of these migration outlets. Phase Four starts at the outbreak of World 
War II which provided new avenues for outward migration, with many Caribbean people leaving for 
Britain, while the construction of US naval bases in the region, including Trinidad attracted considerable 
skilled and unskilled labour. Meanwhile, the USA and UK met their labour gaps (due to the war effort) 
by recruiting large numbers of contract workers from Jamaica, the rest of the Caribbean and the Asian 
sub-continent (in the case of the UK), and mainly the entire Caribbean and Latin. American region (in the 
case of the USA). To this categorisation might be added a Phase Five, which broadly incorporates post- 
war migration, in two main `waves': the first, of skilled and unskilled workers in the 1950s and 1960s and 
the second, and more recent `wave' of large numbers of both skilled and unskilled workers in the period 
under study - the 1970s and 1980s - which both satisfied labour demands abroad, and eased the economic 
and social situation at home. Table 6.1 illustrates this rising and persistent trend in the case of population 
movements from the Commonwealth, as compared with the Commonwealth Caribbean to the USA in the 
post-independence period. 
Table 6.1: Legal emigration by country of birth from the Commonwealth Caribbean to the 
USA: 1960-1987. 




Bahamas n. a. n. a. n. a. n. a. 1628 1602 556 3786 
Barbados 2377 7312 7878 13070 6204 4797 1665 43303 
Guyana 1434 5760 14320 33211 25782 27310 11384 119201 
Jamaica 9675 62676 61445 80550 61815 58340 23148 357649', 




Cuba 84979 180073 110691 290886 28045 64047 28916 787637 
Haiti 10820 27648 27130 41786 223886 32670 14819 178759 
Dominican 36128 58744 67051 80965 57729 73109 24858 398584 
Republic 
Source: Selected from R. Pastor. 1985: (introduction). 
The interrelationship between `push' and `pull' factors must be understood in any study of 
developing state health migration, including that of the Caribbean. Poverty and unemployment combined 
with the need by the British government for both skilled and unskilled labour during the post-war 
`rebuilding' years were both responsible for the high level of migration to the United Kingdom 
in the 
1950s (Pastor, 1985). Britain of course also remained, for colonial reasons, the major destination of 
choice for most Commonwealth Caribbean people in the 1950s and early 1960s. However, 
by the mid- 
1960s there was a major shift away from Britain to the United States and Canada as a result of two 
factors. 
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Firstly, the implementation of the 1962 British Immigration Act curtailed immigration from the 
Commonwealth. The second was the 1965 amendment to the 1952 US Immigration and Nationality Act 
which abolished discriminatory quotas based on national origin, and instead authorised the recruitment of 
temporary unskilled agricultural and industrial labour from the hemispheric region where American 
workers could not be found. These developments triggered a shift in Caribbean migration - both skilled 
and unskilled in the post-1965 period from Britain to the United States and later, Canada (Blackman, 
1985). This ability to manipulate both human resources had a tremendous impact particularly on the 
nursing sector, in the case of health by reinforcing a cycle of skills shortage and ultimately 
underdevelopment. 
At the national push level, two other ideashavebeen offered to explain Caribbean migration: the safety 
valve and comparative advantage theses. Blackman (1985: 262) and Duany (1994) among others have 
noted that successive developing countries have actively encouraged, along with the receiving states, the 
migration of large numbers of skilled and unskilled workers to relieve social and political pressures (the 
safety valve thesis). Blackman in particular has also noted that Caribbean countries have long had a 
comparative advantage in producing skilled workers such as doctors and nurses which though bad for 
these countries, has been good for the receiving mainly developed states in terms of saved training 
resources expenditure. These two issues are particularly crucial in terms of problems posed and responses 
offered by Caribbean governments in the 1970s and 1980s as we shall see later. However there are also 
other special explanations for health migration at the global health policy level. 
The international `health policy' context ofphysician and nurse migration (1945-1970) 
One factor that explains to some extent health professional migration from developing states like the 
Commonwealth Caribbean is the nature of western medical development in colonial societies. As noted in 
Chapter One, this followed a strict colonial Western pattern, which although no bad thing, created by its 
very western nature the enabling conditions for out-migration particularly under periods of economic and 
social crisis. Improvements in health in the post-war era were due to a number of factors including the 
international agenda set by the United Nations and its affiliated bodies for the promotion of progressive 
social policies including the concept of health, together with access to food, clothing and shelter as a 
universal human right in both developed and developing countries. In international health circles, the 
post-war period was characterised by increasing recognition of both the dominance of the `medical model' 
and the many social causes of ill-health. By the 1950s and 1960s, many former colonies (and colonies) 
already had colonial health services modelled on the `mother country' long before independence. 'Left- 
wing' ideology was no barrier to western-style medical dominance as evidenced by the dominant role of 
the medical profession even in revolutionary Cuba (Feinsilver, 1993; Navarro, 1972). As technological 
advances occurred, the increased medicalisation of health care continued, especially in developing 
countries with the mushrooming of developed country modelled-medical schools and the resultant 
acceleration in the rise in status and power of the profession in the protection of its professional interests 
in these countries. Three important confluences thus emerged during this period: 1) the production of 
generally high quality professionals in these countries; 2) the inability of `home' countries to reward and 
retain these workers, especially during crisis periods and 3) the increasing demands for medical and 
nursing services by the richer, more developed countries. 
Physician and nurse migration: Physician and nurse migration lies quite close to the core of the 
health problems facing developing states. In the case of physicians, according to World Bank figures, 
56% of all migrating physicians in the early 1990s were from developing countries (World Bank, 1993). 
Abel-Smith (1994,92-105) criticised developing countries for their role in sustaining this pattern in what 
he called "... a wastage of developing country resources... " by their surplus physician production which 
fitted in with the emerging `developing-developed' migratory pattern. The pattern, he acknowledged 
however, had deep roots in both sending and receiving countries' social, political economic and health 
contexts. The 1950s and 1960s saw large scale doctor emigration from the Indian sub-continent to Britain 
as many British physicians who failed to become specialists emigrated to the US, Canada and Australia 
(Abel-Smith, 1994). Additionally, as Abel-Smith has noted, for many years the United States welcomed 
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physicians from all over the world provided that they could pass its licensing examinations specially 
designed for emigrating doctors. By 1972, over half the candidates for state licensing exams were 
foreign-trained doctors. Part of the reason for this emigration was financial, but some doctors and nurses 
also emigrated because they could not find specialist work for which they had been trained in their own 
countries (Abel-Smith, 1994). Indeed, many Caribbean doctors and nurses who migrated in the 1950s to 
the USA and the UK had also done so to obtain further qualifications (Richmond and Mendoza, 1990: 
74). Developed countries were thus, according to this view, effectively `robbing' less developed countries 
of physicians, trained usually at government expense and who were badly needed at home. 
(Pujadas/Unitar, 1971; Abel-Smith, 1994). Abel-Smith (1994: 92) summed up this developing-developed 
world physician migration pattern as effectively "... a vast subsidy from the developing world to the 
developed, not fully mitigated by the considerable remittances from these doctors to their families at 
home... ". 
The international migration of nurses has been less-well quantified as that of physicians but was as 
serious a problem in the 1950s and 1960s. However, the pattern was, if anything, worse as the numbers of 
overseas nurses practising, for e. g., in the oil-exporting countries increased by 110% between 1965 and 
1980 largely owing to migration from India, Pakistan, and the Philippines and Korea (Bankowski and 
Fulop 1987: 27). Nurses also moved in large numbers from the Caribbean to firstly Britain, and then the 
US between 1950 and 1970 leaving their countries of origin with acute shortages during this period. This 
situation was finally recognised well into the 1960s and 1970s at the international health policy level by 
the United Nation's main health- and development-related bodies, the World Health Organisation and the 
United Nations Children's Fund and culminated in the Alma Ata agreement in 1978 - the watershed in the 
drive for a more non-curative, preventive primary care approach. Both organizations were at the helm of this 
and other related global health policy reforms (Walt, 1993; Godlee, 1994). A decade later however, 
physician overproduction in developing countries was still proceeding apace (Butter and Mejia, 1987: 
494-499). However a start had been made in addressing issues such as societally-relevant training of 
doctors nurses and auxiliaries as part of the primary care approach. However as we shall see in the next 
section the role of such historical and economic influences were also complicated by the realities of 
politics in the newly developing state. 
Comment: In this section we have noted a number of issues. The first is that Commonwealth 
migration is almost as old as the region itself The second is that migration is usually driven by push and 
pull factors - the former a result of poverty, unemployment and economic and even political crises, the 
latter, the manipulation of immigration rules historically by developed states to satisfy their own skilled 
and unskilled labour demands. A variant on these themes - and of particular importance to my study of 
regime characteristics and health migrations - had been the safety valve and comparative advantage 
theses. The safety valve thesis, essentially states that politicians and governments from developing 
countries loosen controls deliberately to relieve themselves of potentially difficult political problems, 
given the high unemployment typical of such states. The comparative advantage argument is that 
developing states can produce at lower cost, highly skilled workers such as nurses and doctors than 
developed states. Thus migration, according to this view, is inevitable as these workers seek better 
opportunities abroad. The drawback is the health care deprivation when such migration occurs and the 
cumulative costs to the training and sending country. A related argument is that the nature of developing 
state health training itself- westernised and highly curative-oriented is also part of the explanation for 
health migration to developed states. The relative merits of both the safety-valve and comparative 
advantage theses and their implications for the role, responsibility, and indeed ability of developing states 
to retain their highly-skilled professionals will be assessed as we now turn to briefly to developments in 
the 1960s, before moving to the 1970s and 1980s. 
6.3 REGIME CHARACTERISTICS AND HEALTH MIGRATION IN GUYANA, JAMAICA 
AND TRINIDAD THE 1960s 
To explain whether national political/regime characteristics play a role in the Commonwealth state 
health migration problem, I now examine the role of regime characteristics and health professional 
migration in the 1960s, beginning with Jamaica. 
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Jamaica 
In Jamaica, medical migration was not a major problem in the 1960s. A study of the movement and location of medical graduates of the University of the West Indies (UWI) between the years 1954 and 
1965 revealed that only 28 of the 98 Jamaican graduates had migrated (Goldson, 1972: 67). This finding 
correlates with one of the early international comparative studies on health human resources migration 
which concluded, inter alia, that a sizeable number of Jamaican medical students who trained abroad did 
in fact return to the country in the late 1960s (Mejia, Pizurki and Royston, 1979: 312-315). Of those 
graduating from the University of the West Indies medical school in 1966,72% were still in the country 
by 1968 while 21 % had migrated. Indeed, the absorption of a further 44 graduates from other Caribbean 
territories meant that Jamaica was on balance a net recipient rather than a donor of physicians during this 
period. Mejia et al (1979) however found cause for concern. Many of the Jamaican medical graduates 
were young, many were among the first batches trained at the regionally-funded medical school and many 
were in search of post-graduate training in Canada and the USA. Many preferred Canada because racial 
tensions were considerably less than in the USA, along with easier access to teaching hospitals. The West 
Indian community in Canada was also rapidly expanding. However, the case of Jamaican nurses in the 
1960s a problems was clearly evident, particularly after the change in US immigration rules. A sharper 
dichotomy was evident, with big increases in migrating nurses registered after the 1965 abolition of the 
American quota system. Figures for this period estimate that the number of nurses who migrated each 
year was equivalent to 1.2% of Jamaica's domestic stock (Mejia et al, 1979: 314). Meanwhile many 
nursing students continued to go to the UK. The best estimates of Jamaican nursing students in the UK 
were that there were about 800 by 1970, with not many expected to return (Mejia et al, 1979: 314). 
Mejia et al found that the main problems for doctor and nurse migration in the 1960s were mainly 
economic and socially-related: inadequate compensation; poor information, personal and family reasons, 
unavailability of jobs in specific areas and local economic and social conditions and attitudes (Mejia et al, 
1979: 315). These reasons are understandable. Jamaica's economic performance in the 1960s was 
impressive but as Anderson notes, this first decade of independence was characterised by very little social 
advancement for the mass of the population. The prevailing pattern of dependent, high-import, capital- 
intensive growth pursued in the 1950s and 1960s of bauxite/alumina export, manufacturing, and tourism 
had few spin-offs for the fast growing population (Anderson, 1988: 99). Despite some level of political 
unrest in Jamaica during the late 1960s, the country remained basically stable and the government 
democratic throughout the decade. There was heightened political activity as Manley's radical PNP party 
mobilised mass support in the run-up to the 1972 general elections as social conditions including health 
and unemployment worsened. However, there were few explicit political/regime-related problems serious 
enough to trigger mass doctor and nurse migration during this period. The main political factor affecting 
policy during this period was essentially an inability - due to insufficient resources - of the conservative 
JLP Shearer regime's to respond adequately and speedily to the doctor and nurse migration problem. The 
explanation for Jamaican skilled migration in the 1960s therefore had more to do with the regime's 
economic weakness lack of administrative reform during this first decade of independence than political 
factors. As Jamaica's first five year development plan recognised in 1963: 
"... were it not for the considerable migration of nurses to countries where the 
conditions of work... are better than they are in Jamaica, the numbers trained would 
be adequate to meet the needs of the country... it is... essential... that conditions in the 
nursing service be improved in order to stem the migration of nurses... " 
(Government of Jamaica, Five Year `Independence' Plan, 1963-1968: 182). 
Comment: The power of both push and pull factors were evident in the increased migration of health 
personnel - particularly nurses - from Jamaica in the 1960s. Both reflected the reality of the 
underdeveloped post-colonial state. However, in the case of Jamaica, there was little evidence of political 
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factors triggering health emigration. The causes were largely socio-economic. We next examine health 
migration experiences in Trinidad in the 1960s. 
Trinidad and Tobago 
Like Jamaica, studies on health migration from Trinidad and Tobago are hard to find. The only 
substantial study of the country was carried out in 1970, and underlines the nurse-dominant trend observed 
in Jamaica. This Pujadas/UNITAR study noted that of the 10,912 professional and skilled workers who 
migrated between 1962 and 1968,143 (1.3%) were doctors and 679 (7.5%) were nurses (Pujadas/Unitar, 
1971: 42-66). It also alluded to the potential losses for Trinidad, noting that in both cases (doctors and 
nurses), those who ought to have returned home was larger than the gross addition to the country's stock 
made in the period from all non-Caribbean sources. In the case of Trinidadian nurses, the study showed 
that between 1960 and 1964,269 nurses out of a total of 459 who graduated or 57% had emigrated, with 
well over two thirds going to the USA, Canada and the UK attracted, like Jamaican nurses by both the 
pull factors implemented in both countries, as well as the economic and social problems at home. Other 
reasons such as cheaper air travel and family ties were given. There were however push factors also 
operating that have some relation to national politics. The main ones seemed. like Jamaica to be 
organisational and socio-economic-related, including low salaries; lack of professional opportunities; the 
under-utilisation of professional skills; an increasing population and "general underdevelopment in the 
widest sense" (1971-46). These explanations revealed not only a tone of political and administrative 
neglect, but also the dominant behaviour of the medical hierarchy within the Caribbean health sector. As 
early as 1969, one physician noted that the reason for non-return of trainee doctors was the singular failure 
of the government to reorganise the health services, and that junior doctors were: 
"... overworked dogsbodies thrown into casualtyfor 118 hours a week, [becoming] 
very discouraged with the working and financial conditions.... the consultants or 
Grade A men are the lords who control government beds and equipment. Others will 
not attempt to compete and leave in disgust... " ('Tackling the problems that trouble 
our doctors', Richardson, Dr. E, Trinidad Guardian, 18/8/69). 
As noted in previous chapters, the personal authoritarian style of rule by Williams and the PNM 
regime was not oppressive as in many genuinely `authoritarian' regimes for e. g. in Latin America. 
However, his presidential style proved quite inflexible in the face of demands for political devolution as 
way of fostering much-needed post-colonial reforms -a fact which must partly explain the health 
migration problem in Trinidad in the late 1960s. As economic and social conditions deteriorated 
the prime minister concentrated decisionmaking in his hands. The attempted coup in February 
1970 was the outcome of frustration with the Williams regime's management of the first decade of 
independence. His unwillingness to undertake more rapid reform in the 1960s was also revealed in the 
prevailing institutional inertia and a continuation of the old colonial bureaucratic ways. The relationship 
between this factor and the problem of doctor and in particular nurse shortages was only officially 
recognised after 1968 with the Pujadas/UNITAR report. Indeed, before 1968, as the study itself noted, 
there were few references to any overall shortage of skills. It concluded that although the Williams regime 
had finally recognised the overall problems created by the outflow of trained manpower and had 
expressed concern , "... specific policies towards 
the problem have been partial and conditional... " 
(Pujadas/Unitar, 1971: 59). The main recommendations of the Pujadas study included the expansion of 
the education system, manpower planning, restrictions on the employment of foreigners and salary 
adjustments. 
The role of increased (and newly available) training opportunities was stressed as the main regime 
response to the problem. Some action was taken by the Williams regime. Specific measures were 
adopted, including tax reductions in 1968, which had as its specific objective the retention of skilled 
persons and the expansion of training opportunities. In the case of manpower planning, the 
Williams 
regime's second and third five year national development plans had emphasised the need to co-ordinate 
manpower planning needs with the structure and numbers of those graduating 
from the educational 
137 
system. However not much was achieved as health workers remained unhappy. In July, 1970, nurses 
presented nineteen (19) proposals to the health minister relating to salary increases, promotional 
opportunities, improved training and working conditions, nursing tutors' qualifications and the persistent 
problem of doctors passing on responsibilities to nurses. Around the same time, the Dolly Report on 
wider public service reform urged the government to take "earliest possible action" to improve the terms 
and conditions of employment of health professionals in line with the policies outlined in the 1967-76 
First National Health Plan formulated during this period. The Dolly report was highly critical of the 
Williams government's health human resource inaction, noting the lack of trained personnel, the demand 
for more services; shortages and rapid turnover in middle management; the rigidity of controls; and the 
"acute" shortage of public health doctors causes ('The Dolly report: call for action in health', Trinidad 
Guardian, 20/7/70: 1). It also stated that the recruitment policy for both doctors and nurses was 
counterproductive since the few recruited were generally followed by those who left. The additional 
demands on serving doctors due to acute staff shortages, administrative delays in making appointments 
and promotions and inadequate housing and poor working (physical) conditions were identified as the 
main causes ('The Dolly report: call for action in health', Trinidad Guardian, 20/7/70: 1). The minister of 
health, Dr. Max Awon acknowledged both the findings of the report and the grievances expressed by the 
nurses and doctors. However he told them that the government could not possibly afford to pay nurses 
metropolitan salaries ('Let a nurses life be at least tolerable', Trinidad Guardian, 11/6/70). 
Health personnel emigration continued in Trinidad therefore without much regime action. The 
Williams regime made some impressive strides in health care, but these were largely ad-hoc and/or 
physical infrastructure-related: achieved without the implementation of the fundamental reforms outlined 
in the national health plan. While the Pujadas study could justifiably conclude, then, that 
`underdevelopment' was the primary cause of migration "... when it is expressed in terms of low salaries, 
compared to abroad, a salary structure which discriminates against skills and unsatisfactory conditions of 
work", there was some element of political neglect about the Williams regime's unwillingness to effect the 
political and sectoral reforms that were urgently needed and could potentially have solved at least a part of 
the problem (1971: 59). The Pujadas study concluded somewhat despairingly of the ineffective 
government action and the power of the pull factors that: 
"... On this basis, it appears that the official measures employed to stem emigration 
have been less effective than those which operated to induce emigration. It is 
doubtful whether national action alone, short of repressive measures which are 
unacceptable nationally, would suffice to counter the pull of the developed countries 
in this period of mass communications... " (Pujadas/Unitar, 1971: 59). 
Comment: Socio-economic factors also figured highly alongside administrative factors in Trinidad's 
inability to stem the migration flow, in spite of the implementation of tax breaks and a government policy 
which committed the regime to focus on health human resources retention policies. However, although 
little could be done given the socio-economic climate, the regime characteristics of the Williams regime, 
particularly his unwillingness to countenance policy reforms already prepared but unimplemented by the 
end of the 1960s was directly linked to his new presidential/authoritarian style of government, which 
though not blatantly authoritarian, nevertheless undermined any idea of reform. 
Guyana 
Unlike the doctor and nurse migration studies on Jamaica and Trinidad in the 1960s, there exists no 
similar study for Guyana. However both push and pull factors were operative, although the former 
assumed a level of importance well beyond that obtaining in Jamaica and Trinidad. Guyana suffered most 
compared with the other two countries, from doctor and nurse migration in the post-Independent late 
1960s, given its chaotic political and economic situation, and the implications for social conditions. 
Economic factors were undoubtedly critical as the Guyanese bauxite- and sugar-based economy 
experienced considerable problems. However, the impact of national politics, as outlined in Chapters 
Four and Five, was arguably as important as the poorly performing economy in pushing thousands of 
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Guyanese to seek a better life abroad. In the case of skilled professionals such as lawyers. teachers, doctors and nurses, the pull factor was also operative as Britain, Canada, the USA and even the other 
more `affluent' Caribbean territories such as The Bahamas, Trinidad, Jamaica and Barbados were the 
main beneficiaries. Guyana, like Jamaica and Trinidad trained its own nurses to similar high British-based 
standards, despite the obvious constraints. Once trained, the choice of staying in poorly paid jobs with little or no prospects in dilapidated, under-resourced hospitals and health centres, added to the socio- 
political oppressiveness of Burnham's already illegal and undemocratic regime meant that migration was a 
most popular option. The magnitude of the exodus, though unknown, is clearly reflected in Drayton and 
Caleb's assertion that during the decades between independence in 1966 and the 1980s, 
"... disequilibrium in the health manpower development/human resources 
development system has become even more critical, as a result of the massive 
emigration of trained health staff-physicians, and allied health workers, but 
especially nurses. In some cases production just could not keep pace with losses 
due to migration!... " (1993: 7). 
The influence on migration of the hopelessness and impoverishment brought on in large part by 
sixteen years of the Burnham regime's authoritarian rule was also illustrated by Spinner who noted of 
Guyanese migrants in the latter half of the 1970s that "... many left reluctantly, not because they were 
seduced by higher salaries in wealthier countries, but because they had lost all hope... " (Spinner, 1984: 
170). 
Comment: By the end of the 1960s, there was little doubt that the problem of doctor and nurse 
migration (particularly the latter) was on the increase in Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad. The causes 
ranged from pull factors including as British policy and American legislative reform, and push-type 
structural factors, such as individual national economic, political and social characteristics and events. 
The combined effect of these factors thus operated to varying degrees in each country during this decade, 
impeding progress in health human resources development and social development generally during this 
first period of full self rule. The sad paradox was that although highly qualified skilled personnel were 
being trained, the inability of these states to reform adequately or pay adequate salaries to retain these 
workers meant that the room for manoeuvre was extremely limited by economic factors, the in-built 
dynamic of a western-style medical training programme and the politics of reform. One area which could 
have potentially given these regimes room for manoeuvre was a political decision to effect the reform 
process as soon as was feasible, given the problems posed by the still-antiquated system. However, 
regime politics deterred reforms, especially in Guyana and Trinidad, but more so in the former. In sum 
then, health migration in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, in the 1960s can all be explained to varying 
degrees by structural or underdevelopment-related factors. However, there are differences among the 
three which can also, be explained by regime politics, particularly in relation to Guyana and Trinidad. 
Comment: Of the three countries in the 1960s, only Guyanese physician and nurse migrants, already 
under the authoritarian Burnham regime for the first four years of independence could claim political 
repression as a genuine determinant, in addition, of course, to the other common factors. In Shearer's 
Jamaica and Williams Trinidad, physicians and nurses were not fleeing the type of regime 
authoritarianism that prevailed in Guyana, or the more excessive degrees of dictatorship practised in other 
third world countries. The economic structural and historical factors were the common denominators. In 
all three countries, migrants left behind unreformed colonially-structure societies and economies where 
there was little impetus after the initial enthusiasm of independence to implement required reforms. The 
apparent regime apathy towards addressing the fundamental institutional problems was most apparent in 
health services even where politically and economically feasible policies plans had already been designed, 
in some cases even prior to independence such as in Trinidad. Doctor and nurse migration even at this 
stage, therefore, has to be seen as much within the context of both the failure of regimes to respond 
consistently and adequately to the `low politics' field of health, as it did economic and other factors 
(Grindle and Thomas, 1991; Walt, 1994). To see whether this pattern persisted in the 1970s, we now turn 
to this decade in the next section. 
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6.4 REGIME POLICY RESPONSES TO THE MIGRATION QUESTION IN GUYANA, 
JAMAICA AND TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO IN THE 1970s 
In this section, I begin my analysis of the relevance of regime characteristics to health human resource 
migration in the 1970s by briefly examining the regional and international context of the migration of 
Caribbean physicians and nurses during the 1970s. 
The regional and international policy context of the 1970s 
Commonwealth Caribbean governments in the 1970s faced, like many other developing regimes, the 
dilemma of how to develop economically, socially and politically in order to satisfy the needs of rapidly 
growing, and increasingly politically-aware, demanding populations, and cognisant the general 
economic/developmental failures of the previous decade. The choice of `alternative paths' to 
development were explored within the region as seen in Chapter Four, with Jamaica and Guyana 
presenting the most radical deviations from the liberal democratic model which was being followed to 
varying degrees by the other newly-independent Commonwealth Caribbean territories. Among the 
contentious issues facing the region's health services in the 1970s however, in addition to economic 
problems, limited resources and political apathy in reforming the health sector were other factors. Among 
these was the decision in the mid-1970s by the Gairy regime in Grenada to allow the establishment of a 
private, offshore private US-owned medical school in Grenada which placed the issue of regional health 
human resources education on the agenda for the first time since the Moyne recommendations in 1945. 
Commonwealth Caribbean health ministers, echoing their medical professions (indeed many were doctors 
themselves), expressed the fear that the traditional Caribbean British-oriented medical training system was 
under threat from an inferior brand. Another, more positive, development which set the policy context for 
the late 1970s was the advent of the primary health care approach which saw regional health ministers 
declaring their commitment to managerial reform, preventive health as well as "... the education, training 
and retention of health personnel, and especially those involved in the delivery of primary health care... " 
They also noted the need to "... review and revise the measures that are needed to combat the `brain drain' 
in the health profession... " (Caricom Secretariat, 1978b: 16-17; 1978a). 
Arguably the three biggest influential factors on progressive health policymaking at the international 
level in the 1970s were 1) the beginnings of the international debt crisis in the mid-1970s; 2) the ongoing 
geo-politics of the `cold war'; and 3) the Alma Ata declaration in 1978 on the central role of primary 
health care in the health systems of all countries. The first severely limited many developing states' 
resource allocation abilities in social infrastructure by the late 1970s. The debt crisis and cold war 
situation only served to heighten the problem, and threatened to undermine the impressive health status 
gains of Commonwealth Caribbean states. The second saw many third world countries divert social 
development resources to the military sector. Another main defining factor shaping the Caribbean health 
and health human resource policies in the 1970s was the ongoing cold war and the alliances forged 
between Cuba and the socialist regimes of both Guyana and Jamaica. The adoption of primary health care 
was essentially a response to the fact that preventable diseases (including many `lifestyle diseases) 
continued to account for high levels of mortality and morbidity in both developed and developing 
countries, partly due to colonial/historical and situational factors such as civil wars and military and other 
forms of authoritarian rule that were with few exceptions, committed to regime maintenance rather than 
social justice. 
Comment: These regional and international contextual factors form the backdrop against which health 
policy processes within the region was played out in the 1970s. Economic and regime characteristics- 
based factors were influential in policy processes during this period, and not surprisingly resulted in 
different outcomes in each state. We begin with Guyana and the Burnham regime. 
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The Burnham regime in the 1970s: co-operative socialism and regime responses to the doctor and 
nurse migration problem (1970-1980) 
Policy response: The context of the 1970s has been discussed in 1970s. Nevertheless, the 1970 
declaration by Burnham's Peoples' National Congress (PNC) party of a co-operative socialist republic 
meant the legalisation of Burnham's authoritarianism. The impact of this blatant form of regime 
maintenance on the continuation of the 1960s migration process, which, although not well documented 
was nevertheless confirmed by the evidence of Guyana's rapidly declining health status indicators. 
Despite Burnham's stated support for human resources development, the migration of both skilled and 
unskilled persisted throughout the 1970s (Spinner, 1984: 137). Economic problems and the resultant 
scarcity of disposable resources for the health and education sectors was a major causal factor. However, 
policy non-implementation was also due to a preoccupation with regime maintenance and policy neglect 
which dominated the regime's behaviour within the national policy arena. Relations with the medical and 
nursing associations were also influenced by the political situation, thus impacting on the level and quality 
of participation in the process. Mass migration from both professions meant that many of those who 
remained tended to be either supporters of the regime or (in the case of both doctors and nurses) those 
who were able to secure employment in the mushrooming private hospital sector given the decline of the 
public services. The lack of support by the regime for public sector non-party supporters who were 
committed to the health development process, coupled with declining economic conditions made 
migration a sensible option for such professionals. Many pointed to a dissatisfaction with regime politics 
and dissatisfaction with the political situation in Guyana were major factors influencing their decision to 
stay abroad (Hope, 1986: 38). As the PAHO/Neal Report noted in 1982: 
"... still being conducted without any clear policy strategies and had not been 
planned or controlled to produce adequate numbers or types of health manpower 
responsive to the nation's needs. As a general rule, manpower development is yet 
conducted independently of actual requirements of health programs and without 
response to projections of needs or co-ordination between existing vertical 
programs... " (Pan American Health Organisation /Neal, 1982: 6). 
Both regime- and non-regime factors therefore explain Guyana's migration predicament. The regime 
effectively undermined its already limited options by resorting to political coercion and neglect. The only 
viable option left for health personnel was migration. The 1982 PAHO/Neal report noted the failures of 
health human resources at all levels: planning production and management/utilisation. The ministry's 
positive efforts in implementing the PAHO/Caricom-designed auxiliary programme and the subsequent 
geographic placement of the medexes in the late 1970s have to be seen within the context of an overall 
health and developmental policy vacuum. Both the PAHO-commissioned Lopez and Neal reports, 
discussed in Four and Chapter Five, alluded to the push factors, driving Guyanese doctors, but particularly 
nurses away from Guyana ((PAHO/Lopez, 1980: 1; PAHO/Neal, 1982: 6-7). As in other Commonwealth 
Caribbean former territories, health care reform in Guyana had been designated a priority by the Burnham 
regime at the end of the 1960s because of the failures associated with the colonial health system. Health 
conditions, though stabilising in the early 1960s then deteriorated considerably making the need for action 
urgent as well as comprehensive in scope. Like the other territories, doctor and nurse migration 
had 
started in the late 1950s, and steadily increased during the political crisis period of the early 1960s. The 
chronic shortages of these two major categories of health professionals were recognised in the national 
health plan formulation process. The process of co-optation and control of the state by the Burnham 
regime however left little or no room for development policy as the Burnham regime sought to tighten 
its 
control of the Guyanese state (Hintzen, 1989: 65-70; Green, 1983: 257-280). 
As noted in Chapter Five, the consequences of neglect and regime maintenance were predictable 
by 
the end of the 1970s also in the case of health worker migration with 
doctor and nurse shortages 
progressively worsening as economic and social conditions deteriorated. In many cases, nursing care 
in 
the 1970s was being provided by nursing students rather than qualified graduates. 
Political harassment, 
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discrimination and continued lack of democratic governance contributed to the outflow. Bilateral 
arrangements signed with a number of socialist states in the 1970 for the training of Guyanese medical 
students, of which the most significant was with Cuba, began to produce results at the end of the 1970s. Most of the newly qualified doctors returned to Guyana, and though some subsequently migrated, many 
stayed partly because of their contractual commitment to the government and partly because their 
qualifications were not generally recognised in other Caribbean and non-Caribbean countries, and in some 
cases by their own colleagues in Guyana (Singh, P, 1990: 10-16). Guyana also became largely dependent 
on contracting Cuban, North Korean and other socialist state doctors to remedy the medical migration 
problem. In the case of nurses, its response was to train ever more nurses in the established British- 
modelled way, many of whom continued the migration trek after training as political, economic and social 
conditions worsened throughout the 1970s. 
Comment: Like many developing states, the Burnham regime was rather powerless to retain its skilled 
health personnel given its economic predicament in the 1970s. However, the mismanagement and/or 
misappropriation of available scarce resources for political survival meant that the regime's progressive 
statement committing itself to developing human resources was also considerably undermined by its own 
actions. The poor state of the health system at all levels - human, physical and material - by the end of the 
1970s therefore reflects as much on the persuasiveness of regime characteristics as it does economic 
factors. We now turn to the Manley government. 
The Manley regime in the 1970s: democratic socialism and the doctor and nurse migration problem 
(1972-1980) 
Policy context: Migration has long been a feature of Jamaica's demographic history (Anderson, 1988: 
101). Between 1943-60, net migration was estimated at 195,000 in total, or nearly 1/3 of the natural 
population increase over the period. During the 1960s however, the net outflow reached 280,000 or 53% 
of the natural increase (Anderson, 1988: 101). On assuming office in 1972, the Manley regime was 
acutely aware of this fact, as well as the influencing role of contextual factors. Jamaica was seriously 
affected by the brain drain and as a result was "... hard put to move ahead in providing the necessary 
services for a people whose rising expectations, and reasonably modest demands, need to be satisfied... " 
(Mejia et at, 1979: 68). Not surprisingly therefore both push and pull factors were luring nurses to the 
USA and the UK in greater numbers in the 1970s, while doctors were increasingly drawn to the USA 
where they usually remained after completing their residency programmes (Anderson, 1988). 
Policy responses: A variety of policy responses were implemented ranging from bonding agreements 
for nurses, to implementation of new training programmes. In 1973, the new Manley regime had 
implemented a bonding agreement for nurses graduating from the Kingston school of nursing in line with 
a similar two to five- year agreement for physicians implemented in the late 1960s (Mejia et al, 1979: 68). 
The Manley regime in active collaboration with the largely state- and regionally-funded UWI medical 
school also continued its efforts to train additional medical personnel. One of the most important policies 
implemented by the Manley government was the availability of free university education to all Jamaican 
medical students. Additionally, the post-graduate medical education programme was implemented in 
1972, given the problems outlined earlier. The regime was also innovative in both urging the university to 
focus on preventive and community medicine as well as implementing its own policy to retain doctors 
who were interested in community health by offering the new post-graduate training opportunities for 
those doctors who served for a year in a rural area (Mejia et al, 1979: 322). 
Another significant policy response by the Manley government was the assistance received from the 
Castro regime under revolutionary Cuba's medical foreign policy initiative (Feinsilver, 1993). As a last 
resort, other policy response tried by the Manley regime with some success included the recruitment of 
overseas professionals from the UK, the USA, Korea, Cuba and India among others - either on contract 
appointment or for full-time service. None of these policy responses could however stem the losses 
through migration, which worsened as the Jamaican economy deteriorated. In the case of training, among 
the government's most impressive policy responses was its strong support for the nurse practitioner and 
142 
community health worker policies in the 1970s. Both were fully implemented under Manley's tenure and 
were testimony to the regime's commitment to searching for viable human resource policy alternatives 
given the accelerating `brain drain' of health professionals. However, by the late 1970s, the better 
educated, including physicians and nurses continued to leave in greater numbers Mejia et al (1979: 316- 7). By the end of the 1970s, more than three-fifths of all Jamaican migrants were professionals in the 1970s. 
Again the pattern for the 1970s in Jamaica, like the other two countries, saw the influence of a 
combination of political, economic as well as other factors. Economic factors explain much of the doctor 
and nurse migration process and the inability of the regime to respond adequately, despite some very 
progressive initiatives. Political factors in the case of the government's deteriorating relationship with the 
medical profession was also a possible cause. Related to this was the political/ideological destabilisation 
factor noted by Stone (1985; 1986) who related migration during the Manley years to the political hysteria 
about the `communist threat' created by orchestrated accusations of the opposition JLP, as well as a hostile, reactionary local and North American mass media, the local business class and a vocal minority 
among the professional business class (Anderson, 1988). Others non-economic factors relate simply to 
proximity and familial ties as in the 1950s and 1960s, though the economic motive was strong. In a 1977 
poll, Stone (1982) reported that 60% of Jamaicans saying that given the chance they would migrate to the 
USA for better mainly for better job opportunities. 
The underdevelopment-related pull factor has been a popular explanation of Jamaican health 
migration, with many seeing health migration as developed states `creaming off developing country skills 
(Stone and Wellicz 1988: 133). This view had some credibility. However there is an alternative view in 
the case of Jamaican health migration which questions the role of governments in developing states, 
particularly progressive. democratic regimes like Manley's. According to this view, successive Jamaican 
governments actively encouraged the exodus of both the skilled and unskilled. As Logan noted, 
"... sometimes indeed, excess production of professionals was deliberately planned with a view to 
exporting manpower.... " (Logan (1980: 121). Barrett shares this view, noting that the Manley regime 
actively proposed exploring "new migration outlets", a policy which unwittingly helped the brain drain of 
skilled health personnel (Barrett, 1979: 68-75). This argument has some merit when applied to the 
unskilled or poorly-skilled. However, Logan's argument seems rather implausible in the case of health 
professionals as it is hard to imagine a conscious decision taken by a socially-progressive regime to export 
much-needed doctors and nurses, trained at considerable state expense, while at the same time having to 
face the political fallout of understaffed health institutions and resorting to importing overseas doctors for 
its own needs, thus incurring twice the expense. An alternative and more plausible view is Anderson's 
(1988: 112) and Cumper's (1993) argument that the absence of effective demand within Jamaica for the 
quantity of doctors and nurses being trained by the state and its inability to adequately reward these 
highly-skilled professionals were both responsible for health worker migration in the 1970s and early 
1980s. Anderson's and Cumper's conclusion was that better planning was need to curb some 
programmes, by targeting scarce resources rather than wastage on too many highly skilled professionals 
many of whom migrated anyway. There is much to be said for this approach in the Jamaican situation, 
and given what we have seen of the Jamaican and Guyanese situations, other countries also, though to 
varying degrees. Nevertheless, this argument points to poor planning and mismanagement common to so 
many developing state governments, rather than to blatant survival politics, at least in the case of Jamaica. 
Other reasons (and combinations of reasons) have been forwarded as explanations of Jamaica's health 
migration problems. Mejia et al (1979: 316-7) have posited that Jamaica's status as both an importer and 
exporter of doctors during the 1970s could be explained by the wider tradition of mobility, coupled with 
economic crises. In the case of nurses the export (no imports occurred) could however, according to 
them, be explained by the high number of female-headed households. These views are also valid in 
explaining Jamaican migration. However they dismiss one of the prevailing assumptions of medical 
migration: that physicians in developing countries being taught developed country medicine will want to 
migrate to find suitable work. They stated, in this regard, that even in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
Jamaica's disease pattern already resembled a developed country, with lifestyle diseases already 
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accounting for the principal causes of death. While a valid point, it is naive to assume that developed 
world concepts of ill-health, medical training and tradition did not influence norms and values, and by 
extension, demands on health services and traditional types of service providers. This returns us to the 
relevance of the structural argument, i. e. the powerlessness of developing state regimes, and their limited 
ability to act in spite of progressive credentials given the effects of economic conditions. Even though the 
Manley regime in the 1970s experimented with a number of progressive policies, the fact remained that 
largely curative-orientated institutions were producing highly skilled professionals many of whom then 
migrated as economic conditions worsened, and as demands for their services abroad increased, with 
government policy - though progressive - failing to react adequately to stem the tide, with due regard of 
course to familial and other reasons. 
Comment. - Both push and pull factors exerted varying levels of influence on health human resources 
migration in the 1970s then, albeit with some evident level of regime mismanagement of the national 
policymaking policy process, both generally, but also as it related to this specific issue. The combined 
impact of economic crisis, public service shortages and poor management practices and their direct effects 
on the Jamaican public sector has been well established (Nunes, 1974; Mills and Robertson, 1974, Mills 
and Slyfield 1987; Mills and Jones, 1989). In the case of medical and nursing migration specifically, the 
main reasons seemed to be seemed to be the outcome of both push factors: poor economic and social 
conditions, lack of effective demand in retaining doctors and nurses; and pull factors: the lucrative foreign 
job packages and related opportunities (Anderson, 1985; Pastor, 1985). Only this combination of factors 
could explain why Jamaican doctors were increasingly migrating in the 1970s while the legitimate and 
non-coercive Manley government had to resort to among others, Cuban medical brigades as a stop-gap 
policy (Cotman; 1993; Feinsilver, 1993). The regime's inability to act given the nature of both the 
economic and professional constraints shows the reality of many a developing state progressive regime. 
What Jamaican experiences in the 1970s represented in the case of health migration then, was the relative 
inability and powerlessness of developing state regimes to resolve the existing national and international 
`disequilibria' in health human resources training, planning and management policy. When combined with 
economic crisis, the situation was bad, though not as debilitating, it must be repeated, as tin Guyana under 
Burnham. With institutional reform itself delayed, and the Jamaican economy going into freefall in the 
late 1970s, it is not difficult to understand why the exodus of both the skilled and unskilled continued well 
beyond Manley's electoral defeat in 1980. We now examine Trinidad's migration problems and policy 
responses in the 1970s under the Williams regime. 
The Williams regime in the 1970s: state capitalism, the oil boom and policy responses to the doctor and 
nurse migration problem (1973-1981) 
Policy context: There is little reliable information on the exact numbers involved in the physician and 
nurse exodus from Trinidad during the 1970s. However, the concerns of the Williams regime expressed 
in the case of chronic shortages in both categories meant that the problem was much more serious than the 
1960s. Despite these concerns, the regime's perception of the problem was different to that held by the 
doctors and nurses themselves. In the case of physician supply, the Williams government believed that the 
number of Trinidadian students graduating annually from the university medical school in Jamaica (about 
30-35) were too small for Trinidad's needs. This belief, though partly true, ignored the feeling of many in 
the service that the pressure for reform of the health services was not strong enough at this stage. In 1978, 
the same year that the national advisory council (NAC) presented its report on health services, the 
Williams regime appointed a task force to hasten the establishment of medical school within a relatively 
short period of time. The Peat Marwick Mitchell report commissioned by the advisory council, as 
mentioned earlier, noted the basic problem: the absence of a clear health policy. This manifested itself in 
a number of planning and management problems: poor co-ordination between training institutions and the 
ministry, poor staff utilisation and gross inefficiency which in turn led to frustration and high staff 
turnover levels (National Advisory Council/Peat Marwick Mitchell report, 1978: 15). The report 
additionally noted that health care remained - in the year of Alma Ata - highly medicalised. 
Together 
with poor salaries, all of these factors contributed to the apparent shortage of public sector 
doctors in the 
1970s. This factor, coupled with the sudden availability of resources enabled the regime and its advisers 
both at the national and international levels to draft what it considered its main, viable, and suddenly now 
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feasible policy response to both migration and perceived health worker shortage: the medical school and 
complex. 
Regime policy responses: The decision to implement the medical school policy, which was later 
expanded to build training facilities for, inter alia, advanced nurse training could be seen as the Williams 
regime's main policy response to the doctor and nurse health migration problem. However, as noted before and also in the next chapter, the role of regime motivations, calculations and characteristics, along 
with other factors such as medical interests also influenced the decision. Other responses to migration 
included overseas recruitment of doctors and nurses and creation of new posts. However even here there 
were problems. In 1977 for instance, 415 new nursing posts were created. However, in this the year 
preceding the Alma Ata conference, all except 21 of these posts (of district health visitor) were bound for 
the three main hospitals. In addition, the government announced the recruitment of 112 nurses from the 
UK most of whom were nationals who had migrated for both training and better employment conditions. 
None of these responses could however adequately solve what was essentially a political problem. During 
the 1970s, the health minister whose ad-hoc, confrontational stance did not exactly endear himself to 
health professionals, continually reminded them of government's other (cheaper and easily implemented) 
policy option of overseas recruitment of both doctors and nurses where local staff could not be found. 
This was in effect an admission, as in Jamaica, that the wider problems facing the health system were not 
going to be comprehensively addressed when such ad-hoc, stop-gap and less politically risky measures 
were available. Reflecting the view of many in the health sector, one opposition member of parliament 
(and doctor) however criticised this approach, accusing the Williams regime of incompetence. His view 
that under-utilisation and underdevelopment of human resources, rather than overseas recruitment was the 
main problem was widely shared ('Poverty and health services', Sampath, M, Dr, Trinidad Guardian, 
18/10/75). 
However neither of these policy responses solved the problem. In the case of the nurse practitioner 
programme, plans never got off the ground as noted before, the main reason being not regime support, but 
medical profession opposition. The failure to engage both the nursing and progressive members of the 
profession and lack of effective lobbying by nurses to counter this opposition could also explain the 
failure of the policy (Trinidad Guardian, 18/10/75: 1). The recruitment of overseas nurses also failed to 
be implemented and was seen to be unfeasible. Trinidad's `de facto' health and health human resources 
policy in the post-boom 1973 period was thus dominated by the medical complex project to the exclusion 
of discussion of pressing problems such as health migration. The Williams regime, and Williams in 
particular, undoubtedly calculated that the medical complex policy would yield long-term solutions to 
chronic physician, nurse and other professional shortages. However, the problem lay more in his 
government's unwillingness to reform and decentralise national power, which gives regime characteristics 
some validity in this case. After the 1970 attempted coup, Williams' increased authoritarian style made 
the placing of reform on the policy agenda very difficult. This was compounded by the oil boom in 1973 
which enabled him to effectively spend his way out of developmental problems - including health, without 
incurring unnecessary political risks. The road to reform was potentially dangerous politically, even for a 
`low politics' issue like health human resources which might have curbed if not prevented migration. 
However Williams was not prepared to comprehensively do so for a low-politics issue such as health 
development. There was even less incentive to do so after the oil boom. 
Comment: The search for development alternatives began in earnest with the three regimes pursuing 
alternative development paths. One of the persistent realities of the Commonwealth Caribbean has been 
migration - driven by socio-economic crises, family ties and developed world manipulation of 
immigration laws to satisfy their own labour demands. In the case of Guyana and Jamaica in the 1970s 
the reality of the weak, resource scarce developing state was a major cause. However, this did not apply 
in the case of Trinidad where ample resources were available in the post-1973 period. However, rather 
than being used for long term fundamental reforms which might have at least helped to retain some health 
personnel, was spent instead on training ever more personnel in the traditional way. This policy was not 
unique to Trinidad alone with Guyana and Jamaica also culpable. This constituted a waste of national 
resources that none of these states - even Trinidad - could afford to lose. The oil boom 
factor enabled the 
state capitalist Williams regime to signal its new status in the region. The major problem with this focus 
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however was that it overshadowed the very real structural problems facing the Trinidadian health system 
that were forcing physicians and nurses to migrate in the first place. 
Regime maintenance thus manifested to some extent in presidential behaviour which had a bad if not 
altogether devastating effect on the health reform impetus, and which hastened the migration of 
dissatisfied professionals. Jamaica and Guyana also revealed the complexity of the determinants of health 
migration under socialist regimes. In Guyana, regime maintenance and political coercion was more highly 
influential, along with economic factors. In Jamaica, the economic factor was dominant. However a 
number of other factors, ranging from active regime collusion to lack of effective demand for doctors and 
nurses were also valid. The difference between Guyana and Jamaica was that two was that blatant 
survival politics was not practised in Jamaica, despite its political problems. The similarity for both 
ultimately was that they each suffered considerably from the oil shock in the 1970s (unlike Trinidad which 
gained from it) which considerably worsened the health migration situation and somewhat limits political 
factors. However, if politics were not applicable to Jamaica, given this point, it was definitely so in the 
Guyanese case. We now turn to analyse developments in the 1980s. 
6.5 TRANSITION AND REGIME RESPONSES TO THE PHYSICIAN AND NURSE 
MIGRATION PROBLEM IN THE 1980s 
The economic context 
The financial crisis that affected almost all Commonwealth Caribbean countries in the late 1970s 
extended to the early 1980s, resulting in the subsequent implementation of fiscally prudent, but socially 
damaging structural adjustment programs as conditions for loans from the IMF and the World Bank. The 
resultant impact on the social development gains of the past as well as the risk to existing policies and 
programs was extremely debilitating (Stone and Wellicz, 1988; Manley, 1987; Thomas, 1988; Pantin, 
1986). In the case of Caribbean health, this impact included a general decline in health status and services 
(Musgrove, 1986; Boyd, 1988; Levitt 1990; Theodore, 1993; Phillips, 1994). 
The international health human resources policy context: Successive rises in oil prices in the 1970s 
resulted in important changes in international physician and nurse migration. The newly-rich Arab 
countries became doctor importers on a large scale (Abel-Smith, 1994: 94). But from the 1980s, other 
countries, including Britain and the United States became more restrictive in the admission of 
foreign 
medical graduates, partly due to pressure from both their own medical graduates, and to political pressures 
to restrict the admission of every type of emigrant, but partly due to an increasing recognition of the 
harm 
being done to developing state health services (Abel-Smith, 1994: 94). As Britain expanded its medical 
schools, plans were set for the replacement of foreign graduates as they retired with 
doctors trained at 
home. The United States also became more restrictive in the case of physicians. As Abel-Smith, Cumper 
and Anderson among others have pointed out, these developments happened simultaneously with reduced 
economic prospects which made developing countries unable to employ all the 
doctors they had trained. 
On the nursing question, the position was markedly different, largely due to the mushrooming 
demands of 
the American health care system. As demand for private medical and nursing care grew the 
1980s, the 
USA addressed its own shortage by amending its legislation, making it relatively easy 
for nurses wishing 
to come to the US to obtain a visa in the 1980s (Abel-Smith, 1994: 94). This selective migration policy 
was to have a profound effect on a number of neighbouring countries such as Mexico, 
but also the already 
short-staffed Guyana and Jamaica, and even Trinidad. In the next section, 
I examine responses to 
migration in the 1980s by looking firstly at Guyana under the Burnham and Hoyte regimes. 
Co-operative socialism and policy responses to the migration problem in 
Guyana: the Burnham and 
Hoyte regimes (1980-1991) 
As noted in the two preceding chapters, the limited information available on 
Guyana's health human 
resource situation as well as my interviews suggest that the health migration problem worsened 
146 
considerably during the 1980s. By President Burnham's death in 1985, one of the more substantial 
assessments of human resources development concluded that both nursing and medicine were in crisis. 
noting also that there was "... little or no evidence of commitment of health professionals - especially doctors - to the education and training processes" (Drayton/Collado/Ray, 1987: iii). The study concluded 
similarly, in the case of student nurses, that nursing training was being used as a tool to facilitate easier 
migration to other Caribbean territories as well as the metropolitan countries, a conclusion also applicable 
to Jamaica, as Anderson and other have noted (Anderson, 1988; Henry and Johnson, 1985). The 
importance of deteriorating economic and social conditions similar to those affecting Jamaica, and to a 
lesser extent, Trinidad cannot be overstated. Low wages could not match rising inflation and poor 
working conditions as a direct consequence of the even more limited resources available for the public 
health sector. 
Policy recommendations and responses: The 1987 Drayton et al report recommended a number of 
policy strategies to the Hoyte regime to improve the system in order to stem the doctor and nurse migration 
flow (PAHO/Drayton/Collado/Ray, 1987). These included the formulation of a comprehensive policy, 
which would, inter alia, define goals and priority areas, as well as the identification of long- and short-term 
strategies to achieve these goals. On the management side, these recommendations covered the 
configuration and functions of the `health team' concept, the integration of production with management 
and the development of `career paths' particularly for Guyanese nurses. The 1987 report reiterated the 
importance of "... adequate provisions be made to support the system with the development of a strong 
infrastructure... " (1987: 1). This report concluded importantly however that without political change, 
these recommendations would remain just that. In formulating policies in support of its ideology of co- 
operative socialism in the first half of the 1980s, the Burnham regime did not entirely ignore health human 
resources development. Indeed, some of the ideas were very radical and progressive by traditional 
Commonwealth Caribbean health training standards, and similar in terms of its change from this 
Caribbean status-quo with Jamaica's nurse practitioner and community health aide programmes. The 
development of the community health worker, medex and medical practitioner programmes as discussed 
in Chapter Five were innovative responses in large part to the doctor and nurse shortages in the public 
sector. However, regime/national politics, meant that the effectiveness of these programs was 
considerably undermined. 
Consequences: By 1990, a serious human resources shortage in the public health sector was predicted 
to continue, given these conditions, and, consequently, the public health sector's inability to attract and 
retain health professionals (PAHO, 1990b). Not surprisingly, the continued preoccupation with regime 
survival by Burnham's successor Hoyte combined with economic crisis impacted negatively on the ability 
of doctors, nurses and other health workers to stay in the public health services. The continuation of 
regime-influenced health human resource migration thus contributed, as did economic factors, to a poor 
health delivery system, which in turn resulted in the progressive decline in the health status of the 
Guyanese people. Even though they were among the hardest workers, nurses remained among the lowest 
paid health workers as well as having the least prestige and status. Nursing was particularly badly 
affected, accounting for at least 88 of the 105 health personnel who resigned over the 1988/9 period 
(Harry/PAHO, 1989: 5-7). Doctors terms of employment and working conditions were similarly bad. 
The decision to establish a medical school was an important, though criticised policy response (Drayton, 
1997). Though somewhat understandable, the question of better allocation of scarce Guyanese public 
resources persisted well into the 1990s (Drayton, 1997). 
Unlike Trinidad, the Burnham regime had long chosen the decentralisation path as a path to health 
services improvement. Laudable though this decision was, the fact remained that it was implemented on 
an `ad-hoc' basis, and under conditions of undemocratic, cooperative socialist- and party paramountcy- 
based rule which had their own ramifications for public policy policymaking. Additionally, even after 
implementation in the mid 1980s, regime maintenance factors were significantly contributing to the 
underdevelopment, not only of the health sector and working conditions, but the 
living conditions for all 
Guyanese. These push factors during the 1980s simply meant an increase in doctor and nurse migration, 
both externally as well as internally into the private sector. In the case of nurses then, 
despite a fairly 
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steady student intake since 1988, a no-fee system, and output of 120 nurses annually by the four publicly- 
funded nursing schools severe staffing problems still remained well into the 1990sä urse migration, not 
surprisingly perhaps, persisted (World Ba. nk/Guyana, 1993: 80). Wages were extremely low for all 
categories, as seen in Table 6.2. Like all health sector personnel, physicians, nurses and other categories' 
salaries were fixed according to central government pay scales. Most physicians earned between G$ 9991 
(US$85) and G$11,437 (Tför 99) per month in 1993, but declines in the real value of salaries between 
1985 and 1991 were greatci all qualified staff. As the opposition Working Peoples Alliance (WPA) party 
manifesto noted in 1992,1uyana's poor health situation - undermined by decades of PNC rule - 
encouraged health migration particularly among the female - dominated nursing profession: 
"... our hospitals are slums, overcrowded and falling apart. Essential drugs, 
bandages, cleansers and equipment for routine medical work are scarce and veri' 
expensive. Doctors, nurses, technicians, administrators and aides, assistants and 
health workers generally are in very short supply. The number of physicians per 
1000 of the population is less than one-fifth of that for Trinidad and Tobago, and 
one-half for that of Jamaica. The number of nurses per thousand of the Guyanese 
population is less than one-third that of Trinidad and Tobago; and these are 
concentrated in urban areas. The working conditions for health care personnel, the 
bulk of whom are women, are bad beyond belief... " (Working Peoples' Alliance 
Manifesto, 1992: 65). 
Table 6.2: Salary differentials for Guyanese health human resources for the 
years 1985 and 1991 (US$) 
Category 1985 monthly salary 1991 monthly salary 
(US$) (US$) 
Consultant 217 128 
Registrar 168 103 
Med Officer 99 98 
Med Intern 99 85 
Medex 55 45 
Ward sister 54 47 
Staff Nurse/midwife 42 44 
Nurse 41 43 
Midwife 31 27 
Assistant Nurse 29 25 
Nurse Aide 24 22 
Source: World Bank/Ministry of Health, Guyana, 1993: 81) 
Comment: The political survivalism practised by the Peoples National Congress (PNC) regime under 
first Burnham, then Hoyte immeasurably worsened living conditions for most Guyanese including health 
workers who migrated en masse to other Caribbean states, the USA, the UK and Canada. In an already 
difficult environment of limited resources - human, material and financial - even those committed 
bureaucrats in the ministry of health and the training agencies could not effectively formulate, implement 
and provide continuing support for even their most progressive policies given the persistence of regime 
politics. The limits placed by scarce resources were thus worsened by the lack of democracy, political 
harassment, mismanagement and poor working conditions. As noted in chapter five, factors such as 
administrative problems, misallocation of health resources within the regions, late payment of salaries 
made it difficult to ensure the development of a health system that would encourage nurses and doctors to 
remain in the public sector, and indeed, the country (World Bank, 1993; Sagala et al, 1992; Drayton and 
Caleb, 1993; S. Gordon, 1994, interview. The end result was high levels of migration from all classes in 
society, but mainly the skilled and the educated - including doctors and nurses - whom the country could 
least afford to lose. As the then chief medical officer concluded by the end of the 1980s: "... by far the 
most intractable human resources problem is that of staff retention... " (Harry/PAHO, 1989: 5-7). 
Economic crisis in the Guyanese case was thus worsened by national politics which resulted in a collapse 
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in health services by the time the newly elected democratic regime assumed office in 1992. This reality 
underscores the need for a balanced approach to explaining Guyanese developing state policy by incorporating the regime characteristics argument. We now turn to the Seaga regime in Jamaica in the 
1980s. 
The Seaga regime in the 1980s: regime change and policy response to migration under liberal 
capitalism (1980-1988) 
The policy context: As noted in Chapter Five, by 1986, Seaga's favourable status within the 
geographic sphere of influence declined as the cold war threat rapidly diminished. Despite the 
government's faithful implementation of IMF policies, the Reagan government was disillusioned with his 
regime's "statist attitudes" (McAfee, 1991: 128). By 1988, Jamaica was no longer an American foreign 
policy priority (McAfee, 1991: 128). Despite the considerable aid and loan packages, Jamaica however 
was now in a worse condition economically, socially and politically than when the regime assumed office. 
At the end of Seaga's term in 1989, the gross domestic product was no larger than it had been in 1980. Its 
debt servicing ratio, like Guyana's was very high, but its overall debt remained at US$4.4 billion, one of 
the highest, per capita in the world, more than half of which had been accrued by the Seaga regime. In the 
aftermath of Hurricane Gilbert in late 1988 and the harshness of the IMF's policies, even the USAID was 
forced to admit of Jamaica in 1988 that it was characterised by: 
"... a crippling debt burden... distribution of wealth and income is highly 
unequal... shortages of key medical and technical personnel plague the health 
system... physical decay and social violence deter investment... " (McAfee, 1991: 
139). 
The combined impact of the disequilibrium of health human resources, the debt crisis and the role of 
regime ideology, though not survival was most evident in Jamaica in the post-1980 period. Despite the 
good intentions of the Manley regime, the fact remained that severe economic problems forced many 
Jamaican professionals including physicians and nurses to search for better job opportunities abroad, 
rather than the regime's politics (Anderson, 1988). A Jamaican health policy paper noted that emigration 
during the latter half of the 1970s had considerably reduced available technical and professional staff in 
the health ministry (Government of Jamaica, 1984: 11). This situation continued during the first half of 
the 1980s. Despite the advent of the laissez faire Seaga regime and its US government-, IMF- and World 
Bank-endorsed policies the process continued to deteriorate. Even the very real progressive achievements 
of the Manley regime were considerably undermined by the adjustment programmes in the 1980s, and 
with it, the aspirations of those committed primary health care and policy reform in the health sector. 
Policy responses: The Seaga government's early attempts to implement its primary health care 
strategy with regard to health human resources was described as "initially gratifying" (Carr, interview, 
1994). These attempts were however, like other reform policies, severely hampered and/or undermined 
by adjustment policies (Carr P, interview, 1994). Staffing requirements were not being adequately met 
due to the devaluation of the Jamaican dollar, low wages, poor working conditions, and importantly, the 
increasingly `open' US health market were some of the main militating factors. These served to enhance 
the existing Jamaican `brain drain' well into the 1980s. They also affected the ability of the health 
ministry to actively recruit expatriate staff, especially doctors, who were often transient (Holding-Cobham 
et al, 1985: 26). Inevitably, Jamaica's much-vaunted training system suffered as it could not keep up with 
the high attrition rates and resultant chronic under-staffmg of facilities at all levels of the health system 
(Holding-Cobham et al, 1985: 17) 
All of these effects on the health sector were endured in a society already struggling under the wider 
social strains of adjustment. Health care was absolutely critical at this time of increased use of public care 
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facilities. However, the Seaga regime acceded to IMF pressures at the height of the social crisis by 
imposing a 12.5% reduction in nursing personnel. The government also added to the restriction of access 
to public hospitals to the poor by imposing fees for service. In the case of doctors, in 1988, the number of 
medical posts in the Jamaican public service was 547, but the number filled was only 376. Of even 
greater concern was the fact that of the 4,312 posts of registered nurse, only 2,663 by the end of 1988 (or 
62%) were filled (Gallimore, interview, 1994). The effects of push and pull factors were thus both being 
experienced. The situation seemed to be a contradictory one of government inability to pay for such posts 
to be filled -a point noted by Cumper (1993) and Anderson (1988) - although the need for health services, 
at all levels of the system was clearly there. These vacancies for both categories persisted well into the 
1990s as a result of a combination of Seaga's monetarism, the IMF's adjustment conditions, and the still 
curative bias prevalent in resources - human, financial and organisational at this time. A study of 
registered nurse migration for the period 1974-1984 found that the major "push factors" in Jamaica were: 
poor salary, lack of professional development opportunities and poor working conditions (Reid, 1985). 
The `pull factors' abroad, as noted in other reports, were increase in salaries, better working conditions 
and professional development opportunities. The Reid study also found that staff shortages led to 
overwork and fatigue of remaining staff and poor interpersonal relationships. The most disliked factors 
on the job were staff shortages, equipment and supplies shortages, unsatisfactory working conditions and 
lack of material benefits. This confirmed the importance of non-economic factors and expressed in the 
contention by Mejia et al that: 
"... whilst income differentials between donor and recipient countries play a role in 
the sense that they determine the directions of migration, low income per se does not 
seem to constitute a push factor... " (Mejia, Pizurki and Royston, 1979: 402). 
As noted in Chapter Five, the Seaga government did manage to implement some progressive policies 
in response to the nurse migration crisis. The most important were firstly, improved conditions for the 
retention of primary health nurses including car provision, no night services and higher salaries than 
institutional nurses. Secondly, the enrolled assistant nurse (EAN) programme was implemented, 
essentially as a stop-gap measure to counter the migration of registered nurses. Organisationally, the 
impressive performances of the rural health team approach was vindicated the new government's 
continuation of the Manley regimes' policy. However, serious problems continued at the tertiary level (La 
Touche, G; interview). Under the administrative reform programme started in the mid 1980s, nurses 
continued to be trained, despite the 50% cut in the training budget. However, because of the 12% cut in 
the number of registered nurse posts, these nurses could not find jobs, given the lack of demand, so went 
to the private sector (including the insurance industry) and abroad aggravating already severe shortages 
(Reid 1985: vi). Between 1984 and 1988, it is estimated that 609 nurses left the system, driven by low 
wages and the proximity of lucrative jobs in North America (Holding-Cobham and Bowen-Wright, 1985: 
17-26; La Touche, interview). Table 6.2 below illustrates the gravity of the nursing problem during this 
time and its continuation of trends from the 1970s: 
Persistent under-funding driven by adjustment policies meant that funding of the health sector 
continued to be a problem, with the 5% spending target recommended by the UN not matched by the 
regime's average of 2.9%. As a result, entire hospital wards were closed down. Where rises in budgetary 
allocation were recorded this was primarily due to inflation and the decreased purchasing power of the 
Jamaican dollar. A significant proportion of the government's income during this entire period went into 
debt servicing. Successive consultancy reports on nursing shortages due to migration recommended that 
better utilisation of staff, better career opportunities, the need to utilise `return flows' of Jamaican nurses 
were integral elements to curb nurse migration (Reid, 1985; Government of Jamaica/Ministry of Health, 
1993). Nevertheless, the developed countries remained the major benefactor of nurse migration with the 
USA receiving 63%, Canada 7%, the UK 2% and other Caribbean countries, 2% of migration by 1985 
(Reid, 1985). The overall result for health human resources development by the end of Seaga's tenure in 
1989 was the persistence both push and pull factors which undermined Jamaica's health services 
considerably. 
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TABLE 6.3: The movement of Jamaican public sector nurses: 19 76-90 
No. of nurses admitted to No. of nurses resigning 
No. of nurses admitted to Year 
the public sector the USA from the public sector 
1976 305 107 106 
1977 275 71 143 
1978 303 117 167 
1979 293 151 205 
1980 211 148 N. A. 
1981 308 119 N. A. 
1982 245 135 186 
1983 246 80 N. A. 
1984 244 80 158 
1985 245 133 175 
1986 243 143 175 
1987 248 120 174 
1988 142 202 182 
1989 115 270 170 
1990 217 189 186 
TOTAL 3640 2065 2027 
Source: Government of Jamaica/Ministry of Health Nurse Migration Survey, 1993: 11. 
A joint PAHO/WHO/Ministry of Health report concluded that the government was unable to supply 
the quantity of nurses needed to meet even basic health service demands (PAHO/WHO/Ministry of 
Health, Jamaica, 1989: 6). Undoubtedly, structural adjustment was the prime factor. However, one 
cannot ignore the interrelated role and influence of both push and pull factors. As the report concluded: 
"... the continuing shortages of nurse manpower due to migration, low 
remuneration, inadequate facilities, poor professional development in all categories 
of professional and non-professional nursing staff have created a deficit in the 
delivery of health care and have reduced the Government's capacity to meet the 
health care demands of the country. This shortage of nursing personnel ... is 
severely affecting the quantity and quality of the delivery of health services and care 
received by users of the health sector... the pull factors to the metropolitan markets 
are caused by a dynamic marketing strategy by these markets targeted at the 
Caribbean... Other pull factors are attractive and fringe benefits schemes, better 
conditions of service and work, better educational opportunities and career 
mobility. " Among the push factors are low salaries, and fringe benefits, poor 
conditions of service and work, and the low status of the nurse... " (1989: 1-6). 
Comment: Unlike the Manley regime's relatively radical policy agenda and its many opponents in the 
1970s, the initial outlook for the Seaga regime in the 1980s in sustaining the gains of the previous regime 
and promoting new policies was good. The confluence of factors was in its favour in the early to mid 
1980s: the support of the US after its own political backing of the Grenada invasion and the initially `good 
reports' from the international financial agencies. Some achievements were laudable, such as the 
incentives for primary care nurses and the creation of the enrolled assistant nurses (EAN) programme. 
However, structural adjustment meant that there was little room for manoeuvre at the national level 
resulting in an underfunded service, and a dismantling some of previous regimes' more progressive 
policies, like 50% cut in the community health aide (CHA) programme in the mid- 1980s. The effect was 
essentially a worsening of the migration problem. The cumulative effects of IMF -imposed adjustment 
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policies saw cuts in nursing staff and the nurse training budget, poor salaries and the imposition of a 
cess/fee for Jamaican medical and nursing students at the University effectively drove both nurses and 
doctors abroad. Despite continuing inter-party strife throughout the 1980s, the limited choices available 
to the albeit monetarist Seaga regime in the 1980s suggest that, as with the previous Manley regime, the 
IMF prescriptions (debt servicing and adjustment policy) rather than active pursuit of power were more 
critical to nursing and physician exodus than regime politics in Jamaica, although regime factors were also 
instrumental in health human resources outcomes by the end of Seaga's two successive terms in office. 
Regime transition and policy responses to doctor and nurse migration in the 1980s: the Chambers and 
Robinson regimes (1980 -1991) 
The PNM regime under Chambers (1981-1986): As oil prices fell, the once-booming Trinidadian 
petro-dominated economy of the mid-1970s was severely affected. Between 1983 and 1988, the country's 
per capita income had dropped by 50% while unemployment doubled (McAfee, 1993: 17-18). Trinidad's 
external debt reached US$ 2.4 billion in the same year, equivalent to 57% of the country's gross domestic 
product (GDP). The annual debt bill was equal to a quarter of the country's export earnings. In a 
desperate effort to cope with the debt burden in the mid 1980s, the new NAR regime negotiated a series of 
IMF loans, beginning in November 1988, as the country's debt increased to more than US$3 billion 
(McAfee, 1993: 17-18). 
Regime responses: Criticising what was effectively the failure of the Williams government's nursing 
policy in the 1970s, a 1981 report on health manpower needs of "... present and projected health 
services... " stated, inter alia, that nursing services had not kept pace with the increasing and changing 
demands, that the creation of new nursing posts lagged behind population growth, that there was a dearth 
of nursing personnel in specific areas like psychiatric care, and that no provision was being made to 
implement the national health policy of providing primary health care by nurses in the community 
(Government of Trinidad/Ministry of health, 1981 a). Economic factors were clearly important. The 1981 
report had pointed to the importance of economic conditions. However even this report noted that it was 
not the only factor forcing nurses to migrate. The other factors alluded to were essentially poor working 
conditions. Drugs and equipment shortages made actual work close to impossible. In terms of the work 
environment, a lack of proper facilities for staff, the lack of security in a social environment of rampant 
drug addiction and increasing criminal activities featured prominently as a secondary reason for the 
departure of nurses. 
Under Chambers' tenure, a new minister of health, Neville Connell assumed office from the long- 
serving Kamaluddin Mohammed, but this made little difference especially the new economic climate and 
the diversion of resources for day to day service maintenance. In 1982 and 1983, the country was in the 
middle of a nursing crisis. Connell acknowledged the crisis, noting the government's response would be to 
fill vacant posts (Trinidad Guardian, 15/9/83: 1). Another response was the amendment of nursing 
council regulations to encourage the return and utilisation of overseas-based nurses equipped with 
specialised skills. One year later however, the failure of these `ad-hoc' strategies and the failure to 
address the core problem of health reform was acknowledged both by the ministry and the minister 
(Holiday Inn Report, 1984; ). The paradox of the first half of the 1980s was that while nursing output was 
relatively steady, the inability to absorb these nurses in the public service, despite the numerous vacant 
posts reflected policy stagnation and inaction as much as financial problems. Ministerial allocations 
remained fairly steady even as the downturn was occurring. As resources began to diminish, even the 
ministry of finance and planning noted that the lack of a single clear-cut health policy was hampering the 
improvement of the existing human resources and sectoral financial/developmental resource allocations 
(St Cyr, E, Holiday Inn Report, 1984). Trinidad and Tobago by the end of the Chambers regime's tenure 
also had yet to ratify the International Labour Organisation's working conditions for nurses. Protest 
action by nurses and doctors, mainly the overworked junior doctors, continued throughout the 1980s as 
economic problems worsened well until the new regime assumed office in 1986. 
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a Comment: The outcome of the Chambers years was little discernible shift in resources from secondary 
and tertiary care almost a decade after Alma Ata. Community health nurse numbers were woefully 
inadequate. In addition, in 1987 the training of primary health nurses seemed to have been suspended 
(Drayton/Ray, 1987). The paradox of oversupply and lack of effective or affordable demand was evident 
in the nursing sector. Those graduating in the late 1980s had no effective demands for their services, 
despite the shortage, because of lack of resources to fund these appointments. The only option left for 
unemployed nurses was migration. This disequilibrium constituted therefore a tremendous waste of 
resources (Anderson, 1988; Abel-Smith, 1994). Migration increased as the cost of living declined in the 
recessionary economy. In the case of doctors, then,, the issue was also one of potential oversupply. 
However, the government, rather than addressing the chronic problems driving away existing public sector 
doctors in the first place stuck to the Williams plans for the medical training complex. 
Regime change and NAR policy responses to health migration (1986-1991) 
By the time the NAR under new prime minister Robinson assumed office, the rapid decline in 
economic and social conditions saw the shortage of health professionals escalate into crisis proportions. 
Within weeks of assuming office, the NAR regime and minister Emmanuel Hosein, in particular, were 
urged by nurses and doctors to improve the conditions that would retain nurses in the public health sector. 
Proposals in the case of nurses included the absorption of unemployed nurses in a temporary capacity at 
hospitals, the reduction in long shifts, better management in minor staff matters, the need to allow 
opportunities for study leave, greater recognition for trained nurses, and promotion based on performance 
rather than tenure ('Nurses turn to Hosein for help', Trinidad Express, 12/1/87: 3). The minister 
responded by commissioning a WHO consultancy on health human resources development in early 1987. 
A number of `old' issues were identified in this report including the central one of a continuing lack of 
clear policy. 
In the case of doctors , the chaotic policy, planning and management situation was clearly reflected 
in 
the fact that far from an anticipated shortfall of 75 physicians by 1985, the numbers had actually increased 
from 723 in 1980 to 1103 in 1986 with the medical school yet to be commissioned (Drayton/Ray, 1987: 
3). The Drayton report warned the health minister and the government that since the avenues for 
physician were gradually closing through externally-generated action, government policy needed to 
recognise this factor in order not to exacerbate the supply. It urged the regime to give the highest 
attention, in current and future plans, to resource constraints rather than needs, given that the health 
budget was estimated to be shrinking by 3%, by the late 1980s as economic conditions worsened. It was 
recommended that given the present difficult financial situation, the resources for some of the unfilled 
posts in the hospitals could be shifted to community health services. In the case of nurses, the report 
stated that even in those categories where shortages most acute: mainly primary health nurses especially in 
mental health, none really needed extensive numbers to be trained. Further, the ministry was advised that 
before embarking on training, the government needed to ensure that posts could be provided for graduates 
so that the public sector could absorb them. One suggestion in this regard was that the government could, 
for example, rationalise by switching vacant institutional posts into community posts. Another was to 
keep nursing assistant training on hold until a need could be established. Finally, the report emphasised 
the need to consolidate all training under one agency. In the case of the medical complex, the report 
urged the government to ensure that relevance, appropriateness and national self-reliance were observed. 
Further, the government's stated adherence to a primary health care approach was also being undermined 
by the continued imbalance between primary and tertiary human resources in the health sector. 
Neglect of the nurse practitioner policy: By far the biggest failure for nurses under the NAR was 
their neglect in implementing the nurse practitioner policy, almost a decade after 
it had been similarly 
considered but not implemented by the Williams regime. The continued failure of successive regimes to 
implement the nurse practitioner program despite numerous supportive statements was the most glaring 
example of the low status and neglect of nurses within the Trinidad health system, compared even to their 
counterparts in Jamaica. The PNM despite minister Mohammed's commitment - in the late 1970s 
had 
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been unable to implement the policy largely due to medical professional influence. Under Chambers 
tenure, the PNM continued to neglect the policy even though it was mentioned in the 1983 Demas report. 
This was partly due to preoccupation with economic crisis and the continued resistance of the medical 
profession, but also due to a weak health minister. Under the NAR, there was a possibility for change. A 
policy commitment to implement was stated in the new government's draft development policy, the `Draft 
Medium Term Macro Planning Framework (1988: 188). There was widespread support for the 
programme. A report on the Tobago health situation noted the potential use in that island of nurse 
practitioners, given the inability to recruit doctors there (Nalder, 1988: 34-43). The Draft report called for 
nursing practice legislation to be reviewed and consideration given to the introduction of the program, as 
practised in Jamaica, in order to, inter alia, "... maximise limited physician time in clinics... " (DMTMPF, 
1988: 7). Even a former medical professor at the regional university questioned whether Caribbean 
countries could afford to produce, then pay the salaries of highly qualified doctors from national resources 
"... on which there are increasing pressures, and which are being rapidly eroded by low productivity and 
inflation... " (Cruickshank, 1989: 7). He urged the government and the medical profession to look towards 
the nurse practitioner as "the obvious answer": 
"... so much simple diagnosis and treatment is already undertaken by the nurse 
receptionist in practice, the casualty sister and the health centre home visitor - and 
yet this is done unofficially and without giving formal training... a year of clinical 
training could produce an efficient, practical clinician as is done with the midwife. 
The nursing profession is well-established and has the support of the public. All that 
is needed is recognition of their potential by the medical and nursing professions, 
and the public could be educated to accept the nurse instead of demanding to see 
the doctor for all their wants. Much of health centre practice could be handled by 
them and I'm sure they could take on the responsibilities of at least half of junior 
hospital doctors. If the will were there on all sides, it could be done... " 
(Cruickshank, 1989: 7). 
Unfortunately, the situation remained the same, despite the optimism surrounding the policy. This 
view was a minority in the medical profession, and certainly reflected the unwillingness of the Trinidadian 
medical profession to work in partnership with nurses. The failure by the NAR to force through and 
implement the policy also reflected the health minister's misgivings about the use of the nurse practitioner 
as an effective retention strategy and the regime's lack of political will to improve the status of nurses vis 
ä vis that of the dominant medical profession. Contrary to the recommendations of many in the health 
sector, and government stated policy, the reason given by minister Hosein, himself a medical doctor, for 
non-implementation was that there was no demand for this category in Trinidad, and hence no need for 
such a post (Interview, 1994). 
The nursing exodus thus accelerated in 1988, having started the previous year, due to a combination of 
regime neglect and economic crisis. An average of four nurses were leaving every month for the USA as 
American private hospital officials and nursing recruitment consultants stepped up their drive within the 
Caribbean region. Those recruited went to either the USA or Saudi Arabia, with starting salaries of 
between US$1000 and US$5000 per month plus perks, three times the Trinidadian nursing wages being 
offered. One report noted that 100 nurses had flown into Barbados during one weekend to write the 
American entrance examinations. Another report stated that more than 500 hundred nurses had signed up 
to a Saudi recruitment agency ('Nurses exodus', Trinidad Guardian, 13/4/88: 1; `Exodus to the gulf, 
Trinidad Guardian, 15/5/88: 1). While the veracity of these press reports could be questioned, the fact 
that senior nursing officials were being quoted gave cause for alarm. Ironically, one of the government's 
flagship IMF adjustment-originated policies, the voluntary termination of employment (VTEP) 
programme, meant to cut staff in the public sector, was used by these migrating nurses to their own 
benefit. It also coincided with both the economic downturn and the activities of the recruitment agencies. 
This made the decision to leave the service even more lucrative. By 1989, the registered nursing 
association president confirmed that 600 nurses had left the service in just two years (Trinidad Express, 
27/6/89: 46). 
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Other administrative causes for dissatisfaction and migration included the fact a nurse had to wait for 
approximately twenty years before becoming a head nurse. Indeed, many were `frozen' in `temporary at 
short notice' posts, with little or no chance of appointment (Bryan, 1989: 8). Five hundred nurses who 
graduated in 1983 were still receiving student and trainee nurse salaries in 1988. Many continued to be 
temporary after seven years despite the vacant posts, at both the primary and institutional levels due to 
government inability to fund these posts (Trinidad Express, 15/5/88: 1). Bryan asserted that nurses 
worked under the same unsatisfactory conditions as doctors, but without the accompanying financial 
remuneration or job prestige. The net effect of the sudden nurse exodus was instant chaos as doctors 
expressed frustration at the disruption in schedules. In addition, the nurses union, the Public Services 
Association (PSA) alleged that the ministry was retaining community and district nurses to meet the 
institutional shortfalls at the main hospitals, and that training policies essential for promotion had not 
occurred for years, which they warned would result in crisis ('Hospitals hit by shortage of nursing staff, 
Trinidad Guardian, 14/8/81: 1). The pragmatic choice made to commission the medical complex held 
little meaning for both health personnel and a general public told of limited resources, especially at a time 
when the government eager to commission the complex managed to find and allocate over TT$ 127 
million for equipment in preparation for imminent opening in the 1989 budget. Better conditions were 
needed for health personnel, particularly junior doctors and nurses. In 1989, the nurses association again 
urged the NAR government to make them a reasonable offer noting that "... in the light of the current 
circumstances in the health field, nurses must evaluate their present position professionally and 
personally... " ('Nurses to government: make us an offer', Trinidad Guardian, 13/9/89: 14). Even the 
president of the nurses association, announcing the departure of another 40 nurses to the UK and Saudi 
Arabia, noted that: 
"... it is most unfortunate that developed countries, with their financial resources to 
train people should come to developing countries with their sever economic 
problems and take experienced personnel... " ('Flight of nurses form Trinidad and 
Tobago continues' (Trinidad Guardian, 12/1/90: 12). 
The NAR regime's response given the national context was to only promise that things would get 
better, a response that did not entirely satisfy health professionals as the migration process accelerated. 
Hosein's perceived unsympathetic manner did not help matters either. He told nurses to make up their 
minds whether they intended to remain in the country or "... migrate to greener pastures.. ", adding that the 
terms and conditions of nurses would be adjusted soon and that "... those who have left will be eating their 
hearts out... " ('Better deal for nurses', Trinidad Express, 5/4/89: 1). He further added that the government 
was not begging anyone to stay. In terms of plans to address the problem, he announced a number of 
reform initiatives. In the case of training, he announced the resumption of the nurse training programme 
which would be run by NIHERST, the newly-created higher education body, instead of the health 
ministry. Additionally, training in advanced nursing would be implemented by the UWI and nurses would 
also benefit from the modern technology of the medical complex. In terms of improvement of conditions, 
he detailed plans to encourage retired nurses to re-apply for jobs in order to meet the shortfall. He also 
noted that nurses would take home more pay with a reformed tax system, and that a health insurance 
scheme would be introduced. He promised nurses, finally, that their terms and conditions would be 
adjusted for the better and called for them to administer the service which the population needed, and not 
envy their colleagues who "... abandoned their responsibilities to the nation... " (Trinidad Express, 5/4/89: 
1). Other policy responses to the nurse migration problem were announced by the NAR regime during the 
1990 budget debate when Hosein stated that nurses trained at the UWI must enter into a three year 
contract with the government. He added that they would receive a monthly stipend but that they would 
have to pay for their uniforms and books. As if to reassure, he added that conditions were not as bad, 
given similar problems in Jamaica and the USA ('Three-year contract for UWI-trained nurses', Trinidad 
Express, 4/1/90: 5). He also reiterated the government's policy of overseas recruitment. 
Most of these policies had little effect as economic conditions and the political and social climate 
worsened. The attempt to lure nationals from home and abroad proved fruitless, due both to poor salaries. 
because of devaluation, and the continued poor working conditions. Many doctors and nurses also 
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criticised this approach as cosmetic without addressing the real question of health sector reform. As 
Bryan (1989: 13), noted, the health human resources situation in Trinidad and Tobago at the end of the 
1980s gave reason for great concern. The economic situation, government's voluntary termination 
programme, and the acute shortages in health manpower in metropolitan countries combined to push 
valuable health manpower out of the country. The opening of the medical complex added further stress to 
a system already in disequilibrium. Responding to the crisis, the acting minister of health Herbert Atwell 
announced what was effectively an `ad-hoc', crisis-driven `action plan' for the health service, which 
included funds for equipment, physical upgrade and funds for the training of 270 nurses in 1990 (TT$ 30 
million action plan for ailing health sector, Trinidad Guardian, 30/6/90: 1). 
Consequences: None of these policies seemed to placate health professionals or stem the tide. 
Instead, by February 1989, the paradoxical situation of both public sector doctor and nurse vacancies 
rose -even though training policies were still at traditional-, in some cases, like nurses, even increased 
levels - as both working and living conditions worsened. In the case of doctors, the public sector 
shortages continued, many migrating to the local private sector. As Hosein had himself noted as a medical 
student in 1974, over 40% of medical graduates migrated from the Caribbean on average mainly because 
of financial security - low salary, bad housing, heavy workload, and inadequate facilities. He added 
somewhat prophetically: 
"... as well as reflecting on the attitudes of students, this is also an indication for 
action on the part of those responsible for the medical programme, and the 
politicians of the region who have for too long done nothing to prevent medical 
graduates from going abroad... " (Hosein, E. et al, 1974: 193). 
In the case of nurses, by 1989 and 1990, there was a virtual "stampede" out of the country 
('Appreciating the value of TT's nurses', Grayson, J, Trinidad Guardian, 7/9/9 1). The majority of nurses 
leaving were institutional, so that hospitals suffered considerably. As noted before, in addition to the 
traditional destinations: the USA, Canada and the UK, many, like nurses in other developing and 
developed countries left to take up lucrative appointments in Saudi Arabia. Many strategies for 
emigration were used, some genuine, many however were simply a means of escape. Postgraduate 
training was highlighted as one reason, Senior nurses opted for early retirement under the new voluntary 
termination of employment (VTEP) policy. Many also applied also for unpaid study leave but were 
prepared to leave even without its approval. Others used the archaic `grounds of marriage' regulation for 
early retirement. Yet more left on vacation and/or sick leave, and never returned (Bryan, 1989: 9). Many 
nurses who had graduated in 1986, had left by 1989. Those graduating in 1989 and had not already left 
were merely waiting for their results before leaving (Bryan, 1989: 9). In 1983,18% of Trinidadian 
nursing posts were vacant. By the end of 1989, only 2500 nurses remained in the system, out of total of 
3277 posts, a shortfall of 777 nurses or 24% (Grayson, J, Trinidad Guardian, 7/9/91). 
This shortfall had also increased from 199 to 266 from both two main general hospitals. The total 
number of resignations, though not necessarily departure increased from 146 in 1988 to 320 in 1989. By 
1991, despite the addition of well over 250 new posts, the nurse vacancy figure had increased to over 40% 
(Ministry of Health, 1994). In the case of doctors the available figures for 1991 showed a 29% vacancy 
rate (1989: 9). Of the 320 nurses who left in 1989,21 left Mt Hope hospital, many specialty nurses, their 
departure especially felt since it took twice as long and was three times as costly to train them. The result 
of these departures made conditions for remaining nurses worse with `doubling up' resulting in greater 
stress. The ministry responded by training in specialties such as geriatric care, oncology, midwifery and 
neonatal medicine. However, the losses were still severe. Many of the migrants were managers and 
trainers, so that even some of these innovative responses could not be adequately implemented because of 
reduced staff. Equally hit was the still neglected public health nurses at a time when greater use was being 
made of community health facilities (Nicholls/PAHO, 1989). For nine weeks prior to the July, 1990 coup 
attempt, health workers led by nurses marched in northern Trinidad to protest deteriorating conditions. 
After the coup attempt, negotiations with the government's chief personnel officer was accelerated, 
although by now the situation was rapidly changing with the advent of regionalisation. In a final twist to 
the Trinidad nurse migration paradox in the late 1980s, it emerged that the newly incorporated Mt. Hope 
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Complex Authority was actively lobbying at nursing fairs in England, Scotland and Ireland to recruit 
British and Irish nurses, aided by a brochure entitled `Work and Play in Trinidad and Tobago', and by 
salaries offers which were more twice that earned by local nurses ('Mt Hope woos nurses in UK', 
Trinidad Guardian, 10/ 10/91: 1). The outlook was not good. 
Comment. The question facing the policy analyst in the case of Trinidad is whether market reformist 
characteristics or structural factors - agency or structure - influenced the policy choices the NAR regime in 
relation to the migration issue on assuming office in 1986. The fall in oil prices was undoubtedly a 
militating factor. It triggered a drastic fall in revenue, which in turn led to a balance of payments problem 
and the eventual implementation of IMF adjustment programmes and limited the policy room, as did the 
PNM thirty year legacy. The result in the case of the health sector was a gradual reduction in resource 
allocation. With devaluation came both a decline in the real value of wages, as well as a general decline 
in working conditions. In a sense the regime was unlucky. Though committed to health reform, it had to 
now govern within the context of economic crisis alongside the guiding hands of the World Bank and the 
IMF: agencies not known for their widespread sympathy of the critical social role of the state in 
developing countries. The chain effect of economic crisis was that other than rationalisation programmes, 
it could only manage ad-hoc policy measures during its tenure which did not address the main concerns of 
the professions, excluding salary increases. On the other hand the regime could be blamed for persevering 
with a relatively modified, phased medical complex policy implementation to the detriment of other areas. 
In addition the regime continued to train nurses, given IMF commitments, although it seemed unable to 
employ them. While the IMF conditions could be held responsible for this state of affairs, the NAR's 
lack of attention to nursing policy was a serious miscalculation. The end result was the paradoxical effect, 
like Guyana and Jamaica where nurses were badly needed for the public services, and were being 
produced, but ended up instead in the US, Canadian, British and Saudi health systems because of limited 
resources to effectively employ and keep them at home, which returns us to Anderson's (1988) Cumper's 
(1993) thesis of lack of effect demand. 
The strong, and in most cases, debilitating influence of economic structural factors is probably the 
single most powerful factor that influenced the health migration problem and regime responses to the 
problem in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad in the 1980s. However, I have tried to show that to accept this 
simple explanation is to deny the complexity of the policy process even within developing states. In 
Guyana in the first half of the 1980s, economic problems were compounded by Burnham's party 
paramountcy and survivalism, which helped to undermine his government's own policies including health, 
as well as the confidence of human resources in the health sector, which hastened, inter alia, doctor and 
nurse migration during this period. In the second half of the 1980s, after Burnham's death, his equally 
non-democratic successor President Hoyte had little economic and political room for manoeuvre and 
hence had to begin the political and economic reform process. This was achieved partly due to political 
pressures linked to IMF and other forms of financial assistance. While migration continued unabated and 
regime responses were limited, the advent of elections and regime change in 1992, signalled the hope of 
improved conditions and reforms which would stem the tide. In Jamaica the situation was clearly one of 
economic adjustment, given the lack of financial support at the end of the cold war, though evidence 
pointed to poor mismanagement of resources. 
As economic crisis deepened, more Jamaican nurses and doctors - but particularly the former - left to 
search for jobs and better rewards. In Trinidad by contrast, the availability of funds in the 1970s had 
disappeared in the 1980s with serious consequences for the health sector. As the Chambers regime 
battled, like those in the other two countries to maintain basic services, the only policy that received 
sustained support was the medical complex project. This was rightly viewed as an example of the 
regime's misplaced priorities at the time. The Chambers regime's options were limited in the case of 
health migration. So was its successor regime, the NAR. The example of the neglect and lack of support 
for the nurse practitioner programme by the end of the 1980s reveals both successive regime neglect and 
medical influence, given the fact that implementation would have cost much less than the billion 
dollar 
medical complex. By the end of the 1980s then, although the negative effects of adjustment programmes 
were being felt and heightening the health migration process, national governments in all three states were 
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now fully on the road to reform after years of ignoring it for lack of political incentives to do so. The only 
problem was that such reforms were not totally in the interests of health workers as we shall see in the next 
section. 
6.6 REGIME CHARACTERISTICS DEVELOPMENTS IN GUYANA, JAMAICA AND 
TRINIDAD IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE 1990s 
Two factors helped to ease medical and nurse migration in the 1990s. The first was the restriction of 
entry to doctors and nurses in the UK and the USA. The second was the implementation of fundamental 
health reforms within these developed states. In the case of the former, while not banning entry, the 
restrictions were partly a recognition of the unfairness of the global health migration phenomenon. 
Regime characteristics were superseded by economic factors in the 1990s as political democratisation was 
no longer a major issue, with the focus increasingly on administrative and sectoral policy reforms. Nurse 
migration in particular persisted, though in Guyana, this slowed with the new democratically-elected 
government. Nurse migration thus remained a serious problem. The steady attrition to private sector and 
overseas saw the near collapse of the health system at all levels (Carr, P; Tesheira, G. interviews, 1994). 
The legacy of the past two decades meant that instant solutions were unrealistic. However the national 
health reforms, although part of adjustment conditions, offered a new start and with it, the hope of 
curbing health migration. With Guyana still one of the world's heaviest per capita debtors by the mid 
1990s, the prospects were still gloomy. 
Jamaica fared did not fare much better in terms of economic conditions, although active policy 
responses to remedy the prevailing system in the early 1990s gave cause for hope. The newly elected 
Manley (later to be succeeded by P. J. Patterson) PNP regime abandoned its socialist rhetoric and, like 
many developing countries in the 1990s embraced the `free market'. Some health professional 
improvement was due to unlikely sources. For instance, in 1990, the number of Jamaican doctors actually 
increased; due to the establishment of Trinidad's medical school. This meant that approximately 92% of 
the medical staff required was now being satisfied. However, the number of shortages among other 
groups especially nurses persisted. The government's own economic and social report for 1991 gave as 
the consequence of this chronic shortage, a continued rationalisation programme which saw the closure of 
more wards and/or amalgamation of wards. which were unmanned by nursing personnel on evening or 
night shifts; reduction in the numbers of elective surgery; unattended deliveries; high incidence of 
absenteeism and low morale among nurses and poor quality nursing care (Government of 
Jamaica/Economic and Social Survey, 1991: 20.1). 
Noting that nursing vacancy rates of approximately 45% was a major cause for concern, the regime 
announced a number of measures to reduce the manpower shortage through a variety of programmes 
(Government of Jamaica/PIOJ, 1991: 100-101). They included training to fill approximately 60% of 
vacancies over the 1991-1996 period, including the restart of the enrolled assistant nurse (EAN) 
programme suspended since 1980 by the Seaga government; the provision of incentives to retain staff, 
particularly those trained at the government's expense; the establishment of new health human resources 
categories; renewed support for the community health aide (CHA) programme, which had been cut by 
approximately 50% under the Seaga government; and even negotiating with private medical practitioners 
to do sessions at public hospitals as a stop-gap measure. A package of incentives designed to retain staff 
was also announced, including salary increases for nurses above the 12.5% wage guidelines; increased 
allowances for key hospital staff, and better access to housing for all health workers. (Planning Institute 
of Jamaica, 1991: 100-101). Attrition of nurses had however slowed considerably when compared with 
previous years: in 1991,80 nurses had resigned, compared with an average of 375 over the previous 
four 
years, although 112 were recruited (35 from abroad). However, despite these noteworthy attempts at 
policy reform, the impact of structural adjustment continued to exert a great impact on the decision of 
nurses to migrate. Even though all nurses were bonded according to the cost of their fellowships, the 
migration problem persisted well into the 1990s (G. La Touche, interview). Even the World Bank's 1993 
policy paper on health reform highlighted the impact of nurse migration on Jamaica's health development 
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process, noting the nearly 50% vacancy rate, and the fact that the 111 registered nurses who resigned form 
the government service in 1990 took with them nearly US$1.7 million in government investment in 
training and education (World Bank, 1993: 141). 
In the case of Trinidad, the migration problem in the 1990s was similar for nurses, though, as 
predicted by Drayton and Ray in 1987, there was now also the danger of a glut of Trinidadian doctors 
with the commissioning of the medical school. Many overseas-based doctors thus returned home in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s, given the changes in UK and US policy. Many returned home but the state of 
public sector work environment forced many into the private sector. Given the paradox of a doctor `glut' 
in the country in the 1990s, after the expenditure of considerable resources since the 1970s together with 
the persistent dissatisfaction of those working in the public sector health, the general feeling was that 
health policy priorities were still confused, despite the implementation of the decentralisation policy in 
1994. Economic factors and low status continued to be the main problems. In the case of nurses, the 
chief nursing officer of the ministry of health noted the relationship between lack of status and the 
difficulty of retaining nurses: 
"... a nurse will endure and remain in a situation where they have the tools to do the 
job; it is when they are without these, that they lose hope... it is not just a matter of 
increasing the supply of nurses, but ensuring that nurses have the tools to work and 
that they have a say, and are not just a presence in policy forming decisions... " 
(Grayson, J, Trinidad Guardian, 7/9/91: 1). 
The chief nursing officer pointed out that 1991 was the first year that a nurse was on the traditionally- 
medical dominated Trinidad's delegation to the World Health Assembly annual meeting. The fact that 
this was considered a significant achievement by Trinidadian nursing professionals showed the extent of 
the extent of exclusion from the policy process. However Bryan underscored the complex 
interrelationship between these influencing factors: 
"... nurses comprise the single largest category of health manpower and thus the 
major providers of the country's health care. Yet [they] are subjected to some of 
the most debilitating and frustrating effects of the health care system. The policy 
decisions, made without nursing participation, have created confusion in the 
implementation programmes, and have hindered efforts of health care 
delivery.... lamentably nine years later, this statement can be accurately repeated... it 
is of particular concern that nursing manpower, both the largest provider of health 
care, and the most important element in the primary health care thrust, is being the 
most quickly depleted. Economic conditions are indeed a critical factor, but 
overall unsatisfactory and substandard working conditions are also significant 
contributing factors... " (Bryan, 1989: 14). 
Comment: The joint and interrelated impact of regime neglect economic factors, poor working 
conditions, poor status, medical dominance as seen in the nurse practitioner issue in Trinidad, contributed 
to health migration. Hence, like Guyana and Jamaica it is inaccurate to say that only economic 
factors 
were influential, although arguably the most dominant. Regime characteristics also along with the other 
factors, played important roles that cannot be neglected. Although migration continued 
into the 1990s, 
given the persistence of poor economic conditions, there was a general feeling that the adoption of 
national health reforms -some off which were arguably not in the nest 
interests of national health care - 
offered on balance for all three countries an improvement in the `policy neglect' status-quo of the past 
by 
finally placing health sector reforms on the agenda. 
6.7 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
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In assessing the role of regime characteristics as a push factor in health migration in the 1970s and 
1980s and government responses to the situation, one needs to first recognise the pervasiveness and 
generally negative effects of the main push factor: the structural economic, political and social influences 
explained by development theory. The key conditions of International Monetary Fund (IMF) adjustment 
policies such as wage restraints, reductions in government spending and elimination of government 
subsidies undermined the standard of living of all workers and enhanced migration. Other elements such 
as devaluation and increased indirect taxation also worsened social and economic conditions. IMF 
pressure, for example, to cut government spending had a disastrous effect on the provision of social 
services, so that hospitals and schools were partially or totally closed, or forced to operate with drastically 
reduced budgets. The inability by organisations such as the IMF, for example, to recognise the social 
impact of the above factors on skilled, middle class worker retention, as well as the elimination nursing 
posts for example at a time of structural adjustment where social conditions had deteriorated rapidly is 
surprising to say the least, although the World Bank's recognition of these problems must be 
acknowledged (World Bank, 1993). 
However, as I have argued here and throughout this study, agency-based factors or push factors: 
namely, the national regime characteristics and political calculations are important to any explanation of 
health human resources policy in the Commonwealth Caribbean state since they were also to blame for the 
health migration through both errors of omission and commission. The neglect of health policy under the 
illegal, undemocratic and coercive rule of Guyana's undemocratic coupled with poor economic 
performance throughout the period resulted in a situation of policy apathy and neglect. Political 
persecution as well as economic factors were therefore triggered all migration including health 
professional migration. In Jamaica in the 1970s, the explanation was somewhat different, again the 
distinguishing feature being regime characteristics. Although a radical socialist party like the Burnham 
regime, the Manley regime in the 1970s was democratic. In Jamaica in the 1970s then, the explanation 
was dominated more by economic than political characteristics-based factors, although these were also 
influential, along with other factors such as medical dominance. In Trinidad there is similar interrelation 
between economic, political and other factors. Sudden economic wealth in the 1970s contrasted with the 
problems for Guyana and Jamaica as a result of the same event - the 1973 `oil shock' - but surprisingly 
had similar grave implications for health migration. There was less pressure and incentives for the 
survivalist, though still democratic Williams government to instigate political change and much-needed 
public sector reforms, including that for the health sector. The `oil bust' less than six years later revealed 
the extent of the public sector neglect. It forced national and low-politics health policy reform onto the 
agenda of succeeding regimes in the 1980s which gave these regime limited policy room for manoeuvre in 
both avoiding the reform issue, or conversely, fording adequate conditions to implement.. 
Far from being separate influences, I have also however argued in this chapter that the interrelated 
impact of these agency and structure-based influences are critical to understanding the Caribbean 
migration process. In the 1980s, structural adjustment programmes undermined policy in all three 
countries in the 1980s. However, this alone could not adequately explain the failure of successive 
Trinidadian governments to pursue inexpensive policy reforms as the PNM and NAR experiences with the 
nurse practitioner policy revealed. The influence of other nationally-based causes of nurse migration such 
as medical dominance, and low status of nurses, in spite of the popularity of the primary care approach 
also contributed to what was effectively a pattern of neglect and/or ineffective, piecemeal action. 
Although the regimes in all three countries in the 1980s recognised the need for reform, they delayed, for 
as long as was politically feasible, consideration of public sector reform until the late 1980s when IMF- 
driven reforms not only placed health sector reform on the agenda, but forced regimes to take far harsher 
action, than might have been necessary, had for instance, persistent calls for decades by doctors and 
nurses for health care reforms been heeded. The economic reforms had a negative impact, culminating in 
increased migration by the end of the 1980s. However, health sector reforms, finally implemented in the 
early 1990s offered some hope of improved working conditions in terms of stemming the migratory flows. 
despite concerns about the role of IMF and World Bank involvement in the process (Phillips, 1994). 
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In terms of external pull factors in the 1980s and 1990s, the impact of the demands of the adjacent and 
vast US health care system, together with its highly inflated wages was another decisive factor for 
Caribbean nurse migration also need be to included in an explanation of policy action and structure in the 
case of health migration from the developing state. The demands of even the distant Saudi health system 
proved attractive, despite restrictive conditions when compared to the low wages and poor conditions due 
to the almost intractable combination of politically- and apathy-based regime neglect, and a real inability 
to act within these states. The migratory trend which had changed in the 1960s, from the UK and towards 
the new destinations was therefore well-established. by the early 1990s. Despite the personal gains for 
Caribbean health workers and their remittances to these countries then, the ability of the US system in 
particular to manipulate its legislation to attract skills from resource-deprived developing states remained 
a significant problem and represented a recurrent cost to the development process (Pastor, 1985). 
Regime characteristics and motivations then cannot be ignored. It has been stated that Caribbean 
migration is deeply rooted in "... powerful structural-geographic, economic, familial and psychological 
reasons... " and attempts to study the region without an appreciation of this phenomenon cannot be 
plausible (Pastor, 1985: 22). However, given the above, there is some sympathy with the suggestion that 
"... governments have been reluctant to even consider policies on the subject... " (Blackman, 1985: 262). 
Pastor's conclusion (1985: 22) of migration that "... communities that have experienced heavy out- 
migration are generally stagnant... " could well be applied to the Guyanese situation after Burnham and 
Hoyte regime policy in particular (Pastor, 1985.259). While economic factors were pervasive, national 
health sector reform initiatives which did not necessarily involve the disbursement of scarce resources 
would have helped, but were either not implemented or considered. As Pastor notes, the prudent use of 
human resources and self-reliance is critical to development (Pastor, 1985: 259). In all three countries, 
the lack of coordination between planning, production and management went well beyond a bureaucratic, 
administrative issue and well into the realm of the political as we have seen to varying degrees in each 
case. This co-culpability, inaction, and lack of innovation at the national level to the migration problem 
was even noted in the regionally-appointed West Indian Commission's 1992 report whose remit included 
the health sector: 
"... governments have recognised that they cannot indefinitely produce trained 
personnel which are acceptable to markets in which shortages exist and then 
complain of lack of staff. It is possible to contemplate training persons to fulfil 
specific local needs without regard to any mythical international standard, with the 
knowledge that these persons cannot leave. Too many Caribbean countries refuse 
to take such actions, however and continue to train along traditional lines while 
bemoaning the loss of those individuals once they are trained. We do not believe 
that given the significant differential in financial benefits between the Caribbean 
and North America, the Caribbean will ever be able to solve its manpower 
shortages, especially in nursing, by offering greater financial incentives... " (1992: 
22). 
On the issue of migration as active government policy, Duany has noted that Caribbean governments 
cannot indefinitely rely on migration as a safety valve on both humanitarian and political grounds, as "... a 
development strategy that expels thousands of workers abroad is morally flawed and ideologically 
committed to preserving the status quo... " (1994,114). Palmer (1990: 14) similarly points out that policy 
responses to the migration problem have only dealt with the effects rather than the real causes of the 
problem, which though structural, allowed some limited amount of opportunity for manoeuvre for 
developing states, and which was in many instances either ignored or neglected. In terms of the 
pervasiveness of both pull and push factors then, Logan's summary of the Jamaican nursing position in 
1980 can well apply to developing state health human resources policy migration dilemma in the 1990s: 
"... Insofar as there are some countries which consider they need more health 
manpower and can pay for it, there will always be `pull factors" somewhere in the 
world. So, countries with "push factors " will always be at risk and should attempt 
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to eliminate them if they wish to curb migration... national administrations 
concerned about outflow will therefore need long-term planning involving revision 
of policies regarding supply and distribution, productivity, and utilisation of 
manpower... action is needed; action at the national level... the need for national 
nurses associations to get involved in the policy process, through collaboration with 
governments in assessing the extent of movement and devise measures to modify 
patterns of nurse migration in desired wavs... the international flow of nurses and 
indeed of health manpower is currently unpredictable and largely uncontrolled, and 
seems to alter quite rapidly in terms of size and direction. It is the result of an 
interaction between `push " and `pull " factors. The policy implications at the 
national level for both donor and recipient countries are clear. On/v well-calculated 
policies and plans can control the f ow in desired ways.... " (Logan, 1980: 121). 
To summarise then, my findings in this comparative case study suggest first, that the economic and 
political as well as a number of other factors influence the process, to a complex extent that deserves 
further study to elucidate. Nevertheless, there is adequate evidence for the influence of regime legitimacy 
and democracy as important push determinants in the nature and extent of the health migration process, 
especially in its interaction with other influencing factors. Economic factor and environmental factors are, 
of course, critical, even overwhelming in some cases. However, equally important at the national level are 
the presence of apathy and inaction as well as well as miscalculation in terms of assessment of health 
human resources needs for various categories, leading to expensive solutions such as Trinidad's medical 
school. It also led to the emergence of paradoxical situations, also in that country, where theoretically 
there was no shortage as similar numbers, if not more, were being trained, but where there were still 
numerous vacant posts and shortages, given government inability to fund their employment within the 
public service. This situation, though not overtly political, had the hallmarks of health policy neglect and 
mismanagement, and neglect, which, when compounded with the debt crisis, led to migration of many of 
these expensively-trained health sector human resources from these middle- to low income developing 
states. Significant pressure to change only arose, ironically enough, out of the negative consequences of 
structural adjustment and IMF conditions in the 1980s and 1990s which later triggered new and innovative 
approaches to the problem within the context of health reform programmes. The orientation towards a 
hospital-based, curative medicine pattern of consumption seen in developed countries is replicated, 
through the medical education and the structure of health services in underdeveloped countries. 
Regime responses to health migration in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad were probably more 
influenced by regime characteristics - particularly regime strength, ideology, democracy and maintenance 
- in the 1970s; and by economic factors in the 1980s. However to apply this simplistic, one-dimensional 
assertion to these countries is to deny the complex interaction of both economics and national government 
action with each other across the two decades, as well as with other important situational, structural, 
socio-cultural and environmental factors in the process which also need to be explained in any accurate 
analysis. As we saw in chapters four Trinidad was strong, while Guyana and Jamaica were economically 
weak, given the onset of the oil boom. Guyana and Jamaica were espoused variants of socialism which 
conditioned both countries' health and development policies for the rest of the decade. Both were 
relatively unstable. However the Burnham' regime's undemocratic, survivalist rule compared 
unfavourably with the Manley regime's democratic socialism. The impact on health migration then was 
bound to be conditioned by these factors. I therefore found that while both experienced serious health 
personnel migration problems in the 1970s, the reasons, in the case of Guyana, were also complicated by 
Burnham's survivalist, undemocratic rule, and the channelling of scarce resources for survival. Henry 
and Johnson's (1985) observation that education and training have always been viewed as a passport to 
geographic and social mobility applies to all three states - as well as to other low-to middle income 
developing states. The pervasiveness of economic and other factors is also a continued reality to be borne 
in developing state policy responses to migration. However, my findings reveal that policy responses are 
conditioned as much by national political/regime calculations as well as by national and international 
economic and professional factors. In short, this means that solutions to the migration problem must. at 
the very least, be addressed at all of these levels. 
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CHAPTER 7 
CASE STUDY (2): THE WILLIAMS, CHAMBERS AND ROBINSON REGIMES AND THE THE 
ERIC WILLIAMS MEDICAL SCHOOL POLICY IN TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO: 1971-1990. 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
In this second case study, I examine the context, determinants outcome of the policy decision in 
1971 to establish a medical school in Trinidad and Tobago. Examining the initial policy decision by the 
PNM/Williams regime and the follow-up actions and decisions taken by its successor regimes - the 
PNM/Chambers and the NAR/Robinson governments in post-independence Trinidad -I compare and 
assess the extent to which regime characteristics, particularly political survival influences low politics 
policy issues such as health, given other influences including economic, factors, medical interests and 
environmental factors. A secondary interest in this chapter is to examine this influence of regime politics 
on the developing state low-politics policy trajectory when `room for manoeuvre' exists within a specific 
time period. In doing so, I assess the relevance of regime characteristics, particularly survival, on 
outcomes, compared with other influences in low-politics policymaking and reform particularly where a 
policy's legitimacy, feasibility and support has not been clearly established, although the regime is 
strong, given sudden resource availability. I further examine the influence of regime change on policy 
reform when enabling conditions suddenly change. Finally, I examine the consequences and implications 
for developing states and developing state regimes of low-politics policy choices influenced by regime 
characteristics, particularly survival. The chapter is divided into five sections. In Section One I examine 
and compare the confluence of political and other factors at the regional and international levels - 
including regime characteristics and timing - which influenced the Williams government to build a 
medical school. In the second section, I examine and compare the influence of regime characteristics and 
medical dominance in the implementation process, particularly in expanding and changing the policy, 
beyond its original remit. In the third section, I examine the influence of regime change, the choices 
facing the two new regimes, and the bases of their eventual decisions, given their limited room for 
manoeuvre. In the final section, I analyse the implications of the original and successive policy decisions 
for Trinidadian health and health human resources development, and by extension, the developing state. 
7.2 POLICY CONTEXT: AGENDA-SETTING, DECISIONMAKING AND REGIONAL 
DEVELOPMENTS 
In order to understand the developments leading to the decision to establish a medical school/complex 
in Trinidad and Tobago in the 1970s, we first assess the three main `political' elements of the policy 
context: regional health politics; the prime minister's personal interest; and the perceived threat of private 
`offshore' medical schools and political conflicts - as sources of the policy. 
Regional politics in the post federation era and the case for a second Caribbean medical school 
As noted in the in Pujadas report on Trinidadian migration in Chapter Six, there was a real doctor 
shortage problem due inter alia to non-return of medical students. However, as this and other reports, 
including the Dolly report, pointed out the issue was not so much a training problem, but more one of 
poor planning and management, utilisation and non-reform (Dolly, 1992; Pujadas/UNITAR, 1971). 
Although economic factors, were influential in terms of effective demand and adequate remuneration, the 
years of unwillingness of the Williams government to effect public sector reforms also contributed to the 
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public sector health human resource shortage. Despite the graduation of about 30 Trinidadian doctors per 
year by 1971 (a figure deemed sufficient for the country's needs by the Pan American Health 
Organization) at the Mona Campus in Jamaica, chronic shortages were attributed almost entirely to lack of 
a Trinidadian medical school rather than the equally, if not more justifiable explanation of regime neglect 
of health services reform. 
The origins of this perception that a medical school was the solution to this problem go back to the 
politics of Commonwealth Caribbean tertiary education. The establishment of the University of the West 
Indies was an important element of the integrationist thrust that swept the region in the post-Moyne 
period. Funded by all Commonwealth Caribbean governments excluding Guyana, its main aim was to 
provide higher education for Caribbean nationals, hence saving member states enormous overseas training 
costs for all categories of tertiary education, while at the same time fostering the training and development 
of home-grown, and hopefully more appropriate human resources. Prior to the opening of the regional 
medical school in Jamaica, most medical students undertook their training mainly in the UK, Ireland and 
to a lesser extent North America. After the failure of political integration, the university represented one 
of the few areas that sustained the regional ethos. However inter-territorial rivalry was inevitable in the 
allocation process. The three campuses of the university were allocated the teaching of the main 
disciplines under the university arrangement: Barbados (law); Trinidad and Tobago, (engineering and 
agriculture); and Jamaica (medicine, pre-clinical and clinical). In the case of medicine, the regionally- 
funded university financed the medical school, while the Jamaican government largely funded the teaching 
hospital. Clinical training was also provided in Trinidad and Barbados, with their main general hospitals 
designated teaching hospitals to satisfy nationals of eastern Caribbean states who wished to continue their 
clinical training closer to home. While no contributing state was entirely happy with these arrangements, 
the economic and developmental benefits far outweighed the costs. 
Contributing to this situation was the inter-territorial political/ideological rivalry between Williams 
and Manley in the 1970s. The tensions between Jamaica and Trinidad go back to the days of Jamaica's 
undermining of the Commonwealth Caribbean federal experiment. Williams' personal bitterness at the 
failure of the West Indian Federation experiment in 1962 - due to Jamaican misgivings about these plans 
for regional economic and political integration - was an ongoing feature of his relations with that country. 
There were however other factors. Williams also wanted to carve out a more influential role for Trinidad 
(and himself) in the region, especially after the 1970 attempted coup, and especially after the 1973 
windfall as a result of rising oil prices. In wanting to do so, he found himself increasingly at odds with the 
newly-elected and democratic socialist Manley regime. Williams openly engaged in dialogue with both 
Cuba and the USA, but remained steadfastly non-aligned. Manley on the other hand, although a 
committed non-aligned leader, never concealed his pro-Cuba sentiments. Manley also had an 
international political profile. His model of democratic socialism attracted considerable attention 
throughout the developing world, and was actively promoted through his high-profile involvement as a 
possible `third path' model for development. While these factors did not directly influence the medical 
school policy, the fact that the region's medical school was located in Jamaica, and the Williams 
government's perception that the country was not adequately benefiting, from its financial outlay, given 
the number of Trinidadian doctors trained, (which marginally less than Jamaicans) helped to focus the 
government's interest in a new medical policy. 
Given. the above, another influential factor that paved the way for the medical school policy was first 
Williams personal support that gave legitimacy to the policy in tandem with the Inter-American 
Development Bank (IDB) which was to financially support this idea, and hence give it feasibility. 
The interrelated role and influence of Williams and the IDB: The Williams government appointed 
its own team of experts including two representatives of the clinical medical faculty in Trinidad to 
examine the possibilities of expansion of the hospital into a medical school, which happened 
simultaneously with the University of the West Indies own examination of the feasibility of the project 
(Williams, 1976: 39). The regime's perception of the problem was thus conditioned by its politics and 
was a dominant factor. Williams was personally, by this stage, fully convinced by the argument for a 
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medical as well as dental school, as a status-building health human resources option over the less 
glamorous, and potentially risky and dangerous loss of power through decentralised reform which was the 
only other alternative to address the concerns about health personnel shortages. In 1971, an Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB) `special committee', consisting of the University Council of the West 
Indies, medical `academics' as well as representatives of the Bank presented a report to Caribbean Health 
Ministers at their annual regional conference, on the feasibility of the expansion and/or duplication of the 
Faculty of Medicine, as well as dental training and general bio-medical research facilities (Government of Trinidad and Tobago, Hansard (House of Representatives), 1978: 1164-6). 
The report essentially confirmed the Bank's, and Williams' enthusiasm for the policy. The IDB 
Committee recommended that a new university medical centre should be established to cater for the needs 
of the Eastern Caribbean, and that this new teaching school be established in Trinidad where IDB was 
funding at that time, the establishment of a maternity hospital and a number of health centres throughout 
the country. The regional Caricom health ministers and the university council accepted in principle the 
Bank's recommendations for pre-clinical facilities to be centralised in Trinidad. The Committee 
emphasised however that when established, the school should produce doctors cognisant of the particular 
needs of the Caribbean. In the interim, the 1971 report recommended and, the policy was subsequently 
adopted by the University Council and medical faculty, that an increase in the Jamaican-based medical 
school's intake from 50 to 110 students was necessary, of which Trinidad's quota would be 30 students 
as noted above, which was generally supported (Williams, 1976: 39). The original idea for the medical 
school was Williams' ('Medical complex idea was sown by Williams', Trinidad Guardian, 27/9/91: 5; 
Williams, 1976). Indeed, as Williams himself noted at a regional medical research conference in 1976: 
"... I myself in my personal connection with the University in the earlier days, participated in those 
discussions which led to the report of the Special Committee... " (Williams, 1976: 39). However the 
support of the Bank during this pre-oil boom period was important in further enhancing the perception 
that a second Caribbean medical school was necessary. Another helpful influence, which helped to 
underline the Williams' government's perception was the offshore medical school which emerged in the 
mid 1970s. 
The `offshore medical school' justification 
At the regional level a study was commissioned by the Caribbean Community on the establishment of medical 
Dols by Private American universities in the smaller islands, including Grenada. Reporting to the Fourth Conference of 
the Caricom Ministers of Health in Saint Lucia in 1978 on the perceived `threat', the Bahamian health 
minister spoke for most delegates when he asserted that: 
"... from the national standpoint, there is little doubt that an educational institution should be meant to 
service the needs, hopes and aspirations of the country and region in which it is located. It should pay 
attention to the problems of the society and social aspirations of its people... " (Caricom/Charles, 1978: 
13). 
This investigation concluded that existing and planned facilities in the Caribbean for the training of 
medical manpower requirements in the Commonwealth Caribbean - including the school in Trinidad- were 
adequate and could be extended to meet future needs without the presence of any `offshore schools 
(Caricom Secretariat/4th Conference of Health Ministers, 1978). The view was one which undoubtedly 
reinforced the Williams government decision. As if to justify the policy decision, Trinidadian health 
Minster, Kamaluddin Mohammed stated that an offer had also been made to the Trinidad government by 
one such American school to provide TT$100,000 per year to the Trinidadian medical services if they 
were allowed to operate in Trinidad. Mohammed concluded that there was no valid justification for such 
development, in the region, of these "... profit-oriented entrepreneurs with little or no experience in 
medical education, to attract principally US students who have failed to secure admission to an American 
medical school... " and that "... participation in the establishment of such medical schools has already 
generated unfavourable publicity which can be ill-afforded by the countries of the English-speaking 
Caribbean... " (Mohammed, 1978: 1). There is little doubt that this sudden development alarmed the 
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Ministers of Health (many of whom were doctors themselves, and/or with doctors as their chief advisers) 
and reinforced the Williams government's decision. 
Comment: Reports of doctor shortages in Trinidad, the location of the regionally-funded medical 
school in Jamaica; the rivalry between the Williams and Manley regimes on the regional stage: the 
perception that Jamaica was benefiting more from the regionally-funded medical school than Trinidad - 
the other main contributor; and the support of Williams own idea of establishing a Trinidadian medical 
school to solve the problem - at the regional level by Caricom, and the international financing level by the 
Inter-American Development Bank - were all important factors that moved the issue swiftly beyond the 
agenda-setting stage to an informal policy decision by 1971. The subsequent establishment of American 
offshore medical schools in the Caribbean reinforced the government's policy position. In addition, the 
high cost of studying medicine in developed countries for those Trinidadian and other West Indian 
students was also an determining factor. There were however problems with this logic. While some level 
of doctor shortages existed, due mainly to migration to the private sector as well as to the more developed 
countries in search of better wages, conditions of work and post-graduate training, solutions had been 
offered in the same IDB recommendations on the training front. Despite a regional agreement that the 
number of Trinidadian medical students be increased to 30 at the Jamaica-based UWI medical school in 
1971 (a figure deemed sufficient for the country's needs by the Pan American Health Organization) 
chronic shortages and migration overseas and the local private sector still persisted, and with it the 
regime's belief that a medical school was the only solution. The Williams government thus interpreted 
this as a training problem. While economic and training factors were part of the problem, equally 
important was the unreformed state of the Trinidadian health services more than a decade after the calls 
for health sector reform in the 1957 Julien report, as we have noted in previous chapters. Thus, the 
decision was clearly taken by Williams, with these other factors simply underlining the need for the 
school. The government and Williams personally, then, were essentially convinced by this logic over the 
less glamorous, and potentially damaging loss of power through decentralised-based reform as we shall 
see in the next section. Meanwhile, the lack of resources for such a project was in 1971 the main problem, 
but not for very long. 
National level influences 
In this section I examine the influence of the two main national factors: first the political impact of the 
attempted overthrow of the government in 1970 on Williams refusal to countenance alternative 
devolution-based policies and the `oil shock' of 1973, both of which directly influenced the policy. 
The impact of the 1970 coup attempt and regime characteristics: As noted in previous chapters, the 
Williams regime's credibility was severely tested by its attempted, but unsuccessful overthrow 
1970. The 
crisis, which had its roots both in the `radical' politics of the period was also enhanced 
by the harsh social 
and economic context. Having retained the critical support of the army, and with the 
Westminster model 
still intact, the move towards the prime minister's distinct style of authoritarian government grew as a 
result and was cemented through a number of measures on the political front, such as 
his heavy reliance 
on select groups of policy advisers and lack of trust even of his own cabinet 
(Sutton, 1984). This 
authoritarianism was enhanced with the boycott in 1971 of the general election 
by the Indian-led 
opposition party with the regime gaining all 36 seats in Parliament, an event which saw the prime minister 
effectively assume total power, at least as far as the constitutional framework allowed. 
The administrative 
system inherited from colonialism was in urgent need of reform. Institutions needed to 
be nurtured and 
built up in order to translate social sector development policies into programmes of action. 
This, 
however, did not happen in quite the rational manner expected of the government, 
despite the regime's 
advocating of public service reform as a major concern (Sutton, 1984: 44). 
The bureaucracy, like others 
in the Commonwealth Caribbean, remained essentially the same, albeit with a new political master 
(Jones, 
1974a; Mills and Jones, 1976). The practice of `survival politics' was becoming entrenched. 
Power was 
effectively with Williams who refused to heed the calls from various elements 
in the society for 
fundamental reforms through inter alia, de-concentration of power and the active support of 
developmental institutional capability and processes. 
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Williams and the PNM in the immediate post-1970s period therefore faced a negative political fall-out 
as a direct consequence of the attempted revolution, the cause of which were largely the failure of the 
government's development strategies. The impact on development policy of these events was largely 
negative. Development plans for various sectors, including health were formulated but not implemented, 
due both to the ongoing economic crisis and Williams' fear of political reform. Administrative reform 
was however, urgently needed, having been endorsed by the numerous commissions of inquiry prior to 
and after independence. In the case of health, the point was recognised as early as 1957 in the Julien 
report, commissioned by the then Legislative Council (of which Williams was chief minister just prior to 
independence) that fundamental reform was urgently needed. The main goal, according to the Julien 
report was decentralisation of health services away from the excessive hospital-based, curative focus that 
existed (The Julien report, 1957). The Julien report was indeed itself a crisis-driven response to poor 
hospital conditions including staff shortages during the immediate pre-independence period: a type of 
response that would continue to dominate health policy decision-making processes throughout the post- 
independence era. The health situation had deteriorated considerably in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
given, inter alia, the economic crisis. The alternative and arguably more feasible option available to the 
regime was health service reform. The ability to improve salaries for doctors and other professional staff 
in most developing states was hardly a realistic option in an environment of limited resources. The option 
of fundamentally reforming the still colonially-structured health services through decentralisation would 
have yielded a marked improvement in working conditions of doctors and nurses, as the Julien report of 
1957. Reform, then under the Williams regime, was effectively on hold, but became even more sidelined 
in favour of ad-hoc policymaking in the aftermath of the 1973 `oil shock'. Between 1973 and 1978, total 
government revenue increased almost six times. The 1973 boom provided the PNM regime and the prime 
minister in particular with an opportunity to reinvent themselves at both the national and regional political 
levels (Sutton, 1984). Williams' and the PNM's political fortunes recovered as dramatically as the oil 
prices, as he and his group of trusted ministers and advisers set about planning and implementing a wide 
variety of industrial and social projects, which were implemented. In the case of the medical school 
policy, like many of the other grand projects formulated by the government and its advisers, it was now 
fully on the implementation agenda. 
Comment: Politically, Williams' popularity by 1973 had declined, and his `benign' authoritarianism 
had increased as a consequence, helped by the fact that between 1971 to 1976, due to an opposition 
boycott of elections, Trinidad was virtually a one-party state. Despite this, Williams was on the verge of 
departing from office when the dramatic change in fortunes occurred that would enable him to implement 
his unique and `ad-hoc' type of development strategy for the country. His practice of `survival politics' 
through, inter alia, centralisation and authoritarianism in decision-making after 1970 would have grave 
implications for the subsequent boom-driven developments in terms of this and other mega-projects that 
the government undertook in the aftermath of the rise on 1973 of oil prices. The main reason for the 
doctor shortage was more migration than limited places at the medical school. Many doctors indeed 
consistently blamed maladministration among their main reasons for leaving the public sector. The 
regime however refused to entertain this power devolution-based reform alternative to solving the 
shortage and migration problems. This inability to implement these highly-recommended and feasible 
management-based alternatives can be traced to the prime minister's own distrust of the civil service and 
its `leaders' whom he saw as a threat to his power, his unwillingness to devolve power given his 
presidential-style authoritarian rule after the attempted overthrow. The oil boom placed the medical 
school/complex policy back onto the implementation agenda by 1975. 
7.3 REGIME CHARACTERISTICS, THE BOOM, MEDICAL `ACADEMIA' AND THE 
DECISION TO IMPLEMENT THE POLICY 
Even though the policy was back onto the agenda in the wake of the oil boom, it was about to be 
fundamentally transformed and expanded. First, Williams himself had stated as early as 1971 that the 
government also wanted to establish both a dental school and an advanced nursing school. While a case 
could be made for the latter, the dental school was a particularly controversial addition, given the 
country's need of only 5 trained dentists per year (PAHO/WHO estimates) as well as the recurrent costs of 
running such an institution. Despite the existence of a medical research facility in Trinidad - the 
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regionally-funded Caribbean Epidemiology Centre (CAREC), some effective lobbying by the 
Commonwealth Caribbean Medical Research Council (CCMRC) was rewarded when the Prime Minister 
announced that medical research would be an integral part of the new `complex' (Williams, 1975). With 
the country awash in oil dollars, consultations with a variety of health professionals including 
veterinarians, dentists, pharmacists and nurses saw these disciplined added to the original medical school 
project. The medical school policy was transformed in a short space of time into the medical complex 
policy. 
Comment: As if to elicit support for the proposed project, the health minister Kamaluddin Mohammed 
continually registered his concern at various forums - including medical association meetings - about the 
shortage of health personnel, especially doctors. In doing so he outlined the PNM government's health 
human resources strategies including changing legislative procedures - which was actually implemented 
in 1975 - to allow American and Canadian-trained doctors to practice. On the positive side, in a move 
towards primary health care, he urged the university and other training institutions to immediately re- 
orient; 'training to suit Caribbean needs. He also outlined the desire of the government to introduce 
new categories of staff "... in line with present day thinking on the composition and function of the health 
team" and noted that policy would be based on intersectoral coordination and integration. He also urged 
doctors to be more community-oriented (Mohammed, 1975: 28-35). These statements reflected 
international policy trends at the time. However, the inability of the minister and the regime to identify 
and address the bigger problems facing the health service which forced many doctors to migrate in the 
first place which was creating the on-going crisis situations and the imminence of the medical `complex' 
implementation process placed these policies and admonitions into perspective. 
The medical research lobby was duly rewarded. Addressing the 21st meeting of the Commonwealth 
Caribbean Medical Research Council on April 21,1976 both the prime minister and his health minister 
pledged that medical research would be a very significant component of the `medical complex' project, 
with Mohammed stating without irony that "... a key word in this decision-making process is social 
relevance... " (Mohammed, 1976: 40-41). Williams' friendship with the then head of the CCMRC was 
also a central factor in the decision to focus on medical research, despite the existence of an existing 
research institution, CAREC. Referring to his budget speech on December 12,1975, Williams stated that 
both the medical faculty and the university council were still supportive of the policy, funding the teaching 
hospital, while the government would fund the rest of the project. To implement the policy, he also 
announced in 1976 that the Trinidad government had established a new committee, the Barsotti 
Committee under the chairmanship of the finance ministry's permanent secretary and comprising senior 
technical officials from this ministry, as well as the health ministry in addition to two representatives of 
the university medical faculty branch in Trinidad (Williams, 1976: 39). This commission was charged 
with considering the procedures and arrangements for the establishment of the medical school as well as 
the feasibility of establishing dentistry, veterinary, pharmacy and nursing teaching facilities. 
Regime characteristics and the decision to underwrite the `complex' 
Funding was now the main issue. The Barsotti Committee urged the Cabinet to consider approaching 
international lending agencies, including the IDB given the ever-increasing funds needed. In addition, 
they acknowledged that the poor economic situations in other Caricom countries indicated that the 
Trinidadian government would be required to meet all or most of the cost associated with the project. In 
addition, disputes developed between the Trinidad government and the University Council, on financial 
responsibilities for the project. As a consequence of the boom, Williams decided to bear the full cost of 
constructing and equipping the teaching hospital and the medical school. In addition, he also expanded 
the policy, announcing that the schools of dentistry and nursing would also be established. Both would be 
run under a new tertiary education organisation, the National Institute for Higher Education (NIHERST) 
and would be integrated with the medical school (Williams, 1976: 40). A paediatric hospital would also 
be built and be the responsibility of NIHERST, but incorporated into the university teaching school 
structure under terms and conditions agreed by regional member governments. In relation to the capacity 
of the medical school, the government on the basis of technical advice decided on an annual intake of 
between 60-70 students (Mohammed, 1976). 
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These developments, including the development of NIHERST were undoubtedly influenced by the oil 
boom and the government's lack of confidence in the ability of the regional university to deliver adequate 
health manpower to Trinidad. His intention was to demonstrate that Trinidad and Tobago could go it 
alone. Policy as political imagery and symbolism thus replaced any sense of bounded rationality in dealing 
with the real causes of the doctor shortage problem. In his 1976 budget speech, the Prime Minister 
justified his decision to establish all of the schools, noting in particular the importance of dental and 
paramedical training in the program. His stated intention was to implement a `two-track' approach, with 
the medical school accounting for professionals and a second approach that would see the training of 
paramedical/auxiliary staff to satisfy Trinidad's health needs. The establishment of NIHERST was to 
focus on the latter. By June 1976, the University of the West Indies' University Council had fully 
accepted the recommendation that a medical school be established at Mount Hope, Trinidad on the site of 
the newly constructed maternity hospital. 
Comment: Williams style of party governance impacted on the decisions being made during this 
stage. The initial IDB-funded and formulated maternity hospital, had thus grown to encompass the 
medical school, and the dental, pharmaceutical, advanced nursing and veterinary schools all within a 
short space of time. This type of `ad-hocism' in the policy process showed a distinct lack of prioritisation, 
reflecting as much the effects of the oil boom and the presidential politics being practised by Williams 
himself, as it did regional politics; the perceived need for a medical- as well as other schools; the IDB's 
interest in the project, and the offshore school programme. It also reflected the influence of the medical 
academics and researchers. This situation is not unique to Trinidad, as Ugalde's study of the influence of 
the medical profession health policy-making in Colombia illustrates (Ugalde, 1979). However, three 
factors are also operative here: Williams, support; the oil boom; and the increasingly powerful role of 
medical academics. The pro-active personal support and involvement of the prime minister, and his 
regime's strength on the back of the oil boom were evident. In the case of medical interests, what was 
different was the increasing involvement of `medical academics' - as distinguished from the general 
medical profession - who seemed to have the greatest influence on policy, and upon whose technical 
knowledge the project was heavily reliant. Although a small group, they exerted considerable influence 
given the nature of the policy. The confluence of all of these factors were thus influential. The decision 
to underwrite the medical school - now complex - policy was based on the PNM regime's strength given 
the oil boom. The resulting ad-hoc, symbolic, snowball effect policy process that ensued, also reflected a 
need for power, higher status, popularity and electability by Williams personally and his ruling party, 
though the power and status argument can also apply to the medical academics now sensing their 
opportunity for a slice of the country's largesse. While the government's stated tertiary/auxiliary 
approach to health human resources was a nominally good move by the regime, the inevitable outcome of 
a focus on the former meant that not only was the original policy objectives vastly different, but their 
absorption of resources meant that little resources and attention was paid to the paramedical and other 
innovative health human resource approaches. Worse, little attention was being paid to the fundamental 
sectoral reform question. 
Implementation 
On Friday 6th April, 1978, Trinidad and Tobago's minister of health Kamaluddin Mohammed 
formally announced in Parliament, the PNM regime's decision to establish the medical complex for the 
training of health professionals in medicine as well as dentistry, veterinary science, pharmacy and post- 
graduate nursing. A number of reasons were given which informed the Government's decision. The first 
was the government's stated recognition of the limited numbers of Trinidadian medical students admitted 
to the regionally-funded University of the West Indies (UWI) medical school at Mona, Jamaica. Coupled 
with this were the severe restrictions placed upon the admission of overseas students to medical schools 
and universities in metropolitan countries. The minister expressed the government's determination "... to 
ensure that the Mount Hope medical school would be of high repute, acceptable to international 
standards... " with facilities for the teaching of the areas outlined above as well as facilities for biomedical, 
applied and operational research in health and other related matters ('Mt. Hope Medical Complex', 
Hansard, House of Representatives 1978/9: 1164-6). Mohammed justified the policy decision noting that 
Trinidad had only 700 doctors in 1975 and with rapidly expanding services would need more. He noted, 
somewhat ominously however that the medical complex would alone need a staff of 300 doctors when 
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fully operational, while the expansion of health services - through the building of health centres - throughout the country would mean the need for another 450 doctors by 1989 ('Mt. Hope Medical 
Complex', Hansard, House of Representatives 1978/9: 1164-6). The offshore school justification was 
again used for the medical school policy in the parliament. It was informed that the complex would meet 
the health human resource needs not only of Trinidad, but also the smaller islands of the Eastern 
Commonwealth Caribbean countries, as initially discussed between the government and the University 
seven years earlier. The establishment in Grenada of a private `offshore' medical school, and the 
possibility of more such schools in the other smaller territories meant, according to the health minister, 
that "... the urgent need to train health personnel to the highest professional level to man our expanding 
health services... " was necessary given the "dubious antecedents" and "questionable standards" of these 
schools ('Mt. Hope Medical Complex', Hansard, House of Representatives 1978/9: 1164-6). 
The initial Barsotti Committee was disbanded, according to the minister, and a new task force, chaired 
by medical researcher and Commonwealth Caribbean Medical Research Council (CCMRC) member, 
David Picou was appointed in 1978 with special terms of reference relating to the implementation of the 
Mount Hope Medical Complex project. These included visits to medical schools abroad, and liaising with 
the University of the West Indies (UWI), Government departments, and statutory and other related bodies. 
The members of the Task Force, at least half of whom were medical academics and professionals of the 
various disciplines were to report to a ministerial review committee, chaired by the Energy Minister Errol 
Mahabir and including eight other senior ministers. Concerns about the `blank-cheque' given this task 
force to implement the project would later be raised by many, including the future health minister who 
would inherit the completed physical infrastructure himself less than a decade later (Hosein, interview, 
1994). 
Government Members of Parliament were unstinting in their praise and support of the medical 
complex project. Supporting the motion, one Member of Parliament, the minister's brother, Sham 
Mohammed noted that "... it is good to see that the thinking in the medical field in the Caribbean is to put 
the emphasis on primary health care... " (Hansard, 1978/9: 1217). This was either a response to the plans 
for curricular reform in light of Alma Ata, or else a grave misunderstanding of the primary health care 
approach. He commended the medical fraternity for its educational objectives which he understood to be 
to be the production of doctors: 
"... who possess attitudes to prevention and to social action that result in their 
practising a truly comprehensive approach to medicine... [able to]... apply 
techniques of health promotion, prevention and the treatment of illness and to 
pursue lines of research appropriate to the needs and priorities of the 
Commonwealth Caribbean.... " (Hansard, 1978/9: 1215). 
The medical school policy was thus being `sold' both as a high-tech as well as preventive/community 
approach to medical training. However, even though such curricular reforms were eventually adopted at 
the school in the early 1990s, it continued to be conceptualised as potentially the best high-technology 
hospital in the Caribbean in numerous political speeches. Moving the motion of support, Sham 
Mohammed reflected the general acceptance of the `big is better' logic common to many developing state 
regimes, curiously linking it, like the minister, to community health and "the local environment" added 
that: 
"... it is going to be the largest single building complex of its kind in the Caribbean... 
far reaching in terms of improving the quality of our health service and the skills 
and knowledge of health personnel... it expected that with the provision of medical 
education at Mt. Hope, a doctor would be more oriented in work in the local 
environment and more acutely aware of the health needs of the community in which 
he serves.... " (Hansard 1978/9: 1226-1229). 
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The minister added that the government was searching for, and had received applications from 
academic staff "of high calibre", nationals from home and abroad, and that "several eminent persons" had 
already applied for work (Hansard, 1978/9). Supporting the motion, another government MP, Winston 
Williams expressed a similar `third-worldist', colonial type of medical logic as referred to in Chapter One, 
giving due regard to the work (including the `invaluable' foreign visits to medical schools) undertaken by 
the Task Force, and asserting that considerable savings would accrue to the country as a result: 
"... This is the type of thing we are looking forward to: saving space, money and 
manpower. With a project like this, one can begin to feel what real independence 
means ... I 
feel every doctor should try to specialise in some area. Many doctors 
would have liked to do that, but because of lack of facilities are unable to do 
so... medicine in the big countries has gone a long way. Many of our doctors find it 
not only more profitable but more satisfying to work in the foreign countries where 
there are facilities to meet their type of training... the cost of the medical complex is 
very high so the task force went on the journey to bring back the sort of information 
to reduce the appalling cost of medical tuition... " (Hansard 1978/9: 1226-1229). 
The decisionmaking process at this critical stage was now confined almost totally to the Task Force 
which reported directly to the Cabinet on the project, with little or no consultation with the non-academic 
medical profession or any other group or even the totally-sidelined technocrats at the ministries of health 
and education. Despite impressions given, there was surprisingly little real involvement of the ministries 
of health (with the exception of the minister, the chief medical officer and the permanent secretary) or 
education (whose permanent secretary was also on the Task Force) in the policy formulation process, as 
power was exclusively in the hands of the Task Force. Dr. Emmanuel Hosein, who would a decade later 
become the health minister confirmed this, noting that in his capacity as a member of the public accounts 
committee of Parliament in the mid 1980s, the permanent secretary of the education ministry had been 
unable to answer even simple questions about the Task Force's operations, even though the complex was 
being implemented as an education project (Hosein, interview, 1994). Many doctors were also sceptical, 
even at this stage about the feasibility and need for the project. The Trinidad and Tobago Medical 
Association (TTMA) expressed its concern at not being consulted in relation to the policy. The chief 
medical officer addressing their annual meeting nevertheless told doctors that: 
"... my sincere wish is that the TTMA will seek to be actively involved in these 
developments 
... it is 
fit and proper that those responsible for the delivery of health 
care should participate in determining this type of medical graduate product... " 
(Quamina, 1977: 31). 
Meanwhile, on a somewhat positive side, in an effort to demonstrate intersectoral coordination, she 
also noted that the government had decided, based on the decisions of Caribbean Health Ministers 
(CCHM) in 1973 and a 1977 Conference convened by the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) and the 
Commonwealth Fund for Technical Cooperation (CFTC) to formalise linkages between the UWI medical 
faculty and the Ministry of Health. The University, it was pointed out, was initially reluctant to entertain 
the idea until 1977. The then chief medical officer admitted of this radical attempt at coordination that 
"... to what degree of success only time will tell... " (Quamina, 1977: 31). However, given the increasing 
disquiet about the rapidly expanding project, even this progressive policy initiative seemed insignificant. 
The government nevertheless claimed that the project enjoyed widespread approval, with the health 
minister again justifying it with the somewhat spurious logic that: 
"... this is why we have dealt with the Pan American Health Organization (PAHO), 
the World Health Organization (WHO) experts and professors in the United 
Kingdom, Canada and the United States, all of whom have the approval of the 
international organisations concerned... " (Hansard 1978/9: 1203). 
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This however was not a simply a question of overseas experts or the PAHO/WHO or the IDB, but one 
of a deliberate policy choice being implemented without exploring less expensive and more effective 
alternatives by Williams and the PNM. As for the recurrent costs required for the project, the Minister 
had to admit that "cost-wise we do not yet know... " which basically summed up the `blank-cheque' 
approach to policy formulation and implementation that was to dominate subsequent developments, at 
least until the recession hit in the late 1970s and early 1980s. (Hansard 1978/9: 1203). 
Comment: The policy implemented in 1978 was thus vastly expanded from the original 1971 remit. 
The government used a number of justifications, including the offshore school, which itself did not 
explain the expansion into other schools: largely Williams' ideas, supported by leading (and eager) 
professionals from each sector. In the case of the medical school policy, the government continued to 
insist that its new policy would solve the medical shortage crisis, and not only that, would help the overall 
community health system. These somewhat questionable views were supported by government 
politicians which, in the context of the authoritarian politics of Williams and the PNM were not exactly 
objective about the use of this fortuitous `policy window' available to the country. Decisionm" as 
confined to the task force reporting to cabinet, with even health professionals, particularly doctors'Many 
of these doctors were not surprisingly opposed to the policy for a variety of reasons, the main one being 
the continued neglect of health sector reform, even during this oil boom period. As the government and 
the health minister continued to justify the policy, there were further concerns raised from different 
quarters. 
Other policy concerns 
The National Advisory Council (NA C) recommendations on health human resources: There were 
important gaps in the policy logic being used by the regime, as policy implementation proceeded apace. 
The government seemed to have largely ignored the main findings of a consultancy commissioned in 1978 
by its principal national policy advisers, the National Advisory Council (NAC) which questioned the goals 
and logic at the heart of the government's health and health human resources policy position at this time, 
particular in relation to the medical school policy, i. e. the production more medical staff to remedy the 
existing chronic shortages. In April 1978, the Peat Marwick Mitchell consultancy firm presented its 
recommendations to this Advisory Council in a report, titled "A strategy for improvement of health 
services: an interim report". The Council's remit in the case of the health sector was a review of proposals 
for the expansion of medical education in Trinidad including the training of health auxiliaries and to 
formulate projections for manpower needs in the medical field among other areas. The Peat Marwick 
Mitchell group report to the Advisory Council identified a number of problems the health services which 
confirmed the recommendations of the 1957 Julien report and subsequent reports, while voicing concerns 
over the `medical complex' policy. These findings included, inter alia: 1) poor utilisation of trained staff; 
2) an absence of properly structured staff development programs; 3) an absence of effective supervision; 
4) general inefficiency and frustration of committed personnel; and 5) high staff turnover. Highlighting 
the glaring lack of a health policy during this boom period, the report also noted that the health ministry 
needed a policy determination, development and evaluation group to assist in determining its overall 
direction; 2) a planning program development division for ensuring that programs are developed in 
response to specific needs; and 3) an adequate information system needed to assist managerial staff in the 
decision-making process (Peat Marwick Mitchell report, 1978: 15). 
On the specific issue of health human resources development, the Peat Marwick Mitchell group noted 
a number of other influencing factors. It stated that medical professionals were in scarce supply largely 
because current methods of compensation tended to aggravate the problem. It also added significantly - 
for an accountancy firm - that one of the main problems was that Trinidad's health care was 
highly 
medicalised with emphasis being on cure rather than "prevention" and "care", and that as a result, 
programmes and activities were being adversely affected by this "inappropriate emphasis" Peat Marwick 
Mitchell group report, 1978: 15). This factor, the report opined, was probably due to medical technical 
dominance within the health ministry (Peat Marwick Mitchell group report, 1978: 15). Noting the need for 
health reform, it criticised the lack of flexibility in the ministry against the fact that the concept of health 
1 ') 
was a dynamic one, adding that there was a conflict between administrative and technical staff and little 
community involvement in health services. It finally stressed that a goal-oriented programme approach to 
health development be adopted and the need for collaboration with other pertinent ministries as well as 
communities (Peat Marwick Mitchell group report, 1978: 15). The problems of health manpower were 
effectively blamed therefore on the absence of health reform and need to encourage more effective use of 
inter alia, human resources. The significant implication of this report for government policy generally, as 
well as for he medical complex policy specifically, was that the government was approaching policy in a 
high-tech manner when less sophisticated, infinitely more cheaper solutions such as a primary approach to 
training as well as fundamental organisational reform were really needed 
The Inter American Development Bank's Caricom health policy concerns: Additionally, at the 
regional level, here were also indirect concerns about the Caribbean policy implementation process, 
expressed by the IDB, that seemed to be alluding to the Trinidadian policy predicament. In 1979, the 
Inter-American Development Bank presented a report to the Caricom Health Minister's meeting on the 
feasibility of expanding and/or duplicating the faculty of medicine hinted at the neglect of Caribbean 
health services by regional governments (Caricom/IDB, 1979). This report criticised the lack of activity 
on the reform front of member states. Echoing the recommendations to the Trinidadian National Advisory 
Council, this report blamed the absence of sound health planning and inappropriate balance as the main 
problem from which all the other problems emanated. It noted that in most Caribbean Community states, 
a high proportion of national health budgets being spent were being spent on hospital services; that rural 
health facilities were understaffed, and that hospitals were also understaffed but overcrowded. The report 
further noted the emerging gap in health provision, where, in these relatively poor countries, more than 
half of all patients were being forced to pay for private care; that while many practitioners are paid by the 
governments to give public care, they were devoting a great part of their attention to private practice; that 
certain types of badly-needed, but more sophisticated care management for diseases that are very common 
such as hypertension, diabetes and health disease are available, but only to a limited, `better-off segment 
of the population. This report, echoing the Peat Marwick Mitchell report also noted that there was an 
excessive curative focus; and that because of the absence of a systematised approach to teamwork, there is 
a grave lack of effective utilisation of paramedical and auxiliary personnel. These concerns while 
directed at all member states of the Caribbean Community, were thus particularly resonant in the case of 
Trinidad, given the ad-hoc nature of the medical complex policy. 
The fact that Trinidad of all thirteen Caribbean Community member states was the only oil producer 
simply made the failure to address the health reform question at all, all the more inexplicable. One former 
Caribbean medical professor, addressing a Commonwealth medical meeting in 1978, seemed to be 
articulating a popular Trinidadian concern about the Williams/PNM government's policy and wider 
concerns about the possibilities for health human resources development in the post-colonial state when he 
noted that: 
"... with increasing affluence, large new [teaching] hospitals still continue to spring 
up in some developing countries and... regarded almost as national status symbols. 
This commonly entails the draining off of both material and personal resources from 
community centres and rural programs... it also leads to the production of graduates 
who have a disproportionate bias towards institutionalised care. Medical schools 
themselves also need to re-examine their roles... too often they lay great emphasis on 
excellence as defined by the more developed countries than on appropriateness in 
the context of their own... " (Stuart, 1978: 4). 
Despite these criticisms and concerns, the project continued with the medical faculty of the university 
establishing its own `steering committee' to liaise with the Trinidad government in preparing the 
expansion plan and as well as curriculum details. The Task Force visited a number of "modern teaching 
hospitals" in the US, Canada, France as well as one in the French Caribbean: Guadeloupe (Hansard, 1978: 
1183). A number of veterinary and dental consultants were also enlisted, while eight representatives from 
the Mona Campus of the University of the West Indies (UWI) visited Trinidad and assisted the Task 
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Force in examining the designs, which were subsequently modified. They completed and submitted their 
report in June 1977. 
Comment: The gap between the reality of the need for health services reform action at both the ideological and political levels, on the one hand, and the proactive, curative, cash-intensive medical 
complex policy, on the other, revealed a number of influences including: the role of the oil boom; the role 
of regime politics; and the role of medical influence on the process. The government was effectively 
ignoring the advice of its own appointed council that reform was needed, on the one hand, while 
proceeding with a policy that though having the support of the cabinet and government, medical academia 
and the Inter-American Development Bank (which voiced its own concerns at the regional level about the 
lack of administrative and ideological health reform), seemed to be rapidly losing support even from the 
broader, non-academic medical profession as a way of tackling the real reasons for doctor shortages in the 
country. The 1978 National Advisory Council (NAC) itself concluded from the Peat Marwick group 
recommendations that first, major and complex policy issues had to be resolved before any strategy for 
improvement could be proposed and that a wide variety of views existed within the medical profession 
and the health administration about the approach to any of the issues. The Advisory Council's 
recommendations essentially supported both the calls for sectoral/administrative reform of the health 
services, and the equally urgent need for a clear primary health-focused national health policy statement 
from the government. The only action that was taken however in relation to the recommendations of these 
report was the establishment by the Ministry of Health of a policy planning committee as well as two 
units: a policy determination, development and evaluation unit, and a program planning and budgeting 
unit. These were however implemented within the context of an unreformed ministry, as the government 
continued to neglect a grand reform policy/plan for the health sector, as well as other sectors it must be 
pointed out, in favour of its showpiece and `ad hoc' medical complex project. Implementation however 
was interrupted by Williams death and the onset of recession. 
Oil `bust', PNM leadership change and policy stasis: the Chambers regime (1981-86) 
Two major developments affected the PNM's implementation plans in the late 1970s and early 1980s: 
Williams death in 1981 and the almost simultaneous onset of economic recession in Trinidad as successive 
oil price falls began to rapidly convert the country from credit-rich to debt-ridden status. The physical 
construction process experienced a number of delays and eventually commenced on January 1,1981, at a 
time when the economic downturn had already started. Prime Minister Williams died exactly three 
months later. As oil prices fell however, the petro-dominated economy was severely jolted. The 
Chambers regime allowed the project to be continued since the contract had already been signed. 
However, the constraints of the economic situation also limited further policy movement under the new 
regime. From its start as a maternity hospital costing approximately 11.9m dollars, the Complex had by 
1985, and even before the commissioning process had started, absorbed well over half billion dollars of 
Government funding as it rapidly expanded and also due to the persistent delays, industrial disputes, 
corruption and contractual claims and counter claims ('Mt. Hope baby chalks up $1/2 billion bill', 
Trinidad Express, 1/2/87: 15). Dr. Neville Connell, the Health minister for most of the next five years 
under the new Chambers regime was largely silent about health policy issues generally, but more so about 
the role and future of the project after its physical completion. He did try however shore up the 
beleaguered project, as well as the University of the West Indies' gradual policy change towards the 
production of a more community-oriented doctor at the Mount Hope medical school in light of the 1978 
Alma Ata Declaration, noting in 1983 that medical schools had: 
"... for too long divorced themselves from the responsibility for meeting the needs of 
the health service it supplies with doctors. The medical profession with its absolute 
insistence on educational freedom has ignored its responsibilities to society by 
producing too many doctors who are educated to work in hospitals. In the 
Caribbean, the UWI has set out to produce a Caribbean doctor of excellence... " 
This upbeat assessment did not however dispel the feeling that the new Chambers government not only 
had limited room to manoeuvre but was, not surprisingly, unsure about its next move once the project was 
completed and handed over. As the Chambers government became increasingly unpopular, given the 
174 
crisis, and its lack of direction, it sought to extract some political mileage - in order to increase its popularity - by praising the completed physical infrastructure as the legacy of a caring political party. The physical 
infrastructure of the project was finished in November 1985: seventy (70) buildings on 135 acres, and a 
total cost, at the time of its hand-over to the government, of TT$657,422,000 (approx US$ 160 million). 
A lavish party was held on the grounds of the complex as it was handed over to the government, carefully 
timed to coincide with Trinidad's 10th anniversary as a republic in September 15,1986, and the 
impending general elections, and named (some might say more than appropriately) the Eric Williams 
Medical Sciences Complex in honour of the man who had conceived of the initial idea. Mahabir also 
outlined the possibilities as well as, without irony, the potential problems, when he stated at the handing 
over ceremony of the still unfinished complex that: 
"... This unique complex is large by any standards and represents a great challenge 
to the government and the people of Trinidad and Tobago. Its operation and 
maintenance will require vast human and financial resources, but it is a challenge 
to which we must rise for there is tremendous potential in this complex, not only for 
the people of Trinidad and Tobago but for the region as a whole.... " (`Medical 
complex idea was sown by Williams', Trinidad Guardian, 27/9/86: 5). 
Noting that the complex was carefully planned and executed with the best of Trinidadian expertise, 
including medical expertise, Mahabir stated that, "... apart from expert advice received from abroad, the 
scope and functions of the complex were defined with the full participation from our professors of 
medicine, our doctors, our educators, our dentists, our nurses, health planners, architects and engineers... " 
(Trinidad Guardian, "Medical complex idea was sown by Williams", 27/9/86: 5. The celebrations were 
shifted at late notice to the Complex site, in an attempt to shore up a now increasingly unpopular 
government, but the imagery of wastage and mismanagement was more evident (Trinidad Guardian, 
"Medical complex idea was sown by Williams", 27/9/86: 5). Despite these efforts however, the fortunes 
of the Chambers regime declined almost as dramatically as the oil prices. Although trying to spend its 
way out of the crisis, all that resulted was Trinidad's slippage from credit-rated to debtor nation. Many 
public sector workers including doctors, migrated either to the private sector or overseas. The medical 
school/complex project was still incomplete but continuing to absorb maintenance costs until the PNM's 
crushing defeat at the polls in December, 1986, leaving the options for the new regime severely limited. 
Comment 
The window of opportunity for Trinidad's health policy development, like its wider development 
process, seemed to be closing as the 1980s recession hit. Williams' successor, George Chambers could do 
no better than say that `the fete is over. Now its back to work' as oil prices dramatically fell on the world 
markets in the early 1980s (Sutton, 1984). Public disaffection with the Peoples National Movement 
(PNM) and the desire for change even saw the tradition of ethnic politics being bridged as the increasingly 
popular opposition coalition National Alliance for Reconstruction (NAR) party encompassed both major 
racial groups. While the PNM was to succumb to its worst defeat ever less than six months later, the fact 
that the NAR coalition had formed, constituted a political milestone for Trinidad's political system in 
terms of the possibilities of overcoming the traditional regime survival-based politics being practised. In 
the case of the medical school policy itself, the role of regime characteristics in the post-boom, post- 
Williams era on the policy is balanced by the economic and political dilemma facing the regime. On the 
one hand, economic recession had weakened the Chambers government, which although maintaining some 
elements of Williams survivalism, was committed to the democratic process. The new NAR government 
seemed interested in technocratic management and reform given the new economic situation. The impact 
on the medical school policy under the Chambers regime then, seemed to be a balance between 
having 
little choice but to continue, given that it had already started in light of the sudden economic constraints, 
and a dilemma about what to do when it was finished. The Chambers regime itself, then, reeling 
from a 
string of scandals, accusations of widespread corruption (some senior-level interviewees also noted that 
the Complex was not untouched by such allegations) and a general economic downturn, was massively 
defeated in the general elections of 1986. The overriding paradox of the Chambers decision now that the 
oil boom was over was that the continued quest for the best high-tech medical school and complex that 
could hold its own with those in developed countries, was in stark contrast the reality of a badly-managed, 
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unreformed health service in a country still without a written health policy. Successive PNM health 
ministers speeches had continued to include references about following a primary health care and 
community health care-based policy in spite of evidence to the contrary. The health services deteriorated 
as resources continued towards pay for the project and maintaining it until improved economic conditions 
eventually improved the chances for full commissioning. There was little political mileage for the 
Chambers regime then, even from the hand-over of the complex, as its last-ditch effort to attract some 
praise and status, given the crushing defeat in December 1986 by the National Alliance for Reconstruction 
(NAR). 
This second regime change in the country's history, but the first non -PNM succession saw the medical 
school dilemma still at the top of the health policy agenda. The PNM's successor, the new 
Robinson/NAR regime was now faced with this policy issue. In December 1986, the National Alliance for 
Reconstruction (NAR) under A. N. R Robinson was elected on a wave of public disaffection with the corruption, scandal 
and mismanagement that, exaggerated or not, had certainly tainted the PNM regime's tenure during the 
`oil boom' years. The economic recession of the early 1980s undoubtedly also played a major role in this 
massive unpopularity. As early as 1982/3, the failure of most of the government's grand petro-led and 
high-spending projects exposed the hollowness of the PNM's policy development strategies and 
processes, which included the medical complex. In the next section, we examine the NAR/Robinson 
government's policy choices and its influence on the policy's trajectory. 
7.4 REGIME CHANGE, POLICY CHOICES AND DECISIONS: THE ROBINSON (NAR) 
REGIME (1986-1991) 
Between 1983 and 1988, the country's per capita income dropped by 50% while unemployment 
doubled (McAfee, 1993: 17-18). Trinidad's external debt reached $US2.4 billion in 1988, equivalent to 
57% of the country's gross domestic product (GDP), according to World Bank figures. The annual debt 
bill was equal to a quarter of the country's export earnings. In a desperate effort to cope with the debt 
burden, the Trinidad government negotiated a series of IMF loans, beginning in November 1988, as the 
country's debt increased to more than US$3 billion. The new National Alliance government's health 
minister, Dr. Emmanuel Hosein was faced with a policy dilemma: should scarce public funds in a 
recessionary period be used to maintain and improve existing health services, or should some also be 
allocated for the medical school policy, inherited from their PNM predecessors. The other choice was of 
course to abandon the project altogether, with the existing infrastructure utilised for other purposes. The 
new minister was, from the start, extremely critical about the entire project from the start, stating that the 
Complex constituted an enormous wastage of public funds, costing over a billion dollars. He also called it 
"... a sinkhole of funds... " with estimated operating costs of over US$200 million a year which was close 
to a third of the average Trinidadian health budget ("Hosein: there is much to be done in health services", 
Trinidad Express, 16/2/87: 19). He criticised the previous PNM regimes for neglecting health generally 
and for creating the policy dilemma facing the NAR government in the first place (Interview, 1994). 
Immediately upon assuming office, the minister stated categorically that he was not prepared to pay for 
the project when 45% of UWI-trained doctors were annually going abroad. The minister knew however 
that a rapid decision was needed, recognising, despite his own concerns, that some level of phased 
commissioning was needed if only to prevent further waste of the infrastructure. In addition, the 
NAR/Robinson government was increasingly convinced that it might be able to prevent a loss of face by 
actually achieving implementation giving the enormous constraints, thus creating its own identity as a 
serious, responsible political party and government given its massive mandate. 
The government thus took the position that a successful commissioning or implementation of the project would help the ply's credentials and its reputation as a `can-do' government especially at a time of economic difficulty, and in 
light of the enormity of the political change, given the PNM's defeat. In one of his first interviews as 
minister, Hosein criticised the former government for its lack of planning, policymaking and reform over 
the preceding decade, noting the dilemma this posed for government health policy (Trinidad Guardian, 
21/6/87: 1. He labelled the policy a classic example of the lack of health human resources planning under 
the PNM regime. He added that there was no primary health care focus by the previous PNM regimes, 
noting that contrary to the assertions of former PNM ministers of health, there was no evidence of any 
budgetary reallocation to primary health care and his intention to remedy such a situation. He admitted 
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however that the job facing him and the NAR government was not going to be an easy one, but 
emphasised the regime's intention to formulate and implement health reform in a review of the entire 
system (Trinidad Guardian, 21/6/87: 1). In the case of the complex, he noted at this point that if 
commissioning were to occur, the emphasis would be on the training of allied health workers and nurses. 
The focus of Mount Hope would thus be on would be on training of lower-order staff, including 
paramedical workers ("Scandals in health", Trinidad Guardian, 29/1/87: 1). In this, effectively his first 
policy speech after the elections, the new minister noted that the broader goal of the new Robinson/NAR 
government was to ensure "... coverage and utilisation of health services where 100% of the population 
will have access to acceptable health care services... " (Trinidad Guardian, 29/1/87: 1). This statement was 
to change, however, as the actual logistics of implementation got underway. Allied health and nurse 
training under the NAR was now charged under the newly formed NIHERST training organisation. The 
medical complex policy would revert back to its original goal: medical training. The decision to 
incrementally implement was therefore both an assessment of the existing economic as well as political 
context and the extremely limited choices given the regime, even though the policy already seemed to be 
reverting to the medical school and complex focus, and away from any connection with primary care 
training. 
The decision to `incrementally implement' 
The NAR/Robinson government decision to proceed with the commissioning process was a pragmatic 
choice, given its existing economic predicament, the policy situation `on the ground', and the potentially 
useful political benefits of successful implementation. The minister had thus changed his views, though 
the reasons given were partly due to the policy parameters set him by the two previous PNM regimes. He 
thus stated that the phased commissioning of the complex was his main objective, noting that "... in pure 
economic terms it is an investment... if we don't activate it, we will lose it... I'll certainly feel proud if I can 
get it off in 1987.... " ("Hosein: there is much to be done in health services", Trinidad Express, 
16/2/87: 19). He added that the new National Alliance regime would engage in discussions with the Inter- 
American Development Bank (IDB) with a view to funding the refurbishment of the complex. (Trinidad 
Express, 16/2/87: 19). He emphasised however, his commitment to provide training programmes for 
allied health human resource categories at Mount Hope such as physiotherapy, medical technology and 
dental nursing, noting that these additional programmes would contribute to the maximum utilisation of 
the institutions as well as the main professional groups: doctors and nurses. 
While the minister and the government had to ultimately and rationally decide upon the best course of 
action, the medical academic lobby had no such doubts. After the decision was taken to commission, the 
Pan American Health Organization offered assistance by funding the return visits in December, 1987 of a 
`review team' from the Missouri-Columbia Hospital of the United States to prepare a pre-feasibility study 
for the launch. Arising out of this visit, the NAR/Robinson government decided to appoint a 
Commissioning Team made up, at least initially, of former members of the original implementing Task 
Force including the medical `academics' who had, in effect, developed and implemented the policy to this 
stage after Williams' initial formulation, and retaining considerable technical control especially after his 
death in 1981. The Commissioning team was charged with the responsibility of implementing the 
recommendations approved by the new Cabinet. Among its main functions was to devise a progress 
report of the complex's expenditure, including the possibility of future self-financing. Links were forged 
between this group and the Missouri-Columbia review team. As the government's popularity waned 
however early in its tenure, given its expulsion of the members of its main coalition, and the continued 
economic crisis, so its judgement in implementing the commissioning phase began to be seriously 
questioned from a variety of quarters. 
The battle for the future of the policy, and its juxtaposition alongside deteriorating, un-reformed health 
services and increasingly migrating health workers, started in early 1987 with striking staff almost as soon 
as the NAR government assumed office in late 1986. Most of these were junior doctors and nurses 
criticising poor working conditions and inadequate remuneration and career opportunities in the public 
health sector. The government was criticised by these groups for its decision to incrementally implement 
the commissioning policy to what was seen as the detriment of the rest of the health services. However, as 
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the Task Force deliberated over the final form of the new commissioning policy, the battle for and against 
the policy was also played out in the national media, which played a particularly important role. Among 
the first were the supporters of the policy, somewhat predictably perhaps, were three medical professors. 
In March 1987, in an attempt to swing both the government-appointed inter-ministerial committee and the 
general public towards the benefits of full implementation, the medical academics pointed to what they 
termed seven main misconceptions about the complex ('The case for the complex', Drs. Coore, Cross and 
Richards, Sunday Guardian, 6/3/87: 9). They noted 1) the medical complex was not a "grandiose" pipe 
dream of the oil boom, but was proposed by the 1971 UWI Committee and sponsored by the IDB, and 
was also geared towards providing more spaces for Jamaican medical students by the 35 extra spaces 
reserved for Trinidadian medical students at the Jamaican medical campus; 2) that it was not only to train 
doctors but paraprofessionals; 3) that teaching would not detract from the Complex's service role; 4) that 
its research would be locally-appropriate: 5) that its high-technology focus was because "... Trinidadian 
citizens expect to receive hi-tech medicine and in many cases are prepared to pay for it abroad, producing 
a drain on foreign exchange... "; 6) that "... inferior secondary and tertiary care will be unacceptable to 
citizens... " given the capital and human resources involved at the complex; and 7) finally, that while the 
cost would be "astronomical", the citizenry would be "gaining" five human resources training institutions 
- medicine, dentistry, advanced nursing, pharmacy and veterinary science ('The case for the complex', 
Drs. Coore, Cross and Richards, Sunday Guardian, 6/3/87: 9). 
While some of these points were accurate, the entire effort was an accomplished, blatant attempt to 
justify full, rather than phased commissioning: the government's favoured middle approach. These 
professors also missed the essential point of the main critics of the policy: implementation of the policy 
would be to the detriment of the bigger priority - the maintenance and support of collapsing essential 
services especially at this time of crisis and a fundamental reform of health services based on the 
government's still-strongly voiced objective of a primary care approach. The momentum against the 
commissioning was however building. As one doctor pointed out a few days later: 
"... the Trinidad and Tobago economy is facing serious fiscal constraints; the time 
when `money is no problem' has long gone. The physical structure of the [Eric 
Williams] Complex is now completed and [the fact that] the medical academicians 
of this country who have a vested interest in this project are planning at tax payers 
expense to open [the various schools]... ignores our present economic situation. 
Professional schools are not one of our present priority areas. The Ministry of 
Health should re-evaluate this project. The present panel should be dissolved and a 
new multi-disciplinary team should make clear [the Complex's] opportunity cost.... " 
('Primary health care more important than this grandiose white elephant', Dr. 
Harry Singh, Trinidad Guardian, 8/3/87: 2. ) 
Of the medical `academics' on the medical faculty's `steering team' (also called FAST), the doctor 
commented: 
"... these men are quite able and honourable in the field of medicine but this does 
not automatically equip them with expert knowledge in health planning and 
economics needed to advise the government to spend our limited financial resources 
on such a grandiose dream. If our present government continues to undertake the 
financing of these professional schools, it will create a serious fiscal strain in our 
economy which we cannot afford in our nation-building. The [Eric Williams 
Medical Sciences] Complex should open as a hospital and be part of the training of 
medical, nursing, pharmacy as well as auxiliary studies of the University of the West 
Indies. The training of 30 medical students [as obtained in previously in Jamaica] 
is adequate for our needs; after Trinidad and Tobago has crippled itself to train 65 
medical students, they will most likely migrate to Europe and North America... 
" 
(Trinidad Guardian, 8/3/87: 2). 
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Even some medical academics who had initially supported the idea and been part of the original policy 
process, were now objecting to the PNM regime's decision. In January 1985, one former member of the initial Barsotti task force, Dr. Courtney Bartholomew had warned the previous Chambers regime that it 
was `creating a monster' and an `ivory tower' (Trinidad Express, 1/2/87: 19; Dean, 1991). Ten years 
earlier, responding to the suggestion that dialogue and cooperation could be enhanced with the private 
medical schools operating offshore at the time, Bartholomew's confidence in the soundness of the 
government's policy, and one which he himself was a part of, was categorical: 
"... my business, like the rest of my colleagues is to ensure that the Mt. Hope 
medical complex will be a school of national pride and international reputation and 
recognition... good business that is our charge... the government has expressed its 
commitment. The gauntlet is thrown The stakes are almost incomprehensible. The 
opportunities are almost mind-boggling. Those of us who are involved in the 
planning process of this new medical school have exciting years ahead of us... this is 
an expensive commitment [but] health is getting a piece of the action. The Mt. Hope 
hospital will be THE teaching hospital of the Eastern Caribbean " (Caribbean 
Medical Journal, 1977,38, (4): 4-9). 
He had now changed his mind. The NAR minister, Emmanuel Hosein was however still trying to 
justify the decision - finding it difficult - pointed out to the critics of phased commissioning that: 
"... it is no secret that the debate was long and often contentious, but after wide- 
ranging and searching discussions, and after consultation with a reputable firm of 
accountants, having due regard to the financial position of our country, we have at 
long last come to the point where Cabinet has confirmed its approval for the phased 
utilisation of the Mt. Hope Medical Sciences Complex... despite financial constraints, 
we are committed to a modern health care system that is community-based and 
committed to the provision of primary, secondary and tertiary care in the service of 
every citizen in the country, with emphasis on primary health care... " (Hosein 1988: 
7). 
Even the IDB - the project's chief loan financier/guarantor - was now concerned with the process, if 
not the policy. The Bank which had been involved since the policy formulation stage voiced its 
unhappiness with the commissioning process, particularly the incompetence of the members of the 
commissioning team. In 1988 an IDB Committee headed by Walter Reddel reported that the 
commissioning team itself lacked the necessary qualifications, expertise and leadership to meet the 
requirements of commissioning a project the size of the complex. Criticising the NAR government, the 
Reddel report added that up to October 1988, the government had made no serious attempt to determine 
the recurrent operational costs of the complex (the Bank's own estimate was US$72 million a year). 
Other criticisms included: 
"... the emphasis on an academic university-based oriented staff, -... too many trips 
and short-stays; certain non-relevant experiences [and] no exposure to government- 
run or foreign medical health systems could be a problem... " (`Mt. Hope: a 
`complex' complex', J. Babb, Trinidad Guardian, 20/8/89: 1). 
It also criticised the wastage of a proposed TT$8 (approximately US$1 million) consultancy to an 
American academic to determine the project's feasibility. The report concluded that the complex could 
pose major problems for Trinidad and Tobago, and recommended that the governing board be reviewed 
since it was too heavily oriented towards doctors. It further stated that proper patient care should be the 
main consideration, and that teaching should not interfere with the commissioning process. The report 
concluded however that even though "... the small team is doing their best ... they 
do not have the 
qualifications to commission a complex of this size and magnitude... " ('Mt. Hope: a `complex' complex, 
Babb, Trinidad Guardian, 20/8/89: 1). The commissioning team now headed by Trevor Romano, a local 
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management consultant rejected these charges outright, only accepting the recommendation of a `team 
approach'. Even the commissioning team itself had not been entirely ignorant of the policy pitfalls 
involved in the process. In its own report to the Inter-ministerial committee in July 1988, the team had 
acknowledged that 
"... the commissioning of the Complex is a complex exercise... its end product has a 
high potential for political and emotional response. In general, it is fraught with 
potential for long-lasting effect of current wrong-decision-making. It is also an 
extremely costly project... " (Government of Trinidad and Tobago/Status report of 
the Commissioning Team to the Inter-Ministerial Committee, July, 1988: 3). 
It nevertheless strongly recommended the need for the university to be fully involved in planning for 
implementation, given the approval, in principle by the government, of the University's proposal to 
establish a self-financing medical education scheme. The Team also recognised the need to "... minimise 
recurrent costs for the government ... [adding that]... the philosophy of excellence must permeate both the 
planning and operation of the complex ... [and] ... the need to be realistic and flexible and to balance 
comprehensiveness with incrementalism... " (Government of Trinidad and Tobago/Status report of the 
Commissioning Team to the Inter-Ministerial Committee, July, 1988: 3). 
Comment: A difficult policy dilemma faced the NAR/Robinson regime: whether to implement the 
policy incrementally during a time of economic crisis and potentially reap some political rewards and 
status from a successful implementation, or to not implement and cut the government's losses. Given the 
prevailing context, both choices must have been appealing to a certain degree. In the event, the regime 
opted for what was a `bounded rationality' type decision based on what they saw to be the best option give 
the situation `on the ground': phased or incremental implementation, beginning with the medical school. 
Before this decision was reached, the lobbyists for the programme: largely the medical academic fraternity 
felt compelled to consistently argue for the continuation of the policy. To its detractors, including former 
supporters and the media, the policy decision was the wrong one given the country's collapsing and 
unreformed public health system and its lack of a written comprehensive health policy. However, either 
way, a compromise decision had been made that reflected more the failings of the past PNM regimes - 
including their regime characteristics and motivations - than any blatant fault of the NAR `phased 
implementation' decision. However, given the interaction of political and economic crisis in the wider 
national context of 1988, the government did not exactly lend itself easily to sympathy from a population 
now being told that structural adjustment was the only way out of the crisis. 
Structural adjustment, policy continuation and the political consequences for the NAR/Robinson 
regime 
As this paradoxical situation continued, the medical school/complex health human resources policy 
was slowly being transformed into high-politics status under the NAR government -a development that 
was to contribute to the regime's eventual demise. Events in 1988 almost ruined the NAR government's 
hope for a successful outcome as both economic factors, and with it the government's political fortunes 
worsened. More funds were needed for the process but less was available given the high interest rates of 
the international loans that funded the complex. The government was however - still partly justifiably 
perhaps - convinced of the need to persevere with the policy, being imminently close to implementation. 
The health minister noted that more funds were needed and would be allocated (US$ 55m) by the NAR 
regime to complete the process, in addition to the then estimated annual running costs of US$ 72 million 
(IDB figures). The government was convinced that Trinidad was "... poised to take a quantum leap 
forward... " in health care with the project (Trinidad Express, 13/7/88: 2). Commissioning was expected 
by the middle of 1990. To make matters worse for the NAR, the minister noted that services might have 
to be paid for either by a fee for service payment by the public, or a national health insurance plan in order 
to recover some of the past costs incurred (Trinidad Express, 13/7/88: 2). To compound matters, 
economic conditions worsened. By July 1988, the health sector, like social and economic 
conditions at the time, was in a state of depression if not crisis. The NAR regime was now in engaged in 
the unenviable process of implementing a questionable IMF structural adjustment programme that 
entailed, inter alia, massive cuts in public sector social expenditure. Other reform measures in the process 
180 
of being formulated included administrative reform and health services decentralisation, which, after more 
than three decades after it had been first recommended, was now virtually forced unto the policy agenda. To add to his woes in relation to the health sector, Hosein, acknowledging the negative impact of his 
government's cut in health budget for 1988 - in line with the IMF programme - noted that lay-offs were a 
real possibility, adding that the ministry's development budget will have to be `cut to the bone. ' (Trinidad 
Express, 13/7/88: 2). As economic problems worsened, the minister warned for the first time that his 
government would have to look at the possibility of curtailing expenditure on the project. 
The picture that emerged by late 1989 in Trinidad, then was one of increasing mismanagement, 
misplaced priorities, and ad-hoc policy making and above all health and social crisis. In addition to 
controversies such as allegations of corruption in the drug supply process at the national hospital 
management company, which the minister ordered to be wound up in October 1988, the financial crisis 
also extracted its toll on general health services. By November 1988, the press was awash with health 
horror stories. The shortage of money, food and drugs and staff at the nation's main hospitals, with nurse 
migration in particular being reaching critical levels. The Government, making its own political prospects 
worse, allocated in its 1989 budget, a total of TT$127 million in capital expenditure for health sector. 
However, most of this money ended up being used to buy equipment for the soon to be commissioned 
Complex, while the Cabinet decided that it would go ahead with phasing in the dental and veterinary 
teaching programmes -a questionable decision at this stage - in addition to the medical school programme 
slated to begin operations in October 1989 ("Doctor: government has priorities mixed up", Dr. Steve 
Smith, Trinidad Express, 9/1/89: 2; Taylor, 1990: 16) ). The government's policy decision on this issue 
however continued to be defended as the NAR's Draft Macro Planning Framework in 1988 noted that the 
commissioning of the medical school and teaching hospital, brought into operation on a phased, self- 
financing basis was the most sustainable policy and best for the country, given both the project and health 
human resources realities `on the ground (Government of Trinidad and Tobago/Draft Macro Planning 
Framework, 1988). 
By January 1989 however, there was even more criticism about the necessity for the Complex and its 
components: the medical school, the other tertiary training schools and hospitals and the sizeable research 
facilities. Hosein in y interview, expressed his disgust with the research component in particular, four 
years after leaving office, blaming both medical academic/research influence as well as the Williams and 
Chambers governments for enabling them to exert such influence by giving them a virtual `carte blanche' 
to create and formulate policy as it suited their individual and professional needs (Interview, Dr. E. 
Hosein, 1994). He added in this regard that the amount of physical space allocated for medical research at 
the Complex was both unconscionable and out of all proportion, when compared to the space allocated for 
treating patients. Nevertheless, during his period in office, the minister increasingly came under attack 
from almost every quarter except medical academics: the press, the main trade unions, prominent 
members of the medical profession, the Trinidad and Tobago Medical Association and the public. 
Questions persisted about the need for the various schools, including medicine, to the detriment of public 
sector health services, and the need for decentralisation and reform, as well as about the imminent medical 
`glut', given the restrictive US and UK health professional immigration laws implemented in the late 
1980s. Many critics would have agreed with one newspaper's critical editorial that the "glow of triumph" 
surrounding the imminent commissioning of the medical school was paradoxical as there was: 
"... very little sense to be creating more doctors to join those already frustrated 
because they lack the tools to carry out their jobs.. . should we 
be proceeding to 
expand our stock of doctors when existing professionals are in a state of rebellion 
about the conditions under which they work? " (`Paradox in medicine', Editorial, 
Trinidad Guardian, 18/1/89: 8). 
One doctor reminded of the central position given the Complex policy by successive governments - 
both PNM regimes and the NAR to the detriment of policy reform, and its imagery to the rest of the 
population as one of the main sources of the crisis: 
"... changes in this decade had its roots in the previous administration's 
preoccupation with the Medical Sciences Complex as its major and only goal to the 
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detriment of the entire health service. The rest of the service was a coat of paint 
here 
, refurbishing there, and occasionally pre-election ideas such as cardiac 
surgery with expenditure of large sums of money on one hand, and equipment that 
went to waste. The problems in our health system were predictable, but no one took 
the trouble to sort them out as we were able to buy our way out of any problem as it 
cropped up. What we need urgently is a rapid assessment of the problems and to 
apply possible inexpensive solutions. We need to restart the nurse training program 
and investigate the problems faced by front line health staff and the organisation 
that is designed to support them in this era of dwindling resources. We cannot 
expect gimmicks to replace serious planning. " (Decentralisation needed for 
service... ' Dr. P. Harnarayan, Trinidad Guardian, 3/6/89: 9). 
He however reiterated, in a balanced analysis, that it was dangerous to blame Hosein for existing 
problems one of which was a total breakdown in public administration and management, like the rest of 
the country's public administration system. Harnarayan however was not the only doctor speak out 
against the rapid deterioration due to the NAR's excessive focus on the medical complex to the detriment 
of policy-making and reform. One interesting development in Trinidad at this time was the formation of a 
coalition of `concerned citizens' opposing the commissioning of the complex in response to the 
commissioning process. This `Citizens Welfare Committee', comprising a number of medical doctors and 
`concerned' citizens who stated that their intention was to inform the public about the consequences of the 
Complex policy, while also trying to convince the government, even at this late stage to change its policy 
course. This committee asserted that some of the IDB's 1988 technical assistance recommendations that 
were not "... consistent with its [the Commissioning Team's] self-serving agenda... " had either been 
circumvented or ignored by the Team ('Mt. Hope: a threat to health care', Reyes, C. Trinidad Express, 
14/8/89: 1). As one member of the group noted of the Commissioning Team: 
"... it is they who possess the administrative and technical expertise to facilitate and 
frustrate the implementation of policies favourable or otherwise; it is time for the 
government to wake up and realise that it cannot afford to gamble away its 
dwindling political fortunes. The Mt. Hope controversy is one which affects every 
citizen. It is a life and death concern which must not be left in the hands of bungling 
bureaucrats... the Eric Williams Medical Sciences Complex is a picture of 
inefficiency.., what is disturbing about this whole affair, that threatens the quality of 
our health, was that it could have been avoided... " (`Mt. Hope: a threat to health 
care', Reyes, C. Trinidad Express, 14/8/89: 1). 
Three medical doctors linked to the activities of this new pressure group also embarked on a press 
campaign against what was seen as the government's immorality in implementing the project. Through a 
series of articles in the Trinidad Guardian, this group was also very vocal in its criticism of questionable 
need in Trinidad and Tobago of this "elaborate edifice" ('Critical look at Mt Hope Medical School', 
Trinidad Guardian, 10/7/89: 9). They added that much of the teaching and research could have remained 
at the Mona campus in Jamaica and at the other existing research institutions within the country and the 
Caricom region. They also criticised as unworkable and unsound the plans for the proposed self-financing 
of the Complex, noting that suggested earnings from private overseas medical students did not warrant 
"... this level of additional expenditure... " by the government. They recognised however that "... that there 
are already vested interests in the establishment of the facilities at Mount Hope and that several 
reputations, including political reputations are at stake... " ('Critical look at Mt Hope Medical School', 
Trinidad Guardian, 10/7/89: 9). This view was also supported by the trade union movement, with one 
unionist stating that "... a group of technocrats and the minister himself seem to have gone off on Mount 
Hope. They are completely taken up with the exciting prospect of practising/and or administering this 'hi- 
tech' megabucks complex. The country does not need a veterinary school. The running costs are much too 
expensive... " ('Peoples' health comes first', D. Abdullah, Trinidad Express 24/7/89: 9). He predicted that 
"... the school would become an `offshore school' offering places to US students with sub-standard 
qualifications... " a statement which was to prove partly prophetic by 1995 ('Peoples' health comes first', 
D. Abdullah, Trinidad Express 24/7/89: 9). The NAR's policy process was by now coming full circle, 
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given the role of the offshore medical schools issue as a contributing factor by the Williams government 
and its advisers in the first place. 
In the Houses of Parliament the criticisms were equally forthcoming. In a Senate debate on the status 
of the Complex, one Independent senator questioned why the board of the new Eric Williams Medical 
Sciences Complex Authority - the management body for inter alia, the various schools - needed twenty- 
five (25) directors when some of the largest companies in the world seemed to manage with no more than 
ten (10) ('Government told to explain delay in complex', K. Bahadoorsingh, Trinidad Express 15/6/89: 
48). He noted that it was even larger than the country's cabinet, and was more `a herd of elephants' than a 
`white elephant'. He warned the government that it was entering into a `debt trap' with the Complex. The 
bill establishing the management to run the Complex was however eventually passed in the Senate, with a 
number of senators walking out of the chamber unconvinced that it was in the best interest of the people of 
Trinidad and Tobago ('House passes Bill, ' Trinidad Express, 28/6/89: 2). The health minister however 
continued to defend the Complex, noting that its training capability would foster and encourage the 
principles of primary health care and that it would provide secondary care for its catchment area in 
addition to tertiary care for the whole country and the wider Caribbean ('Hosein: more resources for 
health care', Trinidad Guardian, 3/4/89: 3). Earlier in that year, he admitted though that even though the 
medical complex might be seen as a symbol of third world extravagance as one opposition MP had 
suggested in the Parliamentary debate, the fact was that it was a `fait accompli', inherited by the National 
Alliance for Reconstruction regime, that something had to be done about it, and as such, that it could be 
used as a device for improving health care in the country should lessen such criticisms. Some did 
sympathise with the choices facing the health minister, even at this late stage, noting that the government 
had `taken the plunge' at a time of limited resources and urged the government "... not to adopt halfway 
measures which would leave it a white elephant... " ('Milestone or white elephant? ', Trinidad Express 
editorial, (29/6/89: 8). Support was also forthcoming from medical academia, with one professor stating, 
not surprisingly that: 
"... we can't afford not to have Mount Hope. Nobody ever said health is cheap. 
There is no point saying to me that you can't afford it, you have to afford it to 
produce a community which can cope with the health problems in the year 2000... " 
('Why we need Mt. Hope says UWI professor', Trinidad Guardian, 17/7/89: 10). 
Criticisms however continued to dog the minister and the government by late 1989 with grave 
implications for both the regime, in the short-term, and the sectoral development process, in the longer 
term. The potential distortion of the health services in particular, resulting from the policy being followed 
was also pointed out at a Pan American health Organisation-convened Caribbean forum on health human 
resource policy (Bryan, 1989: 6). Bryan noted that the curative slant inherent in the policy was: 
"... a practice which validates and reinforces the system of social stratification 
inherited from the colonial period, and which contradicts concepts of egalitarianism 
so crucial to serious nation-building... in addition, the Eric Williams Medical 
Complex is perceived as `cannibalising' financial resources, planning and other 
energies, which should at best be shared with the community health centres, given 
the primary health care thrust on which the government has verbally embarked.. . 
It 
is easy to see then why deficiencies and neglect in primary health care systems are 
directly linked to massive expenditures in the curative health area, and appear to be 
in direct competition with the rest of the system. In addition, doctors are perceived 
as tremendous power wielders who know how to get what they want. It is also 
perceived that a `high-tech' modern complex serves their career interest, since it 
affords the opportunity to practice in an impressive environment, to sharpen their 
skills, and to develop their specialties and sub-specialties to a greater extent than 
the preventive care approach of primary health care would afford. This should be 
an area of great concern, since there is the perception that the Eric Williams 
Medical Complex will skim off the cream of medical personnel, thus aggravating the 
demoralisation and frustrations of medical personnel not employed with the 
Complex... " (Bryan, 1989: 7). 
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The Complex, however, despite such criticisms, continued to absorb funds, adding to the 
destabilisation of the health human resources, health services delivery and, threatening to add to the other 
factors that could potentially destabilise the regime. Another related development was the voluntary 
termination of employment programme. A main component of IMF-induced administrative reform, this 
VTEP policy was meant to trim the public sector. Like other civil servants, however many nurses - 
including those hired by the Complex authority from other public health institutions - took up this offer 
mainly to take up the lucrative jobs offers in the USA and Saudi Arabia. However, many nurses were also 
attracted by the new teaching hospital instead, given the much higher wages, which added to the feeling 
that a dual public health system emerging which would harm existing health services ('Mt. Hope 
Complex gets `green light' Trinidad Guardian, 20/5/89: 1). Welch suggested - more than half-seriously 
that the government should "... stop the medical school, `integrate' the already hired university medical 
staff within the existing Eastern Caribbean medical scheme, cease further employment of university staff 
at the Complex and apologise to the existing applicants and the university... " (Trinidad Guardian, 
27/8/89: 1). Many of the nurses who had gained voluntary retirement from the government's programme 
were applying to the Mount Hope complex which alone needed 558 nurses and 172 doctors, and whom, 
according to the Authority's regulations, would be allowed to practice privately including the specialists 
and consultants, thus aggravating the health human resources imbalance and the crisis in the health sector 
policy process. Criticisms thus persisted, given the ever worsening health and wider economic context, as 
the government also instituted other unpopular policies at this time, including a drastically restricted 
public expenditure which involved the loss of cost of living allowances and merit increases, a 10% wage 
cut and in addition the voluntary termination of service program. In the health sector, the feeling of crisis 
was palpable. The government seemed unable to afford to recruit and retain nurses and other health 
professionals such as pharmacists and radiographers. Most linked these developments in the health sector 
to poor political and policy judgement, given the context. As Welch noted: 
"... Government expenditure on the health services has fallen over the last few years, 
and the accompanying rise in the cost of drugs and other supplies makes the impact 
on services all the more notable. It is in the midst of this reality that the 
establishment of a hospital at Mt. Hope would increase government's expenditure 
on health by TT$150-200 million or 40% of the existing budget for the entire health 
services of the country.. . 
[in relation to the medical school]... the consequences of the 
establishment of a medical school at Mt. Hope along with the Mt. Hope Hospital 
may well have disastrous consequences for the health services.. " (`Will Mt Hope 
destroy our health services? ', Welch, W, Trinidad Guardian, 18/7/89: 9). 
The outcome of the medical school element of the policy in the mid 1990s, then, was not totally 
unpredictable, and a salutary lesson for health policymakers in the developing state. To remain viable, by 
making room available for 50% foreign fee-paying students, the medical school ended up restricting the 
numbers of Trinidadian students to thirty-five (35): the revised number being trained in Jamaica in the 
first place, after the IDB Special Committee recommendations two decades earlier! This in itself rendered 
the entire policy tragic. The NAR's policy commitment that the entire complex should be viable, meant 
therefore that the remaining thirty (30) places were reserved for US dollar-fee paying students from the 
USA, Canada, Australia, the Philippines, Britain and other countries. In 1996, this policy was extended as 
the medical school was `twinned' with India's Manipal Education and Medical Group to undertake 
training of Indian medical students during their clinical years. ('Mt. Hope's twin delivers an international 
flavour', Trinidad Guardian, 18/9/96: 8). Though the end result was this paradoxical situation, the policy 
dilemma facing the NAR government was, admittedly, not an easy one. The government had made its 
decision. Now it was reeling under the consequences, not only at the sectoral level, but more important, in 
relation to its own political survival, as it was now being seen as an uncaring government. 
Comment: While the NAR government was a market-reformist one, its decision to incrementally 
implement the medical school and complex were driven more by economic and policy circumstance that it 
inherited `on the ground', than any great desire for the project itself. Indeed, the health minister was 
opposed from the start, though forced to reluctantly opt for phased commissioning, given the two 
unpalatable choices placed before him and the government: full implementation, or no implementation. 
The eventual decision then while controversial, was also a middle-ground bounded rationality one, given 
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the inaction of the Chambers regime, and the instigation of the policy years earlier by the Williams 
regime. The room for manoeuvre for the NAR regime was extremely limited. Timing its decision to 
commission the medical school at a time of political and economic crisis and a collapsing health service, brought on inter alia by IMF conditions, was a politically difficult, though rationally understandable 
option. However, its very nature of the policy to open a medical school, at a time when there was an increased feeling that one was not needed, coupled with the massive allocation of funds for the medical 
school and wider Complex, though trimmed substantially, was politically dangerous at a time of health 
services shortages at all levels. The feeling of much of the country was that the government and 
specifically the health minister were `uncaring'. Many perceived that the minister was focusing 
excessively on project completion, while neglecting the needs of the rest of the services, especially as 
images and `shock' stories of people dying in wards due to lack of staff and drugs dominated the press. 
Importantly, this perception was to have a major impact on both the coup attempt, as well as the 
citizenry's relatively nonchalant reaction to the plight of government ministers, including the health 
minister, when they were held hostage by the Jamaat al Muslimeen group in the Parliament building just 
over a year later in the country' second attempted coup in two decades. Hosein however continued to 
robustly defend himself and the complex against critics, promising more resources for the other areas of 
what was now a chaotic and chronically under-funded health service. The government however continued 
to have the support of medical academics, as well as the local representative of the local PAHO/WHO 
described the Complex as "fantastic" and dismissed the ongoing human resources crisis as a economics- 
related, a view reflecting lack of understanding of both the context, as well as the primary health care, 
although her organisation was the co-sponsor of the primary health care approach (Sunday Express, 
8/7/90: 5). 
On the positive side, in terms of pure `rational' achievement then, given the goals the NAR 
government set itself, it could feel justifiably proud to the extent that the policy had actually been 
reformed and implemented, despite major problems, given its inheritance from successive PNM regimes. 
However, on the negative side, the overriding sense of this achievement was of its irrelevance to the real 
health needs of the country at a time of serious economic and social crisis. The minister also seemed to 
have dismissed cheaper and potentially more beneficial - both cost wise and policy wise - alternative 
options such as the nurse practitioner policy, which, as we noted in the last chapter was seen by him as 
irrelevant to the country's needs. Regime survival was influential, exerting influence to the extent that the 
regime was in a weak position, but wanted to salvage some praise/status form this situation. Ideologically, 
some criticised the regime for implementing the past regime's policy without questioning it adequately. As 
the political situation lurched towards a climax in mid 1990, one can justifiably say that medical 
school/complex policy process, started by the Williams regime, implemented by the Chambers regime, 
and passed onto the NAR regime for commissioning now contributed to the regime's unpopularity and 
threatened its survival. This meant that normally-low politics issued such as medical training, for most 
states, had now assumed high-politics characteristics that threatened the government. In the interim, 
economic crisis, coupled with the dilemma posed by inherited policy seem more accountable for the 
policy process in this once windfall state. Regime characteristics played a role to the extent that it had to 
rely heavily and unquestioningly on medical academia, like its predecessors because of the nature of the 
policy. This could be construed as regime neglect. However, economic and historical factors seem more 
influential at this stage of the process. 
7.5 SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The Trinidadian medical school policy is both typical and atypical of the developing state government 
dilemma. It is typical to the extent that it represents another example in the long line of examples of 
doctor-dominated curative oriented health policies adopted and implemented by states and leaders in 
instances where cheaper, more simpler forms of policy action and reform may be really needed to address 
real health human resources problems. In Trinidad, like many other developing states, this was 
fundamental and meaningful policy reform, which itself demanded the decentralisation of power. The 
policy is however also atypical to the extent that while most developing states are resource-deficient, a 
fortuitous event, the oil crisis or boom in Trinidad's case in 1973 saw a significant amount of policy 
opportunity become available to the government to pursue its development strategies. Not many 
developing states had been this lucky. The medical policy as one of Williams personal priorities was 
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suddenly on the agenda, aided by the IDB Special Committee in 1971, but actively supported by the 
government and the prime minister personally, who was in turn lobbied effectively by medical academic 
interests, as distinct from the wider, more sceptical medical profession. 
However, the premise for the policy was questionable, and reflected the lack of understanding of the 
problem, due in part to both political and economic factors, as well as a of adequate data information 
systems: an indictment of the PNM regime's failure to either implement such policies or reform the health 
system. As we have seen in this and previous chapters, the doctor shortage which triggered the policy in 
the first place had not clearly been established. Even if it were, the main reason why doctors were leaving 
Trinidad in the late 1960s and 1970s was the singular failure of the increasingly authoritarian Williams 
regime to address the health reform and decentralisation issue recommended to him as far back as 1957 
when he was chief minister of the then British colony. While external factors, particularly the pervasive 
phenomenon of `south-north' migration of health human resources development explains to some extent 
Trinidad's dilemma, this level does not address events at the national level as we have seen. My findings 
suggested that regime characteristics played a more important role under Williams in the 1970s than the 
other succeeding regimes in the 1980s, where economic problems and the inheritance of the policy as 
developed by the government's medical advisers exerted greater influences the policy actually threatened 
regime survival. Undoubted however, interactions between the various influences and interactions: regime 
characteristics, regional organisations such as the Caribbean Community Secretariat, the University-based 
medical academics, the formation of pressure groups both for and against the policy as well as the 
constantly changing socio-political and socio-economic context and international finance all contributed 
to the process and eventual outcomes. In this chapter, I attempted to explain how and why this particular 
policy evolved, given the following influences: 1) the failure by the Williams government to effect 
national institutional and sectoral reforms as important pre-conditions for effective and progressive policy- 
making; 2) the sudden appearance of a policy `window of opportunity' in the form of the oil `windfall' 
and the resultant possibilities for `developmentally-beneficial' policy-making through considerable 
resource availability; and 3) the roles and influence of the medical academics and researchers who were 
most likely to benefit from the particular policy and finally 4) the role of regime characteristics itself. 
The fact that developing country actors at various levels do make important policy decisions and 
choices (by both their action and non-action) on a `day-to-day' that impact, both positively and negatively, 
on their countries' development processes has been increasingly acknowledged in the policy analysis 
literature (Grindle, 1980; Grindle and Thomas 1991; Liddle, 1988; Ugalde, 198 Walt, 1994). I have, in 
this chapter, argued that there was room for policy action, but that the ensuing action, though partially 
understandable in the case of the options facing the NAR regime, was not only heavily biased, the goals 
and objectives were unclear and ill thought out, but very expensive and multi-goal multi-actor oriented - 
all of which detrimental to successful implementation (Cleaves, 1980). I therefore detailed the influence 
and consequences of the failure to properly and effectively use `policy windows' that appear fortuitously 
in the post-colonial state. The policy context just prior to the oil boom - political, economic and social - 
especially the prime minister's authoritarianism and adherence to survival politics saw a reluctance to 
delegate and devolve power and build institutions and institute the reform process. This particular failure 
had grave consequences when the regime sought to take advantage of the windfall provided by this policy 
window for the development of the country. The provision of a `carte blanche' by the Williams' regime 
thus gave this professional generous leeway in creating and developing policy to shape its own needs. By 
the time of economic recession in the 1980s, the policy choice was faced by a newly elected regime which 
had to weigh the costs for and against implementation, with little room for manoeuvre, but to go for a 
phased implementation. By opting for phased implementation, the National Alliance regime and the 
Minister in particular opened themselves up to criticism as uncaring and out of touch, given the increasing 
health crisis. Though not a direct cause of the coup attempt on the National Alliance regime, the medical 
complex policy process nevertheless heavily influenced the public perception prior to and the reaction 
in 
the aftermath to this destabilisation attempt. 
In attempting to explain the apparent paradox of why some developing states remain weak despite the 
access by regimes and state leaders to adequate resources and supporting agencies, Migdal (1988: 
236) 
asserts that such states typically face the dilemma of: 
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"... continued fragmentation of social control [which] has led them to a political 
style and policies: the politics of survival - that have prevented the state from 
enhancing its capabilities by not allowing the development of complex organisation 
in state institutions... " 
In the case of the medical school - later expanded to become `Complex' - policy under Williams then, 
Migdal's analysis of the role and influence of the politics of survival, in light of the evolution of this 
particular policy, is a somewhat depressing example of how the politics of survival and status through 
benign' authoritarian politics can result in states that are blessed with the chance of a `policy window' for 
making progressive strides, doing almost irretrievable harm to the development process over the medium 
to longer term, burdening future governments, as we saw with the Chambers and to a greater extent the 
NAR regimes. In political terms, the Williams government had the biggest policy window in health human 
resources development. His subsequent choice of the complex, along with other dubious policies and 
development actions, in addition to limiting development prospects, also limited the room for manoeuvre 
for the successor regimes, particularly the NAR, but also the PNM Chambers regime. The fact that 
simpler options were eschewed in favour of the more expensive alternative, while espousing contradictory 
policy platitudes says as much for interest groups, as it does for the heavy reliance by developing country 
politicians on short term political gains over institution-building and reform. 
The art of balancing the two main goals: political stability and economic development, according to 
Migdal, may be less demanding for leaders of oil - producing states for example, where wealth is 
generated relatively easily, and state agencies remain viable through such wealth. He compared this 
situation with that of `non-rentier' states such as Egypt and India, where leaders had to promote the 
building of complex organisation which could either enhance production on the one hand but might also 
enhance political dangers to their rulers on the other (Migdal, 1988: 236-237). Migdal concluded that an 
environment of fragmented social control results in "... a particular, pathological set of relationships within 
state organisation itself, between the top state leadership and its agencies.. " which "... shape the very nature 
of state insinuations into society... " Migdal's paradox assumes important significance in light of the oil 
boom experienced in that country in the mid 1970s. The state suddenly had at its disposal in the 1970s an 
adequate supply of financial resources for putting its development plans and policies into action. Mindful 
of the fact that Williams' authoritarianism cannot be equated with Burnham's ruthless, oppressive and 
cynical version, there was nevertheless a fair amount of coercion, manipulation and corruption in the 
utilisation of this oil bounty in the post-1973 for political purposes. Williams' concentration of power 
in 
his own hands, especially after the attempted destabilisation in 1970 had grave implications 
for his 
regime's capacity to effectively formulate and implement policy when resources suddenly 
became 
available. The fact that this instability happened before the oil boom also supports lends credibility to 
Migdal's thesis. 
The role of medical academic interests also cannot be ignored in this policy process -a point as true 
for developing as it is for developed countries. Analysing the relationship between the medical 
`academics' and government on this particular policy does resemble to some extent that 
identified by 
Eckstein in his study of the relationship between the Department of Health and the British 
Medical 
Association (Eckstein, 1960). In terms of Alford's (1975) structural delineation of the power equation, 
the dominant interest was clearly in this particular case the medical academics, with the active support of 
politicians, despite the important role of the regional political context. The `challenging' 
interest were 
elements of the medical profession and citizens groups formed to counter 
further development. The 
repressed were the citizens who were left with the prospect of IMF-originated reform policies 
in response 
to their elected leaders inability to experiment with alternative policy options 
in the health human 
resources process. Even ideology is not a major factor as Navarro found with much-vaunted, 
but highly- 
medicalised, curative Cuban health human resources system, Navarro 
(1972: 415). He warned of the 
dangers of a medicalised health policy, even though in Cuba's case it was done to counter the medical 
brain drain after the revolution, by not substituting them with paramedical and nursing personnel, 
but 
more medical doctors. Trinidad's medical complex managers, by contrast, were mooting over 
the issue 
of making the facility both a potential money spinner from medical tourism as well as 
from overseas 
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medical students, using their comparative advantage over the American health care system (Trinidad Guardian, "Medical tourism could earn $8m TT per year", Trinidad Guardian, 14/10/93: 3). Even Cuba, 
despite its considerable problems, still had a socialised, free health service, despite its evident medical bias. 
On the issue of medical production and balancing the `health team', given scarce resources, Butter and 
Mejia (1987: 494-500) have also warned against training ever more doctors in developing states, given 
both the contraction in overseas recipient countries and economic downturn in donor states, as well as the 
overall waste. Ironically, Caribbean medical as well as nursing education by the late 1980s, like health 
care generally in many developing states were moving rapidly toward an innovative approach started in 
the 1970s that formulated a mixed preventive-curative curriculum to suit the needs of the Caribbean, 
which though not new with the existence since 1972 of the West Indies School of Public Health, was now 
moved to the centre of the medical training agenda (Wray, 1981; 1986; Cruickshank, 1989; Standard, 
1985 
To summarise then, the phased medical complex policy both influenced, and was influenced by regime 
survival, as well an interrelated array of actions and changing contexts. It was the direct result of the 
Williams regime's choice of political survival over reform-led development. In the case of the policy, its 
technical nature also led to considerable dominance of the policy trajectory by medical academics , though 
the regime ultimately triumphed by approving phased commissioning. Opinions on the consequence of 
the policy were mixed by the 1990s. The NAR on the one hand, had limited choices but also made poor 
decisions that jeopardised and, ultimately caused its own demise. Even former PNM ministers were 
divided, with some like the health minister in the 1960s, Max Awon calling it "... a monstrosity that should 
never have been ... the crux of our present 
health problems.. .a 
bottomless pit that will continue to gulp a 
superabundance of scarce public funds... ", while Kamaluddin Mohammed under whose ministerial tenure 
the policy was formulated and implemented calling those who criticised it as "prejudiced" ... " 
('Bright 
vision or bad dream? ', Sunday Express, 29/9/94: 4). Clive Pantin, the NAR health minister for three 
months after Hosein's resignation after the 1990 coup attempt called it "a magnificent structure standing 
next to a dilapidated health service... " ('Bright vision or bad dream? ', Sunday Express, 29/9/94: 4). Dean, 
writing in the Lancet was equally sceptical, noting that the incremental implementation outcome was a 
"messy compromise". He asked somewhat rhetorically: 
"... how a government as sharp as Trinidad's could have proceeded with such a 
project... the story is not a new one for the third world, but it remains no less sad for 
that" (Dean, 1991: 1593). 
If blame had to be apportioned, one cannot ignore the essential fact that the policy went back to 
Williams presidential survival politics, and his resulting blatant neglect of public sector and health reform, 
which, when added to the oil boom, made the incentives for reform unnecessary. Twenty five years, more 
than a billion dollars- and various health crises later, the greatest indictment of the Trinidadian medical 
school policy of particularly the Williams regime was a government decision in the early 1990s that thirty- 
five (35) Trinidadian medical graduates per year was adequate for the country's needs after all, which 
would have been produced in Jamaica in the first place. Medical interests were responsible. International 
finance and structure also undoubtedly shared responsibility. In a major international health policy 
document published in 1993, titled `Investing in Health' the World Bank uncharacteristically admitted, 
among other things, that international assistance can "... frequently exacerbate the problem of 
unsustainable health investments... " (World Bank, 1993: 139). This report also acknowledged that donor 
assistance, "... particularly for tertiary facilities and teaching hospitals, has sometimes been provided even 
if the incremental recurrent costs from these investments are too high... " (World Bank, 1993: 139). This 
is undoubtedly true of the IDB's role in the Trinidadian medical school policy. Nevertheless, the role of 
regime characteristics - particularly survival - at both the first implementation stage, , and also at the 
second commissioning stage was also influential, and raises important questions not only for the health 
human resources development and reform process in the suddenly `affluent' developing state, but for the 





In this conclusion, I shall concentrate on two broad levels: first I briefly discuss my theoretical and 
methodological approach, given the aims and objectives of the study. Second, I assess the main fmdings 
of the data, including the strengths and weaknesses, given both these approaches. 
8.2 AIMS, OBJECTIVES AND METHOD OF THE STUDY 
My central aim in doing this study was to analyse and assess the role, influence and relevance of 
Bossert's regime characteristics - strength, stability, ideology and democracy, in addition to the concept of 
regime maintenance or survival - given other important structural influences on the policy process of the 
post-colonial state. The objective I set myself was to apply this analysis to health human resources 
policymaking processes and outcomes in three Commonwealth Caribbean states: Guyana, Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago in the 1970s and 1980s. In terms of these aims and objectives I set myself, 
theoretically, I was particularly interested in the relevance of the `agency-structure debate in the 
development literature as it applied to the Commonwealth Caribbean region, particularly within the 
countries I had selected. Policy-wise, I was interested in applying social science techniques to a study of 
Caribbean post-independence health and health human resources policy experiences, given my own initial 
interest and observations over periods of time spent in the past in all three countries. I decided to use the 
1970s and 1980s as the main focus of the study for two reasons, first, these were the two main decades of 
independent development after independence at various periods in the 1960s, and second, the evident 
contrasts of experiences and influences both within and from outside the region in these two decades, 
offered enough justification for a comparison across the two decades. 
In terms of my methodological approach to these aims and objectives, after discussions with my 
supervisor, I decided upon a comparative case study-based approach, using the insights of the theory- 
generating techniques of grounded theory. Comparative case study and grounded theory techniques 
were best, in my judgement, to achieve the right balance between the rigour of the hypothesis-testing 
approaches, on the one hand, and descriptiveness, on the other. In the case of policy analysis within the 
developing state policy environment, the paucity of previous studies and data on the area, as well as 
statistics, meant that the search for policy trends and patterns should be my main focus. In this way, I 
could actually collect as much information that I could during my fieldwork, then analyse and search for 
trends with countries, by comparing regimes actions, and also across the three countries. The techniques 
used for data analysis were also conditioned by these factors. Where data availability was patchy and 
uneven, as in Guyana, I relied heavily on interviews, particularly with a range of senior-level officials, 
including politicians, as well as consultants, academics and health workers themselves. In Jamaica and 
Trinidad., where the data collection was more fruitful, I also relied on interviews to corroborate the 
secondary data findings on health human resources. Subjecting the collected data to grounded theory 
hypothesis-type testing, I decided to analyse the study across three levels. At the first level, I would 
analyse, given the overall data, general trends by regime-based comparison, across the three states. At the 
second level, I selected health personnel migration for deeper cross country, and cross regime analysis. 
Although the available statistics had to be gleaned from a combination of reports, including from the 
press, and was uneven - especially in the case of Guyana -I felt confident that I had achieved a `critical 
mass' for a special case study as various patterns were revealed in my subsequent analysis. Similarly. at 
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the third level, applying my grounded theory approach to the data I had accumulated on the Trinidad 
medical school policy process, I found that the breadth and depth of the data was more than adequate for 
another case study in order to assess the role and influence of regime characteristics across the three 
regimes involved in the process from formulation in the early 1970s to eventual implementation in the late 
1980s. 
The main limitations of the study, as I see it are, centred around the limited time (six weeks) spent 
within each country, and probably more important, financial constraints. In terms of time and money, 
these precluded deeper analysis as well as further follow up of leads long after I left the countries, where 
interesting patterns were found, especially to corroborate such emerging trends. Data limitations 
especially access to senior personnel, especially in Trinidad was a major problem, for variety of 
limitations to do with timing, availability and willingness to participate in interviews. Despite these main 
weaknesses, I believed that adequate data had be found, interesting patterns revealed and adequate 
corroboration found for my findings, through return interviews during fieldwork, as well as from a wide 
variety of documentary sources, as well as interviews with a broad cross section of persons (including 
politicians and policymakers grappling with day to day issues, or recounting their experiences, or doctors 
and nurses `on the ground') - one of the strengths, I believe, of the study. I now turn to the main findings 
of the study, which incorporates a summary and critique of my theoretical approach. 
8.2 THE MAIN FINDINGS 
My main findings of the role and influence of regime characteristics on the developing state are along 
three main themes: first, recognition at the general level of the value of the structurated approach: the 
interrelationship between both actor- and structure-based determinants - as the best way forward in 
explaining and accommodating in a non-deterministic way, patterns, including policy trends or 
trajectories, as well as similarities and differences in developing state policy processes and outcomes; 
second, the clear, but variable influence of regime characteristics: strength, stability, ideology, 
democracy, and regime maintenance on low politics issues such as health human resources policy 
development at the planning, training and management phases; and thirdly, and perhaps most 
significantly, the influence of regime survival in occasionally transforming low politics policies, in the 
developing state, such as health policy into high politics issues, in collaboration with other factors, which 
can threaten political survival. I begin with my findings on structurated or integrated actor-structure 
influences on policy. 
`Structurated' or actor/structure influences and the post-colonial state policy process 
The definition of development as `the process of being developed' as it relates to the progressive 
social, political and economic advancement of people and societies in developing states has been the one 
used in this study. Given the developing state `development' dilemma, modernisation and dependency 
the two main approaches to developing state comparative policy analysis offer contrasting views on the 
role agency or self-willed action, and structure. The `modernisation' view, popularised by Rostow and 
Myrdal among others, was primarily concerned with economic growth saw development as evolutionary 
with Western states at the apex of modernity. Prior to the two world wars, `development' was thought 
unable to happen in these `backward' societies. However, after 1945, these opinions could no longer be 
sustained as newly independent third world countries were themselves increasingly exploring various 
economic development strategies. Western `modernising' theorists saw development, as noted earlier, 
primarily as one of economic growth with strategies and societies that modelled the Western approach. 
Development was therefore equated with progressive industrial capitalism. Essentially, the modernisation 
argument went that former colonies lagged behind because of `backward' peoples, traditions and values - 
factors that were not conducive to development. Developing countries could however `evolve' and 
`develop' as long as `modern', Western liberal democratic values, technology, expertise and capital were 
diffused into their societies on a sustained basis with the active participation of local Western-educated 
elites. The basic modernisation argument was therefore that the movement towards devolution of powers 
away from the all powerful authoritative posts to highly specialised bureaucracies and government 
agencies was critical to development. This factor, together with changes in social conditions through 
communications and education would generate a complexity in political systems in developing countries 
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that would be able to satisfy, in the long run, as many different political interests as possible and in doing 
so further the development process 
The main criticism of this approach came in the 1960s in the form of a neo-Marxian response by the 
Latin American `dependency' theorists. Like classic Marxists, they criticised the modernisation concept 
for its total ignorance of the role and influence of national and international class and power relations, 
particularly the roles of imperialism and `dependent' development. Far from being a natural state of 
affairs that would eventually happen to other states who rigidly followed it therefore, Gunder Frank and 
others argued that Western economic growth and development itself was the outcome of a progressive 
system of power domination and exploitation of the peripheral regions by the core, rapidly industrialising 
countries. They saw development and underdevelopment as opposite ideas of the same process: 
development in one region was occurring at the expense of underdevelopment in another (Harrison, 1988: 
150). In order to escape such perpetual underdevelopment, third world countries, accordingly had to 
become socialist and then either `go it alone' or develop links with other socialist countries (Harrison, 
1988: 151). As we have seen in both the 1970s and 1980s, political and policy development in Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were influenced by the dependent development and the pervasiveness 
of structural factors. This influence was dominant at two main levels: 1) in strengthening the idea of the 
political, economic and social structural status quo, with incremental change as the way forward; and 2) 
the negative impact of economic crisis situations in the 1970s and 1980s on developing states' abilities to 
implement progressive policies for their populations. These `situational' crises were the manifestations of 
a number of factors, the main one being the inherited colonial, capitalist form of dependent development. 
By its very nature, this form of development consigned most developing countries to `peripheral' 
development. 
Applying the dependency theoretical approach to my study health and health human resources policy, 
I found that the impact of dependent development extended to the socio-political as well as the economic 
realm as noted by Navarro, Doyal, Turshen and others. The main economic problem was the lack of 
resources. As we saw in Chapter Four, in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, the web of international 
capitalist relations meant that commodity prices were subject to the vagaries of `the market'. As prices 
rose so, the room for policy manoeuvre and the chances for successful policy implementation increased. 
Without adequate resources, policy development for the planning, training and management of health 
personnel could not be implemented or indeed reformed. With this influence an almost permanent feature 
of post-independence development in Guyana and Jamaica, any findings that exposed lack of policy action 
on the part of these and other similar states could well be forgiven. Without adequate financing, health 
policies and plans remain essentially that. This pattern was repeated in the 1980s, as global recession hit 
developing countries particularly hard, including oil-producing ones like Trinidad. These countries had to 
resort to international finance with its attendant harsh conditions that not only set back progressive 
reforms, but also jeopardised past achievements. 
As Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven showed, in the case of health human resources the impact was 
particularly felt in Guyana and Jamaica of the three countries studied. Progressive policy reform 
responses, for example, the Burnham government's medex and community health worker policies, as well 
as Jamaica's community health aide programmes were severely undermined, given both the recessionary 
situation and the externally-driven austerity measures. In addition the production of traditional categories 
such as doctors and nurses were also undermined due to a basic lack of financial resources. Guyana's 
medical school, although targeted to meet community medicine needs, although a controversial policy, 
was also undermined by economic forces and circumstances beyond the control of successive 
governments. Undoubtedly, the structural economic problems and the adjustment programmes forced on 
developing states in the 1980s posed the greatest threat to any semblance of progressive health and health 
human resources development policies. One of the problems was the inability to fund existing vacant 
posts of staff on health service establishments. While cuts might have been necessary for non-technical 
posts in the regional civil services, the forced elimination of particularly nursing and auxiliary health posts 
reflected the negative effects of the structural influences continually faced by developing states. 
One of its other major effects of dependent development was seen in Caribbean health human resource 
migration. As noted in Chapter Six, Caribbean health migration, though grounded 
in long-standing 
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development in one region was occurring at the expense of underdevelopment in another (Harrison, 1988: 
150). In order to escape such perpetual underdevelopment, third world countries, accordingly had to 
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1988: 151). As we have seen in both the 1970s and 1980s, political and policy development in Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago were influenced by the dependent development and the pervasiveness 
of structural factors. This influence was dominant at two main levels: 1) in strengthening the idea of the 
political, economic and social structural status quo, with incremental change as the way forward; and 2) 
the negative impact of economic crisis situations in the 1970s and 1980s on developing states' abilities to 
implement progressive policies for their populations. These `situational' crises were the manifestations of 
a number of factors, the main one being the inherited colonial, capitalist form of dependent development. 
By its very nature, this form of development consigned most developing countries to `peripheral' 
development. 
Applying the dependency theoretical approach to my study health and health human resources policy, 
I found that the impact of dependent development extended to the socio-political as well as the economic 
realm as noted by Navarro, Doyal, Turshen and others. The main economic problem was the lack of 
resources. As we saw in Chapter Four, in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, the web of international 
capitalist relations meant that commodity prices were subject to the vagaries of `the market'. As prices 
rose so, the room for policy manoeuvre and the chances for successful policy implementation increased. 
Without adequate resources, policy development for the planning, training and management of health 
personnel could not be implemented or indeed reformed. With this influence an almost permanent feature 
of post-independence development in Guyana and Jamaica, any findings that exposed lack of policy action 
on the part of these and other similar states could well be forgiven. Without adequate financing, health 
policies and plans remain essentially that. This pattern was repeated in the 1980s, as global recession hit 
developing countries particularly hard, including oil-producing ones like Trinidad. These countries had to 
resort to international finance with its attendant harsh conditions that not only set back progressive 
reforms, but also jeopardised past achievements. 
As Chapters Four, Five, Six and Seven showed, in the case of health human resources the impact was 
particularly felt in Guyana and Jamaica of the three countries studied. Progressive policy reform 
responses, for example, the Burnham government's medex and community health worker policies, as well 
as Jamaica's community health aide programmes were severely undermined, given both the recessionary 
situation and the externally-driven austerity measures. In addition the production of traditional categories 
such as doctors and nurses were also undermined due to a basic lack of financial resources. Guyana's 
medical school, although targeted to meet community medicine needs, although a controversial policy, 
was also undermined by economic forces and circumstances beyond the control of successive 
governments. Undoubtedly, the structural economic problems and the adjustment programmes forced on 
developing states in the 1980s posed the greatest threat to any semblance of progressive health and health 
human resources development policies. One of the problems was the inability to fund existing vacant 
posts of staff on health service establishments. While cuts might have been necessary for non-technical 
posts in the regional civil services, the forced elimination of particularly nursing and auxiliary health posts 
reflected the negative effects of the structural influences continually faced by developing states. 
One of its other major effects of dependent development was seen in Caribbean health human resource 
migration. As noted in Chapter Six, Caribbean health migration, though grounded in long-standing 
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migration patterns since the late 19th century nevertheless developed a momentum largely its own by the 
1950s, heavily influenced by two levels of structural factors: the pull factors: including the manipulation 
of immigration laws to encourage skilled and professional migration from the cheaply-produced pools of 
labour in the developing word; and the push factors: the poor economic and social conditions that force 
many, including developing country skilled workers and professionals to migrate in search of a better 
quality of life, including better job opportunities and rewards for their skills. Given its inherent unfairness 
to developing states, efforts have been made by the major receiving countries to stem this `tide, for 
example in the USA and United Kingdom through immigration reforms. However, this does not preclude 
the option that given existing shortages they cannot reform their rules again. In the 1970 and 1980s, 
Caribbean governments - particularly Jamaica, Guyana and Trinidad were unable to prevent this already - 
developed and entrenched trend, losing literally millions of dollars of investment in the training or these 
personnel to the richer, more developed `North'. By the end of the 1980s, new opportunities for migration 
opened up particularly with the burgeoning American private health sector, especially in the East Coast 
and in the retirement havens of Florida, less than two hundred miles from a Jamaican health service unable 
to adequately pay its highly competent public sector doctors and nurses. The result was also migration 
to the also lucrative internal private sector. However, the decision to migrate to the USA and later to 
Saudi Arabia was the option of choice for many, including other Caribbean nurses. Caribbean 
governments were practically helpless to do anything about the wages and benefits being offered by the 
increasingly active agents on behalf of health institutions in these developed countries. These trends 
simply increased as economic conditions progressively worsened. The outcome was not only an 
understaffed public health service in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad, but also a deterioration in training 
standards, already reeling from `economic rationalisation' but now affected in the late 1980s and early 
1990s by the migration of the trainers as well as the trained. 
Structural problems also extended to the socio-professional realm of developing state human resources 
policy processes. As many including Abel-Smith, Doyal, Navarro, Illich and others have pointed out the 
professional culture of health development as an almost exclusive medical/curative construct was imparted 
to the colonial state, and remained intact well beyond independence. Within this policy environment, the 
doctor through professional control of his skills was able to exercise control and dominance not only over 
medical, but nursing and paramedical training and practice in patterns modelled after independence on the 
developed countries. Thus, issues such as appropriateness and access to adequate care were undermined 
by what was essentially a power issue as underscored by Alford, Freidson, Eckstein and others in 
developed states, but just as appropriate to the developing state. In Trinidad for instance, research reports 
found that the dominance of medical technocrats within the health ministry was a major constraint on the 
developing and reforming health policy away from a curative approach -a significant finding which 
confirmed a situation found in other developing states, by among others, Ugalde in his study of health 
professional dominance in policymaking in Colombia (Peat Marwick Mitchell group report to the 
National Advisory Council, 1978; Ugalde, 1979). 
While not all doctors were not guilty of excessive focus on curative, care, the regional pattern was 
nevertheless entrenched. By the late 1970s and 1980s, the regional medical profession came around to 
recognising the usefulness of an integrated primary health care approach with important changes medical 
training. As Mitchell (1981) has noted, such professional changes usually had to come from within. 
Despite these important changes, coming out of the 1978 Alma Ata Declaration and its acknowledged 
impact on Caribbean health policy processes, community health training, planning and management was 
still heavily influenced by medical dominance, both theoretically and in real terms. Two clear examples 
of this were seen the Chapters Four, Five and Six in the demise of the nurse practitioner policy in 
Trinidad, and the resistance of the Jamaican medical profession to government policy in the 1970s. The 
outcomes of this dominance on nurses frustration and their resulting migration is thus not hard to 
understand. This dominance thus retarded change at critical junctures for both nurses as well as the wider 
health system. When this factor is added to the economic crisis, one can also understand why nurses and 
even junior doctors -consigned to worked excessively long hours as part of the hierarchical tradition - 
resisted and sought new opportunities abroad and in the local private sector after qualifying to practice 
their skills. 
There are of course other related structural factors. As Horowitz has pointed out, policy concerns do 
not match those that predominate in the West. State structures in developing countries whatever their 
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weaknesses are still relatively powerful vis ü vis their societies. The capacity of Third World' states to 
make and effectuate policy is, in several respects, more imperfect than that of their counterparts in the 
West. Participants in the policy process are fewer than in developed states than in the West, and some 
sectors of the society are hardly participants at all. The channels for participation are less well established 
and less clearly prescribed in developing countries. Information for policy making is much scarcer in 
Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Caribbean than in advanced industrial countries. Finally, given all the 
above, the resort to foreign models and frequent reliance on foreign experts is common (Horowitz, 1989: 
199-200). Cleaves (1980) also raised the issue of apathy as a result the prevalence of these conditions. 
And yet, given all of these militating structural conditions at various levels, one would be forgiven for 
thinking the developing state policy processes, including that of the health sector - have been totally 
paralysed, neglected and in crisis since independence. This is not totally the case in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. As shown in Chapter One, the region -with the exception of Guyana - has justifiably been 
proud of its achievements, which have enabled it to be rank well above most developing states. 
Traditional indices such as life expectancy, infant and maternal mortality rates, population growth rates, 
doctor and nurse ratios bear this out especially since independence was achieved. These were 
considerably affected by structural adjustment policies, in the late 1970s (in the case of Jamaica) and 
1980s which revealed the crisis situation for the first time. 
These proactive and progressive developments by both political actors and bureaucrats nevertheless 
revealed the central problems of an over-reliance on deterministic approaches to policy development in 
the developing state. Like south-east Asian economic `miracles', Caribbean leaders have gained a lot of 
attention for their health achievements from other developing states, in what is by any standard a quite 
remarkable achievement, in a short space of time, and especially given the economic crisis situation. This 
effectively revealed the existence of national power and the capability, ability (agency) to act, by the low- 
to middle income Caribbean developing state. As Grindle and Thomas (1991) and others have found, 
developing state health policy actors are also involved in considering issues continually on issues of 
concern to the health sector, and involved in a wider range of activities, including considering (and 
influencing) items on the policy agenda; decisionmaking, implementation, and assessing and evaluating 
outcomes. While conditioned by structural factors, this ability is nevertheless there to varying degrees. 
The biggest actor has, by far been the state and specifically the ruling parties or regimes. Yet explanations 
at this level by most Caribbean researchers has been ignored until recently for largely ideological reasons. 
The ability to explain this paradox of ability to act or not act in the face of structural factors, however runs 
the risk of making generalisations about the Commonwealth Caribbean as a whole. As I have found in my 
study of regime characteristics and health human resources policy, policy changes, choices and outcomes 
reveal the complexity of the development policy process even within this relatively small region. Even 
when one considers the negative effects of structural factors, the effects of political factors, and their 
uniqueness with specific developing country policy environments reveal enough to recognise that this 
factor cannot be ignored in policy explanations. 
The influence of regime strength, stability, ideology, democracy and survival on low politics policy 
The role of the regime in Caribbean health and social policy has to be traced back to the colonial era. 
In Chapter One I examined the relationship between health and the colonial regime with specific reference 
to former British colonies of the Caribbean, to determine whether linkages could be made between the 
power relations and policy objectives of the colonial state and the power relations and its impact on policy 
in the post-colonial state. Power under colonial rule was concentrated at the political level: in the hands 
of the colonial governor and bureaucracy. Power was also concentrated at the economic level: in the 
hands of the planters and the evolving international mercantile system. Health care was used to legitimise 
the colonial system. In the post-slavery, crown colony period, power remained in the hands of these two 
groups, with the newly emancipated being the powerless. Given this situation, policy responses to health, 
after the economic crisis brought on by emancipation, colonial administrators were forced to step to fulfil 
the health duties once carried out by the planters. The reasons for this vary though a combination of self- 
interest (to prevent epidemics, for instance) as well as some genuine level of interest in the social welfare 
of the freed blacks also contributed. 
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In those territories like Guyana and Trinidad, crown colony rule saw the importation of thousands of 
Indian indentured labourers -a phenomenon which added a further level to the social and health policy 
strata. Separate health systems -based on provision of doctors by the planters also reinforced the social 
and racial `apartheid' within the colony. The planter and expatriate classes received the best quality care 
available, the freed blacks depended on the development of new hospitals and missionary-based health 
care, and the Indians received rudimentary care from the plantation. In the 1930s, riots in the region 
protesting lack of employment and poor social conditions - did hasten the reform process by the still 
powerful, but gradually weakening colonial regime. The Moyne recommendations that extended from 
political and economic reform, to social and health care reforms were a part of this crisis-reform mode. 
The relationship between colonial power and health services delivery was thus a power-centralised one 
based on enlightened self-interest and driven by crisis-based reform. Much of this behaviour was adopted 
by post-colonial regimes to the detriment of health services as I found to varying degrees in Guyana, 
Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago particularly in the 1970s. 
The 1970s marked a new phase in Caribbean politics with the search for new strategies of 
development and new models of political organisation in what was effectively the second decade of 
independence (Payne, and Sutton, 1995: 13). Applying Bossert's regime characteristics typology to the 
Caribbean in the 1970s, the Burnham, Manley and Williams regimes shared similarities though 
characterised by important differences that must be understood in accurately interpreting policy outcomes. 
Manley's PNP shared a similar socialist agenda with Burnham's PNC, though the latter's resort to 
survival politics through its non-democratic hold on power contrasted with Manley's adherence to the 
democratic process. The Williams regime was essentially non-aligned, cultivating cordial relations with 
both the Americans, and even the Cubans eventually. However, the oil boom after 1973 made these 
relationships less important than they were to the other two by empowering the regime to formulate plans 
and policies which lending agencies such as the World Bank were willing to offer seemingly unlimited 
funds. 
I used Bossert's typology of regime characteristics - strength, stability, ideology and democracy to 
which I added regime maintenance or survival which I found was also relevant to the discussion of regime 
democracy (1983: 429). Guyana under Burnham exhibited the strongest influences in this regard. 
However, it interacted with other regime influences such as democracy and ideology as well as non- 
regime, structural factors such as economics. I found in the case of Guyana in the 1970s that under 
conditions of non-legitimacy, authoritarianism and limited resources, the urge to maintain control of the 
state resulted in the allocation of resources for regime survival rather than health policy. This in turn has 
the effect of negating and undermining the nominal progressive ideological policies being espoused in the 
policy arena, leading to policy neglect, `ad-hocism' and underdevelopment. Policy `ad-hocism' and 
neglect characterised the policy development process in Guyana in the 1970s, as significant amounts of 
the state's scarce financial resources were directed towards regime survival. The resulting poor conditions 
for the rational planning, training, management and utilisation of heath professionals thus triggered a 
sustained level of migration of health professionals and a marked decline in all aspects of health. 
By contrast, in the case of the Manley government in Jamaica in the 1970s I found that under given 
conditions of regime legitimacy and progressive ideology, and some element of political will, room to 
manoeuvre can be found in making and implementing progressive policies, even under militating internal 
economic conditions and external political pressures. Regime characteristics such as ideology were more 
important than regime maintenance. Hence, the main problem for the Manley government was economic, 
despite the occasional lapses as we saw in its poor relations with the medical profession. Inexperience, 
the size of the task, its failure to effect the required administrative reform as a precondition for 
implementation, a chronic lack of resources due to a sustained economic problems all contributed. Importantly, 
even though the government's own increasingly radicalised political agenda was a symptom of its tenuous 
situation, it never made any moves that constituted a wish to retain power undemocratically. This 
legitimacy along with its ideological commitment to preventive, community-based care was its greatest 
contribution to policymaking for the health sector, although its hands were effectively bound by IMF 
dictates. Finally, in the case of the Williams government in Trinidad, I found that under conditions of 
personal authoritarian, any strong desire to centralise power for regime survival will have deleterious 
effects for reforming implementing institutions of the state in preparation for development policy despite 
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nominal democracy and legitimacy. This tendency can become quite strong with grave consequences for 
long-term policy and development processes even when favourable `intervening' conditions in the form of 
unexpected resource acquisition have created policy windows of opportunity for policy reform. For the 
1970s at least, then the role of regime characteristics was influential, though economic, professional 
interests and international economics and politics were also very important. 
While resource availability is arguably one of the most important determinants of policy 
implementation, even this factor could not adequately explain how `resource-deficient' Jamaica in the 
1970s was able to formulate and achieve what was on balance a more progressive approach to reform and 
innovation specifically relating to health human resources policy, when compared to equally 'resource- 
deficient' Guyana, and the resource-rich Trinidad in the 1970s. More surprisingly, the Manley regime's 
own achievements in health human resources policy development at a time of severe economic problems 
were arguably on par with, and in terms of innovativeness, decidedly more progressive than that of newly 
`oil-rich' Trinidad under the Williams regime: a fact which could not be adequately explained by either 
colonialism or economics. I therefore found evidence to support Hintzen's assertion of the generally 
negative influences of ethno-based `survival politics'. The experiences of the Burnham and Williams 
regimes' in the 1970s in relation to health human resources policy illustrated the secondary status of 
progressive development policy processes in favour of `survival politics' and therefore supports Hintzen's 
basic argument. Specific examples of this neglect included a heavy reliance on ad-hocism, an 
unwillingness to implement internally-generated and recommended reform (in some cases made by 
various commissions appointed by the regimes themselves) and the general neglect of other policy actors 
and institutions. I also found that even when policy `windows of opportunity' were available, the `survival 
politics' approach to governance often generated risky, `crisis-driven' responses to those unresolved, 
wider systemic problems that the regime seemed unwilling to address, due to a combination of apathy and 
the perception of threat to its own survival. This `policy-as-crisis' approach thus undermined not only the 
need to develop and nurture relationships with other policy actors (including the bureaucracy), but also the 
medium-term prospects for systematically developing (through reform and integration) an appropriate and 
effective policy system at the main levels: agenda-setting, formulation and implementation (Grindle and 
Thomas, 1991). 
The health human resources data for the 1980s also revealed both positive and negative trends and 
processes in the role of regime characteristics in the developing state policy process. Compared to the 
1970s, there were strong differences among all three countries' regimes. While the 1970s was 
characterised by radical type policy departures that produced both progressive policies and regressive 
actions by some regimes to maintain power, the 1980s ushered in a reform phase which had both positive 
and negative policy implications. On the positive side, countries such as Guyana in particular, despite the 
last five years of the Burnham regime was forced to democratise after 27 years of PNC regime rule, given 
a changed global and hemispheric context. The choices were limited for this survivalist regime. In 
choosing reform, the chances of improvement of health policy processes and indeed health status were 
greatly improved. On the negative side, in the case of Jamaica and Trinidad, the role of regime 
characteristics seem less relevant though not totally absent, when compared with the influence of 
economic factors. The Seaga regime in Jamaica, like the Chambers and Robinson regimes were not only 
democratically elected but also market-reformist governments - the former, a free-marketeer, the latter two 
forced by circumstances. However, also common to both -along with Guyana of course - was the economic 
crisis of the 1980s which limited policy windows to fundamental structural and economic reforms. 
In the case of Jamaica in the 1980s, explanations of the balance between regime characteristics and 
economic and other factors in determining health policy and would fall more favourably on the Seaga 
regime's side given the poor state of the economy after Manley. Nevertheless, his regime's free-market 
credentials were also much in evidence during the 1980s, and with devastating effect in the case of health 
human resources when combined with the IMF's loan conditions. While even Seaga himself came around 
to questioning these conditions, the damage - in the case of nurse and doctor migration, staff and post 
cuts, elimination of community health aide posts, hospital closures and spiralling inflation that made 
public sector pay packets useless - had already been done. Unlike Guyana, there was never any question 
of regime survival or undemocratic rule. Explanations of Jamaican health human resources policy in the 
1980s however must balance the regime's free market ideology with its limited bargaining position vis a 
vis the IMF at a time of severe economic crisis and declining US financial support. In terms of outcomes, 
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the price paid by the Jamaican health sector and its professionals was arguably bad, though a quick 
comparison to the Guyanese situation with the added influence of political authoritarianism makes it seem 
marginally less traumatic. 
In Trinidad, the situation was bad when compared with its own former strength and status in the oil- 
rich 1970s. By the time the Chambers regime assumed office, recession had already hit. Under these last 
five years of PNM rule, the country changed from a creditor to a debtor nation. Health human resources 
policy, like the other two countries during this period was subsumed to crisis-driven needs, although the 
Chambers government had also recognised the need for reform. Its inability to act and the questionable 
nature of the previous PNM's regime under Williams' persistence with the medical complex made this 
policy all the more questionable in the 1980s when after being used for electoral purposes, it could not be 
commissioned as planned. This policy also came to dominate the tenure of the Robinson regime in the 
mid 1980s, when it had to decide on short notice what to do. The eventual choice of a phased 
commissioning and the subsequent resources allocation at a time when the health sector could least afford 
it contributed in part to the image of an uncaring government and the eventual the 1990s coup attempt, as 
well as the government's massive loss at the 1992 general elections. The medical school policy not only 
symbolised the backlash of NAR regime policy, but of the arguably bigger policy failure of the Williams 
regime - for largely political reasons since the 1950s - to implement fundamental decentralisation of the 
health sector. The implementation of these reforms by the new Manning regime in 1994 signalled a new 
start for the health sector and health planning, production and management. However, like the other three 
countries in the 1990s, the role of the new economic and international policy context of IMF-driven 
reforms were also had their own negative implications for the rest of the decade. 
In my case study of doctor and nurse migration and its relationship to regime characteristics, my 
findings suggested that regime legitimacy and democracy played a varied role but important role in the 
nature and extent of the health migration process, especially in its interaction with other influencing 
factors in all three states. Economic factors and environmental factors were, of course, critical. However, 
equally important at the national level were the presence of government apathy and inaction as well as 
well as miscalculation in the case of migration of expensively-trained health sector human resources. The 
pressure to change only arose out of the negative consequences in the early 1990s which later triggered 
new and innovative approaches to the problem within the context of health reform programmes. Regime 
responses to health migration in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad were probably more influenced by regime 
characteristics - particularly regime strength, ideology, democracy and maintenance - in the 1970s; and by 
economic factors in the 1980s. However to apply this simplistic, one-dimensional assertion to these 
countries is to deny the complex interaction of both economics and national government action with each 
other across the two decades, as well as with other important situational, structural, socio-cultural and 
environmental factors in the process which also need to be explained in any accurate analysis. 
As we saw in Chapter Four, Trinidad was strong, while Guyana and Jamaica were economically weak, 
given the onset of the oil boom. Guyana and Jamaica were espoused variants of socialism which 
conditioned both countries' health and development policies for the rest of the decade. Both were 
relatively unstable. However the Burnham' regime's undemocratic, survivalist rule compared 
unfavourably with the Manley regime's democratic socialism. The impact on health migration then was 
bound to be conditioned by these factors. I therefore found that while both experienced serious health 
personnel migration problems in the 1970s, the reasons, in the case of Guyana, were also complicated by 
Burnham's survivalist, undemocratic rule, and the channelling of scarce resources for survival. Henry 
and Johnson's (1985) observation that education and training have always been viewed as a passport to 
geographic and social mobility applies to all three states - as well as to other low-to middle income 
developing states. The pervasiveness of economic and other factors is also a continued reality to be borne 
in developing state policy responses to migration. However, my findings revealed that policy responses 
were conditioned as much by national political/regime calculations as well as by national and international 
economic and professional factors. In short, this means that solutions to the migration problem must, at 
the very least, be addressed at all of these levels. 
In my second case study of the decision by the Williams government to build a medical school and the 
decision of the successor NAR government to commissioning it, I found that the explanation was bounded 
by both time and financial constraints, but equally important by regime characteristics and motivations, 
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particularly on the part of the Williams' regime. The main reasons for the policy included a medical 
doctor shortage. Yet the evidence suggests that while this may have been the case, a combination of other 
factors including resource availability, the regional politics behind the prime minister's personal interest in 
the project and other situational factors such as the offshore medical school problem saw intensive lobby 
action by medical academic interests for the adoption and implementation of the policy. The dilemma 
that faced the NAR regime in 1986 given the stalemate of the Chambers years was essentially the least 
worst option and clearly a bounded rationality approach. International financial involvement and support 
of the project was also a legitimising determinant from the start, a policy that has now been criticised by 
among others the World Bank in the 1990s (1993: 139). The clear implication from my fmdings is the 
need for an integrated approach to developing state policymaking as much as to developing state policy 
analysis. 
The transition of low politics to high politics, crisis-ridden policy 
Chapter Seven of this study identified what was perhaps the most interesting overall finding in this 
study of regimes and Caribbean low-politics health policy processes. I found that such policies, give what 
Kingdon (1988) might call a confluence of contextual and content-related `streams', can assume high- 
politics, crisis-ridden characteristics that can actually threaten regime survival. This is amply 
demonstrated in the Robinson/NAR's predicament in the late 1980s of whether, and how to proceed with 
a medical school (which had graduated to a `complex' of schools and research facilities by the time of its 
physical policy implementation) given the legacy left by successive PNM governments, but particularly 
the Williams regime that placed the issue on the agenda in the first place. A number of interesting points 
emerge, in this regard, that are particularly instructive to third world politicians engaged in policymaking. 
One is that despite considerable special interests (in this case the medical academics) involvement and 
cooptation (through the control of technical influence) on low-politics processes, the fall-out from the 
process ultimately had political consequences, as politicians and ruling parties, and not technocrats have 
the most to lose - particularly their political futures, given their ultimate responsibility in policymaking. 
Another is that the causes for such predicaments are to be found, in a combination of structural factors - 
including historical and economic factors - as well as agency-based factors, for instance, the 
Robinson/NAR regime, although making a sound bounded-rational approach to policy, compared to the 
inaction and non decision-making legacy of the Williams and Chambers years on this issue, it also 
committed its own errors that must be added to the structural explanations of this particular policy 
trajectory. Jeffrey's (1986) example of the role of the family planning issue in undermining the Indira 
Gandhi regime also illustrates the role reverse, and transformed role of regimes being influenced and 
worse, politically threatened by their low-politics, health policy decisions. Even here however, such 
illustrations of the power content of policies themselves need to be seen within power and process 
contexts at the structural level, which returns us to the middle-ground' value of the structurated approach 
to low-politics policy issues such as health. 
The case for the structurated approach 
Gidden's sociological concept of structuration is one of the more interesting and influential 
theoretical constructs that can be applied to this explanatory gap within development theory. Giddens 
essentially advocates the need for a balanced, integrative and dynamic approach to actors and structures in 
sociological analysis which pays due attention to the specificity of time/space issues. He justifies this by 
noting that only such an integrative approach can explain diversity and specificity at the micro- and meso- 
levels with along with some amount of structural uniformity and pattern: effectively the prime objectives 
of social enquiry. In Chapter Two, a number of themes recurred in our discussion of policy: power, 
content, context, process, timing, and interrelationships at a variety of levels. Policy is about power and 
its influence on process, hence Dahl's famous assertion that politics is about `who gets what' and `why'. 
Power in policy making is about national and international actors, elites and interest group influences all 
affecting the decisions that affect the national policy arena. National and international actors and 
contexts are particularly critical in this regard. In the case of policy making in the post-colonial state, 
power is the product of a number of situational, structural, socio-cultural and environmental actors and 
contexts that are vary form territory to territory, but are nevertheless conditioned by power arrangements 
in colonial society. 
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The analysis of both national and external power is critical to analysing and explaining low politics 
processes like health and health human resources policy processes. Migdal's `strong society-weak state' 
thesis has similarly contributed to the agency-structure debate by acknowledging the use and negative 
consequences of political survival on the development process in poor to middle income states. In his 
study of policymaking in Indonesia, Liddle (1992: 793-807) criticised dependency theory for placing most 
of the blame on structural factors, noting the importance of political and socio-cultural factors in the 
process. He added that in their search for deeper roots, analysts did not address the question of the causes 
of policy at all, or did so only obliquely. Even where they did, they tend to look at an overly abstracted 
state without examining the power factor, that is those who control and direct the activities of state 
agencies. he also added that these researchers tended to tend "... to paint with too broad a brush, rendering 
monochromatic what might in reality be a rainbow of factors... " Liddle (1992: 793-807). Liddle 
concluded that these approaches were almost invariably locked into a positivist framework of hypothesis 
testing and the search for generalisation, which though not bad in itself for policy analysis, got in the way 
of the basic objective of development policy analysis: which is to solve the problems facing the economy 
and society. He asserted that the prodigious capacity for self-willed action of human actors as policy 
makers or in other political roles, individuals and groups often acting against analyst's expectations must 
be analysed if there was to be balance: 
"... Any approach to the study of the causes of development policy that does not take 
this simple but powerful truth into account loses much of its diagnostic and 
prescriptive potency. What is sacrificed is the sensibility necessary to appreciate the 
range of possible actions a decisionmaker might in fact take, and with it the range of 
variables or combinations of variables that might influence his or her decision For 
the problem solver, the ability to respond to flexibly to the unexpected can often 
make the difference between a win and a loss in the policy game... " (Liddle, 1992: 
794). 
Bates has similarly noted that scholars should pay more attention to the capacity for autonomous 
action on the part of local actors, both public and private, and give greater weight to the importance of 
these choices in shaping the impact of external environments upon the structure of the local 
societies... (Bates, 1981: 8). I could have analysed the material collected using a solely deterministic, 
dependency approach that examined the negative impact of external political and economic factors on 
policy processes. Using this approach the ideas associated with the dependency and indeed much of the 
development literature would have provided adequate theoretical support for the negative influence of 
these factors on attempts by post-colonial regimes in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago to further 
their development. However, I found that this was unsatisfactory for two reasons: first, much supporting 
research has already been done in this area; but second, and more importantly, an exclusively dependency- 
based approach did not explain some of my preliminary observations as well as subsequent findings about 
policy experiences in these states. Thus, a dependency approach would have explained some, 
but not all 
of post-colonial state policy reality `on the ground'. 
It would have, for instance, explained the real financial pressures facing the Jamaican and 
Guyanese 
regimes in the 1970s and 1980s in particular, but would not have explained that the Guyanese regime was 
undemocratic, more interested in its own survival than policy implementation, and even 
its progressive 
policies, were in reality undermined by manipulative regime politics which 
forced many Guyanese, 
including hundreds of health personnel to flee the country. The nurse practitioner program which was 
implemented in 1977 was undoubtedly the government's most innovative and ambitious human resource 
strategy. In the case of management capability the role and influence of national regime characteristics 
and motivations was also clear. In the case of Guyana, the gap between the admittedly progressive 
constitutional and legislative provisions pertaining to health, on the one hand, and 
its "meaningless" 
reality "... in terms of the actual delivery of health services and health care to the citizen... 
" on the other, 
was also a by-product of a combination of regime characteristics, particularly regime survival 
(Lutchman, 
1989: 309). 
The question of whether regime characteristics or structural factors has played a crucial role 
in health 
human resources development policy cannot elicit straightforward, single level answers. 
Marxian and 
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neo-Marxian explanations of dependent development are as valid as the agency exhibited by the post- 
colonial state in its attempt to better itself. Jeffrey's (1986) study of Indian health policy supports my 
argument for a balanced, integrated approach that includes an appreciation of both structural forces. 
including medical dominance on the one hand, with the very real positive (and negative) actions that can 
emanate from developing state governments. On the negative influences of regime characteristics, and 
indeed its risks for political survival, Jeffrey noted the politically motivated 1975 sterilisation policy 
decision the 1975 and its negative political fall-out for the Congress Party under Indira Gandhi, as well as, 
of course, for family planning policies and programmes in India. On the positive side, he points to the 
role of political democratisation and health policy achievement in the comparative cases of Pakistan and 
India, both of which gained independence at the same time. 
To make generalisations about the influences on the health policy process - particularly health human 
resources trajectory, given these regime ideological characteristics, however - is to ignore the other 
important influences of regime power, level of democratisation and desire to hold on to power as equally 
important factors in the developing state process. Undoubtedly, the relationship between regime 
characteristics and the policy choice available in the case of health human resources development in 
Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago between 1970 and 1990 was heavily conditioned by 
structural factors -a situation common to developed as well as developing states. However the 
conditions of the developing state are particularly unique. The lack of a preparatory ideology, the 
unreformed political and bureaucratic structures, the nature of regional and international political, 
economic and social processes in the 1950s, all managed in their own way to retard the post- 
independence reform process, while promoting an incrementalist, bounded rationality model of 
development policy that while promoting stability managed to ignore this fundamental need for a 
decentralisation-based reform of power relations in order to foster development (Mills and Jones, 1989; 
Rondinelli 1984; Rondinelli et al 1989). 
Structural factors are important, but even economists recognise the value of political factors. 
Questioning whether IMF agreements led to revolutionary upheavals in the third world, Pantin has noted 
of Trinidad that while the economic foundations of the political crisis of 1990 did not help, the main 
problem was a continued regime failure to transform the country's rentier economy (heavy reliance on oil 
revenue), and hence the state and society. Examining role of good governance in the Caribbean in the 
post-1983 period, Musgrove (1986: 156) criticised wasteful investment projects, the lack of reform and an 
overstaffed state sector as key determinants to the health situation in 1981-84. The political and policy 
motivation question is also acknowledged by economists. As Lee and Mills note: 
"It may... be a myth to believe that governments allocate resources to the health 
sector solely in order to improve the health of their populations, and even more of a 
myth to believe that governments are universally committed-above all else-to health 
improvement (Lee and Mills, 1983: 226). 
Abel-Smith's (1976) also notes the wider prevalence of dilemmas faced in what are commonly termed 
developing state problems: 
"A powerful politician may have promised to secure a hospital for his constituency 
and he is likely to get it. Any theoretical distributional aim may be modified by 
short-term political pressures. These are the realities of life in any society... " (1976: 
180). 
The role of political factors has been recognised in the Caribbean public administration literature. 
Khan's (1993) list of the major problems facing the Caribbean public sector, are therefore extremely 
applicable in the case of health and health human resources policy because they concur with my findings 
in this study. The lack of clear national strategic plans identifying priorities as well as short-medium and 
long term objectives including the fundamental reforms needed to implement such a plan; organisational 
inertia, resulting, inter alia, from over-centralisation; the over-centralisation of decision-making which 
manifests itself in an over-reliance on cabinet decisions without which little significant action is initiated; 
the lack of delegation of authority; the lack of coordination; the ad-hoc attempts at organisational reform 
and the resulting mobilisation of forces to block such attempts; many of which had come from 
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prescriptions of external consultants are all relevant in the case of the health human resources process that 
may have some relation to resource scarcity, but more to do with regime mismanagement and failure to 
reform. 
Khan's conclusion that these "constraining" forces have resulted in significant levels of turnover from 
the public sector, with those who leave doing so through disillusionment resonates in Chapter Six on the 
doctor and nurse migration problem. The outcome of these departures, as he points out, provides an 
excuse for not embarking on any meaningful human resources planning since the view prevails that 
planning in the context of uncertainty regarding the quantity and quality of available human resources is 
seen to be a meaningless exercise "... since those who benefit from such efforts are more often than not the 
same ones who leave the public sector... " (Khan, 1993). While a profoundly pessimistic view this 
reflected much of the reality of the health sector throughout the 1970s and 1980s. Considerable 
improvements have been made in the 1990s, the most important one being the implementation of health 
policy reform programmes. However, many of these basic problems remain, thus emphasising the need 
to recognise that the problem is one of both actors and structures, and can only be solve if addressed at 
both levels (Simmonds, 1989). Given, these views which confirm the need for an integrated structurated 
approach to health policy analysis in the developing state, I now turn to the prospects for the rest of the 
decade and beyond. 
The implications of the findings for the future of Caribbean health human resources 
A number of implications arise of this study that are potentially disrupting in the health and health 
human resources policy process in the 1990s and beyond. Structural factors such as resource scarcity, the 
debt crisis and structural adjustment are undoubtedly the biggest problems impeding the ability to 
implement policies that are in the interests of national populations. The capacity of international financial 
institutions to undermine national policies and development plans through the conditions attached to 
urgently-needed loans cannot be underestimated, a fact which the Manley regime eventually recognised to 
its political as well as its policy cost (Barrett; 1979; Carr, 1977: 166-170). In the case of the debt crisis, 
Caribbean debt doubled to nearly US$10 billion US between 1980 and 1988. In 1991, Jamaica had to use 
31% of its US$ 2.4 billion export earnings to service its debt. Both Guyana and Jamaica have suffered 
from the consequences of the debt crisis more than Trinidad. Jamaica was actually the first country to be 
given a structural adjustment package, and so has been under a much longer indebted period, but without 
any relief in sight. The fact that Jamaica's GNP per capita is marginally higher than Guyana's, has seen 
the latter placed on the `Group of Eight' shortlist for debt forgiveness. Policies such as this threaten tot 
undermine Jamaica's tremendous social and health gains since independence (Pastor and Fletcher, 1993: 
267). Trinidad is also indebted but its oil revenue continues to offer a brighter future for the funding of 
the public health services. However the country still has not fully recovered from the spending spree 
period of the 1970s under the Williams' regime. As Stone noted of the `windfall developing states': 
"... Countries like Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago where a weak state in the first 
case and poor management of the windfall gains in the second created economic 
crisis and chaos rather than real progress are interesting examples of how windfall 
benefits can hurt rather than help development... " (1991: 99). 
In the case of the impact of structural adjustment and health policy reform in Trinidad in the early 
1990s, there was concern about the possible negative effects of the World Bank-supported health 
decentralisation programme (Phillips (1994: 144). There was the feared impact of regionalisation and 
decentralisation for staff job security and tenure, with the autonomy shifted to the regions and the private 
sector. Phillips noted that the new roles and structure superseded the functioning of the public service 
commissions and was to the disadvantage of the employee. However views like this, while valid, have to be seen 
seen in the context of the status quo prior to reform. One cannot deny the considerably negative effects of 
World Bank and IMF policies on social development in the `third world' (Feder, 1983; Burkett, 1991; 
Caulfield, 1997). However this is a reality that should serve as a reminder the developing state 
governments to act responsibility in the long-term health interests of their citizens, despite that 
fact that it 
was attributable to both international banks and developing states. 
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However, events in developing countries including Commonwealth Caribbean states in the 1990s give 
some cause for concern in this regard, particularly the increasing role of privatisation. In the case of this 
`public-private' mix for health human resources, Frenk (1993) defended it on the grounds that it can 
"correct the imbalances" in the health sector by drawing from the best of both sectors, given public sector 
mismanagement and the contradiction in so many developing states - the co-existence of unserved 
populations with under-utilised human resources. In the Caribbean, privatisation has also been supported 
by some, although this support is still in the minority (Grell, 1993: 3). Jamaica has been ahead in this 
regard with private sector involvement in an investment climate study in that country's health sector. 
However, In terms of the future and the role of privatisation in the 1990s, as Borzutsky has noted (1993: 
255-6) despite the widespread enthusiasm for privatisation generally, as recent demands for national 
health insurance in the USA have indicated, there are definite limits to the role of the private sector in the 
context of declining economic conditions. As she noted: "... some functions will always have to be 
performed by the state. " (1993: 256). She added however that the pressures for "expanding and 
improving... health policies and services are likely to increase as democratisation continues. " (Borzutsky, 
1993: 256). The connection to democratisation as we have seen in the case of Guyana has been a 
welcome one. There is a prevailing sense on the one hand in the region that a good balance will be 
reached, and that adjustment policies and even some privatisation of non-care services, and other reforms 
including better management will strengthen and preserve these health systems in the long run. However, 
there is the prevailing fear of further private sector incursions into the public health sector. The answer to 
this is that private sector has always operated side by side with Caribbean public health systems. This ot to say 
however that the public health system cannot be improved and retained in these small, developing states. 
Aside from economic factors, the most important concern and priority for the rest of the 1990s and 
beyond is an action-oriented one: better planning. One of the key issues as we have noted repeatedly in 
this study is poor information. Even the information available during this course of this study reflect my 
central argument about the role of regime characteristics. The implementation of regular health manpower 
statistics surveys in Jamaica, strongly supported under the Manley regime meant that I was able to access 
reliable data, which though not always detailed and perfect, was reasonably systematic. In the wealthier 
Trinidad by contrast, the poor health planning unit at the health ministry could not supply basic data on 
vacancies by categories of health staff for the period under study which reflected badly on among other 
things, the Williams boom years, and the neglect of the bureaucracy. On the more relevant issue of 
planning for a balanced health manpower work force Abel-Smith (1994: 104) has concluded that: 
"... planning the health professions, the mix of different grades, and where those 
that have been trained will practice are all critical for health service planning. if 
this is all but left to market forces, any health system will become inequitable, 
unnecessarily expensive and unresponsive to health priorities. Moreover, there are 
important international ramifications which can damage the best intentions of 
national planners. The developed countries have a responsibility not to allow their 
own special needs to obstruct health progress in the developing world... " 
Better planning has to be both integrated into other elements of the system and within the common 
health goals of primary health care. Simmonds (1989: 194) has pointed in this regard to the relative 
absence until recently of the integration of management component of human resources development with 
the planning and production elements, and especially the need for better systemic knowledge especially in 
the case of nurses which, she asserted, would uplift their status as managers and better articulators (like 
doctors are) of their problems. Here again, the issue of effective demand in Caribbean states must he 
considered (Cumper, 1993; Anderson, 1995). Ferster and Tilden similarly argue that health human 
resources planning, training and management needs to be synchronised with other human resources "... to 
ensure that demand for people with different levels of education are congruent with their supply, and that 
the plans of one sector are not hampered by those of another... " (1983: 116-117). The importance of cost- 
effectiveness in health then, while not only relevant to developing states, is however even more vital in an 
environment of scarce resources. There exists therefore the need to explore options for `anomalies' where 
for example highly trained professionals such as doctors are used for tasks that could be handled by less 
qualified personnel such as nurses (Abel - Smith 1994: 98-90). Abel Smith noted that the most logical way 
forward was to plan for a "... correct balance of types of available service and trained manpower necessary 
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; Private Sector Organization of Jamaica, (PSOJ), 1990). 
to meet medical needs, geographically distributed on a rational and equitable basis... ". He added that 
excessive and unnecessary medical procedures also constitute a form of economic inefficiency. 
.A number of such problems and dilemmas continued to plague the health human resources situation 
in Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad in the late 1990s (Drayton, 1997: 17). These problems could be traced 
back to both actor-and structure-related factors. Problems such as the fragmentation of training among a 
variety of agencies with little formal channels of coordination among them; the failure to rationalise the 
costs of training for all categories of workers; and in the case of Guyana and Trinidad for example, the 
high costs undertaken by the state to produce doctors under these programmes were symptoms of these 
combined influences in the 1980s. The most obvious symptoms were the high migration levels of 
medical graduates not only from Trinidad and Guyana, but also Jamaica. In the face of the crisis 
situations in the specific context of the 1980s, a transition period was effected as conditions attached to 
structural adjustment held regimes to democratic and sectoral reforms. These `intervening conditions' 
forced regimes to calculate the costs and benefits of policy, sometimes with positive, but at other times 
with questionable consequences for long-term policy. By the late 1990s, however many of these problems 
continued as the costs of structural adjustment continued to limit policy space. Given this situation which 
basically prevailed in most states under adjustment, the general belief was that a greater effort on policy 
calculation based on cost effectiveness and appropriateness, among other things, would be carried out in 
the 1990s. However as Drayton found in the 1990s a number of these issues in the case of health human 
resources remained problematic. These included the failure to estimate and plan for the costs of 
employing health personnel and an estimation of the adequacy of numbers of personnel for national needs. 
The dominance of the medical approach to health, and medical practitioners in health policy, though 
difficult also has to be addressed. Given the concentration in many developing states on curative 
hospital medicine, shortages of resources and facilities for training the different levels of health 
professionals in disease prevention and health promotion activities are also needed in the Commonwealth 
Caribbean. In addition, policies to ensure that efficient and effective promotion of different manpower 
grades for community health work still needs to be formulated and implemented and even though the 
situation has been vastly improved in the mid 1990s, there is still much more that can be done in relation 
to these issues. On the role of medical dominance, the Commonwealth Caribbean simply has to pay much more 
attention to the role of auxiliary personnel and in Trinidad in particular the role of the family nursing 
practitioner as implemented in Jamaica holds many possibilities for the much-neglected community health 
services in that country. As Herbold-Green (1991: 748) has noted, the main danger in terms of this issue 
is of status-quo doctors in developing countries hindering the achievement of the primary health care and 
HFA 2000 initiatives, mainly because of the giving up of power that it entails. As he noted: 
"... the rule is still the medical professional as platonic guardian setting standards 
which - given available resources - necessarily 
limit access, and also treating 
attempted patient, politician or other professional criticism as either ignorant folly 
or 'malpractice'... some medical professionals do believe radical changes are 
needed... in the end however, it is often necessary for politicians to pluck up the 
courage to say (and to act) that health is too important and too complex to be 
left 
totally in the hands of doctors... " 
As long as economic problems persist, migration will remain a problem for small under-resourced 
developing state health systems. At the very least however, it can be stemmed and curbed 
if other 
political and policy-based concerns of `challenging' professions such as nurses are addressed. 
Mass 
emigration rose during late 70s taking advantage of the US immigration 
law which gave professional 
categories including doctors and nurses a good chance of entering the country. 
As Doan has noted, 
starting from the 1970s, changes have taken place globally in relation to 
health human resources 
development. The international migration of health continued from certain countries, drying up the 
human 
resources of their health systems, whereas others faced the threats of sudden 
flows of return migration. 
Doan concluded that the outlook for health human resources policy was not good given the 
imbalance in 
supply and training between developing and developing states as well s structural adjustment: 
"... There is no doubt that the underlying factors are to be found mainly in the 
economic upheaval which has shaken the world since 1973, and especially since 
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1979. In most countries, unemployment has increased, poverty has struck new 
groups, austerity policies have been implemented, and government health 
expenditures have been reduced. Increased malnutrition, famine, and deteriorated 
health conditions have become realities in many countries. The health manpower 
system could not be immune form such turmoil. New trends have emerged, 
challenging some of the conventional ways of thinking wt, hich were "a la mode " in 
the early 1970s. It seems that the prime task today is to build up systems able to 
adjust themselves quickly and safely to changing adverse conditions... " Doan, 
(1987: 106). 
The West Indian Commission noted in their 1992 report that while the entire region had fewer doctors 
and more nurses than Latin America, it nevertheless recorded massive migration of health workers 
especially nurses with their numbers steadily declining in the larger countries such as Guyana, Jamaica 
and Trinidad (West Indian Commission, 1992: 22). The Commission expressed concern at the Seaga 
regime's cutbacks in health staff including nurses and community health aides in the 1980s. There is also 
cause for concern about the role of international financial and non-fmancial institutions as de facto 
policymakers in developing states. In the case of the increased visibility of organisations such as the 
World Bank and USAID, and even UN organisations such as the WHO and UNICEF one critic has 
questioned the increasing level of influence of these organisations in dictating health programmes and 
reforms in developing countries, as the "principles of `equity and `health for all' [become] distorted by the 
ideologies of Western market forces health care... ' (Lob-Leyt, 1990: 86). Buse (1994: 98-99) has pointed 
to the major realignment in global health policy and the now increasingly influential role of the world 
bank in the health sector, and its overwhelming agenda-setting policy role and leverage as lender to 
developing states. The role of national actors, particularly national governments in framing debates, 
according to Buse is critical in this regard. . There was 
however enough cause for optimism in the 
Commonwealth Caribbean as Pastor and Fletcher (1993: 257) noted was the continued faith in the 
democratic process in the region and its promise for future development: 
"... politically and socially, Caribbean hopes have been commendable. The region 
has wanted democracy, independence and stability for its nations and justice and 
equality of opportunity for its citizens. Although the English-speaking Caribbean 
has serious economic and social problems, by and large, it has retained its 
Independence within a democratic framework that has promoted peaceful change. 
This is a remarkable achievement in the developing world... " 
The debate on whether there is a specific third world policy process is answered by Horowitz who 
came to the following conclusion: 
"... On the one hand, it is clear that the systemic frameworks of policy -the 
institutions, participants, resources, the weight of the state relative to the society, 
and the capacity of the state to work its will-all vary between developing and 
Western countries. The same is true for the scope of policy activity , the 
configuration of issues, and the actual content of policy. On the other hand, the 
policy process - the constraints, the ripe moments that produce 
innovation, the 
tendency of policy to have unanticipated consequences, and so on - appears to 
display regularities that transcend the categories of Western or Third World state" 
(1989,197). 
It is an underestimation to say that developing countries - including those 
in Guyana, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and the rest of the Commonwealth Caribbean are faced with difficult challenges 
in their health 
and health human resources policies in the decades ahead. For far too long there 
has been a blinkered. 
softly-softly approach in the literature towards the roles and responsibilities of 
developing states in their 
policy actions, processes and outcomes. While highly justifiable given economic 
developments over the 
last two decades, such a blinkered view does a disservice to those committed governments and 
policymakers who have through their actions made huge improvements to the quality of 
health care within 
their countries. Dependent development theory may be an overriding 
factor given the continued 
globalisation trends. However, state and regime action are still relevant and are still going 
to be shaped 
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and conditioned by a variety of factors, including enlightened self-interest, as in the colonial period. In an 
era of accountability and good governance however, the possibilities for mismanagement and political 
graft, at least in the Commonwealth Caribbean, seem less important than the need to strive for efficiency 
and better management of limited resources. Although there is much to criticise about these institutions in 
the case of health care, one wonders whether efficiency and better management would be on the agenda in 
the first place, one totally relied on the political will of prime ministers and health ministers in developing 
states. This goes back to Reich's (1994) negation of the idea of `political' will as significant. The 
fundamental question then remains, as Reich, Walt (1994) note, not so much one of political will but 
rather the influence of power on process even in `low-politics', yet non-directly-linked `crisis-ridden' 
issues like health policy and policy reform. According to Reich the more important focus should be on: 
"... how governments act as the agents of private interests, how governments act to 
retain power... markets become instruments of political Organisation... and how the 
international political economy impacts on national health policy and health 
conditions... " 
Implications for further research 
Given the limitations of time, money and method that conditioned this study, future research in this 
area to fulfil the other half of grounded theory - the hypothesis-testing element - by examining policy 
processes in other similar, as well as dissimilar developing states is clearly necessary, to compare, even 
corroborate some of the findings. Within the Caribbean region, such studies, for instance, could examine 
and compare the developments in the smaller micro-states; while it could also be applied to the former 
Spanish, French, and Dutch Caribbean countries. Other studies could for instance question whether 
economic factors are more significant by comparing regimes and countries according to economic levels - 
for instance middle-range economies as against low-income economies, which Trinidad and Jamaica, on 
the one hand, and Guyana, on the other, also to some extent symbolise. These are just some general ideas. 
The worthwhile nature therefore, of such studies is that they would contribute to our understanding of both 
diversities and similarities in policymaking experiences across developing states. 
8.3 SUMMARY 
In this dissertation, I have examined the role, influence and relevance of the following regime 
characteristics first used by Bossert (1983) - regime strength, stability, ideology, democracy to which I 
added regime maintenance and survival, given my data findings - on health human resources development 
in the post-colonial state, using three states in the Commonwealth Caribbean, Guyana Jamaica and 
Trinidad and Tobago for my comparative case study. Unlike Bossert's study, my intention was not to test 
any single level or multi level influence of the these characteristics on health human resources policy. 
Rather, I wanted to examine the available evidence for conclusive trends of the existence of such 
influences in these three states between 1970 and 1990. I found evidence for the pervasive influence of 
structural factors - colonial structures, economic political, and socio-cultural factors, as well as 
international factors on policy process. However, like Grindle and Thomas and other researchers 
concerned with the capacity of the developing state to act, I found that ample evidence was available for 
positive, progressive action, negative, regressive action, inaction, limited action, pragmatic policymaking 
based on available choices as well as non-pragmatic decisions that had dire consequences. My main 
finding - if there is one- is that one set of determinants cannot be examined without relation 
it to the other. 
In effect, my basic finding was that to structure-based factors must also be added those national-level 
policy choices (both progressive and regressive) that certain regimes have actively and consciously made 
in the past (and in some cases continue to make), and which are based inter alia on variety of reasons 
ranging from genuine interest to enlightened self-interest to blatant political or regime survival. 
Essentially this is what Giddens' termed structuration. While structural factors, may dominate the policy 
equation, the essential finding of this study is that to ignore actors and their actions at the national level, 
the contexts within which they make decisions within the international context rather than outside the 
international context is to miss the central goal of social inquiry, that is to determine deviation and 
diversity within more generalizable and justifiable theoretical patterns. Structuration-based approaches 
thus offers the developing state policy researcher a fresh, `mixed-scanning' type look at the developing 
state policy process, which is what in the final analysis is needed to move knowledge forward in the policy 
sciences. 
204 
Comparative policy analysis has long been used to examine the influence of regime characteristics on developed state high politics national policy processes, yet its application to low politics issues such as health has been problematic, the most obvious being the pervasive and largely negative influences of 
structural factors. The impasse in development theory in the 1980s and the influence of Giddens' 
structuration or agency-structure theory revealed the need to integrate deterministic explanations of developing state policymaking, with analyses of individual political, economic and socio-cultural 
contexts, dominant actors, their motivations, diversity of experiences, and the resulting potential 
implications for policy action, inaction and limited action within a changing, though still heavily-skewed 
global environment. 
Using an integrated grounded theory-comparative case study methodology, I examined and compared 
the influence of regime characteristics on health human resources policy in the post-colonial state, using 
three Commonwealth Caribbean states: Guyana, Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago as my case studies. I 
used as my framework Bossert's regime characteristics: regime strength, stability, ideology and 
democracy - to which I added the phenomenon of regime survival or maintenance, applied by Migdal, 
Hintzen, Ames and others in the developing state political sciences. My findings like Bossert's 1983 
study of Central American health policy, were similarly complex. At the broadest level, a reasonably 
clear relationship was found between regime ideology, democracy and maintenance and health human 
resources trajectories and outcomes particularly during the 1970s when regimes in each country pursued 
various development paths, some of them radical; and the 1980s, when structural adjustment programmes 
limited action and even undermined policies. 
The most significant findings for development country health policy studies were nevertheless: 1) that 
regime characteristics do invariably affect low-politics policy processes; 2) conversely, that low-politics 
issues such as health can also occasionally become high-politics and crisis-driven to the extent that they 
can in turn affect regime survival under particular and unique confluences of content- and contextual 
factors that go beyond resource scarcity explanations; 3) that structural adjustment policies seriously 
impeded, indeed undermined existing and newly-implemented programmes; and 4) interestingly, that 
while structural adjustment policies were largely and unsurprisingly negative for non-crisis-driven, low- 
politics issues, in one they proved `positive' by returning the issue of political and administrative reform - 
critical to public policy development, and neglected for various reasons, including regime survival - back 
onto the developing state policy agenda of the Caribbean developing state. The evident complexity of 
these findings only underscores the need for developing state health policy analysis to focus more on 
integrated actor-structure-based approaches in order to effectively explain the diversity of low politics 
policy actions and processes and experiences within such states. 
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